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Ius sanguinis a 
matre
Lit.: right of the blood from the mother: a person acquires the 
nationality of the mother at birth or by the establishment of a 
child-mother family relationship.
Ius sanguinis a 
patre
Lit.: right of the blood from the father: a person acquires the 
nationality of the father at birth or by the establishment of a 
child-father family relationship.
Ius soli Lit.:  right  of  the  soil:  a  person  acquires  the nationality of his 
country of birth.
Per se by or in itself; intrinsically
Prima facie Lit.: at first sight
Glossary of Latin terms
A priori Lit.: from the earlier
Ab initio from the beginning
Ad litem Lit.: for this action. Guardian ad litem someone
 chosen by a law court to do something for another person when
 that person is not able to do it him/herself
Conditio sine a necessary condition without which something is not possible 
qua non
De facto factually; in fact
De iure legally
Et al Et alii
Ex lege by operation of the law, automatically
Ex nunc without retroactivity




Inter alia among other things
Ipso iure by the law itself; by operation of the law
Iure sanguinis by ius sanguinis
Iure soli by ius soli
Ius sanguinis Lit.: right of the blood: a person acquires the nationality of a
 parent at birth or by the establishment of child-parent family
 relationship.
Status quo existing state of affairs
Stricto sensu in the restricted sense; in the narrow sense
Supra above
Sui generis Lit.: in a class or group of its own: not like anything else
Vice versa Lit.: in-turned position
 





1. INTRODUCTION            
The aim of this introductory Chapter is threefold. First of all, it aims to provide an 
introduction to the topic of nationality in general and dual nationality in particular. 
After discussing the historical predecessors of nationality, an attempt will be made 
to define the concept of nationality and its functions in international and municipal 
law. Subsequently, the concept of dual nationality will be introduced. It will be argued 
that the attitude of States towards dual nationality has historically developed from 
an expressly negative stance to a more neutral stance. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that dual nationality is nowadays increasingly embraced by emigration States in 
order to retain or re-establish the bond between a State and its diaspora. 
 
Secondly, this Chapter aims to introduce the topic of emigrant nationality by 
reviewing the existing literature on emigrant nationality. Next to that, a framework 
of analysis will be presented that can provide a better understanding of dual 
nationality and emigrant nationality. On the basis of the concept of ‘citizenship 
formations’, it will be argued that the acceptance of dual nationality for emigrant 
populations increases a State’s flexibility in respect of nationality, which can result 
in the emergence of novel utilizations of nationality. It will also be argued that 
nationalities should not solely be studied as isolates, but in conjunction with other 
nationalities within a ‘citizenship constellation’ in order to unravel the interactions 
between those nationalities. 
Thirdly, on the basis of the preceding Sections, this Chapter will present a set of 
research questions that will be answered in the subsequent Chapters as well as the 
scope of the thesis. Lastly, this Chapter will further elaborate on the methodology 
that will be used in the subsequent Chapters. 
2. A VERY SHORT HISTORY OF NATIONALITY 
Nationality is a legal status that establishes a link between a State and the members 
of its population. The universality of nationality is of relatively recent date, as 
historically, there have been many different systems in place for the creation of 
such a link.1 Commonly discussed predecessors of modern nationality are Roman 
and Greek citizenship, although it would be inaccurate to draw a direct line from 
1  Hailbronner, K., “Nationality in public international law and European law”, in: Bauböck, R. et al. (eds.), Acquisition and loss 




these classical forms of citizenship to modern nationality.2 In the Roman Republic 
(509-27 BC), the status civitas was a personal status which was only conferred to a 
number of privileged individuals within the Republic.3 Individuals who possessed 
this status were subjected to Roman law and also possessed political rights, as 
opposed to peregrini (‘foreigners’) who remained subjected to the laws that were in 
place in their territories before Roman conquest.4 Under the Roman Empire (27 
BC-395 AD) the scope of the Roman status civitas widened extensively and also lost 
its focus on political participation, redefining the citizen as a bearer of certain rights 
(i.e. the right to property ownership).5 In addition to that, the status also became 
an instrument for the inclusion of the peripheral areas of the Roman Empire.6 In 
the year 212, the emperor Caracalla granted the status civitas to virtually all persons 
residing in the territory of the Roman Empire.7 Contrary to Roman citizenship, 
the connotation of Greek citizenship has historically differed for each city-state.8 
When it comes to Greek citizenship, scholars have usually focused on Athenian 
citizenship specifically.9 The status played a minor role until the seventh century 
BC, when Athenian citizenship came to play a more important role, predominantly 
as a corollary to the constitutional reforms of the Athenian statesman Solon.10 In 
essence, Athenian citizenship was rooted in a notion of statehood (the polis or 
politeia) and the active participation of a privileged part of the population in its 
political affairs (the demos).11  
 
These early manifestations could arguably be considered as anomalies, as 
throughout history, links between those in power and those subjected to it were 
mostly based on a form of allegiance. Such an allegiance meant that an individual 
was bound as a subject to a sovereign entity.12 In the feudal ages of Europe, the 
allegiance established a bond between a lord and a subject or vazal, which entailed 
that a subject had a feudal obligation of fidelity and obedience towards a lord, who 
was obliged to provide guardianship in return.13 Outside of the system of feudality, 
the concept of allegiance was also of relevance in the monarchical context. Under 
2  Boll, A.M., Multiple nationality and international law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 61. 
3  Mathisen, R. W., “Peregrini, barbari, and cives Romani: Concepts of citizenship and the legal identity of barbarians in the 
later Roman Empire”, The American Historical Review Vol. 111 No. 4, 2006, p. 1013. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Smith, R., “Modern Citizenship”, in: Isin, E F., and Turner, B.S. (eds.), Handbook of citizenship studies. London: Sage Publi-
cations, 2002, p. 106.
6  Ibid.
7  Lavan, M., “The Spread of Roman Citizenship, 14–212 ce: Quantification in the Face of High Uncertainty”, Past and 
Present, Vol. 230 No. 1, 2016, p. 32 ff. 
8  Riesenberg, P. N., Citizenship in the western tradition: Plato to Rousseau, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994, p. 3. 
9  Ibid., p. 6. 
10  Blok, J., Citizenship in classical Athens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 107. 
11  Manville, P., The origins of citizenship in ancient Athens, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 124 ff. 
12  Makarov, A. N., Règles générales du droit de la nationalité. The Hague: Academie de Droit International, 1949, p. 279 ff; Ver-
wilghen, M., Conflits de nationalités: plurinationalité et apatridie, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p. 50 ff. 
13  Verwilghen, M., op. cit. 
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English common law, for example, a person born within the country’s territory 
was deemed to have an ‘indelible allegiance’ with its monarch.14 The term was 
further defined by a decision of the Court of King’s Bench of 1608 which came 
to be known as ‘Calvin’s Case’: “[…] the mutual bond and obligation between 
the King and his subjects, whereby subjects are called his liege subjects, because 
they are bound to obey and serve him; and he is called their liege lord, because 
he should maintain and defend them.” 15 This territorial notion  and the indelible 
nature of the allegiance would remain of influence for the further development of 
nationality law in Anglo-Saxon countries. An example outside of the West is the 
Chinese Empire, where an ‘indissoluble natural allegiance’ between the individual 
and sovereign (the Chinese emperor) established a bond between the emperor and 
his subject.16 Imperial Korea, on the other hand, made use of a system that was 
more similar to modern nationality, as it constructed a bond on the basis of an 
inscription in a family register, which resulted in the imposition of certain rights 
and obligations.17 Another wholly different system can be traced in the 19th century 
Ottoman empire, where the demarcation of the population was based on the 
Islamic concept of ummah, or a global Islamic community. According to Ottoman 
law, any person who converted to Islam fell under its reign, whether they were 
present within its territory or not.18 This system granted different rights to Muslims 
and non-Muslims. In addition to that, a parallel system of individual ‘capitulations’ 
could discretionarily grant a different set of rights and obligations to a particular 
individual.19  
Nevertheless, in practice, local statuses often played a far more important role than 
(weakly developed) country- or empire-wide statuses. Within Europe, ‘citizenship’ 
was often a formal status in a local or urban context, which granted its holder rights, 
duties and privileges.20 In pre-revolutionary France, for example, a person held a 
local status related to a community (bourgeois) as well as a national status related to 
the Sovereign (citoyen).21 This local status was of greater practical importance than 
one’s allegiance to the Crown.
14  Hansen, R. and Weil, P., Dual nationality, social rights and federal citizenship in the US and Europe: the reinvention of citi-
zenship. New York City: Berghahn Books, 2002, p. 182. 
15  Coke, E., The reports of Sir Edward Coke Vol. 4, London: J. Butterworth 1826, p. 2 ff. 
16  Chutung, T., “The Chinese Nationality Law, 1909”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 No. 2, 1910, p. 
404. 
17  Sik, K. S., Nationality and international law in Asian perspective, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, p. 234.
18  Parolin, G. P., Citizenship in the Arab world: kin, religion and nation-state. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009, p. 
74.
19  Ibid., p. 73. 
20  Prak, M., Citizens without Nations: Urban Citizenship in Europe and the World, c. 1000–1789. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018, p. 34. 




This diversity of statuses came to a halt during the course of the 19th and the 20th 
century. From the 19th century onwards, the concept of nationality arose in the 
European States and became the subject of extensive codification. How can this 
rise of nationality, at first in European States and subsequently in non-European 
States, be explained? First and foremost, this was a corollary of the formation of 
a world order of sovereign States, a development that had commenced with the 
ratification of the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648 and was further enhanced 
during the aftermath of the French Revolution.22 In the European context, these 
sovereign States became more and more the principal power constructs, as internal 
divisions (i.e. estates and guilds) were gradually abolished.23 Next to that, the status 
of nationality was given more substance. In post-revolutionary France, civil rights 
were attached to nationality status, which gave nationality a political dimension. All 
in all, the State – as well as one’s link with the State – gained in importance.24 
Secondly, the significance of nationality was bolstered by the rise of nationalism. 
In short, this ideology entailed that statehood should overlap with a community, 
resulting in a so-called ‘nation-state’.25 In more abstract terms, philosopher and 
historian Ernest Renan has argued in his renowned treatise on the subject that a 
nation is developed on the basis of two elements.26 The first element is a collective 
(yet selective) set of memories which affirm the unity of a population, while the 
second element is a will of this population to live together.27 A century later, 
Benedict Anderson defined a nation as an “imagined [emphasis added] political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”, emphasizing 
that most members of a nation might never meet each other in person, but will 
nevertheless imagine themselves to be a community.28 It must be added that a State 
can also have an active role in this process through ‘nation-building’, or at least 
attempt to do so.29 
22  Suter, K., Global order and global disorder: globalization and the nation-state, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003, 
p. 17 ff. It should nevertheless be noted that many other factors gave rise to a world order of sovereign States. See: Caporaso, J. 
A., “Changes in the Westphalian order: Territory, public authority, and sovereignty”, International Studies Review, Vol. 2 No. 2, 
2000; Osiander, A., “Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth,” International organization, Vol. 55 No. 2, 
2001.  
23  Prak, M., Citizens without Nations: Urban Citizenship in Europe and the World, c. 1000–1789. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018, p. 302 ff. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Kohn, H., The Idea Of Nationalism: A Study In Its Origins And Background, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2008, 
p. 19.
26  Renan, E., “What is a nation?” (1882) in: Woolf, S. J. (ed.) Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the present: a reader, London: 
Routledge Press, 1995, p. 57 ff.
27  Ibid.
28  Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, New York City: Verso 
Books, 2006, p. 6. 
29  Strayer, J., “The historical experience of nation-building in Europe”, in: Deutsch, K. W. and William J. (eds.), Nation buil-
ding in comparative contexts, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1966; Bendix, R. Nation-building and citizenship: Studies of our 
changing social order, New York: Wiley Publishing, 1964. 
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Thirdly, the rise of nationality was reinforced by intensifying international relations 
and by a corresponding development of international law in particular. The grant 
of nationality resulted in a legitimate claim over a State’s population, recognized 
under international (customary) law. Therefore, nationality did not only have an 
internal effect, but also came to impose duties on States in relation to other States.30 
Examples of such duties are the duty to recognition of another State’s right to 
exercise diplomatic protection and the duty of a State to readmit its own nationals 
to its territory.31  
 
In 1948, the Declaration of Human Rights was promulgated, constituting in its 
fifteenth article that every human being has a right to a nationality. Nowadays, 
nationality is used universally for the establishment of a link between States and 
individuals.32
3. DEFINING NATIONALITY
A confusing feature of the English word ‘nationality’ is that it has two distinct 
meanings, as the term refers to the bond between an individual and a State as well 
as the bond between an individual and a nation.33 The bond between individual and 
State is called the legal nationality (nationalité de droit), while the bond between 
individual and nation is called factual nationality (nationalité de fait).34 ‘Nationality’ 
is often used interchangeably with the term ‘citizenship’, although the latter refers 
more to a political dimension or membership in a political community. Citizenship 
is therefore perceived as an internal status referring to the possession of political 
rights within a particular State.35 
30  Henkin, L., International law: politics, values and functions: general course on public international law, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 35 ff. 
31  Weis, P., Nationality and statelessness in international law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff Publishers, 1979, p. 32 
ff. 
32  It is important to note that nationality is not the only way to link a State to an individual. Domicile, for example, can also 
link non-national residents to a State and result in having certain rights and obligations. Next to that, rights and obligations can 
be derived from personhood rather than territorial links or nationality. McMurray therefore stated in his 1918 journal article that 
“it is to-day in our legal system the rare exception when one’s citizenship or allegiance have anything to do with his civil rights”. 
McMurray, O. K., “Inter-Citizenship: A Basis for World Peace”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27 No. 3, 1918, p. 301 ff. Neverthe-
less, nationality has remained the primary link between an individual and a State. 
33  It is noted that not all languages do not have the described defect; in German, for example, a difference is made between 
Staatsangehörigkeit (legal nationality) and Nationalität (factual nationality). See also: <http://globalcit.eu/glossary_citizenship_na-
tionality/>.
34  Batiffol, H. and Lagarde, P., Traité de droit international privé, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1993, p. 
93 ff. 
35  Bauböck defines the citizen as a member in a self-governing political community. See: Bauböck, R., “Stakeholder citizen-
ship and transnational political participation: a normative evaluation of external voting.” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 75, 2006, p. 
2393. In more classical scholarly works, the difference between nationality and citizenship is also emphasized. See: Valéry, J., Ma-
nuel de droit international privé, Paris: Fontemoing, 1914, p. 125. Koessler states that citizenship refers to the ability to exercise 
the highest political duties, which is illustrated by French law, where the status of citoyen was originally distinguished from the 
lower status of Frenchmen. Becoming a citoyen was possible through the procedure of grande naturalization while becoming a 
Frenchmen was possible through petite naturalization. See: Koessler, M., ““Subject”, Citizen”, “National” and “Permanent Alle-





As stated before, nationality is a link between a State and an individual.  However, 
the exact nature of this link has been the subject of a legal-theoretical debate. Firstly, 
the link between a national and a State can be defined as a bond. A small number 
of authors perceives this bond as a contract, in the French literature referred to as 
rapport or rapport juridique. 36 This sits uneasily with the fact that contracts are usually 
based on consensuality, an element that is often lacking in this case as nationality is 
most commonly acquired at birth. For that reason, the term is more often used as 
a metaphor for ‘the social contract’.37 However, the link can also be described as a 
bond sui generis, or a bond of its own kind. This bond sui generis is then described in 
general wordings as a ‘lien juridique’ or ‘lien politique’.38 This bond has a vertical- as 
well as a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension establishes a bond between 
the individual and the State, while the horizontal dimension establishes a bond 
among the citizenry. Secondly, the link can also be defined as a status. Ko Swan 
Sik, for example, defines nationality as the internal and international status of an 
individual, which serves to define that a person belongs to a certain state.39 
The main difference between the two viewpoints is that the first view is based 
on a communitarian vision which puts an emphasis on the bond between State 
and individual, while the latter view is more individualistic in nature.40 Makarov 
proposed to combine these two perceptions of nationality. He suggests that by 
establishing a bond of nationality between individual and state, the individual 
receives the status of national.41 Thereby, Makarov includes both the reciprocal 
element of nationality as well as the fact that nationality provides an individual 
a certain legal status. All in all, it can be concluded that nationality can be more 
precisely defined as a bond between a State and an individual, constituting the 
status of national of a certain State. 
Thirdly, nationality can also be perceived as a form of membership from a right-
based approach. Spiro, for example, states that a reconceptualization of nationality 
is necessary in order to move away from traditional, sovereignty-oriented 
approaches.42 According to Spiro, scholars frame nationality more and more in 
36  See for example: Valéry, J., Manuel de droit international privé, Paris: Fontemoing, 1914, p. 125.
37  See for example: Weiss, A., Traité théorique et pratique de droit international privé, tome 1, Paris: Larose & Forcel, 1892, p. 
12. 
38  Verwilghen, M., Conflits de nationalités: plurinationalité et apatridie, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p. 72 ff. 
39  Sik, K.S., Nationality and international law in Asian perspective, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, p. 7
40  Brøndsted Sejersen, T., “ ‘I vow to thee my countries’ ‘the expansion of dual citizenship in the 21st century”, International 
Migration Review, Vol. 42 No. 3, 2008, p. 526
41  Makarov, A. N., Règles générales du droit de la nationalité, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1949, p. 281 ff. 
42  Spiro, P. J. “A new international law of citizenship”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 105 No. 4, 2011, p. 694.
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an individual rights-context. He argues that traditionally, international law only 
defined who could not be included as a national, while nowadays, nationality is 
more and more defining who must be included as a national. Spiro warns, however, 
that these developments are “provisional, fragile and unstable”.43
4. THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nationality has two primary functions. Firstly, as discussed above, nationality 
delimits the permanent population of a certain State, in the same way that borders 
delimit the territory of a certain State. Brubaker has therefore described the role of 
nationality as “an international filing system, a mechanism for allocating persons 
to States”.44 Secondly, once a link between a State and an individual is established, 
the status of nationality can be used as a starting point for allocating rights and 
duties. From a sociological perspective, Marshall has famously identified three 
core elements of nationality, namely the civil, the political and the social.45 Even 
though such common elements can indeed be identified, nationality remains in 
principle an empty concept; it does not inherently entail certain rights and duties 
in itself. Hence Koessler states that nationality is “[…] a formal frame, surrounding 
a picture of changeable character”.46 However, rights and duties can be connected 
to nationality. This is why De Groot refers to nationality as a Koppelungsbegriff47, 
or a concept that connects two entities with one another. Historically, nationality 
has played a crucial role in the field of municipal private law. For example, the 
French Civil Code used to make a distinction between nationals and foreigners, 
who could therefore not inherit property.48 Nowadays, this distinction within the 
realm of private law has in most States been abolished.49 Nevertheless, in a number 
of (mainly non-Western) States, rights within the realm of private law (e.g. land 
ownership) still remain restricted to nationals.50 
In municipal public law, nationality has traditionally served as a lead for military 
43  Ibid., p. 719.
44  Brubaker, R., Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 31. 
45  Marshal, T.H., Citizenship and Social Class and other essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 10 ff. 
46  Koessler, M., “Subject”, Citizen”, “National” and “Permanent Allegiance”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 56 No. 1, 1946, p. 
58
47  De Groot, G.R., Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel: eine rechtsvergleichende Studie uber Erwerbs- und Verlustgrunde 
der Staatsangehörigkeit, Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1989, p. 13. 
48  Weil, P., How to be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 49 ff. It must be 
noted that citizenship status already had this role in pre-revolutionary France. See: Prak, M. Citizens without Nations: Urban Citi-
zenship in Europe and the World, c. 1000–1789, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 33. 
49  De Groot, G.R. and Vonk, O., International Standards on Nationality Laws: Text, Cases and Materials, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2016, p. 18. 
50  See for an overview of such restrictions: Hathaway, J. C. The rights of refugees under international law, Cambridge: Cam-




conscription (see par. 2.1.1).51 Leaving this aspect aside, nationality still plays a 
crucial role in municipal public law for two reasons. Firstly, active and passive 
political rights are in principle allocated on the basis of nationality status.52 
Therefore, nationality constitutes a country’s demos. Secondly, nationality is also 
the primary allocator of residence- and mobility rights.53 The political dimension 
of nationality has been extensively studied by scholars; the term ‘citizenship’ has 
almost become a synonym for this political connotation. However, the latter aspect 
has received much less scholarly attention, even though it is arguably the most 
profound effect that nationality has in this day and age. 
In principle, matters related to nationality fall under the scope of a State’s sovereignty 
(or the ‘reserved domain’) and the influence of international law on the content of 
nationality has therefore traditionally been limited.54 The most important limitation 
that international customary law imposes on States is the obligation to – as a 
corollary of State sovereignty – respect another State’s autonomy when it comes 
to nationality matters.55 Next to that, other human rights obligations can indirectly 
impose limitations on a State’s sovereignty, such as the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality and the prohibition of racial discrimination in nationality 
legislation.56 However, whether States are obliged to recognize a nationality for 
international purposes is a different matter. A report of the International Law 
Commission states that nationalities acquired upon certain problematic grounds 
do not necessarily have to be recognized by other States for the purposes of 
international law.57 When it comes to multilateral treaties, significant progress has 
been made from the second half of the 20th century onwards, in particular regarding 
the reduction of statelessness, gender equality and children’s rights.58 
Regarding dual nationals, a traditional rule is that a State cannot invoke its 
right to diplomatic protection against another State of which that particular 
51  De Groot, G.R., Vonk, O., International Standards on Nationality Laws: Text, Cases and Materials, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2016, p. 19. 
52  Nevertheless, non-citizen voter rights are increasingly common. See for an overview of electoral law provisions in 51 States: 
Globalcit, “Conditions for Electoral Rights 2017” via <http://globalcit.eu>.
53  Hailbronner, K., “Nationality in public international law and European law”, in: Bauböck, R. et al. (eds.), Acquisition and 
loss of nationality: Policies and trends in 15 European states, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 78. 
54  International Court of Justice, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco [advisory opinion], PCIJ Series B No. 4 
(1923) par. 40. 
55  Randelzhofer, A., “Nationality.” Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (EPIL), p. 417. 
56  UNHCR, Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation 
of Nationality (“Tunis Conclusions”), 2014 via <http://www.refworld.org/>; Hoffmann, R., “denaturalization and forced exile”, 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (EPIL), par. 17. 
57  International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth ses-
sion, Official Records, Fifty-seventh session, Supplement no.10, A/57/10, New York: United Nations, 2002, 174 ff. 
58  See: Convention relating to the status of stateless persons (1954), Convention on the reduction of statelessness (1961), In-
ternational Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discriminations (1966), International convention on civil and po-
litical rights (1966), International convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination of women (1979), the European 
convention on the rights of the child (1989) and the European convention on nationality (1997). 
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person is a national. However, it is nowadays increasingly accepted that a State 
may invoke its right to diplomatic protection if its nationality is considered the 
dominant nationality.59 Next to that, the International Court of Justice has ruled 
in its Nottebohm judgement that a State is not necessarily obliged to recognize a 
nationality for the purposes of diplomatic protection if there is no “genuine link” 
between the national and the State.60 However, the Nottebohm judgement has been 
subject to criticism and there is general consensus on its limited scope.61 
In private international law, nationality has traditionally played an important 
role. The moment that ‘a foreign element’ is brought into a case, it must first 
be determined under which jurisdiction the respective case falls. Therefore, a 
connecting factor between an individual and a jurisdiction must be found. In cases 
that are connected to several jurisdictions, nationality could serve as a determinant 
of the relevant jurisdiction.  However, domicile or the place of habitual residence 
can also be used as a determinant in such cases as a determinant of the relevant 
jurisdiction.62 Jessurun d’Oliveira states that the usage of nationality as a connecting 
factor  was propagated by the ‘romantic school’ in private international law due to 
their emphasis on the importance of the nation-state.63
5. DUAL NATIONALITY
Dual nationality or multiple nationality entails that an individual is considered 
as a national by more than one State.64 As stated earlier, States are in principle 
sovereign when it comes to the allocation of their nationality and as long as 
interstate coordination over the exercise of this right remains limited, it is inevitable 
59  Hailbronner, K., “Rights and duties of dual nationals: changing concepts and attitudes”, in: Martin, D. and Hailbronner, K. 
(eds.), rights and duties of dual nationals: evolutions and prospects, The Hague: Kluwer, 2002, p. 22. 
60  Nottebohm Case (second phase), April 6, 1955, International Court of Justice Reports 1955, p. 4.
61  Following the 1958 Flegenheimer case of the United States-Italian Conciliation Commission, it is generally accepted that a 
‘genuine link’-test should exclusively be applied to multiple nationals, as mononationals might otherwise find themselves with-
out any effective nationality. See Flegenheimer Case, September 20, 1958 Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, Inter-
national Law Reports 1958. Weis states that the “genuine link”-criterion cannot be generalized and that the circumstances of the 
Nottebohm case where highly exceptional. See: Weis, P., Nationality and statelessness in international law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Si-
jthoff & Noordhoff Publishers, 1979, p. 180. Others scholars claim that the “genuine link”-criterion can no longer be applied at 
all in the realm of international law. See: Sloane, R. D., “Breaking the genuine link: The contemporary international legal regula-
tion of nationality”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.  50, 2009.
62  Nationality is a more stable status than domicile, which is considered an advantage. Another advantage is that it is easier to 
establish the nationality of an individual than his or her domicile. After all, nationality is based on a formal act of a State, while 
domicile is based on the practice of an individual. A disadvantage is that nationality can connect an individual to a jurisdiction in 
which he or she does not reside. North summarizes this dilemma perfectly by stating that “[…] nationality yields predictable but 
frequently inappropriate law and that domicile yields an appropriate but frequently unpredictable law” See: Cheshire, C., North, 
M.N. and Fawcett J.J. Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 13th edition, London: Butterworths 1999, p. 161. For a tra-
ditional, but nevertheless topical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the nationality principle as well as the domicile 
principle, see: Raape, L., Internationales Privatrecht, Berlin: Verlag Frans Vahlen, 1955, p. 49 ff.
63  Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U., “Once again: plural nationality”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 25 
No. 1, 2018, p. 26 ff. 
64  Strictly speaking, ‘dual nationality’ refers to the possession of two nationalities, while ‘multiple nationality’ refers to the pos-









Dual nationality arises primarily as a corollary of naturalization if the acquisition 
of another nationality did not lead to the loss of nationality in the State of origin. 
Historically, immigration States often facilitated naturalization of newly arrived 
individuals in order to expand their populations. The Argentinian Constitutional 
Reform of 1860, for example, allowed persons to naturalize after two years of 
residence.66 In Mexico, foreigners would obtain nationality automatically upon the 
acquisition of real estate67, while Brazil granted nationality to all persons resident 
in the country on the day it gained independence (or 15 November 1889)68. While 
some European States would release these persons of their nationality of origin, 
others adhered to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, which made it impossible 
for these nationals to renounce their original nationality.69 
Dual nationality can also arise at birth. First of all, dual nationality arises when 
the nationality of the parents is transferred to the child iure sanguinis and the child 
also obtains the nationality of the State where it is born (iure soli). The principle 
of ius soli has feudal roots and was therefore predominantly used by Anglo-Saxon 
States.70 Next to that, virtually all States in the Americas facilitate the acquisition of 
nationality (unconditional or near-unconditional) iure soli in order to incorporate 
the offspring of emigrants. In the South-American context, also inclusion of 
indigenous populations played a role in this regard.71 These provisions are often 
still in existence today.72 Secondly, in case the parents of a child have different 
nationalities, it is very well possible that both nationalities are transferred to their 
offspring.73 
Historically, dual nationality has been perceived as a problematic and controversial 
65  Spiro, P., “Multiple nationality”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, par. 5. 
66  Art. 20 Constitution of 1853 including the reforms of 25 September of 1860. See also: Cook-Martín, D. The scramble for 
citizens: Dual nationality and state competition for immigrants, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013, p. 43. 
67  Art. 1 par. 10 Decree of 28 May 1886 (Decreto de 28 de mayo de 1886).  
68  Art. 1 Decree of 15 December 1889 (Decreto Nº 58-a de 14 de Dezembro de 1889). 
69  Lawrence, T. J., The principles of international law, Boston: D.C. Heath & Co. Publishers 1900, p. 194. 
70  Rosenfeld, M.and Sajó, A., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012, p. 1006. 
71  Acosta, D., The National versus the Foreigner in South America: 200 Years of Migration and Citizenship Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 36. 
72  Globalcit, Global database on modes of acquisition of citizenship via <http://globalcit.eu/acquisition-citizenship/>.  
73  This occurs if both parents can pass on their nationality to their offspring iure sanguinis simultaneously. See also: Baty, Th., 
“La double nationalité est-elle possible”, Revue de Droit International et Legislation Comparée, Vol. 7, 1926, p. 624 ff.
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that persons can simultaneously be a national of several States. Dual nationality
is in principle caused by the fact that people cross the borders that were supposed
to neatly delineate them in national groups. Therefore, it only became an issue of
concern for States in the course of the 19 th century, when industrialization and
novel ways of transportation had made migration streams more substantial. 65
issue. Contemporary scholarly works regularly blame this perception on a historical 
‘emotional’ aversion of dual nationality.74 Many works on dual nationality refer 
to a quotation that is often ascribed to the American diplomat George Bancroft: 
“one would as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries”.75 
By comparing dual nationality to polygamy, the quote seems to present dual 
nationality as an immorality. However, below this surface, concerns about dual 
nationality were often of a more practical nature. Bancroft, for example, has indeed 
made the abovementioned statement, but did so in a fierce plead for the right of 
expatriation.76 The advancement of this right was of great practical concern for 
the United States, as the United States were constantly confronted with conflicting 
claims on their nationals. 
Over the course of two centuries, the attitude of States towards dual nationality 
has further evolved. Spiro has divided this evolution in three subsequent periods, 
starting with an outspokenly negative approach to dual nationality and then 
passing on to a more neutral approach. Currently, in a number of States, one can 
even perceive an embrace of dual nationality (See par. 3). Clearly, an attempt 
to divide the global development of nationality law in three successive ‘eras’ is a 
simplification. Instead, these developments are fluid processes and also differ from 
State to State. States might show ‘mixed attitudes’ towards dual nationality instead 
of a clear overall ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ attitude. Nevertheless, it provides a useful 
paradigm for discussing the drawbacks and benefits of dual nationality acceptance. 
5.1 A negative attitude to dual nationality
5.1.1 Sovereignty, unstable State relations and military service
One of the most discussed problems in the regard of dual nationality is the obligation 
to perform military service.77 Whether an individual has the obligation to fulfil 
military service in a certain State is in principle dependent on one’s nationality. 
In the case of dual nationality, problems can arise for the individual as well as 
the State, as the individual might have to fulfil military obligations in two States, 
while the State might regard participation of its nationals in another State’s army 
74  See for example Spiro, P. J., At home in two countries: The past and future of dual citizenship, New York City: New York Uni-
versity Press, 2016, p. 23. 
75  For example, Spiro states the statement indicated that “dual nationality was still draped in a heavy mantle of moral con-
demnation”. See: Spiro, P. J., “Embracing dual nationality”, in: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds.), Dual Nationality, Social Rights and 
Federal Citizenship in the US and Europe: The Reinvention of Citizenship, New York City: Berghahn Books, 2002, p. 24. De Hart 
states that the metaphor “deprives dual nationality of the required emotion of good citizenship” (“[…] dubbele nationaliteit de 
vereiste emotie voor goed burgerschap wordt ontzegd”). See De Hart, B., Een tweede paspoort: dubbele nationaliteit in de Verenigde Sta-
ten, Duitsland en Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, p. 118.
76  Letter from Bancroft to Buchanan, January 12, 1849, British and Foreign State Papers Vol. 53, London: William Ridgway 
1868. 
77  Karamanoukian, A., “La double nationalité et le service militaire”, in: The Hague Yearbook of International Law: Vol. 4, 




as undesirable. Especially if interstate relationships are unstable, colliding military 
claims on dual nationals can be regarded as problematic. For example, in 1812, 
the British enforcement of conscription duties on American-British dual nationals 
sparked a military conflict between the United States and the United Kingdom.78 
Initially, States aimed to solve these problems by concluding bilateral treaties on 
the topic of military service for dual nationals.79 From 1868 onwards, the United 
States concluded such bilateral treaties with 25 States.80 These treaties established 
that nationals of one of the States who had naturalized in the other State and had 
resided there uninterruptedly for at least five years, would solely be regarded as a 
national of that other State. However, upon permanent return, that person could 
be enabled to resume his nationality of origin and renounce the newly acquired 
nationality. In some of the treaties, it is assumed that a person has permanently 
returned after a certain period of residence in the country of origin, which led to 
implicit renunciation of nationality.81 Importantly, the treaties limited the liability 
of naturalized nationals for not performing military service in the State of origin, 
aiming to end the plight of American nationals who were prosecuted in European 
States for not performing their military duty.82 The treaties were considered to be 
of historical importance, as they forced States to move away from the doctrine of 
perpetual allegiance.83 However, in the second half of the twentieth century, views on 
dual nationality gradually began to chance, and in 1980, the Carter administration 
eventually terminated most of the treaties.84 The last remaining treaty – between 
the United States and Bulgaria – was terminated by the Obama administration.85 
The problems around military conscription and multiple nationality have declined 
over the course the past decennia, as military conscription duties is in decline. 
Currently, around one-third of all States still have a (partial) system of military 
conscription in place.86
The first multilateral convention that addressed issues of nationality law was the 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 
of 1930. The preamble of the convention stated that it recognized the ideal of 
78  Spiro, P. J., At home in two countries: The past and future of dual citizenship. New York City: New York University Press, 2016, 
p. 14. 
79  Ibid.  
80  Boll, A. M., Multiple nationality and international law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 185. 
81  Herzog, B. and Román, E., Revoking Citizenship: Expatriation in America from the Colonial Era to the War on Terror, 
New York: New York University Press, 2015, p. 57. 
82  Spiro, P. J., At home in two countries: The past and future of dual citizenship. New York: New York University Press, 2016, p. 58 
ff. 
83  DeWolfe, H. and Mark, A., The life and letters of George Bancroft, New York: Charles Scribner, 1908, p. 257. 
84  Herzog, B. and Román, E., Revoking Citizenship: Expatriation in America from the Colonial Era to the War on Terror, 
New York: New York University Press, 2015, p. 58. 
85  United States Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United 
States in Force on January 1, 2016 via <https://www.state.gov>. 
86  Central Intelligence Agency, “compulsory military service” via <https://www.cia.gov/>. 
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“the abolition of all cases both of statelessness and double nationality”. However, 
the provisions of the treaty did little to realize that ideal. The first Chapter of the 
Convention contains a set of general principles, which mainly confirm the autonomy 
of States when it comes to nationality matters. Regarding multiple nationality, the 
main contribution is Article 6 of the Convention, which states that a person who 
involuntarily acquired two nationalities may renounce one of the nationalities, 
which could reduce cases of unwanted multiple nationality.  Virtually all other 
provisions of the Convention see on the prevention of statelessness.  
 
Importantly, the Treaty was complemented by the Protocol relating to Military 
Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality of 1930. The Protocol aimed 
to reduce conflicting military obligations of persons with more than one nationality. 
The first Article of the Protocol stated that such a person would only have to fulfil 
military obligations in the country where he habitually resides, as long as he holds 
the nationality of that country and is in fact most closely connected with that 
particular country. 
A more significant, albeit only regional step followed in 1963, namely the 
Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military 
Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality. The most important provisions can 
be found in the first Chapter of the Convention. Art. 1 par. 1 of the Convention 
states that nationals of full age of one of the contracting States who acquire the 
nationality of another contracting State by naturalization, option or recovery shall 
lose their former nationality. The second Article of the Convention establishes that, 
under certain conditions the nationals of the contracting States have the right to 
renounce their nationality. The Second Chapter of the Convention sees on military 
obligations of dual nationals. Art. 5 par. 1 of the Convention states that those who 
hold the nationalities of two or more contracting States only have to fulfil their 
military obligations in one of the States. Article 6 of the Convention establishes – in 
short – that such a person shall in principle perform his military obligations in the 
State where he ordinarily resides or in the State of his choice. 
The Convention was initially ratified by thirteen States, three of which (Ireland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom) only ratified the Second Chapter on military 
obligations.87 At present, there are only three contracting States left for the first 
Chapter on the reduction of cases of multiple nationality, namely Austria, the 
87  The contracting States were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 




Netherlands and Norway. However, as Norway has adopted a bill for toleration of 
multiple nationality in 2018, it has denounced the first Chapter of the Convention 
from 19 December 2018 onwards.88 
5.1.2 Loyalty, nations and nationalism 
Historically, the notion of national loyalty arose concomitantly with centralized 
sovereign States, where this notion was often personified as an allegiance to a 
sovereign ruler.89  Kohn states that this began to change in post-revolutionary Britain, 
United States and France, where national loyalty gained a political dimension in 
order to turn a population into a cohesive demos.90 Only in the late nineteenth 
century, national loyalty was increasingly linked to romantic nationalism.91 The 
concept of romantic nationalism entails that cultural and social life is essentially 
formed by a nation and is the expression of a Volksgeist or national character.92 In 
particular with the rise of romantic nationalism, nationality became intertwined 
with identity and belonging and became to be perceived as one’s “supreme 
loyalty”.93 As one could not be loyal to two ‘motherlands’, dual nationality was 
severely criticized and perceived as an anomaly.94 This line of argumentation does 
no longer play a major role in the scholarly literature.95 It is nevertheless still present 
in the political sphere.96 It has been argued that such concerns of a ‘lack of national 
loyalty’ are often based on different concerns, for example the challenges around 
the integration processes of guestworker immigrants.  
5.1.3 Diplomatic protection 
Under customary international law, a State has the right to exercise diplomatic 
protection if an internationally wrongful act has been inflicted on one of its 
nationals.97 For dual nationals, diplomatic protection can in principle be provided 
88  Declaration contained in a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, dated 14 December 2018, registered at 
the Secretariat General on 18 December 2018, via <https://www.coe.int/>. See also: Amendments of the Nationality Law Pro-
posal 111 L (2017-2018. Original title: Endringer i statsborgerloven Proposisjon 111 L (2017-2018); Decision on the Amendments 
of the Nationality Law, Legislative Decree 17 (2018-2019). Original title: Vedtak til lov om endringer i statsborgerloven, Lovvedtak 
17 (2018–2019). In the overview provided in the second Chapter of this dissertation, these amendments have not been taken into 
account as they took place after the reference date of 1 January 2018. 
89  Franck, T. M., “Clan and superclan: Loyalty, identity and community in law and practice”, American Journal of Internation-
al Law, Vol. 90 No. 3, 1996, p. 371. 
90  Kohn, H., (1944) The ideal of nationalism: A study in its origins and background, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 
2008, p. 4. 
91  Franck, T. M., “Clan and superclan: Loyalty, identity and community in law and practice”, American Journal of Internation-
al Law, Vol. 90 No. 3, 1996, p. 374. 
92  Guibernau, M., Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, 
p. 55. 
93  Kohn, H., (1944) The ideal of nationalism: A study in its origins and background, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 
2008, p. 16. 
94  Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: A study on changing norms in public and private international law and 
in the municipal laws of four EU member states, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 58 ff. 
95  See for a notable exception: Schuck, P.H., “Plural Citizenships”, in: Pickus, N.J.M. Immigration and Citizenship in the Twen-
ty-First Century, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 1998, p. 149 ff. 
96  An example would be former Dutch Junior Minister Rita Verdonk, who referred to Dutch nationality as ‘the first prize’. 
Thereby, she argued that allowing dual nationality would not do justice to its value. See: De Hart, B. Een tweede paspoort: Dubbele 
nationaliteit in de Verenigde Staten, Duitsland en Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, p. 169. 
97  International Law Commission, Report of the 56th Session, A/59/10, General Assembly, Official Records, Supplement No. 
10, 2004, p. 25 ff.
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by two States. According to Mcgarvey, such situations of ‘dual protection’ were 
regarded as an undesirable phenomenon.98 There are two scenarios in which dual 
nationality can lead to problematic situations in this regard. Firstly, a State might 
want to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person vis-à-vis another State 
whose nationality that person also possesses. In order to evade the occurrence of 
such a conflict, a traditional rule of international customary law stipulates that 
no protection over a dual national can be claimed against the State of which that 
person is also a national.99 However, there is no consensus among legal scholar on 
the extent to which this rule still applies today.100 Instead, the principle ‘dominant 
nationality’ is increasingly gaining ground, which entails that the nationality of 
the State with which a person has the most ties is prioritized.101 Secondly, it is 
also possible that neither of the States might want to offer protection, shifting the 
responsibility for protection to the other State.102 There does not seem to be clear-
cut solution for this problem, as diplomatic protection remains a discretionary 
competence of a State rather than an individual right.
5.1.4 Political participation 
A problem of more recent date is that of dual political participation. The scope 
and extent to which States allow dual political participation is determined on 
the national level and differs from State to State. An often-mentioned argument 
against external voting rights is that the participation of dual nationals is unfair 
as they are able to vote in two polities. Fonte, for example, refers to dual nationals 
as ‘civic bigamists’.103 He also states that dual political participation might lead 
to divided loyalties and could hinder integration.104 When it comes to of passive 
suffrage (or standing for election), dual nationality has led to concerns about 
State loyalty and security, which has urged several States to enact provisions that 
restrict dual nationals from taking up certain political positions.105   
98  McGarvey-Rosendahl, P., “A new approach to dual nationality”, Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, 1985, p. 
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99  See Art. 4 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law of 1930. The general prin-
ciples codified by the Convention are considered to be part of international customary law. See also: de Groot, G.R. and Vonk, 
O., International Standards on Nationality Laws: Text, Cases and Materials, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2016, p. 21 ff.  
100  Forcese, C., “The capacity to protect: diplomatic protection of dual nationals in the ‘war on terror’”, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 17 No. 2, 2006; Klein, P., “Protection Diplomatique des Doubles Nationaux: Reconsideration des Fonde-
ments de la Regle de Non-Responsabilite”, Revue Belge de Droit International, Vol. 21, 1988. 
101  Dugard, J., First report on diplomatic protection, International Law Commission, 2000, p. 42; Hailbronner, K. “National-
ity in public international law and European law”, in: Bauböck, R. et al. (eds.), Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and 
trends in 15 European states, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 75. 
102  Russell, F., Dual nationality: some bizarre results, International Lawyer, Vol. 4 No. 4, 1970, p. 758. 
103  Fonte, J., Dual allegiance: A challenge to immigration reform and patriotic assimilation, Washington D.C.: Center for Im-
migration Studies, 2005, p. 14. 
104  Ibid. 
105  An example is Art. 44 par. 1 of the Australian Constitution, which states that a person who is “[…] a subject or a citizen 
or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign power […] shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting 
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5.2 A neutral attitude to dual nationality 
In the second half of the twentieth century, several factors resulted in the adoption 
of a more neutral stance on dual nationality. This acceptance of dual nationality 
could mostly be regarded as a ‘collateral effect’ of other developments. 
5.2.1 Gender equality
Historically, nationality legislation often included discriminatory provisions 
towards women. Firstly, many States provided that a female national would lose her 
nationality upon marriage with a non-national.106 Secondly, a child would in principle 
obtain the nationality of the father. Only under exceptional circumstances would 
the child obtain the nationality of the mother.107 Once gender equality had become 
an important topic of concern, more and more States abolished such provisions.108 
A milestone in this regard was the Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women of 1957, the first article of which states that neither the celebration nor the 
dissolution of a marriage between a contracting State’s national and an alien shall 
automatically affect the wife’s nationality. The article also states that a husband’s 
change of a nationality shall not automatically affect the nationality of the wife of 
that national. In addition to that, the second article of the convention states that 
neither a person’s voluntary acquisition of another nationality nor the renunciation 
of a nationality shall automatically affect the nationality of that person’s wife. A 
second milestone was the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women of 1979. Article 9 of this convention states that 
women shall be granted equal rights to acquire, change or retain their nationality as 
well as equal rights to transfer their nationality to their children.  As a result, women 
could retain their nationality upon marriage and pass their nationality on to their 
offspring. A corollary of the introduction of gender equality in nationality law was 
therefore that it greatly increased the prevalence of dual nationality.109 
5.2.2 The international dimension: migration, stabilization of State 
relations and EU citizenship
It has been estimated that the number of dual nationals has steeply increased 
because of increased migration rates.110  This development is reinforced by the 
Three problems and a solution”, Alternative Law Journal, Vol. 43 No. 2, 2018, pp. 73-80. 
106  Boll, A.M., Multiple nationality and international law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 243. 
107  Vink, M. P., and De Groot, G.R., “Citizenship attribution in Western Europe: International framework and domestic 
trends”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 36 No. 5, 2010, p. 716. 
108  Ibid. See also: Faist, T., “The fixed and porous boundaries of dual citizenship”, in: Faist, T., Dual citizenship in Europe: 
From nationhood to societal integration, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007, p. 14; Kivisto, P., and Faist, T., Beyond a border: 
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sterdam University Press, 2006, p. 337; Faist, T., op. cit., p. 14; Kivisto, P., and Faist, T., op. cit., p. 239. 
110  Martin, D., “The trend towards dual nationality”, in: Martin, D. and Hailbronner, K. (eds.), Rights and duties of dual na-
tionals, The Hague: Kluwer, 2003, p. 5; Legomsky, S., “Dual nationality and military service: strategy number two”, in: Martin, 
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fact that emigrants are often enabled to transfer their nationality of origin to 
their descendants, which entails that cross-border movements can result in dual 
nationality status for multiple generations. It has become clear that this rise of 
dual nationality is hard to curtail; reducing the prevalence of dual nationality as 
a result of cross-border movements would only be possible through international 
coordination of nationality law and such coordination is still not present today. 
As a result, States might accept the ‘new reality’ of dual nationality rather than 
attempt to reduce the number of dual nationals at a very high cost.   
In the post WWII era, the advancement of international law and democratization 
led to a further stabilization of interstate relations and interstate tensions were 
gradually further diminished. As potential interstate conflicts decreased, dual 
nationality became a less contentious issue. 111  As a consequence, more and more 
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Within the European Union, the dimension of EU citizenship comes into play. 
EU citizenship, as established by Art. 20 par. 1 TFEU, is an additional status to 
national citizenship and grants its bearer the rights and duties provided for in the 
European treaties. It could therefore be said that all EU citizens are the holders of 
(at least) two citizenship statuses.112 The scope and magnitude of EU citizenship 
and its interaction with national citizenship has developed extensively over the 
years, in particular by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.113
EU citizenship has unquestionably mitigated the di erences between the nationalities 
of EU Member States and has therefore been interpreted as the ‘lightening’ of 
citizenship. 114 Kochenov has therefore argued that the non-acceptance of dual 
nationality in a minority of EU Member states is “outdated and misplaced”, as well 
as a potential source of discrimination. 115 In that context, it is telling that several 
Member States with a negative stance on dual nationality have come to permit dual 
nationality in an EU-context (see also Chapter 2, par. 4.2).
5.2.3 The political dimension: regime variation and international policy 
diffusion 
Faist, Gerdes and Rieple propose that a State’s tolerance or intolerance of 
dual nationality can be based on a range of political factors, such as particular 
understandings of nationhood and nationally-specific modes of politics.116 Mirilovic 
states that the tolerance of dual nationality can be partially explained by regime 
type variation. She demonstrates that democracies with a large emigrant stock are 
more likely to tolerate dual nationality, while for authoritarian States with a large 
emigrant stock, the opposite is the case.117 Increasing tolerance of dual nationality 
can also be an outcome of international policy diffusion. It has been demonstrated 
that international policy diffusion played an important role in the broader context 
of diaspora policies, in particular regarding the acceptance of extraterritorial 
political rights.118 Vink argue that international policy diffusion can also plays in 
a role in the dissemination of dual nationality acceptance, demonstrating that the 
introduction of dual nationality acceptance is more likely if neighboring States 
have introduced similar policies.119 
6. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF EMIGRANT
NATIONALITY 
As outlined above, more and more States have moved away from an explicitly 
negative stance on dual nationality and gradually have come to terms with the 
acceptability or – at the very least – the inevitability of dual nationality. Moreover, 
we are witnessing a tentative embrace of dual nationality in one particular context, 
namely the context of emigration. In an emigration context, the acceptance dual 
nationality can be utilized to remain connected to a diaspora, even if the members 
of the diaspora have already acquired the nationality of another State. This 
particular manifestation of nationality can be referred to as ‘emigrant citizenship’ 
or ‘emigrant nationality’.
6.1 The state of the art on emigrant nationality 
In Barry’s landmark article on the concept of emigrant nationality, she describes the 
116  Faist, T., Gerdes, J. and Rieple, B., Dual Citizenship as a Path-Dependent Process, International Migration Review, Vol. 38, 
No. 3, 2004, p. 928 ff. 
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118  Turcu, A., Urbatsch, R., Diffusion of Diaspora Enfranchisement Norms: A Multinational Study, Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2014, pp. 407-437. 
119  Vink, M., Schakel, A.,  Reichel, D., Luk, C., De Groot, G.R., The international diffusion of expatriate dual citizenship, Mi-
gration Studies, Vol. 7 No. 3, 2019, p. 375. 
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concept as “efforts [of emigrants] to remain included in their national communities 
and the efforts by emigration States to encourage this [emphasis added]”.120 She states 
that emigrant nationality is a ‘legal entity’ and also a ‘practiced identity’ that is given 
shape by both emigrant nationals and emigration States.121 Focusing on the latter 
aspect, Barry describes how emigration States can foster the inclusion of emigrants. 
In this regard, Barry distinguishes economic, political and legal incorporation of 
emigrants. According to Barry, legal incorporation primarily entails the acceptance 
of dual nationality, which Barry describes as “the most far-reaching effort [of 
incorporation]”.122 Therefore, she concludes that emigration can reconfigure the 
concept of nationality.123 She also claims that migrant nationality is not only more 
and more accepted by States, but even actively encouraged.124 Still, Barry also 
acknowledges that many emigrant States have not gone further than ‘symbolic 
gestures’.125 Based on her analysis, she made two predictions. Firstly, she predicted 
that the relationship between emigrant and emigration State will gradually further 
institutionalize. Secondly, immigration States might perceive these processes as 
disruptive for reaching their own policy goals (e.g. immigrant assimilation), which 
might lead to inter-state tensions.126 It should be noted that emigrant nationality 
does not per definition entail the acceptance of dual nationality. However, the two 
phenomena are very closely linked. After all, it is clear that the tolerance of dual 
nationality is a catalyst of the increasing  proliferation of (external) emigrant 
nationality. 
Emigrant nationality is external in nature. After all, emigrant nationality allows 
a State to remain connected to a part of its population across its borders. The 
result is therefore that a State’s personal jurisdiction and its territorial jurisdiction 
no longer overlap.127 Schuck argues that this extraterritorial dimension is in fact 
the most defining feature of emigrant nationality.128 Fitzgerald argues that such 
extraterritorial nationality is based on a ‘Roman’ conception of nationality, in which 
nationality is mainly perceived as a status. This is opposed to a ‘Greek’ conception 
of nationality, which is territorial in nature and based on the premise of active 
participation in a polity.129 According to him, the extraterritoriality of emigrant 
nationality makes the status more voluntarist, as it is difficult for States to impose 
120 Barry, K., “Home and away: The construction of citizenship in an emigration context”, New York University Law Review, 
Vol. 81 No. 1, 2006, p. 26. 
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obligations on nationals who do not reside within their territorial boundaries.130 
However, the extraterritoriality of emigrant nationality does not necessarily turn it 
into a postnational status. As Brubaker argues, the nation-state has always been a 
territorial association as well as a (territorially unbound) membership association. 
The increasing acceptance of emigrant nationality therefore represents “an 











The academic literature on nationality and emigrants also strongly focuses on 
one particular subtopic, namely the political participation of emigrants and, more 
specifically, external voting.136 Although the majority of States nowadays permits 
external voting in one form or another, external political participation remains 
nevertheless a contentious topic.137 Therefore, scholarly views on the topic differ. 
Rubio-Marín argues that emigrants should in principle be permitted to retain 
their nationality of origin, but that they should not have a similar entitlement to 
130  Fitzgerald, D., “Citizenship à la Carte”, Global Migration and Transnational Politics, Vol. 3, 2008, p. 7. 
131  Brubaker, R., “Migration, membership, and the modern nation-state: Internal and external dimensions of the politics of 
belonging”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 41 No. 1, 2010, p. 78. 
132   Fitzgerald, D., “Rethinking emigrant citizenship.” New York University Law Review Vol. 81 No. 1, 2006, p. 98. 
133 Fitzgerald, D., “Citizenship à la Carte”, Global Migration and Transnational Politics, Vol. 3, 2008, p. 6. 
134  Deutsche Welle, “Erdogan calls for Turkish schools in Germany and dual citizenship”, <https://www.dw.com/en>, 25 
March 2010; Gezer, Ö. and Reimann, A. “Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate: ‘You Are Part of Germany, But Also Part of 
Our Great Turkey”, <http://www.spiegel.de/>, 28 February 2011.
135  Levitt, P. and De la Dehesa., R., “Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: variations and explanations”, 
Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 26 No. 4, 2003; Bosniak, L., “Multiple nationality and the postnational transformation of citizen-
ship”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, 2001; Ho, Elaine Lynn-Ee, “‘Claiming’ the diaspora: Elite mobility, send-
ing state strategies and the spatialities of citizenship”, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 35 No.6, 2011; Ragazzi, F., “Diasporas, 
Cosmopolitanism and Postterritorial Citizenship”, in: Gupta, S and Padmanabhan, S. (eds.), Politics and Cosmopolitanism in a 
Global Age, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 137-165. 
136  See for example: Rubio-Marín, R., “Transnational politics and the democratic nation-state: normative challenges of ex-
patriate voting and nationality retention of emigrants”, New York University Law Review Vol. 81, 2006; Spiro, Peter J., “Perfecting 
political diaspora”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 81, 2006, p. 207, Bauböck, R. “Stakeholder citizenship and transnation-
al political participation: a normative evaluation of external voting”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 75 No. 5, 2006; López’Guer-
ra, C., “Should Expatriates Vote?”, Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 13 No. 2, 2005; Lafleur, J. M., Transnational politics and the 
state: The external voting rights of diasporas, London: Routledge, 2013 and Grotz, F. and Nohlen, D., “External voting: legal frame-
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137  Ellis, A. et al., Voting from abroad: The International IDEA handbook, Stockholm: International Idea, 2007.
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Fitzgerald argues that emigrant nationality is not a new phenomenon as such,
but that the active promotion of it by sending States is. 132 Dual nationality has
historically indeed been accepted for emigrant populations by a number of
States, but States did not actively encourage their emigrant population to become
dual nationals. 133 An example of the latter development is Turkey, which has
criticized certain host countries of the Turkish diaspora for not allowing dual
nationality and has encouraged persons of Turkish descent to obtain such a dual
status. 134 Many other studies on emigrant nationality take a broader, less
legalistic perspective on the phenomenon, for example studies on nation
building, imagined communities, ‘tales of belonging’ and deterritorialized
nation-states. 135
external political participation.138 Bauböck introduces a ‘stakeholder principle’ for 
determining who should be permitted to vote from abroad. This principle entails 
that external political participation should be allowed if a person is either dependent 
on that State for the grant of basic rights (dependency criterion) or if a person has 
been subjected to that State’s political authority for a significant part of his life 
(biographical subjection criterion).139
The phenomenon of emigrant nationality can also be placed in a broader framework. 
The acceptance of dual nationality for emigrant populations can be perceived as part 
of a broader category of policies which aim to reach out to emigrant populations, 
namely so-called ‘diaspora strategies’ or ‘diaspora policies’.140 Ragazzi categorizes 
diaspora policies in symbolic policies (i.e. organizing diaspora celebrations and 
conferences), cultural policies (i.e. education abroad), social and economic policies 
(i.e. investment schemes and welfare provisions), State control (i.e. attempts of 
surveillance) and citizenship policies.141 Such diaspora policies are often executed 
by designated governmental institutions, often referred to as ‘diaspora institutions’. 
Such diaspora institutions have become widespread; by 2014, almost half of all 
States had created a governmental institution (ranging from an advisory council to 
a ministry) dedicated to that State’s emigrant populations and its descendants.142 
As mentioned earlier, such transnational institutional incorporation can be driven 
by instrumental motivations (often referred to as the ‘tapping’ perspective). In 
addition to that, the incorporation of emigrant populations is based on ideas of 
national identity and nationhood (the ‘embracing’ perspective). In addition to these 
two State-level perspectives, Gamlen has also proposed a third – more transnational 
– perspective, namely the ‘governing’ perspective. He argues that the spread of 
diaspora policies and diaspora institutions is stimulated by international policy 
diffusion through a governmentality model, which entails that States voluntarily 
take over policies and institutional models from other States.143 
Historically, the attitudes of States towards their diasporas have been varied in 
nature. In the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the question how a 
State should relate to its emigrant population emerged in many Western-European 
States, as these States were confronted with high outflows towards (in particular) 
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ra’diaspora”, Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 28 No. 1, 2005, p. 5 ff. 
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the Americas due to economic and industrial development. The attitudes with which 
these States approached their emigrants differed. The German States, for example, 
traditionally approached emigrants with a relatively hostile attitude. Emigration 
was first of all in most cases officially curtailed through bureaucratic hurdles, for 
example the requirement for those who wished to emigrate to obtain an emigration 
permit from the authorities.144 Next to that, upon permanent emigration from 
the State’s territory, their nationality was usually lost, regardless of whether the 
emigrant had naturalized in the destination country or not.145 This extremely strict 
approach was adapted in 1870, when the common nationality law of the German 
Empire determined that those who emigrated from German territory could retain 
their nationality for a period of ten years.146 By 1913, the attitude of the German 
State towards emigration had somewhat altered, as German authorities had come 
to the realization that it could be politically advantageous to remain connected 
to German communities abroad.147 Therefore, the 1913 nationality law allowed 
German emigrants to retain their nationality while residing abroad and to pass 
German nationality on to their children iure sanguinis.148 However, this gradual 
acceptance of external nationality did not lead to general acceptance of external 
dual nationality. One could now retain German nationality upon residence abroad, 
but German nationality would still in principle be lost upon acquisition of another 
nationality.149 Only in exceptional cases, those affected could be granted special 
permission for retaining German national next to another nationality.150 Wilhelm 
Cahn states that when questions arose in the German parliament about this 
provision, a governmental representative replied that dual nationality was indeed a 
highly undesirable phenomenon, but that its complete elimination was unfeasible. 
For example, it was regarded as unreasonable that a German national who acquired 
another nationality against his will would automatically lose his German nationality 
without any possibility for recourse.151 Nevertheless, Germany would retain a 
relatively strict position on (external) dual nationality, which is still present in 
German nationality law today (See Chapter 2). By contrast, Italy is often presented 
as a country that has traditionally held an inclusive attitude towards its diaspora, as 
emigrants could retain their Italian nationality while residing abroad and transmit 
144   Fahrmeier, A., “From economics to ethnicity and back: Reflections on emigration control in Germany”, in: Green, N. 
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cy L., and Weil, F. (eds.), Citizenship and those who leave: The politics of emigration and expatriation. Champaign: University of Illi-
nois Press, 2010, p. 184 ff. 
148  Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz vom 22. Juli 1913.
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their nationality to their descendants for multiple generations.152 This inclusive 
attitude was, again, a response to the nationality policies of the receiving States 
in the Americas. As nationality could be acquired in most of these countries iure 
soli, the descendants of Italian emigrants would automatically become nationals of 
the receiving State, which Italy perceived as an undesirable claim on its external 
population.153 Instead, Italy wished to preserve its connection to Italian emigrants 
for economic as well as political reasons.154 Despite Italy’s inclusive attitude, 
Italian nationality remained an exclusive status. This entailed that nationality was 
still in principle lost upon naturalization abroad. All in all, emigrants of Italian 
descent could remain Italian, but Italian only. This changed in 1912, when Italy 
partially came to allow dual nationality for a share of its emigrant population on 
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In modern times, the context of diaspora relations has changed significantly.
Scholars of transnationalism have argued that communication technologies
and transportation means have made cross-border interaction “faster, more
frequent and more intensive”, as Fitzgerald phrases it. 157 A similar development
of attitudes towards emigration populations can be observed in predominantly
non-Western emigration States. Certain emigration States used to have outright
hostile attitudes towards their emigrant population, in some cases even perceiving
them as ‘traitors’. Iheduru, for example, outlines how highly skilled emigrants
from newly independent African States were regularly framed as profit-seeking
deserters who failed to contribute to the development of their homeland. 158 As 
these States came to realize that emigrant populations contributed significantly to
their countries of origin through (monetary as well as non-monetary) remittances,
they attempted to redefine their relationship with their emigrant populations.
This entailed that emigrants were increasingly framed as ‘stakeholders’ who were
encouraged to remain actively connected to their homeland. Manby states that when
African States gained independence, many of these States decided not to allow
dual nationality to prevent that their nationals would remain connected with old 
colonial powers.159 However, many African States have amended such provisions 
in recent years.160 These changes are partially based on economic considerations, 
as it is thought that dual nationality acceptance can ensure that States maintain 
an important link with their diaspora and stimulate economic participation.161 
Next to that, emigrants who are able to obtain the host country’s nationality might 
experience an increase in earnings (the so-called ‘citizenship premium’), which 
could again result in higher remittances.162 Whitaker concludes that when it comes 
to acceptance of dual nationality in African States, political considerations play 
a more important role than economic considerations. She therefore states that 
dual nationality acceptance is dependent on democratization processes and the 
relationship between those in power and the diaspora.163 Aminzade holds a midway 
position, arguing that government officials are mostly concerned with economic 
arguments for dual nationality acceptance, while politicians are guided by political 
and electoral considerations.164 The latter are therefore inclined to oppose dual 
nationality tolerance if the political party that they represent does not have 
enough support among the diaspora population or if the resident population is 
not supportive of dual nationality tolerance. Berg’s analysis of Peruvian attitudes 
towards its diaspora shows that this development is not necessarily a linear process, 
as it can be a contentious and fiercely debated issue. She argues that the perception 
of Peruvian emigrants has fluctuated from ‘national problem’ to ‘national solution’ 
on the basis of political and economic factors.165 In the Mexican context, Fitzgerald 
has concluded that these two discourses have become intertwined and emigrants 
have been simultaneously been referred to as “traitors of the motherland” as well 
as “national heroes”.166 
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163  Whitaker, B. E., “The Politics of Home: Dual Citizenship and the African Diaspora”, International Migration Review, Vol. 
45 No. 4, 2011, p. 777 ff. 
164  Aminzade, R., Race, nation, and citizenship in postcolonial Africa: The case of Tanzania, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013, p. 351. 
165  Berg, U. D., “El quinto suyo: contemporary nation building and the political economy of emigration in Peru”, Latin Amer-
ican Perspectives, Vol. 37 No. 5, 2010.
166  Fitzgerald, D., A nation of emigrants: How Mexico manages its migration, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, p. 
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On the basis of the preceding Section, it can be determined that States are 
increasingly willing to ‘accept’ dual nationality, in particular for their diaspora. 
Nevertheless,  what does this acceptance exactly entails in practice? In other words, 
in which cases and under which circumstances is dual nationality accepted for 
emigrant populations? And, in addition to that, which patterns can be detected in 
these policies?  These are questions that remain to be answered. 
7. STUDYING EMIGRANT NATIONALITY AND 
DUAL NATIONALITY
 
In addition to a descriptive analysis of emigrant nationality and dual nationality 
acceptance, there is equally a need for a more conceptual analysis of the 
phenomenon. On the basis of the concept of ‘citizenship formations’, it can be 
argued that nationality can be perceived as a flexible concept and that this flexibility 
is further reinforced by the acceptance of dual nationality. It will also be argued that 
this flexibility offers a State more leeway to utilize its nationality in novel ways. 
Next to that, the concept of ‘citizenship constellations’ will be introduced in order 
to also study the dynamics that can arise between two nationalities. 
7.1 Citizenship formations, citizenship constellations
As Marston and Mitchell put it, nationality is not “a monolithic social category 
that is determined by state edict and endures unchanged through time and 
across space”.167 They claim that there is a continuous interaction between the 
State and other actors, which leads to perpetually shifting “new understandings 
of citizenship”.168 They argue that in recent times, the predominant factor that 
influences such shifting understandings of citizenship is global capitalism. 
Marston and Mitchell prefer not to speak of citizenship as such, but of ‘citizenship 
formations’, which they define as “non-static, non-linear, social, political, cultural, 
economic and legal construction[s]”. In other words, they claim that citizenship is 
inherently flexible. The importance of flexibility has been emphasized  earlier in the 
studies of citizenship by the work of anthropologist Aihwa Ong, who has claimed 
that “[…] in the era of globalization, individuals as well as governments develop a 
flexible notion of citizenship169 and sovereignty to accumulate capital and power” 
3 
167  Marston, S. A., and Mitchell, K., “Citizens and the state: citizenship formations in space and time”, in: Barnett, C. and 
Low, M. (eds.), Spaces of democracy: geographical perspectives on citizenship, participation and representation, London: Sage 
Publishing, 2004, p. 110. 
168  Ibid. 




and to respond “fluidly and opportunistically” to changing political-economic 
conditions.170 Based on her study of transnational migrants from Hong Kong in the 
years preceding 1997 (an era characterized by uncertainty surrounding the transfer 
of powers from the United Kingdom to the People’s Republic of China), she argues 
that global capitalism increased the importance of economic rationalities when it 
comes to citizenship, for individuals as well as for States. Ong mainly elaborates on 
the former, by arguing that the transnational highly-skilled migrants which are the 
subject of her study strategically utilize citizenship(s) in order to make optimal use 
of the opportunities that different nation-state regimes offer them.171 In her later 
work, she also further elaborates on how market-driven intrusions have, in her view, 
led to a flexibilization of the citizenship policies of States. Firstly, she argues that, 
in order to address and incorporate global flows of people and capital, citizenship 
has been deterritorialized beyond the borders of the nation-state.172 Next to that, 
she argues that the bundle of rights and duties that has been traditionally connected 
to citizenship is increasingly disarticulated and rearticulated on the basis of an 
economic logic, which leads to the grant of rights to certain ‘preferred citizens’, 
while others remain excluded.173 
The concept of citizenship formations studies a nationality in isolation. When 
it comes to dual nationality, an additional dimension comes into play. For this 
phenomenon, Bauböck coined the term ‘citizenship constellations’, a concept 
rooted in transnationalism and, as Bauböck states, “[ ] brings into view how host 
and home countries create a web of legal and political ties with migrant and ethnic 
kin groups that also affects intergovernmental relations and public policy reform 
in each country”.174 In short, when studying dual nationality, it should also be 
taken into account what role a particular nationality can play in relation to another 
nationality. 
How does the framework presented here relate to the topic of this study? The 
holistic conception of citizenship formations has indeed very little to do with the 
more modest legalistic definition of nationality that has been proposed earlier in 
this Chapter, but it provides nevertheless a valuable contribution to it. Focusing 
specifically on nationality as a “non-static, non-linear […] legal construction”, it 
ity; it includes formal citizenship, but also refers to a much wider category of practices. See: Ong, A., Flexible citizenship: The cul-
tural logics of transnationality. Duke University Press, 1999, p. 113.. 
170  Ong, A., Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality. Duke University Press, 1999, p.6. 
171  Ibid., p. 112. 
172  Ong, A., “Mutations in citizenship”, Theory, culture & society, Vol. 23 No. 2-3, 2006, p. 500. 
173  Ong, A., “(Re) articulations of citizenship”, PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 38 No. 4, 2005, p. 697. 
174  Bauböck, R., “Studying citizenship constellations”, Journal of ethnic and migration studies, Vol. 36 No. 5, 2010, p. 849. 
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Conversely, by accepting dual nationality, a State acknowledges that its nationality 
can be a divisible and extraterritorial status. Such a nationality is not necessarily 
a manifestation of an all-encompassing ‘genuine link’ between national and State, 
but can instead play many different roles.175 To unravel these different roles, a 
nationality should not only be studied as a (solitary) ‘citizenship formation’, as this 
approach would neglect the interaction that can arise between the two nationalities. 
For that reason, a nationality should also be studied as a part of a ‘citizenship 
constellation’. 
On a more abstract level, it could be argued that within a citizenship constellation, 
nationality can develop into an additional status to another nationality and that – in 
particular over the course of the past decades – new utilizations of nationality have 
emerged which can only be understood in that particular way. A prime example is 
economic nationality, or ‘citizenship-by-investment’. This practice entails that in a 
number of States, non-nationals can be granted nationality in exchange for making 
a certain pre-defined investment within the State or a donation. Other substantive 
requirements for naturalization, such as residence requirements, are in general 
waived for those who make use of such provisions.  An example is Malta, where 
nationality can be granted in exchange for a donation of 650,000 euro and an 
additional investment of 500,000 euro.176 Such a nationality is in principle always 
acquired in addition to another nationality; it is telling that Bulgaria in principle 
requires those who wish to naturalize to renounce their nationality of origin, but 
175  Wautelet therefore argues that one should not conflate all situations of dual nationality, but instead distinguish these var-
ious situations. See: Wautelet, P., “The Next Frontier: Dual Nationality as a Multi-layered Concept”, Netherlands International 
Law Review, Vol. 65 No. 3, 2018.     




            
            
             
            
           
              
          
       
            
            
            
     
puts an emphasis on the State’s flexibility when it comes to determining, firstly, who
is able to obtain, retain or reacquire its nationality and under what preconditions
and, secondly, which rights and duties are allocated on the basis of this status to
that particular national. It could be argued that in particular a State’s acceptance
of dual nationality drastically increases its flexibility when it comes to allocation
as well as deprivation of nationality status. If a State perceives its nationality as a
‘mononationality’, it treats its nationality as an undivisible status that confines its
permanent population within its territorial borders. Consequently, extraterritorial
nationality remains a mere anomaly and a State’s leeway for the allocation of
nationality is relatively limited. Next to that, for individuals, there is a high threshold
for obtaining as well as retaining such a mononationality and therefore, its potential
outreach is per definition also limited.
that those who naturalize in exchange for an investment are exempted from this 
requirement.177 The purpose of holding such a nationality is that it enables the holder 
to make use of the extraterritorial (mobility) rights that the holder’s nationality 
of origin cannot provide. Especially if the nationality of a remote microstate is 
acquired in this particular way, it is likely that the nationality holder has never 
even set foot within that State.178 Further examples can be found in a field that 
is more closely related to the topic of this study, namely diasporic nationality, or 
nationality provisions which enable certain groups to (re)acquire nationality on 
the basis of their origin or ancestry. In 2010, Hungary amended its nationality 
law in order to enable persons with Hungarian ancestry to be able to acquire 
Hungarian nationality on preferential grounds. As those persons would most 
likely be permanently residing outside Hungary and hold the nationality of that 
particular State, they were not obliged to renounce their other nationality as part of 
the application process.  A similar, albeit even more delicate example is the German 
provision on the basis of which those who were deprived of German nationality 
between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945 on political, racial or religious grounds 
and their descendants can restore their nationality upon application.179 This 
provision is still of relevance today, as the German High Court has ruled in 1994 
that the term ‘descendants’ ( ‘Abkömmlinge’) does see on all descending generations 
and is therefore not restricted to the children of those who were deprived of their 
nationality.180 Although Germany has in general still a negative attitude towards 
dual nationality, those who apply for German nationality on the basis of this 
provision are not required to renounce their other nationality. This deviation is very 
much understandable if one considers that this pathway to nationality has been 
created as a form of compensation for an injustice to victims and the descendants 
of these victims. It would make little sense to require the renunciation of a former 
nationality in this case, as that would pose a major hurdle to acquiring a status that 
could be considered as a moral entitlement. Another, less contentious example 
can be found in South Korea, where the selective toleration of dual nationality is 
177  Art. 12a Law on Bulgarian Nationality (Закон За Българското Гражданство).  
178  For example, the nationality of Saint Kitts and Nevis by investment can be acquired without an interview or residence in 
Saint Kitts and Nevis. See: Saint Christopher and Nevis Citizenship by Investment Regulations No 52 of 2011 and https://ciu.
gov.kn.
179  Between 1933 and 1945, German nationality could be lost under two laws that were introduced by the national-socialist 
regime. Firstly, a large number of individuals was deprived of their nationality on the basis of the Law on the Revocation of Na-
turalizations and the Deprivation of the German Citizenship’ of the 14th of July  1933. Either their nationality was revoked for 
the fact that the individual ‘harmed German interest’ or their naturalization was revoked for the reason that it was deemed ‘unde-
sirable’. The legislation offered in principle unlimited discretionary power and no possibility for judicial review. According to an 
additional regulation, the legislation had to interpreted in line with ‘ethnic-national principles’. In practice, the legislation affected 
Jews and opponents of the national-socialist regime. Secondly, another large group lost its nationality on the basis of the Eleventh 
Decree to the Law on the Citizenship of the Reich of the 25th of November 1941, which stated that all Jewish individuals living 
outside of Germany lost their nationality. See also: Majer, D., “Non-Germans” Under the Third Reich, Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2003, p. 109 ff.
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utilized as a mechanism to attract the best and the brightest. In principle, foreigners 
who wish to naturalize in South Korea or former South Korean nationals who wish 
to recover their original nationality are in principle obliged to renounce their other 
nationality. Nevertheless, those who have “contributed greatly to the Republic of 
Korea” or persons who have “excellent ability in a specific field, such as science, 
economy, culture, sport” are exempted from this renunciation criterion.181 Such 
‘preferential naturalization’-schemes, which are aimed at attracting an elite few, can 
only be effective if their thresholds are sufficiently low and therefore, permitting 






The other side of the coin is that toleration of dual nationality does not only 
increase a State’s leeway when it comes to the allocation of nationality, but also 
when it comes to the deprivation of nationality. The case of Norway provides a 
perfect example in this regard. Currently, Norway’s nationality legislation is 
restrictive in nature when it comes to dual nationality. For the past years, the 
question whether Norway should amend these restrictive provisions has been hotly 
debated. A breakthrough in this debate took place in 2017, when the conservative-
liberal Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) had a change of heart on the matter and 
began supporting a reform. The party’s main motivation for its reversal was that 
the reform would enable the Norwegian authorities to strip dual nationals of their 
Norwegian nationality, in particular in cases related to terrorism.182 Scholars have 
been critical of this utilization of dual nationality. Macklin, for example, has stated 
that a similar British practice regarding nationality revocation signal that “[…] for 
these dual nationals [second generation immigrants, LvdB] UK citizenship remains 
tentative and subordinate to their ‘real’ nationality […]. Their entitlement to equal 
citizenship with other British citizens is provisional, precarious and continually 
under surveillance”.183 This argument shows how a State’s utilization of the 
flexibility that is engendered by the acceptance of dual nationality can generate a 
181  Art. 7 Nationality Act No. 14183 of 2016. 
182  See: Background of the bill, Amendments of the Nationality Law Proposal 111 L (2017-2018). Original title: Bakgrunnen 
for lovforslaget, Endringer i statsborgerloven Proposisjon 111 L (2017-2018). 
183  Macklin, A., “The Securitization of Dual Citizenship”, in: Faist, T., and Kivisto, P. (eds.) Dual citizenship in global perspec-




These examples illustrate that particularly through partial toleration of dual
nationality, a State can introduce a novel element of selectivity in its nationality
policies. In that case, the question is no longer merely who a State includes in
its citizenry, but also who it allows to be simultaneously part of another State’s
citizenry.
shift within a citizenship constellation. 
8. HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND
SCOPE 
The main objective of this thesis is to describe how States use their nationality 
policies to remain connected to their diasporas. In order to do that, this thesis will 
firstly conduct a global comparative legal study to map the relevant policies. Our 
hypothesis is that the acceptance of dual nationality, as it increases a State’s leeway 
when it comes to determining who is a national and who is not national, reinforces 
this flexibility. Further, we anticipate that this additional flexibility might give rise to 
novel utilizations of nationality, depending on how a State makes use of this leeway. 
In order to complement this broad analysis with a more in-depth analysis, also two 
in-depth country studies will be conducted on Spain and Sri Lanka. Admittedly, 
for such case studies, Spain and Sri Lanka might seem like an odd couple. Yet, 
these states have not been chosen for their similarities, but for their differences. This 
approach builds on the “Most Different System Design” method of comparative 
research. Przeworski and Teune coined this term for the comparison of cases that 
are as different as possible in order to demonstrate the robustness of an association 
between a dependent and an independent variable.184 However, the case studies 
of Spain and Sri Lanka in this dissertation are meant as illustrations rather than 
exhaustive tests.  Spain is an EU Member State is a net receiver of migration since 
the 1970s. However, during the 19th century and part of the 20th century, Spain has 
experienced high levels of emigration, specifically to South-American regions.185 
During the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent rule of the 
Franco regime, Spanish emigration was also of a humanitarian nature.186 These 
historical processes could continue to play a role in Spanish nationality legislation. 
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, is a relatively young Asian State and has always 
been a net migrant sending state, including a large number of refugees.187 Another 
difference is that Sri Lanka has been a post-civil conflict State until relatively recent 
date, which further complicates its outreach to (former) external nationals and 
their offspring. By choosing to conduct case studies on Spain and Sri Lanka, I 
184  Przeworski, A. and Teune, H., The logic of comparative social inquiry, New York: Wiley, 1970, p. 32 ff.  
185  See Cook-Martin, D., The Scramble for Citizens: Dual Nationality and State Competition for Immigrants, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013, p. 90 and Rubio Marín, R, and Sobrino, I. “Country Report: Spain”, San Domenico di Fiesole: Europe-
an University Institute, 2010, p. 10. 
186  Ibid. 
187  Unicef Migration Profile Sri Lanka via <http://esa.un.org/ > and Ukwatta, S., “Sri Lanka, migration 1960s to present”, in: 
Ness, I and Bellwood, P. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, Hoboken: Wiley, 2013.
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aim to describe how emigrant nationality can manifest itself in two very different 
settings. 
In these country studies, particular attention will be paid to how their nationalities 
relate to another nationality in a citizenship constellation. The purpose of this study 
is therefore not to merely compare emigrant nationalities on an abstract level, but 
to unravel the nuances of these policies and trace novel utilizations of nationality. 
As stated earlier, the academic literature on the flexibility of citizenship has often 
pointed towards global capitalism as the predominant driving force behind this 
development. Therefore, it will be critically assessed what role economic rationalities 
play in this regard.
The main research questions of this thesis are: To what extent do States permit 
dual nationality for their emigrant population and their descendants and 
does this tolerance of dual nationality for emigrant populations lead to 
new utilizations of nationality? 
The four ensuing research questions are:
1. To what extent do States allow their emigrant population and their 
descendants to retain their nationality of origin next to another 
nationality?
2. Which patterns can be detected in emigrant nationality policies and 
can new utilizations of nationality be detected? 
3.  What are the emigrant nationality policies of Sri Lanka and what is 
their historical, political and societal context? 
4. What are the emigrant nationality policies of Spain and what is their 
historical, political and societal context?
9. METHODOLOGY  
 
As this thesis aims to map and analyze a large set of nationality laws, it will 
primarily deploy a comparative legal methodology. In order to answer the first 
two research questions, it is necessary to first map the dual nationality policies of 
States regarding their emigrant populations. To ensure its comprehensiveness, this 
study should be global in scope. As such a wide-ranging analysis leaves no scope 
for an in-depth analysis for each State, two country studies will also be conducted. 




approach adopted in this thesis. A more detailed account of the adopted approach, 
in particular issues regarding data collection and data analysis, can be found in 
Chapter 2. 
In comparative law, there are several different methodological directions. A number 
of these methods, such as the structural method, the analytical method and the 
common core-method are best used for the study of legal systems in their entirety 
and can therefore not be used in this study.188 For comparison of nationality laws, 
the most suitable research method is the so-called ‘functional approach’. This entails 
that a law’s ‘function’ is used as a starting point for comparison.189 The functional 
approach to comparative law is based on the premise that, in short,  many States 
experience the same problems, but solve them with different solutions. Therefore, 
a legal concept that can be found in the legislation of one State cannot always 
readily be traced in the legislation of another state. This problem is countered by 
determining the function of a specific law in one State and carefully analysing 
legal resources in another State to trace a law with the same function.190 This 
methodology has been criticized for its ambiguity, as the term ‘function’ is open 
to a multitude of interpretations.191 Next to that, depending on the area of law, 
many factors can potentially inhibit a proper ‘functionalist’ comparison.192 Gerber 
states that the functional approach does not take the context in which law came 
into being into account, which can inhibit a proper understanding of the subject 
of the analysis.193 The functional approach nevertheless remains to be considered 
as an adequate legal research method, although its limitations must be taken into 
account.194 This entails that the functional approach should be perceived as a 
starting point; it is a ‘bottom-up approach’ that does not primarily have to result 
in an analysis of a legal system in its entirety.195 Therefore, the functional approach 
remains a valuable method of comparative law.
As established earlier in this Chapter, the (twofold) function of nationality in law 
188  Van Hoecke, M., Methodology of comparative legal research, Law and Method, Vol. 12, 2015, p. 11 ff. 
189  Zweigert, K., and Kötz, H., Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, Tübingen: Mohr, 1996, p. 33; Esin Öcürü, A., “Method-
ology of comparative law”, in: Smits, J., (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Cheltenham: Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2006, p. 443. 
190  Samuel, G., An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 65 ff.;  
191  See for an overview of potential interpretations: Michaels, R. “The Functionalist Method of Comparative Law”, in: Rei-
mann, M. and Zimmermann, R. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 
343 ff. The views of Michaels have been criticized. See: De Coninck, J., The Functional Method of Comparative Law: “Quo 
Vadis”?, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 2, 2010. See for Michaels’ response: Michaels, R., 
Explanation and Interpretation in Functionalist Comparative Law–a Response to Julie de Coninck, Rabels Zeitschrift für auslän-
disches und internationales Privatrecht Law, Vol. 2, 2010.
192  Graziade, M.,  “The Functionalist Heritage”, in: Legrand, P. and Munday, R. (eds.), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions 
and Transitions, Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press, 2003, p. 108. 
193  Gerber, D., “Sculpting the agenda of comparative law”, in: Riles, A., Rethinking the masters of comparative law, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2001, p. 205 ff. 
194  Siems, M., Comparative law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 32 ff. 
195  Samuel, G., An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 76.
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The legal historical method can best be perceived as a specific subdiscipline of 
the law-in-context method. After all, the historical context of a law can explain 
why a law is as it is. This is particularly the case for the field of nationality law, as 
nationality has been considered as “path-dependent”, which means that historical 
choices of a legislator regarding to nationality law often remain of influence in 
this day and age.199 The case studies will therefore also be based on an analysis of 
196  Luk, C., Diaspora status and citizenship rights : A comparative-legal analysis of the quasi-citizenship schemes of China, 
India and Suriname, Oisterwijk : Wolf Legal Publishers, 2017. 
197  Van Hoecke, M., Methodology of comparative legal research, Law and Method, Vol. 12, 2015, p. 16 ff. 
198  Valcke, C. and Gretelle, M., “Three Functions of Function in Comparative Legal Studies” in: Adams, M. and Heirbaut, 
D. (eds.) The Method and Culture of Comparative Law: Essays in Honour of Mark Van Hoecke, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 
107. 
199  Faist, T, Gerdes, J. and Rieple, B., “Dual citizenship as a path-dependent process”, International migration review, Vol. 38 




              
             
             
              
           
           
          
            
            
            
         
          
          
 
is to delimitate the permanent population of a certain State as well as being a 
starting point for the allocation of rights and duties. Hence, how can the functional 
approach be of value for comparing nationality laws? It must be admitted that the 
problem that the functional approach to comparative law aims to solve is only to a 
very limited extent applicable to nationality law. As explained earlier in this Chapter, 
the concept of nationality is nowadays utilized universally as the primary link 
between individuals and a State. Nevertheless, using a functional comparative legal 
method has two remaining advantages. Firstly, it enables one to take take several 
modes of loss of nationality into account that either directly or indirectly function 
as a restriction on dual nationality. Secondly, States might have opted for less 
conventional routes for acquisition of nationality for emigrants and descendants 
(e.g. special regulations for reacquisition of nationality or facilitated acquisition of 
the nationality of ancestors, or even specific residence permits or ‘quasi- 
citizenship’-programmes).196
9.1 Methodology of the country studies
For the two case studies, the law-in-context method and the legal historical method 
will be used. The law-in-context method emphasises the importance of the context 
in which law is developed and therefore aims to, as Van Hoecke puts it, come to a 
better understanding of law and explain why the law is at it is. 197 According to Rodolfo 
Sacco, it entails that one should trace ‘legal formants’, or constitutive elements of 
law, which can be ‘synecdoche’ (obvious, e.g. case law and scholarly interpretation) 
as well as ‘cryptotypes’ (hidden). The latter category refers to phenomena that may 
covertly influence law and its interpretation, examples of which are ranging from 
(unwritten) legal practices to cultural or personal predispositions of lawmakers or 
judges. 198 In the case studies, it will be therefore be attempted to uncover these legal 
formants by conducting an extensive literature review.
historical legislation and historical policy documents, combined with an extensive 
literature review on the historical predecessor of today’s nationality legislation in 
the aforementioned States.  
 
 




















   
   
  
 
   
  
  
cross-national convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 117 No. 4, 2012.
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The first country study on Sri Lanka concentrates on the Sri Lankan dual 
citizenship certificate, through which Sri Lankan emigrants can retain or 
reacquire their Sri Lankan nationality next to another nationality, deviating 
from Sri Lanka’s usual restrictive stance. The second country study on Spain is 
dealt with in two separate chapters, as it addresses two distinct Spanish policies. 
Firstly, it will focus on the Spanish Law of Historical Memory, which enables 
(the descendants of) those who exiled from Spain in the past to (re)acquire 
Spanish nationality, although the scope of the law is broader than that in practice. 
Secondly, it will focus on Law 12/2015, on the basis of which persons of Sephardic- 
Jewish origin can acquire Spanish nationality, since their ancestors were driven out 
of Spain by the Alhambra Edict of 1492.
Taken together, the country studies provide a diverse depiction of dual nationality 
policies aimed at emigrant populations, as both countries try to remain connected 
to their emigrant populations in di erent ways and in di erent contexts. While 
the Sri Lankan country study demonstrates how a country can remain connected 
with its present-day diaspora in a post-conflict context, the Spanish case study 
demonstrates how a country can remain connected with its diaspora over a lengthy 
period of time.
            
          
          
            
           
            
             
             
           
           
            
            
             
             
             
           
           
            
            
             
             
The case studies broadly follow the same structure. After a short introduction, the
country’s diasporic populations will be mapped.After that, the country’s nationality
policies will be discussed from a legal-historical perspective, focusing in particular
on the country’s nationality policies towards its diaspora and dual nationality in
general. After that, the country’s current policies regarding dual nationality and its
diaspora will be discussed in detail.These policies will be subsequently assessed in
order to depict their e￿ects. Lastly, the policies will be studied in conjunction with
selected countries where are a relatively large share of the diaspora has settled in 
order to also assess the effects of the policies from a transnational perspective. 
As the context of the case studies differ greatly, the emphasis is on different aspects 
in each case study. For the Sri Lankan case study, the Sri Lankan diaspora and its 
diaspora engagement are mapped out extensively, as a large part of Sri Lankan 
emigration took place in relatively recent years. For the Spanish case studies, 
emigration movements are discussed that took place several generations ago; in 
the case of the Sephardi this even goes back several centuries. It would not be 
accurate to put these emigration movements on an equal footing with emigration 
movements that took place in relatively recent times. Therefore, less emphasis is 
put on mapping of these diasporas, as they cannot be studied in the same manner 
as modern-day diasporas. The Sri Lankan case study also discusses the historical 
development of Sri Lankan nationality law (including preceding [colonial] statuses) 
in greater detail. Although this might seem excessive, few in-depth studies of Sri 
Lankan nationality law have been conducted until now and, therefore, such a 
segment is of added value. On the contrary, numerous in-depth studies have been 
conducted on the historical development of Spanish nationality law. Therefore, the 
historical development of Spanish nationality is introduced only briefly, referring 
to other scholarly works for a more extensive treatment of the matter. 
The country studies draw heavily on the concept of ‘diasporas’, which has been 
subject to criticism. In essence, a ‘diaspora’ refers to an international dispersion 
of people.200 However, over the past decades, a multitude of definitions has been 
introduced. Among those definitions, Brubaker identified three core elements, 
namely a dispersion of people in space, an orientation towards a homeland and 
boundary maintenance (referring to the preservation of an own identity).201 Other 
authors also argue that a diaspora does not encompass all dispersions of people, 
but only forced dispersion.202 Brubaker criticizes the proliferation of the ‘diaspora’ 
concept, as he states that it is “imposing groupness” on individuals by assuming they 
form a collective.203 It is indeed true that the concept implies a certain generalization, 
but it must also be acknowledged that, in the Sri Lankan case, there are grounds to 
speak of a Sri Lankan diaspora. There is an international dispersion of Sri Lankans, 
200  Scott, J., A dictionary of sociology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 173. 
201  Brubaker, R., “The ‘diaspora’ diaspora”, Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 28 No. 1, 2005, p. 5. For a further, more recent dis-
cussion, see: Alexander, C., Beyond the “The ‘diaspora’ diaspora”: a response to Rogers Brubaker, Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 
40 No. 9, 2017 and Brubaker, R., “Revisiting “The ‘diaspora’ diaspora””, Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 40 No. 9, 2017. 
202  Cheran, R., “Diaspora circulation and transnationalism as agents for change in the post conflict zones of Sri Lanka,” 
Berghof Foundation for Conflict Management Policy Paper, 2003, p. 4. 




with a share that has (through diasporic organizations) remained oriented towards 
Sri Lanka or the imagined homeland of Tamil Eelam. This way, it has been possible 
for a distinctive Sri Lankan, Tamil or Sinhala identity to be maintained. This does 
not encompass all of those who have permanently emigrated from Sri Lanka, but 
a certain level of generalization is necessary to study emigration and transnational 
engagement. However, it is less clear in the Spanish country study whether it would 
be appropriate to speak of a diaspora, as such, as the Spanish nationality policies 
discussed in the country study mostly cover the (at times distant) descendants 
of those who emigrated from Spain in the past. Therefore, as stated earlier, these 
diasporas will be discussed in a more generic manner and less attention will also 
be paid to diaspora engagement. A broad definition of the term ‘diaspora’ will be 
used, which is not limited to forced dispersion only. Nevertheless, caution will be 
exercised in order to avoid that, in Brubaker’s words, groupness is imposed when 
that would not be appropriate. 
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Into the Citizenship Maze: 




As observed in the previous Chapter, it has almost become commonplace that the 
acceptance of dual nationality is proliferating around the globe.204 However, the 
question remains what this  ‘acceptance’ entails in practice. Further questions also 
arise in this context, such as, can a binary categorization of ‘acceptance’ and ‘non-
acceptance’ do justice to the diversity of nationality policies? Firstly, in order to 
answer these questions, this Chapter aims to provide an in-depth legal comparative 
study of nationality legislation on the topic of dual nationality. This study will be 
conducted from an emigration perspective. This means that this Chapter does 
not focus on the already well-studied naturalization policies from an immigration 
perspective, but instead it focuses on the nationality policies from an emigration 
perspective. More specifically, it attempts to shed a light on how States enable 
emigrants and their descendants to retain or (re)acquire their original nationality. 
For that purpose, a categorization and further analysis of such policies will be 
presented, and these policies will be assessed critically on the basis of relevant 
international standards. Secondly, on the basis of the abovementioned analysis and 
categorization, this Chapter aims to analyse whether and how States make use of the 
flexibility (see Chapter 1) that is engendered by the acceptance of dual nationality 
for emigrants. Thirdly, drawing on the concept of ‘citizenship constellations’ 
brought forward in the previous Chapter, the loss provisions of emigration 
States will also be studied in connection with the provisions for naturalization in 
immigration States.
This Chapter will start with a literature overview of comparative legal analyses 
of nationality legislation. After that, the methodology of the comparative analyses 
presented in this Chapter will be explained further, as well as how the analyses 
in this Chapter can be of added value compared to earlier studies. Subsequently, 
an overview of the modes of loss and (re)acquisition of nationality that are of 
relevance from an emigration perspective will be presented for 194 States, which 
will demonstrate to what extent States accept dual nationality for emigrants and 
their descendants. In addition, a categorization and a more in-depth analysis of 
the overview is presented, which will also provide numerous nuances that could 
204  For example, see: Tanasoca, S., “The ethics of multiple citizenship”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 1; 
Bosniak, L., “Multiple nationality and the postnational transformation of citizenship”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 
42, 2001, p. 979-1004; Vertovec, S., “Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation”, International migration Review, 
Vol. 38 No. 3, 2004, pp. 970-1001 and Levitt, P., “Transnational migration: taking stock and future directions”, Global networks, 




not be presented in the overview itself. When appropriate, the findings will also 
be assessed normatively and it will be determined to what extent they are in line 
with relevant international standards.205 After that, it will be analysed whether and 
how States make use of the flexibility that dual nationality acceptance facilitates. 
Lastly, the outcomes of an interactive analysis of dual nationality provisions will be 
presented in an overview table and analysed further.     
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Numerous studies have aimed to provide an overview of dual nationality policies, 
with greatly varying scopes, methodologies and outcomes. The great majority 
of these studies focus on the acquisition of nationality from a receiving State 
perspective only, which entails that the studies mainly focus on the requirements 
for the acquisition of nationality by naturalization.206 In this section, a number of 
studies will be discussed that also focus on the conditions for retaining nationality 
or the conditions for transferring nationality in the case of birth abroad. 
A study from 2008 conducted by Bronsted Sejersen analysed the nationality 
policies of 115 States in order to provide a “global analysis” of dual nationality 
and study whether “dual nationality [is] on the increase”.207 The selection of these 
States was based on the availability of resources and therefore excludes “most 
African States, very small States and countries for which it was impossible to obtain 
reliable information”.208  This analysis was conducted by “analysing official State 
Websites and journal and newspaper articles”.209 The results are presented for each 
State in a table that categorizes the allowance of dual citizenship in four categories: 
allowed for the majority of the population, allowed for treaty nations, allowed for 
children and adolescents, and allowed under special circumstances.210 Next to that, 
the study describes the development of the acceptance of dual nationality over 
time, by providing an overview of acceptance rates at six different moments in time 
between 1959-2005. 
205  Relevant international standards have been derived from the following source of reference: De Groot, G.R. and Vonk, O., 
International Standards on Nationality Laws: Text, Cases and Materials, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2016.  
206  For example, see: Huddleston, T., Bilgili, Ö, Joki, A. and Vankova, Z., Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, Barcelona/ 
Brussels: CIDOB and MPG 2015; Howard, M., “Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU”, Internation-
al Migration Review, Vol. 39 No. 3, 2005, pp. 697-720; Janoski, T., The Ironies of Citizenship: Naturalization and Integration in In-
dustrialized Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
207  Brøndsted Sejersen, T., “ ‘I vow to thee my countries’ ‘the expansion of dual citizenship in the 21st century”, International 
Migration Review, Vol. 42 No. 3, 2008, p. 523. 
208  Ibid, p. 530. 
209  Ibid. 
210  Ibid, p. 532. 
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The scope of the study is relatively broad and therefore can provide more insights, yet 
the chosen methodology makes the outcomes less reliable, as the usage of secondary 
sources does not guarantee that the outcomes of the study are necessarily correct. 
For example, the author claims that Argentina has concluded dual nationality 
treaties with 11 States, while Argentina has concluded dual nationality treaties with 
only two States (Italy and Spain).211 The remaining nine treaties address the issue 
of conflicting military conscription obligations, but they do not provide a ground 
for the acquisition of dual nationality as such.212 The author has also excluded 
those States for which reliable sources are more difficult to obtain, which means 
that mainly policies of non-Western States have been ignored. 
One of the most extensive studies of dual nationality was conducted by Boll. He 
describes grounds for acquisition and loss related to dual nationality for 75 States.213 
The goal of his study is to provide an overview of State practice regarding multiple 
nationality.214  The author does not mention the criteria he used to select the States 
included in the study. The data is derived from primary sources found in the 
Countries of Origin and Legal Information Database of the UNHCR. In addition, 
Boll also refers to other sources, such as government websites and newspaper 
articles.  For each of the 75 States, Boll indicates whether and how nationality is 
acquired or lost for ten modes of acquisition and nine modes of loss.215 For each 
mode of acquisition or loss, the conditions are summarized. Taken together, the 
study provides insightful information about the acceptance of dual nationality. It 
goes far beyond the more traditional binary model, in which dual nationality is 
either accepted or not, as it provides precise information on the scenarios in which 
dual nationality can be acquired and when it cannot. The study also examines the 
nationality policies of States that are often left out of comparative analyses, such 
as microstates. However, as the selection of States is based on the availability of 
resources in the abovementioned database, it cannot be determined whether it 
provides a representative overview, as Boll also acknowledges.216 
An often-cited study of Jones-Correra addresses the nationality policies of Latin-
American States. It is one of the few analyses that studies dual nationality policies 
211  Ibid.
212  Habib, J., “Report on Citizenship Law: Argentina”, Eudo Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fiesole: European 
University Institute 2016, p. 20.
213  Boll, A., Multiple nationality and international law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007.
214  Ibid, p. 51. 
215  The nine modes of acquisition covered by the study are: birth, naturalization, adoption, legitimation, marriage, resump-
tion, State service, acquisition through a parent, and acquisition through spouse. The ten modes of loss covered by the study are: 
renunciation, conditional attribution at birth, naturalization elsewhere, adoption by a foreigner, marriage to a foreigner, spouse 
acquires another nationality, parent acquires another nationality, resumption of previous nationality, service to a foreign State, 
other forms of attribution of nationality, and punitive deprivation. 




from an emigration perspective, as the analysis also describes whether nationality 
can be retained upon naturalization abroad.217 The study describes the stance on 
dual nationality of 33 “selected countries in the Western Hemisphere”, although it 
remains unclear what this selection is based upon.218 The study was compiled by 
using a combination of primary and secondary sources, namely the IOM, CIMAL 
(Centro de informacion sobre migraciones en America Latina), national constitutions, 
and telephone interviews with embassies and consulates.219 Thereby, it remains 
unclear what the presented data in each individual case is based upon exactly. 
Jones-Correra notes whether the State recognizes dual nationality or not and added 
a section of additional comments. Three different comments are included, namely, 
‘[recognition of dual nationality] only with treaty nations’, ‘[original nationality] 
recoverable if return’ and ‘[recognition of dual nationality] since independence’.220 
The scope of the study is limited and it is unclear what is meant exactly by 
‘recognition’ of dual nationality. 
By far the most extensive comparative study of nationality policies was conducted 
by Vink, De Groot and Luk. It provides a comparative overview of 200 States 
regarding the loss of nationality upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality 
in 1960 and 2015 in order to analyse the policy changes that took place between 
those reference years.221 The study is based on primary sources, all of which are 
listed in a Codebook. The States are categorized on the basis of (a combination 
of) three possible consequences of the acquisition of a foreign nationality, namely 
‘automatic loss of nationality’, ‘automatic loss of nationality if the original nationality 
was acquired through naturalization’ and ‘renunciation of nationality possible’. 
Subsequently, States are presented in a grouped model of three categories as well 
as a binary model. In addition to this, the Codebook provides further explanations 
on the nationality provisions of most of these States in a Comment section. 
Because of the large number of States included and the use of primary sources, 
the study provides a reliable account of the global development of the acceptance 
of dual nationality. It also presents the outcomes of the study in several different 
ways. By doing so, it provides a more nuanced overview as well as a clear binary 
overview. However, these categorizations may not always do justice to the nuances 
of nationality legislation. Furthermore, the study provides an overview of one mode 
217  Jones-Correa, M., “Under two flags: Dual nationality in Latin America and its consequences for naturalization in the 
United States”, International migration review, Vol. 35 No.4, 2001, pp. 997-1029.
218  Ibid, p. 999. 
219  Ibid.
220  Ibid. 
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of loss of nationality (i.e. loss upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality) 
and therefore its scope is rather limited. 
Another extensive comparative study was conducted by Jeffers, Honohan and 
Bauböck, which provides a comparative overview of 177 States.222 The study 
addresses the acquisition of nationality by birth, iure sanguinis, as well as iure soli, in 
the year 2016. It was compiled on the basis of data available in the GLOBALCIT 
Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship. It is therefore not a study 
on the topic of dual nationality, as such, but it does include certain elements related 
to dual nationality (e.g. whether nationality acquired at birth can be retained at 
majority next to another nationality). Each State is assigned a score ranging from 
0 to 1 on the basis of the GLOBALCIT Citizenship Indicators system, in which a 
score of 0 means that a particular mode of acquisition does not exist in that State, 
while a score of 1 means that a particular mode is unrestricted in that particular 
State. A score between 0 and 1 indicates that the mode of acquisition or loss is 
restricted up to a certain level. The explanatory paper provides an exhaustive 
overview of these restrictions, each of which leads to an adaption of the score 
(e.g. if a child cannot acquire nationality iure sanguinis in the case of birth out of 
wedlock, 0.5 point is deducted).223 If these restrictions can be avoided,  this is taken 
into account by multiplying the score by a certain factor, ranging from 0.25 (if 
restrictions can easily be overcome) to 1 (if restrictions cannot be overcome).224 
Thereby, a quantitative indicator is provided that takes into account the conditions 
for a particular mode of acquisition of nationality. This makes clear to what extent 
a State enables the acquisition of nationality through a particular mode and also 
facilitates international comparison. However, the score, in itself, does not reveal 
how acquisition is facilitated or restricted.
3. METHODOLOGY 
As the preceding section made clear, conducting a comparative study of nationality 
policies is in many ways a balancing act. Comprehensiveness ensures that the study 
provides a clear picture, but it might impair the depth of the analysis. Providing a 
greater level of detail leads to a more accurate depiction of the policies, yet it can also 
222  GLOBALCIT, “CITLAW Indicators Version 3.0”, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute 2017.
223  Jeffers K., Honohan, I. and Bauböck, R., “How to Measure the Purposes of Citizenship Laws: Explanatory Report for 
the CITLAW Indicators (Version 3.0)”, 2017, GLOBALCIT, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute 2017, p. 
21. 




make the study unclear. This section will therefore elaborate on the methodological 
choices that have to be made for the execution of this comparative study.  
Firstly, as the goal of this study is to expound the nuances of the acceptance of 
dual nationality, the relevant legislation will be described and summarized rather 
than ‘coded’. This approach might not result in a clear categorized overview, but 
it will provide more insights into the nuances of the nationality policies. However, 
in order to make this study practically feasible as well as accessible for the reader, 
the descriptions of the relevant legislation will be standardized and simplified in 
certain cases. Next to that, the study will be conducted on a global scale in order 
to ensure the relevance of the study and it will also include, in particular, the (non-
Western) States which have often been excluded from previous analyses. The study 
will therefore include the States that have been recognized by the United Nations 
as of January 2018. Three other territories that are nevertheless of relevance will 
also be added to the set, namely Kosovo, Taiwan and Vatican City. The legislative 
provisions will be studied based on the reference date of 1 January 2018. 
The study will make use of the data available in the GLOBALCIT Database on 
Modes of Acquisition and Loss of Nationality as a starting point, which will then be 
verified on the basis of primary (legislative) sources and supplemented. The relevant 
legislation is primarily derived from official governmental sources and is on file with 
the author. In case the relevant legislation cannot be found in governmental sources, 
the legislation is derived from reliable databases.225 In some cases, when (part of) 
the current legislation is not available in an accessible language and it is also not 
possible to obtain a reliable and current translation of the legislation,226 it  will be 
necessary to resort to machine translation in order to trace the relevant provisions. 
These provisions will be subsequently translated by a professional translator. In 
order to ensure that the retrieved legislation is up to date and/or correct, as much 
as possible, the validity of the relevant retrieved provisions will be cross-checked 
on the basis of a range of secondary (academic and non-academic) sources, such 
as scholarly works, websites from relevant government ministries and departments, 
websites from consulates and embassies, policy reports and newspaper articles. The 
legislative provisions will subsequently be summarized in an overview table. In each 
case, the provisions will be cited by stating the exact article number and the title(s) 
225  These databases are: GLOBALCIT Country Profiles <http://globalcit.eu/country-profiles/>, Refworld <http://www.ref-
world.org/>, Natlex <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.home>, WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/>, the Citizenship 
Rights in Africa Initiative <http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org> and Verlag für Standesambtwesen Internationales Ehe- und Kind-
schaftsrecht online <https://www.vfst.de>. 
226  This was the case for China, Laos, Montenegro and Uzbekistan. 
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(or a literal translation thereof) of the (consolidated) law(s). 
The question that this Chapter aims to answer is whether States allow their emigrant 
population to retain their nationality upon naturalization in another State. This 
Chapter also aims to find out whether States allow the offspring of these emigrants 
to obtain and retain the nationality of their parents, even if they already possess 
another nationality. In order to answer these questions, several different grounds 
for the loss and acquisition of nationality will be included in the analysis. In order to 
make such a broad analysis feasible, it is necessary to resort to a simplified scenario. 
For this study, the starting point will be a national of a State who will take up 
residence in another State and subsequently acquire the nationality of that State by 
means of ordinary naturalization.227 After naturalization, this person will become 
the parent of a child and will wish to transfer both nationalities to the child. In total, 
four modes of loss of nationality and one mode of acquisition of nationality will 
be included in this scenario. As this Chapter approaches dual nationality from an 
emigration State perspective, the requirements and procedures for the acquisition 
of nationality in the immigration States in principle fall outside the scope of this 
analysis. However, these procedures will be taken into account to a limited extent 
in  the section of this Chapter on citizenship constellations (see par. 7), in order to 
provide a transnational perspective on the matter as well.  
First generation: Relevant modes for loss of original nationality 
The first mode of loss of nationality to be studied is ‘loss upon voluntary acquisition 
of another nationality’ (GLOBALCIT mode of loss L05). An example of this 
mode of loss can be found in Japanese nationality law, as Japanese nationality is 
automatically lost upon acquisition of the nationality of another State.228 If there 
is no such provision in place, this will be noted as ‘not applicable’. If there such 
a provision is in place, this will be noted as ‘yes’, and (if necessary) followed 
by a summary of conditions and exception grounds. If nationality is not lost 
automatically, but it can be withdrawn instead, this is noted as ‘yes (withdrawal)’. 
Regarding the exception grounds, it is important to note that a number of States 
have concluded bilateral treaties in order to allow for the acquisition or retention 
of dual nationality status for the nationals of certain States. However, as many 
States have amended their legislation over the past decades in order to tolerate dual 
nationality in general, these treaties have often become obsolete.229 In this overview, 
227  The term ‘ordinary naturalization’ refers to the voluntary acquisition of nationality by a person with a certain period of 
residence in the country. It may refer to various procedures as, for example, in Belgium, it refers to two distinct procedures for 
acquisition of nationality.
228  Art. 11 par. 1 of the Japanese Nationality Law.
229  An example is the Spanish-Argentine dual nationality treaty of 1969. See: Instrument of ratification of the Convention be-




only dual nationality treaties that are still of relevance to a particular State will be 
included. A special reference must be made here to the bilateral nationality treaties 
in former socialist States. Historically, the largest cluster of bilateral nationality 
treaties could be found in the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia.230 Between 1956 and 1984, 39 such treaties were concluded between 
26 States in this particular region.231 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the majority of these treaties were gradually terminated by the concluding 
States.232 Furthermore, in particular due to the numerous issues of State succession 
that affected this region, it has become exceedingly difficult to determine whether 
a treaty can still be considered to be in force and, moreover, whether the treaty 
provisions are still adhered to in practice. For those reasons, it cannot merely be 
assumed that the remaining treaties are still of influence currently for the position 
of dual nationals. The latest extensive treatise on the status of these dual nationality 
treaties stems from 2003.233 For the minority of treaties that were reported to be 
still in force at that time, it was assessed whether the treaty was still in force on the 
reference date of 1 January 2018 and whether the concluding States still adhere 
to the treaty provisions.234 If this is the case, the treaty provisions will be included 
in the overview for the concluding States. If the status of the treaty remained 
uncertain, this will be stated in a footnote for the concluding States. 
The second relevant mode of loss of nationality is loss upon residence abroad 
(GLOBALCIT mode of loss L02). Although this mode is not a restriction on 
dual nationality per se, it is of paramount importance for emigrants. In addition to 
that, these provisions are often only applicable to those who hold more than one 
nationality in order to prevent cases of statelessness, which could be perceived as 
an indirect restriction on dual nationality. An example of this mode of loss can 
be found in the case of Myanmar, as its nationality can be lost upon ‘emigrating 
permanently’.235 If there is no such provision in place, this will be noted as ‘not 
applicable’. If there is such a provision in place, this will be noted as ‘yes’, followed 
by the period of residence abroad after which the loss of nationality can occur. If 
nationality is not lost automatically, but it can be withdrawn instead, this is noted 
1969 (“Instrumento de ratificación del Convenio entre el Gobierno Español y el Gobierno de la República Argentina sobre nacionalidad, 
firmado en Madrid el 14 de abril de 1969”), BOE, No. 236 of 2 October 1971, p. 15918 ff. via <https://www.boe.es/>. 
230  Hecker, H., “Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen in völkerrechtlichen Verträgen osteuropäischer Staaten”, Archiv des Völkerrechts, 
Vol. 30 No. 3, 1992, p. 326. 
231  Ibid., p. 342 ff. 
232  Hecker, H., Die Doppelstaater-Konventionen in Osteuropa gestern und heute, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag fur das Stan-
desamtwesen 2003, p. 65 ff. 
233  Ibid. 
234  This was primarily assessed on the basis of formal statements that affirm that the bilateral treaty is in force as well as over-
views of bilateral treaties that are currently in force provided by official government websites, supplemented with academic re-
sources (in particular Globalcit country reports) and general information available on official government websites. 
235  Art. 16 Burma Citizenship Law 1982. 
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as ‘yes (withdrawal)’. If applicable, further conditions and exceptions to the main 
rule will be summarized. It must be noted that virtually all States whose legislation 
provides for loss upon residence abroad provide for exemptions for those who 
work abroad in the service of the Government and/or an international organization. 
Due to the particularly narrow scope of these exceptions, they are not included in 
the analysis. 
Second Generation: Relevant modes for acquisition of nationality in the case of birth 
abroad 
Concerning the descendants of first-generation emigrants, it must be described 
whether they can acquire the original nationality of their parent(s) in the case of birth 
abroad (GLOBALCIT mode of acquisition A01b). This category can be divided 
into four subcategories: acquisition on the basis of the nationality of the father (a 
patre), acquisition on the basis of the nationality of the mother (a matre), acquisition 
on the basis of the nationality of both the mother and the father (a patre et a matre) 
(in case both parents are required to be nationals), and acquisition a patre/a matre 
(in case there is no difference between acquisition a matre and acquisition a patre). 
Each applicable subcategory will be noted as ‘yes’. If applicable, it will be mentioned 
if there are further (non-procedural) conditions in place. For example, a number of 
States preclude certain categories of nationals from transferring their nationality in 
the case of birth abroad or make acquisition of nationality dependent upon taking 
up residence in the country. It must be noted that acquisition of nationality by birth 
is a complicated matter. The overview provided hereinafter should be interpreted 
as a starting point rather than an exhaustive overview. The overview presents each 
State’s main rules for acquisition at birth abroad; other potential routes to the 
acquisition of nationality (e.g. option rights or preferential naturalization) will not 
be included in this analysis. In addition, the complicated topic of establishment and 
the annulment of parentage will not be dealt with in detail. This also applies to the 
exact procedural requirements in case of birth abroad (e.g. registration of birth). 
The common specific provisions for those who are born abroad while their parent 
is abroad for public service or provisions for the prevention of statelessness have 
also not been taken into account. These concessions are justified by the fact that the 
main goal of this study is to unravel the attitudes of States towards dual nationality 
from an emigration State perspective and, as such, they fall outside the scope of 
this study. Providing an overview for rules on the acquisition of nationality in the 
case of birth abroad is a necessary step in this process, but it is not the core issue 




Second Generation: Relevant modes for loss of original nationality 
There are two main ways through which the child of an emigrant can lose his or 
her nationality later in life. First, nationality is lost in some cases if the child holds 
more than one nationality and he does not renounce one of the nationalities at a 
later age (usually after attaining the age of majority) (GLOBALCIT mode of loss 
L06). An example is Nepal, as minors who hold more than one nationality are 
required to opt for one of the two nationalities within two years after attaining the 
age of 16 years.236 Failure to fulfil this obligation will result in the loss of Nepalese 
nationality.237 If there is no such provision in place, this will be noted as ‘not 
applicable’. If there is such a provision in place, this will be noted as ‘yes (loss upon 
non-renunciation of other nationality)’, and completed with further conditions (if 
provided by the legislation). If applicable, exceptions to the main rule will also be 
described, as well as ways through which loss of nationality can be prevented. 
 
















236  Art. 10 par. 3 Nepal Citizenship Act 2063 (2006).
237  Ibid. 
238  Art. 34 359/2003 Nationality Act. 
239  Art. 22 par. 5 Belgian Nationality Law 1984. 
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An approach for studying citizenship constellations
The relevant legislative provisions addressing dual nationality should not be 
studied in isolation. After all, it takes two to make a dual national. Drawing
Secondly, in some cases nationality can be lost upon residence abroad (GLOBALCIT
mode of loss L02).As outlined in the previous section, this mode is not a restriction
on dual nationality per se, but is if of particular importance to second generation
emigrants. In addition to that, these provisions are often only applicable to those
who hold more than one nationality in order to prevent cases of statelessness,
which could be perceived as an indirect restriction on dual nationality. An example
is Finland, where, in principle, a dual national will lose his Finnish nationality if
he has never lived or resided in Finland before reaching the age of 22 (although
numerous exemptions apply to this provision). 238 Another example can be found
in Belgium, where a national who was born abroad in principle loses his nationality
upon continuous residence abroad between the age of 18 and 28, although there
are a number of exceptions in place. 239 If there are no such provisions in place,
this will be noted as ‘not applicable’. If there is such a provision in place, this will
be noted as ‘yes (loss upon residence abroad)’, along with the period of residence
abroad after which nationality is lost. If applicable, exceptions to the main rule will
also be described.
on the concept of ‘citizenship constellations’ brought forward in the previous 
Chapter, the loss provisions of emigration States will therefore also be studied in 
interaction with the provisions for naturalization in immigration States. In the last 
section of this Chapter, it will be attempted to present a framework of analysis for 
studying these interactions. 
The last section of this Chapter will aim to answer the question in which citizenship 
constellations dual nationality is permitted for naturalized individuals in all cases. In 
other words, this entails that the emigration State permits the retention of nationality 
after naturalization in another State in all cases, while the immigration State does 
not require the renunciation of the original nationality in any case. This section will 
therefore specifically focus on the most inclusive citizenship constellations. 
In order to accomplish this task, it is not feasible to take all the nuances discussed in 
this Chapter into account and, therefore, a number of concessions have to be made. 
First of all, the scope of analysis will be reduced to the context of EU Member 
States, as a global scope of analysis is not feasible due to the complexity of the task. 
For immigration States, the naturalization requirements relating to renunciation of 
nationality for 28 EU Member States will be taken into account (mode of loss L06 
and mode of acquisition A06 in the GLOBALCIT methodology). For emigration 
States, data regarding the retention of nationality upon the naturalization in another 
State (mode of loss L05 in the GLOBALCIT methodology) will be derived from 
the overview presented in this Chapter. On the basis of Eurostat data, the scope 
of analysis will be further reduced to the 30 largest origin States of those who 
acquired an EU Member State nationality in 2017, as this was the most recent year 
for which statistical data was made available at the time the research was executed. 
In order to include important individual outliers, the three largest origin States for 
each EU Member State will be determined. If those particular States were not yet 
included, they will be added to the analysis.   
            
               
             
               
            
            
 




The outcomes will be presented in a table. If two States permit dual nationality 
in the manner described above in all cases, the relevant cell is marked. If either of 
the States does not permit dual nationality in the manner described above in all 
cases, the relevant cell is left blank. If a State, in principle, does not permit dual 
nationality in the manner described above, but exception grounds to that basic rule 
cover virtually all cases, this is interpreted as permissive. If such exception grounds 
to that basic rule cover either a limited number of cases or if their scope cannot be
established, this is interpreted as not permissive. However, if an exception ground
permits dual nationality for certain other nationalities, this will still be interpreted 
as permissive in those particular cases only. 
            
            
 
          
            
       
             

















240  European Commission, “Acquisition of citizenship” [data file], Eurostat, 2019.   
241  According to Art. 3 par. 1 sub d Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007, EU Member States shall supply statistics on the num-
bers of “persons having their usual residence in the territory of the Member State and having acquired during the reference year 
the citizenship of the Member State and having formerly held the citizenship of another Member State or a third country or hav-
ing formerly been stateless, disaggregated by age and sex, and by the former citizenship of the persons concerned and by wheth-
er the person was formerly stateless”. 
242  Art. 34 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1999. 
243  Art. 12a Constitution of the Second Republic of Gambia 1997. 
244  <https://www.foreign.gov.bb/foreign-relations/travelling/dual-citizenship>. 
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In order to indicate the magnitude of each citizenship constellation, each cell will 
state the number of persons who acquired the nationality of that particular EU 
Member States with an original nationality of that particular other State in 2017, 
as reported by Eurostat. 240 It should be noted that these figures are indicative rather 
than conclusive, as the Eurostat statistical data on the acquisition of nationality is 
broader than naturalization alone. 241 Nevertheless, as long as more precise statistical 
data is lacking, these figures provide a strong indication of the significance of each 
particular citizenship constellation.
4.1 Loss upon acquisition of another nationality
In total, 117 States out of 196 States do not have a provision for loss upon acquisition 
of another nationality in place, while the remaining 79 States do. In the majority of 
these 117 States, nationality law is completely silent on the topic of dual nationality, 
while in a small number of cases, dual nationality is expressly permitted. An example 
is Venezuela, where nationals are constitutionally protected against the revocation 
of their nationality upon the acquisition of another nationality.242 Another example 
is Gambia, where the constitution explicitly states that a person who acquires 
another nationality may retain Gambian nationality.243 Such provisions indicate 
that the acceptance of dual nationality in those States is not a result of indi￿erence, 
but rather they embrace the phenomenon. This is well illustrated by Barbados, 
where nationality can be retained upon the acquisition of another nationality and 
emigrants are even encouraged to do so. A  website of the Barbados Ministry of 
Foreign A￿airs and ForeignTrade states: “If you are residing overseas permanently 
or for an extended period and are eligible to apply for citizenship, you should do so. 





















An important addition is that, in certain States, nationality is not only lost upon the 
acquisition of another nationality, but it can also be lost upon the exercise of certain 
rights that are deemed to be only accorded to nationals of the other State. Although 
the practical importance of these provisions is probably limited, their existence 
is nevertheless problematic, as rights that are reserved traditionally for citizen 
are nowadays increasingly also accorded to non-nationals. Malaysian nationality, 
for example, can be lost upon voting “in any political election” abroad (Art. 39A 
Constitution). This sits uneasily considering that it is becoming increasingly 
common that voting rights are granted to non-nationals; a significant part of the 
245  Mounir, S., “Do countries that recognize dual citizenship have healthier economies? Evidence from the Economic Com-
munity of West African States” Migration and Development, Vol. 3. No. 2, 2014, pp. 254-271; Leblang, D., “Harnessing the dias-
pora: dual citizenship, migrant return remittances”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 50 No. 1, 2017, pp. 75-101.
246  Alarian, H., and Wallace Goodman, S., “Dual citizenship allowance and migration flow: an origin story”, Comparative Po-
litical Studies, Vol. 50 No. 1, 2017, pp. 133-167.
247  Vink, M., Prokic’Breuer, T. and Dronkers, J., “Immigrant naturalization in the context of institutional diversity: policy 
matters, but to whom?” International Migration, Vol. 51 No. 5, 2013, pp. 1-20. 
248  Newland, K., Circular Migration and Human Development, Human Development Research Paper 2009/42, United Na-
tions Development Programme 2009, p. 13; Skeldon, R., “Going Round in Circles: Circular Migration, Poverty Alleviation and 
Marginality”, International Migration, Vol. 50 No. 3, 2012, p. 54; Hugo, G., What We Know About Circular Migration and En-
hanced Mobility, MPI Policy Brief No. 7/2013, Migration Policy Institute 2013, p. 7.




Although the remaining 79 States constitute a minority nowadays, their position
under international law has nevertheless remained strong, in principle, as Chapter
1 made clear. It is however questionable whether the restrictive position of the
remaining 79 States can still be defended from a normative perspective. As stated
earlier in the first Chapter, the traditional arguments against dual nationality
have proven to be mostly anachronistic and inconclusive. The acceptance of dual
nationality can be beneficial for emigration States, as it facilitates circular mobility
and can increase the level of (monetary as well as non-monetary) remittances. 245 
Importantly, the acceptance of dual nationality is also in the emigrant’s interest.
It has been shown that the acceptance of dual nationality by an emigration State
is of great significance to emigrants, as it is an influential factor in the emigration
decision-making process. 246 From a transnational perspective, it has been shown
that the acceptance of dual nationality by emigration States influences the
naturalization rate in receiving States, indicating that the acceptance of dual
nationality in the country of origin lowers the threshold for migrants to obtain
nationality in their new country of residence. 247Therefore, allowing dual nationality
facilitates the optimal circularity of migrants and enables them to shape their own
migration trajectories. 248 Lastly, nationality has been considered an important
part of one’s social identity. 249 As national identities are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, enabling migrants to retain their original nationality upon the acquisition
of another nationality should be encouraged.


















         
     
               
             
          
   
           
           
         
       
        
250  See: GLOBALCIT (2017). ELECLAW Indicators. Version 5.0, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Insti-
tute.
251  Kaochan, P., “Thai Nationals with Dual National Status” (Master Thesis), Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2009, p. 
87. 
252  <http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/services/1415/21483-Frequently-Asked-Questions-(FAQs).html>.  
253  Art. 19 Law N 2235-III (2235-14) on the Citizenship of Ukraine. 
254  Leontiyeva, Y., “Ukrainians in the Czech Republic: On the pathway from temporary foreign workers to one of the largest 
minority groups”, in: Fedyuk, O. and Kindler, M., Ukrainian Migration to the European Union: Lessons from Migration Studies, Ba-
sel: Springer, 2016, p. 144. 
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4.1.1 Exceptions
In general, there are several factors that mitigate the e ects of the loss provisions
of the 79 remaining States. First, nationality is not always lost automatically upon
the acquisition of another nationality, but only after the authorities take steps to
withdraw the nationality from the person concerned. Until such steps are taken,
a person will remain de facto and de iure a national. Whether or not nationality
will be lost is then dependent on government practice. A prime example of this
scenario is provided by Thailand. According to Art. 22 of the Thai Nationality Act,
a person of Thai nationality who has been naturalized will lose Thai nationality.
However, Art. 5 of the Nationality Act states that the loss of Thai nationality shall
only be e ective upon publication in the Government Gazette. It has been stated
that such publication, and thereby the loss of Thai nationality on this ground, does
not occur in practice. 251 Another strong indication of this is that a website of the
Thai Ministry of Foreign A airs states that a Thai national who also holds another
nationality can apply for a Thai passport, without warning that acquiring a foreign
nationality can lead to loss of Thai nationality. 252
This situation should be distinguished from States where acquisition of 
another nationality leads to the automatic (ex lege) loss of nationality, but where 
the authorities of the State in question are simply not aware of the fact that it 
took place. Therefore, in practice the national can continue to make use of his 
nationality status. An example is provided by Ukraine, where the acquisition of 
another nationality in theory leads to the loss of nationality. 253 However, a case 
study on Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic revealed that the naturalization 
rate among this group almost doubled after the Czech Republic revoked its 
renunciation requirement for naturalizations in 2014, even though the Ukrainian 
loss requirement had remained in place. 254This clearly indicates that many of these 







   
 
Exception ground: permission can be granted for retaining nationality upon naturalization 
in another State 
Firstly, in 12 States, emigrants who have obtained or are about to obtain another 
nationality are enabled to request the retention of their original nationality. 255 It 
is important to note that, in these cases, permission for retaining nationality is 
usually granted on a discretionary basis. The category is diverse in nature, as the 
requirements for such permission differ from State to State. 
In some States, obtaining permission for maintaining nationality seems to be a 
mere formality. An example is Egypt, where, in all cases, a national is required by 
law to seek permission from the Egyptian Minister of Interior to obtain a foreign 
nationality, even if he does not intend to retain his Egyptian nationality.256 Also, 
if this permission is granted, Egyptian nationality can in principle be revoked 
subsequently.257 For that reason, an Egyptian national who wishes to retain his 
Egyptian nationality next to another nationality is required to submit a second 
request for permission.258 It was reported that, between January 2011 and March 
2015, 3,951 Egyptian nationals obtained such permission to retain Egyptian 
nationality next to another nationality.259 
Other States impose additional requirements for retaining nationality. An example 
is offered by Sri Lanka, where retaining dual nationality is – in short – dependent on 
the age, education level and income of the applicant (see also Chapter 3). Another 
example is Uganda, where each application for permission to retain Ugandan 
nationality is individually reviewed by the National Citizenship and Immigration 
255  Austria, Bahrain, Egypt, Germany, Latvia, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
and Uganda. 
256  Art. 10 Law No. 26 of 1975 on Egyptian Nationality.
257  Ibid.  
258  Ibid.  





             
             
             
            
          
             
           
      
 






In addition to these general mitigations, it is important to note that, in the
remaining States, nationality is not in all cases lost upon the acquisition of
another nationality, as the analysis shows that a large share of these States (34)
allow for major exceptions to their main rule on loss. The exception grounds
that the abovementioned 34 States provide can be divided into four categories.
These four categories will be discussed further below. It is important to note that
certain States have several exception grounds in place and, therefore, the figures
presented in the section below can overlap.
Board. The Board must be satisfied that, among others, the applicant does not 
have a criminal record, is not an undischarged bankrupt person and is of sound 
mind.260 Interestingly, in the Ugandan context, the term “dual nationality” should 
be taken literally, as the Act does not allow the applicant to hold more than two 
nationalities.261 
In Austria, requirements for the retention of nationality are so stringent that they 
can only be fulfilled in exceptional cases. An Austrian national who has acquired a 
foreign nationality can, upon application, be permitted to retain Austrian nationality 
if this retention “is in the interests of the Republic [of Austria] by […] [his] actual or 
expected achievements or on grounds particularly deserving of consideration”.262 
These grounds are relatively vague and have not been defined further by the 
Austrian legislator. In 2009, the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court therefore 
ruled that “the law does not contain any details on the nature of the achievements”. 
However, as a helping hand to ordinary Austrian citizens, it did rule that “average 
achievements” (“durchschnittliche Leistungen”) should already be sufficient to fulfil 
the criterion.263 The second Austrian exemption ground, “grounds particularly 
deserving of consideration”, is even less clearly defined, as the Court ruled that 
this should be regarded as a “catch-all clause”.264 Lastly, there is a third exemption 
ground in place for those who are Austrian nationals by birth. This group can be 
permitted to retain nationality if there are “extenuating circumstances” in their 
“private- and family life” related to either retaining Austrian nationality or to 
acquire the nationality of another State.265 This provision has also not been further 
defined by the legislator, although an information leaflet for applicants from the 
provincial government of Vienna states that such circumstances should go beyond 
those circumstances that most nationals living abroad would face.266  
Exception ground: nationality is only lost upon the acquisition of the nationality of 
certain States
Second, seven States in principle do not allow their nationals to retain nationality 
upon the acquisition of another nationality, but they make an exception for those 
260  Art. 19C Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act. 
261  Art. 19A par. 2 Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act. 
262  See Art. 28 par. 1 Austrian Nationality Law 1985. The person concerned will also have to fulfil the requirements for ordi-
nary naturalization stated in Art. 10 par. 1 of the Law, except for the requirement to have sufficient means of living. Next to that, 
it is required that the State of which the applicant wishes to obtain the nationality agrees with the retention of Austrian national-
ity. 
263  Austrian Supreme Administrative Court, case 2009/01/0023 via <https://www.ris.bka.gv.at>. See also: Rieder, C., “Zur 
Bewilligung von Doppelstaatsbürgerschaften im österreichischen Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 1985 - eine kritische Analyse”, Juri-
dikum: Zeitschrift für Kritik - Recht - Gesellschaft, 2016, Vol. 3, p. 344 ff.
264  Ibid.
265  Art. 28 par. 2 Austrian Nationality Law 1985.
266  Vienna Provincial Government, “Information der Wiener Landesregierung: Bewilligung der Beibehaltung der österreichi-
schen Staatsbürgerschaft für den Fall des Erwerbes einer fremden Staatsangehörigkeit” via <https://www.wien.gv.at/>.
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who acquire the nationality of certain States. This category can be further divided 
into two subcategories: six States that have unilaterally introduced such exceptions 
and one State where such exceptions are based on bilateral treaties.267 
          
 
           
            
             
          
              
          
         
 
          
  
             
           
            
         
          
Several EU Member States make an exception for the acquisition of nationality 
of other EU Member States. For example, a German national does not lose his 
nationality if he voluntarily acquires the nationality of another EU Member State 
or Switzerland.270  Another example is Latvia, where nationality is not lost if a 
nationality of an EU Member State, EFTA Member States, NATO Member States, 
or Australia, Brazil or New Zealand is acquired.271  This development is particularly 
interesting in the light of EU citizenship status. Even though the status of EU 
Citizenship already grants the holder a substantial set of rights in any particular 
EU Member State, a number of EU Member States apparently still wish to further 
facilitate the acquisition of their nationality for EU citizens. This practice is in line 
with another development, namely the increasing number of EU Member States 
which allow nationals of other EU Member States to naturalize under preferential 
267  The first category includes Bahrain, Bangladesh, Germany, Latvia, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea. The second catego-
ry includes Tajikistan, which concluded a bilateral treaty with Russia.   
268  Art. 9 par. 1 sub b Kingdom Act on Netherlands Nationality. 
269  Art. 15 par. 1 sub a Kingdom Act on Netherlands Nationality.
270  Art. 25 par. 1 Nationality Act 1913. 




         
             
 





      
           
   
           
 
   
 
   
  
The former subcategory mainly consists of States that unilaterally allow their
nationals to retain their original nationality if they naturalized in a Western State.
An example is Bangladesh. According to Article 2B of the Bangladesh Citizenship
Temporary Provisions Order 1972, a person can be allowed to retain his
nationality of Bangladesh if he acquired the nationality of a European or North
American State. Pakistan provides another example, as it allows Pakistani
nationals to retain their nationality if they acquire the nationality of one of the 19
approved States.These 19 States areWestern-European and North American States
and Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Bahrain. Strangely, the
authorities of Pakistan refer to these exceptions as “dual nationality arrangements”,
insinuating that these exceptions are based on bilateral treaties. However, these
exceptions are unilateral in nature. This can be regarded as being misleading,
as it implies that these 19 States also allow Pakistani nationals to retain their
nationality. However, this is not always the case. For example, Pakistani nationals
who naturalize in the Netherlands will in principle be required to renounce their
original nationality.268 Also, Dutch nationals of Pakistani origin who reacquire the
nationality of Pakistan will, in general, lose their Dutch nationality.269
conditions. According to an analysis by Kochenov and Lindeboom, eight EU 
Member States apply more lenient naturalization rules for EU citizens.272 The 
difference between these preferential conditions and the ordinary naturalization 
conditions can be substantial, as the example of Italy shows. In principle, Italy 
requires ten years of residence in order to be eligible for naturalization, but this 
requirement is reduced to four years for nationals of other EU Member States.273 
Together, these examples illustrate how having EU citizenship can result in a 
privileged status in the nationality law of other Member States. 
Exception ground: nationality lost on the basis of a bilateral treaty 
Persons can be exempted from loss provisions on the basis of bilateral nationality 
treaties. As noted earlier, there are many historical examples of such bilateral 
treaties, but they have mostly lost their added value for those who acquire another 
nationality in this day and age, as the countries that concluded such treaties have 
come to accept dual nationality in general. Such treaties were often a reflection of 
the willingness of these States to strengthen their ties. In other cases, dual nationality 
treaties were intended to be a solution for the scattering of populations across 
borders. A combination of these efforts can be seen in the practices of Russia. In 
the post-Soviet era, Russia has attempted to stimulate further rapprochement with 
its neighbouring former Soviet States, aiming to create a customs- and passport 
union.274 In general, these attempts have not been successful, although the Treaty 
on the Union between Russia and Belarus of 1997 is a notable exemption.275 With 
other States, Russia signed dual nationality treaties as an alternative strategy. An 
example is the Russian-Tajik Nationality Agreement of 1996, which states that 
nationals of each of the two States have the right to acquire the nationality of 
the other state without losing their original nationality.276 A similar treaty had 
already been concluded with Turkmenistan in 1993, but with little success, as it 
was decided to terminate the treaty ten years later.277 Several former Yugoslav 
272  Kochenov, D., and Lindeboom, J., “Pluralism Through Its Denial: The Success of EU Citizenship”, in:  Davies, G. and 
Avbelj, M. (eds.), Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, p. 198. 
273  Art. 9 par. 1 sub d Act No. 91/92. 
274  See: Kembayev, Z., Legal aspects of the regional integration processes in the post-Soviet area, Berlin: Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2009 and Arakelyan, L., Russian foreign policy in Eurasia: National interests and regional integration, London: 
Routledge, 2017.
275  The Treaty on the Union between Russia and Belarus of 1997 established a supranational union for the two States. Al-
though the treaty did not lead to the establishment of a common citizenship status, it did lead to the establishment of freedom of 
movement and freedom of residence for the nationals of Russia and Belarus. See: Danilovich, A., Russian-Belarusian integration: 
playing games behind the Kremlin walls, London: Routledge, 2018.
276  Art. 1 par. 1 of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on dual citizenship. The 
other provisions of the Agreement mostly address rights and obligations of dual nationals. In most cases, the Agreement allocates 
rights and obligations on the basis of a person’s place of permanent residence. A copy of the Agreement is on file with the au-
thor. 
277  In 2003, Russia and Turkmenistan signed a protocol that stipulated their intention to terminate the dual nationality treaty. 
The Turkmen authorities subsequently issued a decree that stated that Russian-Turkmen dual nationals would have to opt for ei-
ther one of the nationalities within a period of two months. Next to that, Turkmenistan reinstated the obligation to apply for exit 
visas for those who wished to cross the Turkmen-Russian border. This led to protests in the Russian parliament, as it led to se-
vere difficulties for the Russian minority residing in Turkmenistan. Eventually, the exit visa policy was overturned, while the ex-
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States also concluded dual nationality treaties to reconcile with their cross-border 
population. An example is Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the nationality law of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina states that its nationals may hold dual nationality if there is a 
bilateral agreement between the two States.278 The country has concluded such 
bilateral agreements with Serbia, Sweden and Croatia.279 However, since March 
2016, Bosnian nationals who naturalize in another State no longer automatically 
lose Bosnian nationality.280 Nevertheless, for those Bosnian nationals who obtain 
another nationality on another ground, the dual nationality treaty can remain of 
importance. 
Exception ground: loss of nationality limited to certain categories of nationals 
Only 14 States allow certain nationals to acquire another nationality, while other 
groups of nationals are lose the nationality in that case.281 These States often 
make a distinction between nationals by birth, nationals by descent (or nationals 
born abroad) and nationals by naturalization. This entails that nationals by birth 
or descent do not lose their nationality upon acquiring another nationality, while 
naturalized nationals do. This is often caused by the fact that nationals by birth 
are constitutionally protected against the involuntary loss of nationality in that 
particular State. As a consequence, loss provisions only refer to other groups of 
nationals. For example, the Mexican Constitution does not permit the revocation 
of nationality of a national by birth in any case, but it provides several grounds for 
revocation for those who obtained their nationality through naturalization.282  
These provisions can be criticized, as they create a hierarchy of nationals, in which 
the loyalty of those who were born as a national is left unquestioned, while other 
nationals are met with more suspicion and are required to prove their national loyalty 
by remaining a ‘mononational’.  Such differential treatment of naturalized nationals 
has been subjected to criticism, as it could be perceived as the discriminatory 
deprivation of nationality under Art. 9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness or Art. 5 par. d iii of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of 
act status of Turkmen-Russian dual nationals remained uncertain for more than a decade. The dual nationality treaty was even-
tually terminated by both parties in 2015. See: Anceschi, L., Turkmenistan’s foreign policy: Positive Neutrality and the consolidation 
of the Turkmen regime, London: Routledge, 2008; Nygren, B., The rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s foreign policy towards the CIS 
countries, London: Routledge, 2007. A copy of the treaty is on file with the author. 
278  Art. 4 Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 22 March 2016. 
279  Shaw, J. and Štiks, I., Citizenship after Yugoslavia, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 90 ff and Džankic, J., Citizenship in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro: effects of statehood and identity challenges, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 120 
ff. 
280  Law on Citizenship Bosnia and Herzegovina of 22 March 2016. See also: Džankić, J., “Dimensions of Citizenship Poli-
cy in the Post-Yugoslav Space: Divergent Paths”, Central and Eastern European Migration Review, Vol. 6 No. 1, 2017, pp. 31-48, 
p. 44 ff. 
281  This includes Estonia, Honduras, Ireland, Kiribati, Lithuania, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago.




All Forms of Racial Discrimination.283 In several country reports, the Committee 
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed its concern about such 
cases of differential treatment.284 In the European context, Art. 5 par. 2 of the 
European Convention on Nationality of 1997 states as a declaration of intent that 
the State Parties shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination concerning 
the treatment of nationals by birth and other nationals. 
Other exception grounds 
Lastly, a handful of States have exemptions in place that are not covered by this 
categorization. In Brazil, the acquisition of another nationality in principle does 
lead to the loss of Brazilian nationality, but it provides several exception grounds. 
A major exception is that those who acquire nationality “imposed by the foreign 
norm, through a naturalization process, to the Brazilian resident in a foreign state, 
as a condition for continuous residence in their territory or for the exercise of civil 
rights” will not lose Brazilian nationality.285  This provision has such a wide scope 
that it can be seen as a de facto tolerance of dual nationality. A similar provision can 
be found in Sao Tome and Principe, where the acquisition of another nationality 
leads to loss, except if the other nationality is acquired “for emigration reasons”.286 
China, as is widely known, takes a negative stance towards dual nationality and, 
therefore, the acquisition of another nationality in principle leads to the loss of 
nationality.287 However, the Chinese loss provision contains an often overlooked 
second requirement, namely that nationality is only lost if the person concerned 
is “residing abroad”. In this case, “residing abroad” is interpreted as holding 
permanent resident status and residing abroad for at least two years, of which 
18 months was continuous residence.288 Therefore, Chinese nationality is lost by 
those who migrated permanently and subsequently naturalized. However, a small 
minority of Chinese nationals who are able to acquire another nationality without 
emigrating do not lose Chinese nationality. Importantly, this means that Chinese 
nationals who have obtained another nationality through citizenship by investment 
programs could remain dual nationals.289  
283  Vandenhole, W., Non-discrimination and equality in the view of the UN human rights treaty bodies, Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2005, p. 95; Spiro, P., “Citizenship, Nationality and Statelessness”, in: Chetail, V. and Bauloz, C. (eds.), Research Handbook on In-
ternational Law and Migration, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, 2014, p. 299; Ramcharan, B., “Equality and Nondiscrimination”, 
in: Farrior, S. (ed.), Equality and Non-Discrimination under International Law, Volume 2, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 46; Tibur-
cio, C., The Human Rights of Aliens Under International and Comparative Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001, 
p. 9.
284  Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Concluding observations on Qatar”, CERD/C/60/CO/11, 
21 May 2002, par. 12; Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Concluding observations on Iceland”, 
CERD/C/304/Add.111, 27 April 2011, par. 14; Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Concluding observa-
tions on Lithuania”, CERD/D/C/LTU/CO/3, 11 April 2006, par. 23. 
285  Art. 12 par. 4 sub 2a Constitution of 1988. 
286  Law 6/90, Law on Nationality.
287  Art. 9 Nationality Law of the PRC.
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289 Low, C., “Report on citizenship law: China and Taiwan”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fiesole:
The nationality laws of Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia make statements on the issue of 
dual nationality, but they do not contain any explicit loss provision. The Mongolian 
nationality law states that dual nationality is “not allowed”, but it does not state 
whether acquiring another nationality would lead to loss.290 A contrary situation 
may be found in Kyrgyzstan, as the nationality law only explicitly “recognizes” dual 
nationality in certain cases, but it does not provide any loss provisions for other 
cases.291 A similar situation can be found in Turkmenistan. According to Turkmen 
nationality law, a national of Turkmenistan who also holds another nationality is 
solely regarded as a Turkmen national,292 but the acquisition of another nationality 
does not lead to the loss of Turkmen nationality. Nevertheless, holding dual 
nationality can still lead to severe problems for Turkmen nationals. Embassies 
warn that these nationals will not be allowed to travel out of Turkmenistan on their 
second passport unless they “voluntarily” renounce their Turkmen nationality 
first, which is a process that can reportedly take up to six months.293 Allegedly, 
Turkmen authorities have also refused to renew passports of dual nationals.294 
Russia is another example of a State which, on first sight, tolerates dual nationality, 
but nevertheless it has a hostile attitude towards dual nationals. Russian nationals 
who hold an additional nationality are still only considered as Russian nationals 
under all circumstances.295 Next to that, this provision also requires Russians who 
hold a second nationality to report this to the Russian authorities. This requirement 
was introduced in 2014 in order to trace dual nationals and is reportedly based on 
sentiments of suspicion and hostility towards dual nationals.296 Even though holding 
multiple nationalities is permitted, as such, by Russian law, the phenomenon has 
for sure not been embraced. 
Although the partial acceptance of dual nationality mitigates the effects of the loss 
provisions for the nationals concerned, this practice has important drawbacks. 
In particular, if permission for the retention of nationality can be granted on a 
discretionary basis, there is a clear risk of arbitrariness. The prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation is enshrined in Art. 15 par. 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and was subsequently included in 1961 UN Convention on the 
 
290  Art. 4 Law of Mongolia on Citizenship 1995. 
291  Art. 22 par. 2 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic 2007. 
292  Art. 5 par. 2 Law of Turkmenistan of June 22, 2013 No. 411-IV “About citizenship of Turkmenistan”. 
    
294  Rejapova, T., “Turkmenistan revisits a ban on dual citizenship”, The Central-Asia Caucasus Analyst, 2010 via <http://www.
cacianalyst.org/>. 
295  Art. 6 par. 1 Federal Law from 31 May 2002 No. 62-FZ ‘About Citizenship on the Russian Federation’. 





  293 For example, see: https://tm.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/dual-citizenship/.
European University Institute 2016, p. 14.
Reduction of Statelessness (Art. 8 par. 1), in addition to multiple either explicit and 
implicit references in other treaties.297 The prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation 
of nationality also requires that minimal procedural standards are observed.298 It 
is difficult to establish whether minimum procedural standards are observed in 
these discretionary procedures, in particular if permission for the retention of 
nationality has been refused. As brought forward earlier, a selective allowance of 
dual nationality can also result in the development of discriminatory practices. The 
deprivation of nationality can be considered arbitrary if it is discriminatory on 
racial, national, ethnic, or religious grounds.299  Lastly, if the retention of nationality 
is only permitted for emigrants in Western States or for those with a considerable 
income or significant achievements, dual nationality risks becoming an elite status, 
which reserves an optimal legal status solely for a privileged group. This could 
result in the exclusion of more vulnerable migrant groups, for whom nationality 
status is also of vital importance. 
4.2 First generation: Loss of nationality upon residence abroad
First generation emigrants do not only risk losing their original nationality upon 
naturalization in the destination country, but they can also lose their original 
nationality solely on the basis of their residence abroad. In a minority of States, 
nationality can be lost if a national has resided abroad for a certain period of time. 
To be precise, 46 States have such a provision in place, while 150 States do not. 
In most of these 46 States, the loss provisions stipulate that nationality can be lost 
upon residence abroad for a period between five to ten years. There are a handful 
of outlier States where nationality can be lost after a significantly shorter time. An 
example is Qatar, where a national by naturalization can already lose his Qatari 
nationality after one year of residence abroad.300 On the contrary, Guinea has a 
significantly longer criterion in place, as Guinean nationality can only be lost after 
50 years of residence abroad.301 
At first sight, such provisions may seem like a major hurdle for those who have 
297  These include Art. 1 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Art. 5 d iii 1965 Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 9 par. 1 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, Art. 8 par. 1 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and Art. 18 par. 1 sub a 2006 Convention on Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical development of the prohibition of arbitrary depri-
vation of nationality, see: Molnár, T., “The Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality under International Law and EU 
Law: New Perspectives”, Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law, 2014, pp. 67-92.
298  This entails, among others, that the deprivation of nationality must take place in accordance with the law and accompa-
nied by full procedural guarantees. See: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Expert Meeting – Interpreting the 1961 Stateless 
Convention and Avoiding Statelessness Resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality (Tunis Conclusions), March 2014, 
par. 25 ff.; Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General, A/
HRC/13/34, 14 December 2009, par. 25. 
299  UN Human Rights Commission, Resolution on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, 1997/36, 11 April 
1997, par. 2. 
300  Art. 12 par. 4 Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari Nationality. 
301  Art. 103 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea. 
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emigrated permanently and wish to maintain their original nationality. However, in 
nearly all of these 44 States, the effect of these provisions has been mitigated; either 
the scope of these provisions is limited to certain categories of nationals or there are 
major exceptions to the main rule in place. For example, in 32 of the 46 States that 
have such a loss provision in place, the scope of the provision is limited to those who 
obtained nationality by naturalization or, to a lesser extent, through a route other 
than birth or descent. As the original nationality is by birth or descent in the great 
majority of cases acquired, the scope of these provisions is particularly narrow. 
In 16 of the 46 States, nationality can in principle be lost upon residence abroad, but 
this loss can usually be prevented. In most of the cases, this can be accomplished by 
making a declaration. In a small number of cases, such a declaration must be made 
on an annual basis, while in the majority of cases, such a declaration must be made 
once or once in a longer period. In other States, a national can be exempted from 
the loss of nationality on the discretion of the authorities. In Egypt, for example, a 
national by naturalization can lose his nationality if he has resided abroad for two 
consecutive years, but he can be exempted from this provision if he provides a 
reason which is deemed acceptable by the Egyptian Minister of Interior.302 
In all except one of these 46 States, loss of nationality on this ground is either 
limited to nationals by naturalization or can be avoided by making use of exception 
clauses. The only State which has an unmitigated provision in place for loss upon 
residence abroad is Myanmar, where “a citizen who leaves the State [Myanmar] 
permanently” is set to lose his nationality.303 
This analysis shows that these provisions have much less impact than may seem at 
first sight, as the loss provisions in virtually all States are either limited in scope or 
their effects can be avoided. Nevertheless, the provisions discussed here possibly 
remain the most problematic ground for loss that is discussed in this Chapter. A 
particularly troubling aspect is that the scope of these provisions is not always 
limited to dual nationals, which means that those who lose their nationality on this 
ground might end up stateless. This could be a breach of Art. 7 par. 3 of the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which states that a national of a 
Contracting State shall not lose his nationality and subsequently become stateless 
on the ground of departure, residence abroad, failure to register, or a similar 
ground. By exception, Art. 7 par. 4 of the 1961 Convention permits the loss of 
302  Art. 15 par. 3 Law No. 26 of 1975 on Egyptian Nationality. 




nationality if it results in statelessness in case a naturalized person resides abroad 
for a period of not less than seven consecutive years and he has failed to declare his 
intention to retain his nationality. 304 
Even if the affected nationals can prevent the loss of nationality by means of 
registration or declaration, it is questionable whether nationals will always be aware 
of these, at times, opaque provisions and procedures. Next to that, these procedures 
are in some cases unnecessarily cumbersome. For example, in the case of Pakistan, 
the registration for the retention of nationality has to be renewed every year.305 
With regard to the loss of the nationality of an EU Member State, the judgment of 
the European Court of Justice in the Tjebbes case is of paramount importance.306 
The Court ruled that a Dutch provision which provided for the loss of nationality 
after ten years of residence abroad was, in principle, not a breach of the country’s 
obligations under EU law.307 However, the national authorities should determine 
whether the loss of nationality (and the subsequent loss of EU citizenship) has 
due regard to the principle of proportionality in each particular case.308 As a 
consequence, the authorities are required to assess whether the loss of nationality 
“[…] disproportionately affect[s] the normal development of his or her family 
and professional life from the point of view of EU law”.309 The authorities are 
also required to make such an assessment for minors who lose their nationality 
as a consequence of their parent’s loss of nationality.310 The nationality of an EU 
Member State (and thereby EU citizenship) should not be lost automatically on 
the basis of a provision as discussed in this section without a possibility for an 
assessment of the proportionality of that loss by the national authorities. 
Lastly, it should be noted that a large number of States make a distinction between 
nationals by naturalization and other groups of nationals in this regard, which 
could be regarded as a discriminatory practice (see also par. 4.1.1). 
           
304  For example, in his study on acquisition and loss of nationality in the Western Hemisphere, Vonk concludes that in eight 
States in that region (Belize, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Saint Vincent, and the 
Grenadines), nationals by naturalization or registration can lose their nationality upon residence abroad and subsequently be-
come stateless. Only the Dominican Republic and Jamaica are compliant with the requirements of Art. 7 par. 4 of the 1961 Con-
vention. See: Vonk, O., Nationality law in the western hemisphere: A study on grounds for acquisition and loss of citizenship in the 
Americas and the Caribbean, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, p. 395. 
305  Art. 16 par. 4 Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. 
306  European Court of Justice, Judgement of 12 March 2019, Tjebbes, Case C-221/17. 
307  Ibid., par. 39. 
308  Ibid., par. 40. 
309  Ibid. 
310  Ibid., par. 47. 
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In seven States, nationality can be acquired either a matre or a patre, but there are 
more stringent criteria in place for one of the two acquisition routes. In most of 
these cases, acquisition a matre has the function of a safeguard provision in case 
the  acquisition of nationality a patre is not possible. For example, the nationality 
of Oman can only be acquired a matre if paternity is not confirmed.312 In 18 States, 
nationality can in principle only be acquired a patre. An example is Bahrain, where 
nationality can only be acquired a patre in the case of birth abroad and only if the 
father or the paternal grandfather was born in Bahrain.313 In three States (Bhutan, 
Montenegro and Myanmar), nationality can in principle only be acquired if both 
parents are nationals in the case of birth abroad.  
China and Cuba are the only States that exclude the acquisition of nationality in the 
case of birth abroad. In China, nationality cannot be acquired if the parents have 
settled abroad, the child is born abroad and also acquired another nationality.314 It 
is important to note that the parents are only considered to have settled abroad if 
they hold permanent resident status and have resided abroad for at least two years, 
of which 18 months was continuous.315 It goes without saying that the nationality 
of Vatican City cannot be acquired by birth. In Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
a child born abroad can only acquire nationality if he takes up residence in the 
country.316 
311  Art. 11 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia 1995. 
312  Art. 11 par. 4 Royal Decree No 38/2014. 
313  Art. 4 par. B Bahraini Citizenship Act 1963. 
314  Art. 5 Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China.
315  Art. 1 par. 1 Regulations defining overseas Chinese and diasporas with foreign nationality (on file with author).
316  See: Art. 13 Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama 1972 (Panama), Art. 150 Political Constitution of 1992 
(Paraguay) and Art. 74 of the Constitution of the Republic (Uruguay). There is in principle no age limitation in place for these 




abroad.This matter will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.5 of this Chapter.
4.3 Second generation: Acquisition of nationality in the case of birth 
abroad
In the great majority of States, a child born outside the country of his parents’ 
nationality can acquire the nationality of the parent, even if the child also acquires 
another nationality at birth. In 142 States, nationality can be acquired in the case 
of birth abroad if either one of the parents is a national. This entails that nationality 
can be acquired a patre or a matre under equal conditions. In 20 States, acquisition 
of nationality is facilitated if both of the parents are nationals. An example is 
Armenia, where nationality is automatically acquired in the case of birth abroad if 
both parents are nationals, but the formal consent of both parents is required for 
the acquisition of nationality if only one of the parents is an Armenian national. 311
It is important to note that many States have imposed a generational cap on 
acquisition of nationality by birth abroad.317 This can entail, for example, that 
nationality can only be acquired by birth abroad if the parent was not born abroad. 
The aim of such provisions is to ensure that nationality can only be passed on to the 
first generation born abroad and not to any subsequent generations. Other States 
take a less restrictive approach and determine that nationality can also be acquired 
by subsequent generations, but they impose additional (procedural) requirements 
in that case. An example is Belgium, as a child born abroad from a Belgian parent 
who was also born abroad can only acquire Belgian nationality if a declaration is 
submitted within a period of five years after the child was born.318 Lastly, a number 
of Portuguese speaking countries have introduced a generational cap in a quite 
extraordinary form, namely the so-called ‘opposition’ (oposição). In Guinea-Bisau, 
for example, authorities can oppose the acquisition of nationality in case there is 
an “[…] absence of any link to the national community”.319 This process must be 
instigated by the public prosecutor’s office at the Supreme Court of Justice within 
a period of one year after the birth of the child.320 On the basis of such a provision, 
a person born abroad could be prevented from acquiring nationality. 
It is understandable that States have imposed such generational caps concerning 
the automatic acquisition of nationality by parentage, as it is difficult to justify the 
automatic transfer of nationality if several generations have been resident abroad. 
In such cases, enabling those descendants to obtain nationality through an option 
right would be a more appropriate alternative. 
As mentioned earlier, this presentation of the acquisition of nationality by birth is a 
simplified one. The acquisition of nationality by birth is not always a straightforward 
matter, as it is dependent on the preliminary establishment of parentage. There are 
three main routes to the establishment of parentage, namely ex lege establishment, 
establishment through an administrative procedure (acknowledgement) and judicial 
establishment.321 Ex lege establishment entails that parentage is automatically 
established by the birth of the child, without requiring any further action. Maternity 
they have reached the age of majority. 
317  For an analysis of such provisions in the European context, see: Vink, M. and De Groot, G.R., “Citizenship attribution in 
Western Europe: International framework and domestic trends”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 36 No. 5, 2010, p. 
718.  
318  Art. 8 par. 2 sub b Code of the Belgian Nationality.
319  Art. 12 par. A Law on Nationality No. 2/92 of 6 April 1992. 
320  Ibid.  
321  Saarloos, K., European private international law on legal parentage? Thoughts on a European instrument implement-
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(in or out of wedlock) as well as paternity (in wedlock) is commonly established ex 
lege. However, even though parentage is de iure automatically established through 
this route, it can be difficult to obtain the required means of proof which affirm 
the establishment of parentage.322 If it is impossible for the parents to obtain these 
means of proof, it can subsequently be impossible to acquire nationality on the 
basis of parentage.
Compared to ex lege establishment, the administrative establishment and judicial 
establishment of parentage is a more complex matter and it would go beyond 
the limits of this study to discuss these procedures in detail.323 However, it is 
important to note that, in general, there are often time constraints in place for 
the establishment of parentage. For example, if the paternity of a Dutch man is 
established by a judicial decision, the child will only acquire Dutch nationality if 
the judicial decision was made during the child’s minority.324 Therefore, if no action 
is taken by the parents or child himself on time, it may no longer be possible to 
acquire nationality. 
4.4 Second generation: loss of nationality if the other nationality was not 
renounced before attaining majority 
In 21 States, a person who has acquired another nationality at birth or during 
minority can lose his nationality if he does not renounce that other nationality 
before attaining a specified age, commonly called the age of majority.325 In eight 
of these States, major exceptions are in place for this loss provision. Four of these 
States (Bangladesh, Latvia, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea) make an exception 
to this loss provision for certain dual nationals. For example, Latvia has extended 
its exemption provision mentioned earlier to this category of nationals, which 
entails that nationality is not lost if the nationality of an EU Member State, EFTA 
Member States, NATO Member States, or Australia, Brazil or New Zealand is 
acquired.326 In three other States (South Korea, Sri Lanka and Switzerland), 
nationals can obtain permission to retain the nationality, while Germany provides 
several alternative routes through which nationality can be maintained. 
These provisions can have severe consequences, in particular if the loss takes place 
322  Forder, C. and Saarloos, K., “The Establishment of Parenthood: A Story of Successful Convergence?”, Maastricht Facul-
ty of Law Working Paper, No. 2007-01, 2007, p. 27. 
323  See for a comparative overview of these procedures: ibid., p. 28 ff. 
324  Art. 4 par. 1 Kingdom Act on Netherlands Nationality. 
325  This includes Bangladesh, Botswana, Cameroon, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Latvia, Lesotho, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and Tanza-
nia. 




automatically and the affected person is not duly informed. For that reason, States 
should ensure that those affected are duly informed and the loss of nationality 
should preferably not take place automatically, but only after a review by the 
competent authorities has taken place which takes into account all the relevant 
circumstances of the case before withdrawing  nationality. Another objection is the 
burden that such provisions place on young dual nationals, as they are not only 
forced to make a choice about a fundamental legal status which can have profound 
consequences later in life, but it also affects their identity.327      
A special reference should be made here to the dual nationality treaties concluded 
between 26 Eastern European and (Central) Asian States between 1956 and 1984 
(see also par. 3). In two cases, it could be ascertained that these treaties are still 
considered to be in force, namely in the Russian-Mongolian and the Russian-
Slovak case. In those cases, the parents of a child that obtained either Russian-
Mongolian or Russian-Slovak dual nationality at birth are required to opt to keep 
one of the two nationalities within a period of three months.328 If the parents fail to 
do so, the child will retain the nationality of the country of residence and lose the 
other nationality. If the parents are residing in a third State, the child will retain the 
nationality of the last country of residence of the parents.329 
4.5 Second generation: loss upon residence abroad 
In a number of States, provisions that address the loss of nationality upon residence 
abroad (also) target the descendants of emigrants. In 15 States, a certain period 
of residence abroad can lead to loss of nationality for those who were born 
abroad.330 In the majority of these States, the loss provisions specifically target 
those born abroad, while in other States, the provisions address all categories of 
nationals residing abroad. In the great majority of the States (namely 14), major 
exceptions to this loss provisions are in place. In seven of these 14 States, the loss 
of nationality can be prevented by the national himself, in most cases through a 
declaration or registration.331 In five States, the loss of nationality can be prevented 
327  For a critical analysis of the German loss provision in this regard, see: Dornis, C., “Ungelöste Probleme des Staatsange-
hörigkeitsrechts: Gestufte Staatsangehörigkeit als Modell”, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, Vol. 34 No. 12, 2001, p. 548; Diehl, C. 
and Fick, P., “Deutschsein auf Probe: Der Umgang deutsch-türkischer junger Erwachsener mit dem Optionsmodell”, Soziale 
Welt, 2012, pp. 339-360.
328  Art.1 Convention between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Mon-
golian People’s Republic on the prevention of dual citizenship of 11 September 1975 and Art. 1 Convention between the Czech-
oslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the prevention of dual citizenship. 
329  Art. 2 jo. Art. 3 Convention between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government 
of the Mongolian People’s Republic on the prevention of dual citizenship of 11 September 1975 and Art. 2 jo. Art. 3 Conven-
tion between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the prevention of dual citizen-
ship.
330  This includes Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Guinea, Iceland, Laos, Liberia, Netherlands, Norway, Singa-
pore, Sweden, Thailand, and Uzbekistan. 
331  This includes Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Liberia, Netherlands, Singapore, and Uzbekistan. 
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if the authorities grant permission to retain nationality.332 It should be noted that 
the loss provisions of two of the three remaining States have a relatively narrow 
scope. In France, a descendant of an emigrant can lose French nationality if he 
never had status (possession d’état) in France or has never resided in France and 
his French parents have not resided in France for the last 50 years.333 Guinea has 
a similar provision in place.334 This leaves only one State, Thailand, that has a 
genuinely restrictive provision in this regard. According to Art. 17 par. 1 of the Thai 
Nationality Act, Thai nationality can be revoked on the discretion of the Minister 
of Interior Affairs if a person was born in Thailand and, for five consecutive years 
from the day he attained the age of majority, has lived in another State of which his 
parent is a national. The same objections that were brought forward in Section 4.3 
can be raised in relation to these provisions. These provisions have therefore been 
the subject of scholarly criticism.335 However, as all except one State have chosen 
to mitigate these provisions, States seem to already be aware of the drawbacks of 
an overly restrictive attitude in this regard. 
An important matter is how States determine whether a national is residing abroad. 
The procedures to determine residence status differ from State to State. For example, 
a Belgian dual national can his Belgian nationality under certain circumstances 
lose if he uninterruptedly had his ‘principal residence’ between the age of 18 and 
28 in a foreign country.336 The term ‘principal residence’ is defined as ‘the place 
of registration in the population register’.337 A Belgian national residing abroad 
can register his place of principal residence in a consular population register.338 
Whether or not a Belgian national can lose his nationality upon residence abroad is 
therefore in the first place dependent on his official registration. 
 
5. REACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY 
Even though most States currently allow (a share of their) emigrants to retain their 
nationality upon naturalization in another State and to pass on their two nationalities 
to their offspring, a number of States have remained unwilling to do so, while other 
332  This includes Brunei, Denmark, Laos, Norway, and Sweden. 
333  Art.23-6 Civil Code. 
334  Art. 103 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea. 
335  See, for example, for a critical analysis of the Belgian loss provision for those who were born abroad: Wautelet, P., “La 
perte silencieuse de la nationalité : plaidoyer pour la suppression de l’article 22, § 1, 5°, du Code de la nationalité belge”, Revue 
de la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Liège, Vol. 62, 2017.  
336  Art. 22 par. 5 Code of the Belgian Nationality. 
337  Art. 1 par. 2 sub 1 Code of the Belgian Nationality. 




emigrants might have lost their nationality on the basis of restrictive provisions 
in the past. However, this is not necessarily the end of the matter. Emigrants who 
have lost their original nationality may be able to reacquire it, as provisions for 
‘reacquisition’, ‘resumption’ or ‘restoration’ of a lost nationality are not uncommon. 
As with most provisions in nationality law, their scope varies considerably from State 
to State. However, there are a number of recurring requirements, which result in a 
substantial overlap with ordinary naturalization procedures.339 In this section, this 
phenomenon will be explored further by discussing reacquisition routes in a small 
number of States. If necessary, the specific national context of the reacquisition 
route will also be taken into account. 
An important limitation is that nationality can often only be reacquired on a 
discretionary basis, which makes it difficult to assess the practical feasibility of the 
reacquisition of nationality in practice.  Next to that, the scope of such provisions 
differs greatly from State to State. For example, in the case of Canada, nationality 
is in principle always granted to a person who applies for the reacquisition of 
nationality and has held permanent residence in Canada for at least one year, as 
long as he is not under a removal order or considered a security threat or involved 
in organized crime.340 In the case of China, former Chinese nationals can apply 
for the reacquisition of Chinese nationality if they have ‘legitimate reasons’ for 
this.341 The provision does not offer any clarity on what would be considered a 
‘legitimate reason’. In the case of Brunei, it is explicitly stated that the reacquisition 
of nationality is in principle not permitted, but that an exception can be made to 
this main rule by the approval of the Sultan of Brunei.342 
Routes to reacquisition: regulatory inconsistencies 
Most of the States that have a negative stance on dual nationality, in general, 
also have this negative stance on the reacquisition of nationality. This entails 
that, if the nationality of a certain State is in principle lost upon naturalization in 
another State, the reacquisition of that nationality requires that the newly acquired 
nationality is again renounced. For example, a Nepali national loses his nationality 
upon naturalization in another State.343 If he wishes to reacquire Nepali nationality, 
339  For example, a number of States permit former nationals to reacquire nationality if they have taken up residence within 
the State or have resided in the State for a particular period of time. This is a major hurdle for potential applicants, as it requires 
them to fulfil immigration law requirements and obtain a residence permits as any other non-national. Some of these States re-
quire that the applicant must be of good character and check whether the applicant has a criminal background or could be con-
sidered a threat to public security. Lastly, a number of States require proof of integration in order to reacquire nationality. 
340  Art. 11 par. 1 Canadian Citizenship Act.
341  Art. 13 Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China.
342  Art. 5 par. 7 Brunei Nationality Act.
343  Art. 10 par. 1 Nepal Citizenship Act 2063 (2006). 
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he will have to take up residence in Nepal and prove that he renounced his other 
nationality.344 
However, in a small number of States, these loss provisions are not consistent. For 
example, a national of Ivory Coast who voluntarily acquires another nationality 
will automatically lose his original nationality.345 However, a former national can 
reacquire Ivorian nationality by decree if he takes up habitual residence in Ivory 
Coast and has not lost his nationality due to – in short – behaviour seriously 
detrimental to the interest of the State.346 In order to reacquire the nationality, 
it is not explicitly required to renounce any other nationality that the applicant 
might hold. A very similar situation can be found in Guinea, where nationality 
is lost automatically upon the acquisition of another nationality, but it can be 
reacquired by decree if the former national takes up residence in Guinea.347 Again, 
it is required that the applicant did not lose his nationality – in short – on the basis 
of behaviour seriously detrimental to the interest of the State or to evade military 
service in Guinea. It is not explicitly required that the applicant renounces his other 
nationality in order to make use of this procedure. 
A somewhat similar route to dual nationality can also be found in Slovakia. The 
Slovakian policies for the reacquisition of nationality are, at first sight, illogical and 
are difficult to understand outside of its political context. Until 2010, Slovakian 
nationality law had a tolerant attitude towards dual nationality, as a Slovak national 
would not lose his nationality upon the acquisition of another nationality. However, 
this provision was amended in response to a nationality law reform in neighbouring 
Hungary, which entailed a rapprochement to ethnic Hungarians residing abroad.348 
This meant that a person residing outside of Hungary could now be naturalized on 
preferential grounds, as long as he proved that one of his ancestors is or has been 
a Hungarian national, that he has knowledge of the Hungarian language, a clean 
criminal record and that he is not considered to be a threat to public order and 
security.349 The scope of this reform was substantial, as a large number of persons 
of Hungarian descent reside in Hungary’s neighbouring States as a consequence 
of Hungary’s loss of territory in 1920 through the Peace Treaty of Trianon.350 In 
conclusion, many Slovak nationals of Hungarian origin were now permitted to 
344  Art. 11 Nepal Citizenship Act 2063 (2006).
345  Art. 48 Law No. 61-415 of 14 December 1961 on the Code of the Ivorian Nationality. 
346  Art. 34 Law No. 61-415 of 14 December 1961 on the Code of the Ivorian Nationality.
347  Art. 81 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea. 
348  See: Pogonyi, S., “Dual citizenship and sovereignty”, Nationalities Papers, 2011, Vol. 39 No. 5, pp. 685-704; Waterbury, 
M., Between state and nation: Diaspora politics and kin-state nationalism in Hungary, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
349  Art. 4 par. 3 Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship. See also: Tóth, J., “Update: Changes in the Hungarian citizen-
ship law and adopted on 26 May 2010”, San Domenico di Fiesole: European Union Democracy Observatory On Citizenship 
2010. 
350  Waterbury, M., Between state and nation: Diaspora politics and kin-state nationalism in Hungary, New York: Palgrave 




obtain Hungarian nationality, while retaining their Slovak nationality. 
The Slovak government, led by the nationalist Prime Minister Robert Fico, 
responded in anger to the Hungarian amendments. The (potentially large scale) 
grant of Hungarian nationality to Slovak nationals was framed by the Slovak 
government as a security threat. More fundamentally, it ran contrary to Slovak 
nationalist narratives, in which Slovakia is framed as a nation that has liberated itself 
from Hungarian oppression and must remain wary of threats to its autonomy.351 
Therefore, Slovakia amended its nationality law in such a way that the acquisition of 
a foreign nationality would now automatically lead to the loss of Slovak nationality. 
A Slovak national who acquired another nationality was obliged to report this to the 
district attorney and failure to do so could lead to a fine of more than 3,000 euros.352 
As a consequence, Slovak nationals of Hungarian origin who would make use of 
the provisions of the Hungarian Status Law would lose their Slovak nationality. 
The effects of this amendment were later mitigated to some extent by the provision 
of a new route to the reacquisition of Slovak nationality for some of those who 
had lost it. On the basis of a regulation, Slovak nationality could now be granted 
on a discretionary basis to anyone who had lost Slovak nationality if the former 
national had ‘special reasons’ for the reacquisition of Slovak nationality.353 Article 
2 of this Regulation further specifies these special reasons, namely economic, 
scientific, technical, cultural, social, or sports contributions to Slovak society or 
other reasons in the interest of the Slovak Republic. In addition, Slovak nationality 
can be reacquired for – in short – humanitarian reasons (e.g. family reunification). 
The applicant is exempted from the requirements of the ordinary naturalization 
procedure and thus not required to renounce any other nationality. 
Routes to reacquisition: regulatory changes
A wholly different category of reacquisition can be found in States where 
reacquisition routes are implemented as a corollary to other policy changes. Over 
the past decades, many States have moved from rejection to the acceptance of dual 
nationality, and therefore they have amended provisions through which nationality 
was lost if another nationality was acquired. This raised the question whether those 
who had lost nationality in the past, on the basis of these provisions, should now be 
351  Jenne, E. and Deets, S., “Political Context Matters. The Banality of Hungar’s Dual Citizenship Law and Slovakia’s Res-
ponse”, in: Bauböck, R. (ed.), “Dual citizenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-
tat”, San Domenico di Fiesole: European Union Democracy Observatory On Citizenship 2010.  
352  Art. 9 par. 16 Act No. 40/1993 on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic. 
353  Regulation of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic of 9 January 2015 on the grant of nationality of the Slo-
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offered the opportunity to reacquire their former nationality. 
While many States did not offer those who had lost nationality in the past the option 
to reacquire it, some States did offer that option. An example is the Philippines. On 
the basis of Article 3 of Republican Act 9225 of 2003, a ‘natural-born’ person who 
lost his Philippine nationality due to naturalization in another State can reacquire 
Philippine nationality upon applying and swearing an oath of allegiance to the 
Philippine State.354 Another example is Denmark, where the nationality law was 
reformed in 2015, revoking the provision that acquisition of another nationality 
would lead to loss of Danish nationality. In order to compensate those who lost 
Danish nationality on the basis of that provision at an earlier date, this group was 
allowed to reacquire Danish nationality.355 There is only one further requirement 
for the reacquisition of Danish nationality on this ground in place, namely that 
the applicant may not have been sentenced to imprisonment between the date of 
the loss of Danish nationality and the date of application for the reacquisition of 
Danish nationality.356 This procedure is in place temporarily and is due to expire 
on 31 August 2020.357 
A very problematic example of a reacquisition route is provided by Pakistani 
nationality law. Originally, the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951 had a restrictive 
attitude towards dual nationality and provided for the loss of Pakistani nationality 
upon the acquisition of another nationality.358 However, a 1972 amendment of 
this provision made an exception for those who acquired the nationality of the 
United Kingdom or other countries, as determined by the Federal Government 
of Pakistan.359 Importantly, the provision stated that “nothing in sub-section 
(1) [the original loss provision, LvdB] shall apply, or shall be deemed ever to 
have applied at any stage [emphasis added], to a person who, being or having at 
any time been [emphasis added], a citizen of Pakistan” to such a person.360 As a 
consequence, former nationals of Pakistan who had acquired the nationality of 
one of the States automatically reacquired their Pakistani nationality ex tunc.361 
The potential repercussions of such automatic reacquisition are illustrated by the 
354  According to Art. 4 par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines 
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. For an elaborate discussion on the 
exact meaning of the phrase, see: Aguilar, F., “Report on citizenship law: Philippines”, Globalcit, San Domenico di Fiesole: Eu-
ropean University Institute 2017.  
355  Art. 3 par. 1 Law No. 1496 of 23/12/2014. 
356  Art. 3 par. 2 Law No. 1496 of 23/12/2014. 
357  Art. 3 par. 1 Law No. 1496 of 23/12/2014.
358  Art. 14 par. 1 Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. 
359  Art. 14 par. 3 Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951.
360  Ibid. 
361  Nazir, F., “Country Report: Pakistan”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fiesole: European Universi-




fate of a Dutch-Pakistani dual national, as the Dutch authorities perceived this 
automatic reacquisition of Pakistani nationality as a voluntary acquisition of another 
nationality, since he had not taken any action to refuse it. This would subsequently 
result in the loss of his Dutch nationality.362 The matter was brought to the court, 
which ruled that automatic reacquisition could not be perceived as the voluntary 
acquisition of another nationality.363 Nevertheless, this case does demonstrate that 
such involuntary automatic reacquisition of nationality poses serious risks to those 
affected and is therefore undesirable. Furthermore, the involuntary reacquisition of 
a nationality after attaining the age of majority could be considered to run counter 
to the principle of respect for human dignity, in particular if it is taken into account 
that nationality has been considered an important part of one’s social identity.364 
In such cases, offering former nationals the possibility to voluntarily reacquire 
the original nationality on the basis of an option right would be a more viable 
alternative. 
Routes to reacquisition: ancestry-based acquisition
If the child of an emigrant could not acquire the nationality of one of his parents 
iure sanguinis, he may be able to acquire it later in life on the basis of his ancestry. 
In some cases, even ancestry going back several generations can be sufficient for 
the acquisition of nationality. In the case of Latvia, nationality can be acquired by 
a person whose ascendant has resided permanently in the territory of Latvia for 
any period between 1881 and 17 June 1940, who is fluent in Latvian and who can 
provide evidence that one of his parents or grandparents belonged to the constituent 
nation (i.e. held Latvian nationality) or to the autochthonous population.365 In 
principle, those who want to acquire Latvian nationality have to renounce their 
other nationality. However, those who acquire Latvian nationality on the ground 
discussed here do not have to renounce their nationality, regardless of the other 
nationality they hold.366 A second route is provided by the first paragraph of Article 
8 of the Citizenship Act, which states that a person can acquire Latvian nationality 
if he was a Latvian national on 17 June 1940, provides evidence that he had left 
Latvia because of the occupation by Germany and the Soviet Union and that he 
had not returned to Latvia for permanent residence for that reason before 4 May 
1990. More importantly, a descendant of such a person can also acquire Latvian 
nationality (Article 8 par. 2 Citizenship Act). A person who makes use of this 
362  Netherlands Council of State [Raad van State], Judgement of 10 October 2012, 201112039/1/T1/A3. 
363  Ibid. 
364  European Court of Human Rights, Genovese v. Malta, Application 53124/09, 11 October 2011, par. 33. 
365  Art. 2 par 1 sub 3 Citizenship Act. 
366  Art. 9 par. 3 Citizenship Act.
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provision is not required to renounce his other nationality, as he is exempted from 
this requirement by virtue of Article 8 par. 3 of the Citizenship Act.
Macedonian nationality law contains a more straightforward provision in this 
regard.  According to Article 8 of the Law on the Citizenship of the Republic of 
Macedonia, a person who has emigrated from Macedonia or the first generation 
descendant of such an emigrant can acquire Macedonian nationality if the fulfils 
the conditions for ordinary naturalization, but he is exempted from the (15 year) 
residence requirement, as well as the requirement to renounce his other nationality. 
6. DUAL NATIONALITY POLICIES AS 
CITIZENSHIP FORMATIONS 
The dual nationality policies discussed above can also be perceived as the outcomes 
of citizenship formations (see Chapter 1), which puts an emphasis on the flexibility 
that States have at hand when they give shape to these policies. This raises the 
question how States make use of this flexibility. Although this question can better 
be answered in the in-depth case studies in which  the context can be taken into 
account, a broader answer can be provided here. 
Flexibility is best illustrated by the States that have chosen to allow dual nationality, 
selectively or partially. Concerning the retention of nationality upon the acquisition 
of another nationality, a not insignificant minority of almost one-fifth of all States 
practices such selectivity. For the retention of nationality upon residence abroad, the 
great majority of States does so. Except in cases where this selectivity is dependent 
on the agency of the affected nationals (e.g. when nationality can be retained on the 
basis of a declaration), such selectivity results in hierarchies of nationals, privileging 
one category of nationals while simultaneously excluding another. 
Broadly, two forms of selectivity can be distinguished in this regard, namely ethnic 
selectivity and economic selectivity. One manifestation of ethnic selectivity is 
the privileged treatment of nationals by birth or descent compared to nationals 
who obtained nationality in other ways. Another form of ethnic selectivity is the 
allowance of dual nationality for those who naturalize in States that are considered 
to be culturally proximate. In such cases, dual nationality seems to be regarded by 
these States as less contentious, while it remains unacceptable in a different context. 




of nationality and ethnically preferential immigration and nationality policies.367
Economic selectivity is evident in States that permit the acquisition of another 
nationality for their emigrants in Western States, while those who naturalize in 
other States lose their original nationality. Economic selectivity can also be seen 
in States where emigrants can obtain permission for the retention of their original 
nationality. Admittedly, as this is usually a discretionary process, it cannot always 
be ascertained on what grounds this permission is granted. However, the analysis 
in this Chapter shows that, in cases where these grounds have been disclosed, 
personal achievements, educational background and income often play a role. In 
such cases, nationality is utilized in an instrumental way to maintain a connection 
with the desired nationals and these States’ principled objections against dual 
nationality are seemingly overridden by other interests. Although the analysis shows 
that economic selectivity has remained a rather marginal phenomenon, it is an 
important factor that has been embraced by several major emigration States and so 
far has remained an understudied phenomenon. Shachar coined the term ‘Olympic 
citizenship’ in this regard, which perceives selective naturalization practices as a 
part of the global race for talent.368 Furthermore, there is increasing academic 
attention for the instrumentalization of nationality.369 
7. STUDYING CITIZENSHIP CONSTELLATIONS 
So far, the legislative provisions on dual nationality for each State have been studied 
in isolation. In this section, it will be shown how these provisions interact with 
legislative provisions in other States within a citizenship constellation. To be precise, 
it will be shown how two provisions that affect naturalized individuals can interact, 
namely provisions resulting in the loss of nationality upon the voluntary acquisition 
of another nationality (mode of loss L05 in the GLOBALCIT methodology) in 
the 42 most predominant States of origin of persons who naturalized in an EU 
Member State in 2017 and provisions requiring the renunciation of the original 
nationality upon naturalization (mode of loss L06 and mode of acquisition A06 
367  See for example: Joppke, C., “Citizenship between de-and re-ethnicization”, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44. No. 3, 
2003, pp. 429-458; Joppke, C., Selecting by origin: Ethnic migration in the liberal state, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005; 
Dumbrava, C., Nationality, citizenship and ethno-cultural belonging: preferential membership policies in Europe, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014. 
368  Shachar, A., “Picking winners: olympic citizenship and global race for talent”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120 No. 8, 2011, pp. 
2088-2139; Shachar, A. and Hirschl, R., “Recruiting Super Talent: The New World of Selective Migration Regimes”, Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 20, 2013, pp. 71-108; Spiro, P., At home in two countries: The past and future of dual citizenship, 
New York City: New York University Press, 2016, p. 131 ff. 
369  Harpaz, Y. and Mateos, P., “Strategic citizenship: negotiating membership in the age of dual nationality”, Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies, Vol. 45 No. 6, 2019, pp. 843-857; Joppke, C. “The instrumental turn of citizenship”, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, Vol. 45 No. 6, 2019, pp. 858-878; Bauböck, R., “Genuine links and useful passports: evaluating strategic uses 
of citizenship”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 45 No. 6, 2019, pp. 1015-1026.
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in the GLOBALCIT methodology) in the 28 EU Member States. The analysis 
aims to answer the question in which citizenship constellations dual nationality is 
permitted for naturalized individuals in all cases. In other words, this entails that the 
emigration State permits the retention of nationality after naturalization in another 
State in all cases, while the immigration State does not require the renunciation of 
the original nationality in any case. The results of this analysis are presented in an 
overview table. 
The chosen approach studies the dual nationality policies of 42 emigration States in 
conjunction with the naturalization policies of 28 EU Member States, which results 
in 1,176 citizenship constellations, or combinations of two nationalities. However, 
as eight of these 42 most predominant emigration States are also EU Member 
States, this results in 1,168 constellations. Of these 1,168 constellations, a majority 
of 672 permit dual nationality in all cases, or 57.5 % of all cases. It should be noted 
that this figure is a conservative estimate of all permissive constellations, as many 
significant exception grounds could not be included in this analysis. According to 
Eurostat data, these 1,168 constellations covered the acquisition of nationality by 
593,500 persons in 2017.370 It turns out that 72.4% of all persons were covered by a 
permissive constellation. As these figures address a broader category of nationality 
acquisition than naturalization alone, they should not be interpreted as entirely 
conclusive. However, these figures strongly indicate that the great majority of 
naturalized individuals in EU Member States are allowed to obtain dual nationality. 
It should be noted that a number of restrictive States with a large number of emigrants 
disproportionally affect the overall view of the allowance of dual nationality in the 
EU Member States, namely Ukraine, India and China. The same is true for some 
of the EU Member States that, in principle, require the renunciation of the original 
nationality upon the voluntary acquisition of another nationality, namely Germany 









It can be concluded that the great majority of States allow – in one form or another
– dual nationality for their emigrant population, for first generation emigrants, as


















           
         
           
            
          
            
           
             
The picture presented is even more extreme concerning provisions for the loss of 
nationality upon residence abroad. It turns out that, in 44 States, nationality can 
be lost upon a certain period of residence abroad. However, in all except one State 
(Myanmar), the consequences of these provisions have been mitigated. In 32 of the 
44 States, their scope is limited to those who obtained nationality by naturalization 
or who acquired nationality otherwise than by birth or descent. In 16 States, the 
loss of nationality can be prevented, for example by making a declaration. However, 
these provisions remain problematic, in particular in States where they can lead to 
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States), the acquisition of another nationality does not lead to the loss of the original
nationality, but it turns out that almost half of the remaining 79 ‘strict’ States have
important exceptions in place that mitigate these loss provisions; next to a
number of general practical mitigations, permission for retaining nationality can
be granted in 12 States, while nationality is only lost upon the acquisition of certain
nationalities in seven States and the loss of nationality is limited to only certain
categories of nationals in 14 States. In some cases, these exceptions have such a
wide scope that they can prevent the loss of nationality in virtually all cases. Finally,
a small number of States have idiosyncratic exemptions in place that are not
covered by this categorization.
 
 
           
            
           
           
            
     
It is questionable whether the stance of the 79 remaining restrictive States is still
justifiable, as it has been shown that the acceptance of dual nationality is beneficial
for emigration States and is also in the emigrant’s interest. Although the partial
acceptance of dual nationality could be considered as a step forward, the
practice continues to have important drawbacks. Most importantly, there is a
risk of arbitrariness or even the development of discriminatory practices. From a
normative point of view, reserving dual nationality status for a privileged group
of emigrants could also exacerbate social inequalities.
It was studied how these provisions interact in emigration States with legislative 
provisions in other States within a citizenship constellation. Therefore, provisions 
resulting in the loss of nationality upon the voluntary acquisition of another 
nationality in 42 States of origin and provisions requiring the renunciation of the 
original nationality upon naturalization in 28 EU Member States were studied 
together. In short, out of 1,168 constellations, a majority of 672 (57.5%) permitted 
dual nationality in all cases. The 1,168 constellations covered the acquisition of 
nationality of 593,500 persons in 2017, of which 72.4%was covered by a permissive 
constellation. It should be noted that this is a conservative estimate. 
statelessness. On a general note, the, at times, unnecessarily arduous procedures 
for the retention of nationality, as well as their potentially disproportional nature 
should be scrutinized.   
In virtually all States, nationality can be passed on to the next generation, even 
in the case of birth abroad and in addition to another nationality. A number of 
States have imposed a generational cap in this regard, which entails that nationality 
can only be acquired by the second or third generation of emigrants born abroad. 
In those cases, it is a justifiable view that nationality can no longer be acquired 
automatically; providing an alternative route (e.g. an option right) would be a 
more apt alternative. Much less defensible is the remaining gender inequality in a 
minority of States, which often entails that nationality can only be acquired a patre 
in the case of birth abroad. 
In 21 States, a person who acquired another nationality at birth or during minority 
can lose his nationality if he does not renounce that other nationality before 
attaining a specified age. However, in a minority of eight of these States, major 
exceptions are in place for this loss provision. It can be regarded as problematic 
that the loss often takes place automatically in those cases. It has also been argued 
that such provisions put a heavy burden on young dual nationals. 
It is unlikely that descendants will lose their nationality on the basis of their residency 
abroad. Although a minority of 15 States have a provision for this purpose in place, 
the actual loss of nationality can be avoided in all except one case (Thailand). 
Finally, this Chapter also explored how certain States facilitate the reacquisition 
of nationality for emigrants and their descendants. While such reacquisition 
routes incidentally seem to stem from legislative inconsistencies, some States have 
introduced such routes due to their newfound acceptance of dual nationality for 
those who lost their nationality in the past. Remarkably, certain States have also 
introduced such routes for distant descendants, who can thereby acquire another 
nationality on the basis of their ancestry. This phenomenon can illustrate how 
emigration States can maintain relations with a diaspora even after a significant 
period of time and it is a topic that deserves more scholarly attention. 
What remains after the examination is an eclectic picture. Concerning dual 
nationality, the question is no longer only whether dual nationality is accepted, but 
also for whom dual nationality is accepted. There is therefore not a straight road that 




that a large number of States have introduced preferential and selective policies 
to allow dual nationality. States that have such selective policies can roughly be 
divided in two categories: ethnically selective States and economically selective 
States. With regard to ethnic selectivity, for example, some States have preferential 
provisions in place for nationals by birth compared to nationals by naturalization, 
in particular relating to the loss of nationality. While it is widely known that States 
can have preferential nationality policies for groups that are considered culturally 
proximate, economic selectivity is a less studied paradigm. Some States seem to 
be willing only to reach out to a selective part of their diaspora, a group that could 
be considered ‘elite emigrants’, rather than foster diaspora engagement in general. 
These nuances of dual nationality deserve to be studied in greater depth. 
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ANNEX I CHARTS AND MAPS 
Figure 2.1 Loss of nationality upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality 




Figure 2.3 World Map: No loss of original nationality upon acquisition of another nationality or 
exceptions to loss provisions. High resolution map available at  https://cutt.ly/mapone
Figure 2.4 World Map: Loss of original nationality upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality. 
High resolution map available at https://cutt.ly/maptwo
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Figure 2.5 Loss of nationality upon residence abroad 




Figure 2.7 Second generation – Loss upon non-renunciation of another nationality 
Figure 2.8 Exception provisions 
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Figure 2.9 Second generation – Loss upon residence abroad 





Overview of relevant modes of loss and acquisition of nationality in all 
States
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality
Loss of nationality 
upon residence abroad
Afghanistan Na
Art. 7 states that a national of Afghanistan cannot hold dual 
nationality. There is no loss provision for those who acquired 
another nationality in place. 
Art. 30 states that those who obtained another nationality 
“illegally” will not lose Afghan nationality. 
Na 
Law on Citizenship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
2000
Albania Na
Art. 3 states that Albanian nationals can also be a national of 
another State.
Na 
Law No. 8389 of 5.8.1998 “On Albanian Citizenship” 
Algeria Na Na 
Law No. 70-86 of 15 December 1970 concerning the 
Algerian Nationality Code
Andorra Yes Na 
Art. 7 par. 2 Constitution of 28 April 1993
Art. 18 Law on Nationality of 5 October 1995
Angola Na 
Loss upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality if 
he manifests the intention of not wanting be an Angolan 
national. This intention is not assumed to be present; explicit 
renunciation of nationality is required.371 
Na 





The Antigua and Barbuda Constitution Order 1981
The Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship Act 1982 
Argentina Na Na 
Law 346 on Nationality of 1978  
Armenia Na Na 
Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia 1995 
Australia Na Na 
Australian Citizenship Act 2007
371  Jerónimo, P., “Report on Citizenship Law: Angola”, GLOBALCIT Global Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fie-
sole: European University Institute 2019, p. 31.  
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Austria Yes
Except if permission to retain nationality has been granted. 
This exception is not in place if the other State has signed 
and ratified the Strasbourg Convention of 1963 and is party 
to the first chapter of that convention (on 1 January 2018: the 
Netherlands and Norway).
Na 
Art. 27 par. 1 Federal Law on Austrian Nationality 1985
Azerbaijan Yes (withdrawal) Na 
Art. 18 par. 1 Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Citizenship 
of the Azerbaijan Republic
Bahamas Yes (withdrawal) Na 
Art. 11 Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 
1973
Bahrain Yes (withdrawal)
Except if permission to retain nationality has been granted.
Except if he/she holds the nationality of a Member State of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon renunciation 
of permanent residence 
permit for five connected 
years. 
Except if permission 
to retain nationality 
has been granted or an 
“acceptable excuse” has 
been provided. 
Except if he/she holds 
the nationality of a 
Member State of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.
Art. 9 par. 1 sub a Bahraini Citizenship Act of 1963 as 
amended by Law No. 21/2014 amending certain provisions of 
the Bahraini Citizenship Act. 
Art. 8 par. 1 sub d 
Bahraini Citizenship 
Act of 1963 as amended 
by Law No. 21/2014 
amending certain 
provisions of the Bahraini 
Citizenship Act.
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality






Except if person acquires the  nationality of any state of 
Europe or North America or any other State specified by the 
Government in this behalf and applies for retention of his/her 
original nationality.372 
Yes (withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a continuous 
period of seven years 
and the Government 
is satisfied that it is in 
the public interest that 
the person should not 
continue to be a national. 
Except if he/she has 
registered annually 
his intention to retain 
nationality. 
Art 14 Citizenship Act 1951 
Art. 2B Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) 
Order 1972
Art. 16 par. 4 Citizenship 
Act 1951
Barbados Na Na 
Constitution of Barbados 2002
Barbados Citizenship Act 1996 
Belarus Na Na 
Law of the Republic of Belarus of 1 August 2002 No.136-З 
On Citizenship in the Republic of Belarus
Belgium Na Na 
Belgian Nationality Law 1984 
372  It is important to note that even though nationals of Bangladesh are able to apply for retention of nationality prior to their 
naturalisation abroad, the abovementioned legislative provisions only refer to reacquisition of nationality.  See: <https://www.
bangladeshconsulatela.com/dualnationality.html>. Although permission for retention of nationality is generally required, subor-
dinate regulation indicates that nationals of the United Kingdom are not required to obtain such permission (Statutory Regula-
tory Order (SRO) No. 69 Law/2008). 
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality




INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
Belize Na 
Article 27 of the Belize Constitution 1981 states that a 
national by birth or by descent may retain his/her nationality 
after the acquisition of another nationality. There are no 
explicit loss provisions in place in this regard for any group of 
nationals.   
Yes (if national by 
registration other than 
‘economic citizen’373) 
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 5 
years (automatic loss) 
or 2 years of continuous 
residence in the country 
of origin (withdrawal).
Except if he/she has 
maintained a substantial 
connection to Belize. 
Exceptions for loss upon 
continuous residence 
of five years abroad are 
in place. Exceptions are 
related to work abroad, 
residence abroad for 
holiday or health reasons, 
studying abroad and for 
those whose spouse is 
a Belizean national by 
descent. 
Belize Constitution 1981 and  Belizean Nationality Act 1981 Art. 20 Belizean 
Nationality Act 1981 
Art. 21 Belizean 
Nationality Act 1981
Benin Na Na 
Law No. 65-17 of 23 June 1965 on the Benin Nationality 
Code
Bhutan Yes Na
Art. 6 par. 5 Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan 
Art. 6 par. A Bhutan Citizenship Act 
Bolivia Na
Art. 39 of the Constitution states that Bolivian nationality will 
not be lost upon the acquisition of another nationality. 
Na 
Political Constitution of the State 2009
Supreme Decree 27698 of 24 August 2004 on the 
implementing regulations on dual nationality and recovery of 
Bolivian nationality 
373  The term ‘economic citizen’ refers here to persons who have obtained the nationality of Belize in exchange for an invest-
ment. 
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality








Art. 27 of the Law on Citizenship Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
22 March 2016 states that nationality is lost if a person loses 
his ‘nationality’ status of Republika Srpska or the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ‘nationality’ legislation of 
these two entities do not contain a loss provision that is of 
relevance in this regard.374 
Na 
Art. 27 of the Law on 
Citizenship Bosnia 
and Herzegovina of 
22 March 2016 states 
that nationality is lost 
if a person loses his 
‘nationality’ status of 
Republika Srpska or the 
Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The 
‘nationality’ legislation of 
these two entities do not 
contain a loss provision 
that is of relevance in this 
regard.
Law on Citizenship Bosnia and Herzegovina of 22 March 
2016
Botswana Yes Yes (if national 
by registration or 
naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years. The period of 7 
years can be renewed 
twice if he/she has given 
notice to the Minister that 
he/she has the intention 
to retain nationality. After 
21 years, nationality can 
be retained if permission 
is granted by the 
authorities. 
Art. 15 par. 2 Citizenship Act No. 8 of 1998 Art. 18 par. B sub 5 
Citizenship Act No. 8 of 
1998
374  Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two constitutional entities, namely Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The country has one national nationality and two subnational ‘nationalities’, regulated by the Law on the Na-
tionality of Republika Srpska of 10 April 2014 and the Law on the Nationality of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
28 April 2016. The acquisition and loss of these subnational statuses is connected to the acquisition and loss of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina nationality. See also: Sarajlic, E., “Country Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Coun-
try Reports, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute 2013. 
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality
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Brazil Yes (withdrawal)
Except if the nationality has been acquired on any other 
ground than naturalization or if he/she has naturalized 
in a foreign State, is a resident in a foreign State and the 
naturalization is as a condition for permanent residence on its 
territory or for the exercise of civil rights. 
Na 
 Art. 12 par. 4 sub 2 Constitution of the Federative Republic 
of Brazil
Brunei Yes Yes
Loss upon absence from 
Brunei Darussalam for a 
continuous period of five 
years.
Except if he/she has been 
able to provide proof to 
the satisfaction of the 
Sultan of Brunei that he/
she has maintained a 
substantial connection 
during that period. 
Art. 9 par. 2 Brunei Nationality Act Art. 9 par. 1 Brunei 
Nationality Act
Bulgaria Na Na375 
Law on Bulgarian Citizenship
Burkina Faso Na Na 
Law No. VII 0013/FP/PRES of 16 November 1989 on the 
Code on Persons and Family in Burkina Faso
Burundi Na Na 
Law No. 1 -010 of 18 March 2005 on the promulgation of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi
Law No. 1-013 of 18 July 2000 on the reform of the 
Nationality Code 
Cambodia Na Na 
Law on Nationality 1996  
Cameroon Yes Na 
Art. 31 par. A Law of 11 June 1968 on the Cameroon 
Nationality Code 
Canada Na Na 
Citizenship Act 1985
Cape Verde Na Na 
Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde 1992
Law No. 80/III/90 of 29 June 1990 
375  The status of the Convention between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Bulgaria to prevent 
cases of dual citizenship of 6 July 1966 is unclear, as the Bulgarian dual nationality treaties have been explicitly terminated by 
Bulgaria with all States in 1990, without mention of the treaty with the Russian Federation. Although the treaty is considered by 
Hecker to be terminated between the Russian Federation and Bulgaria, the Russian Foreign Ministry considers the treaty to be 
in force. See: Hecker, H., Die Doppelstaater-Konventionen in Osteuropa gestern und heute, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag fur das Stan-
desamtwesen, 2003, p. 65. 
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Art. 46 Law No. 1961.212 of 1961 on the Central African 
Nationality Code 
Chad Na Na 
Order No. 33/PG-INT of 14 August 1962 on the Chad 
Nationality Code 
Chile Na Na 
Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile
China Yes
Loss upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality if he/
she has settled abroad, which is defined as holding permanent 
resident status abroad and having resided abroad for at least 
two years, of which 18 months continuously. 
Chinese nationals who voluntarily acquire Malaysian 
nationality will automatically lose their nationality regardless 
of their residence status.376
Na 
Art. 9 Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China 
1980
Art. 1 par. 1 Regulations Defining Overseas Chinese and 
Diasporas with Foreign Nationality
Colombia Na Na 
Political Constitution of 1991  
Law 43 of 1993 
Comoros Yes Na 
 Art. 51 Law No. 79-12 of 12 December 1979 on the 
Comoros Nationality Code 
Congo DRC Yes Na 





 Law No. 35-61 of 20 June 1961 on the Code of the 
Congolese Nationality 
Costa Rica Na Na 
Political Constitution of 1949
Côte d’Ivoire Yes Na 
Art. 48 Law No. 61-415 of 14 December 1961 on the Code 
of the Ivorian Nationality 
Croatia Na Na 
 Law on Croatian Citizenship
Cuba Yes (withdrawal) Na 
 Art. 32 Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1992
376  Art. 5 Joint Communique of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia of 31 
May 1974. The Joint Communique of 1974 was reaffirmed by the Joint Communique of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of Malaysia of 31 May 2014. Both documents are on file with the author. 
State First Generation
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INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
Cyprus Na Yes (If national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years. 
Except if he/she makes 
a declaration to retain 
nationality. 





 Act 186/2013 on Citizenship of the Czech Republic
Denmark Na Na 
 Act on Danish Nationality
Djibouti Na Na 
Law No. 79/AN/04/5 of 24 October 2004 on the Djibouti 
Nationality Code
Dominica Na
Art. 20 of the Constitution states that acquisition of another 
nationality does not lead to the loss of Dominican nationality.  
Na 
 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Dominica 1978
The Commonwealth of Dominica Citizenship Act 1978 
377  The Convention between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the preven-
tion of dual citizenship of 23 June 1981 referred to under Slovakia has been terminated by Czech Republic in 2006 in relation to 
its two remaining treaty States, namely Russia and Belarus. See: Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Termination 
of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the prevention of 
dual citizenship, 73/2006, 14 August 2006. Both documents are on file with the author. 
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality







Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal) 
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 10 
years or transfer of their 
residence to another State 
within one year after 
naturalization. 
Except if absence is 
considered “justified” by 
the authorities. 
 Art. 12 par. 2 sub 
d Law No. 1683 on 
Naturalization of 16 April 
1948
Art. 12 par. 2 sub 
e  Law No. 1683 on 
Naturalization of 16 April 
1948
East Timor Na Na 
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor
Law No. 9/2002 on Nationality 
Ecuador Na Na
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008
Organic Law on Human Mobility 2017 
 
Egypt Yes (withdrawal)
Except if permission for retaining nationality is granted by 
the authorities within one year after acquisition. In that case, 
Egyptian nationality can no longer be revoked on the basis of 
Art. 16 par. 1 of Law No. 26 of 1975 on Egyptian Nationality. 
Yes (if national by 
naturalization)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 2 
years.
Unless he has provided 
an acceptable reason for 
his absence.  
 Art. 10 par. 1 Law No. 26 of 1975 on Egyptian Nationality 
Art. 16 par.  1  Law No. 26 of 1975 on Egyptian Nationality
Art. 15 par. 3  Law No. 
26 of 1975 on Egyptian 
Nationality
State First Generation
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El Salvador Na Yes (If national by 
naturalization)  
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 
5 years or 2 years in 
country of origin.  
Except if permission has 
been granted. 
 Art. 94 par. 1 
Constitution of the 





Nationality can be lost voluntarily or by court ruling. The 
acquisition of a foreign nationality is interpreted as an 
act resulting in the voluntary loss of Equatorial Guinean 
nationality. 
Na
Art. 12   Law No. 3/2011 of 14 July, regulating the Equatorial 
Guinean Nationality
Art. 13 Law No. 3/2011 of 14 July, regulating the Equatorial 
Guinean Nationality 
Eritrea Yes (withdrawal) Na
 Art. 8 par. 1 Eritrean Nationality Proclamation No. 21/1992 
Estonia Yes (if national otherwise than by birth)
Art. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 28 par. 3 of Citizenship 
Act 1995 state that nationals by birth cannot be deprived of 
their nationality. 
Na
Art. 22 par. 1 Citizenship Act 1995
Art. 28 par. 3 Citizenship Act 1995 
Art. 8 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 1995
Ethiopia Yes Na
 Art. 20 par. 1 Proclamation No. 378/2003 
Fiji Na Na
Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013 




Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality





France Na Yes 
Person has never 
resided in France or 
held possession d’état 
and ascendant through 
whom he/she obtained 
French nationality has 
not resided in France or 
held possession d’état for 
50 years. 
 Civil Code (Book I, Title I bis of French Nationality) Art. 23-6  Civil Code 
(Book I, Title I bis of 
French Nationality)
Gabon Na Na
 Law No. 37-1998 
Gambia Na
Article 12a of the Constitution states that a national of 
Gambia who acquires the nationality of another State may 
retain his/her nationality.  
Yes (if national by 
naturalization or 
registration)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years. 
Except if he/she has 
registered annually or 
signified his intention to 
retain nationality. 
Art. 12a Constitution of the Second Republic of Gambia 
1997  
Art. 8 par. A Gambia Nationality and Citizenship Act 1965 
Art. 9 par. 3  Gambia 
Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 1965
Georgia Yes (withdrawal) Na
Art. 21 par. 1 sub c Law of the Republic of Georgia on 
Citizenship of Georgia 
Germany Yes
Except if nationality of an EU Member State or Switzerland 
is acquired.
Except if permission for retaining German nationality has 
been granted.
Na
Art. 17 par. 2 Nationality Act 1913 
Art. 25 par. 1 Nationality Act 1913 
Art. 25 par. 2 Nationality Act 1913
Ghana Na Na
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992
Citizenship Act 591 of 2000
State First Generation
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Greece Na378
Nationality can be withdrawn. 
Na
Art. 16 par. 1 sub a Law 3284 on the ratification of the Greek 
Nationality Code 
Grenada Na Na
Grenada Constitution Order 1973
Citizenship Act of 1976
Guatemala Na Na
Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala 2002
Citizenship Act 591 of 2000
Decree No. 1613 
Guinea Yes Yes (withdrawal)
Person or ancestor 
resided outside of Guinea 
for at least 50 years.  
Except if person or 
ancestor has possession 
d’état. 
Art. 95 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea Art. 103 Civil Code of 




Law on Nationality No. 2/92 of 6 April 1992
Guyana Yes (withdrawal) Na
 Art. 46 par. 1 Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of 
Guyana 1980 
Haiti Na Na
Constitution of the Republic of Haiti 1987  
Honduras Yes (If national by naturalization) (withdrawal) Na
Art. 29 par. 2 Political Constitution of 1982 
Hungary Na Na
Act LV. of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship
Iceland Na Na
Icelandic Nationality Act No. 100/1952
378  It is important to note that the provision to withdraw Greek nationality was introduced in 1914 to replace the provision 
of automatic loss of Greek nationality in order to prevent Greek emigrants from losing their nationality. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that Greek nationality is in principle not lost upon the acquisition of another nationality. See: Christopoulos, D. “Country 
Report: Greece”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute 2013, p. 4. 
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India Yes Yes (if national by 
naturalization or 
national by registration 
(exceptions apply)) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years. 
Except if he/she was at 
any time during that 
period a student of an 
educational institution 
outside India or has 
registered annually in the 
prescribed manner. 
Art. 9 The Citizenship Act 1955 Art. 10 par. 2 sub e The 
Citizenship Act 1955 
Indonesia Yes Yes
Loss upon residence 
abroad for five 
consecutive years.
Except if a declaration is 
made within the five-year 
period and a valid reason 
is provided. 
Art. 23 par. A Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 12 2006 Art. 23 par. I Law of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
No. 12 2006
Iran Na Na
The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Iraq Na Na
Iraqi Nationality Law 26 of 2006 
State First Generation
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INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
Ireland Yes (If national by naturalization) (withdrawal) Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence for a period 
of 7 years abroad (or 
outside the island of 
Ireland in case he/she 
is a spouse of an Irish 
national and has been 
naturalized under Art. 
15A).
Except if a declaration 
has been made in the 
prescribed manner and 
he/she has registered 
annually or provides a 
reasonable excuse for not 
registering annually. 
Except if he/she is a 
person of Irish descent or 
associations.
Art. 19 par. 1 sub e Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 
1956
Art. 19 par. 1 sub c 
Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 1956
Israel Na 
Nationality can be withdrawn if the nationality of 
Afghanistan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, 
Pakistan, Sudan, Syria or Yemen is acquired.
Na
Art. 11 par. b sub 2 Nationality Law 5712-1952 (as amended 
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Jamaica Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for a 
period of 7 years. 
Except if he/she has 
registered annually in the 
prescribed manner. 
Except if he/she has given 
notice to the authorities 
of his/her intention to 
retain nationality. 
Art. 8 par. 3 The 
Jamaican Nationality Act 
1962 
Japan Yes Na
Art. 11 par. 1 The Nationality Law
Jordan Na Na
Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality 
Kazakhstan Yes (withdrawal) Na
Art. 21 par. 5 Law On Citizenship of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan
Kenya Na Na
Constitution of Kenya 2010
Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act No. 12 of 2011
Kiribati Yes (if national is not of ‘I-Kiribati descent’379) Na
Art. 8 par. 1 sub a Citizenship Law 1979 
Kosovo Na Na
Law No 04/L-215 on Citizenship of Kosovo
Kuwait Yes (withdrawal) Na
Art. 11 Kuwait Nationality Law 1959
Kyrgyzstan Na
Dual nationality is only explicitly ‘recognized’ under certain 
further conditions. There is no explicit loss provision in place. 
Na
Art. 22 par. 1 sub 2 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic 2007
379  Art. 2 par. 1 of the Citizenship Act 1979 defines “I-Kiribati descent” as descent from a person who was born in Kiriba-
ti before 1900. 
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality




INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
Laos Na
Art. 6 states that Lao nationals are not authorized to hold 
more than one nationality. There is no loss provision in place. 
Yes 
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period 
of 7 years or without 
valid authorization and 
without being under 
the administration of an 
embassy or consulate.
Loss if he/she has not 
maintained any legal 
connection with Laos for 
a period of more than ten 
years.
Art. 6 Law on Lao Nationality No. 29/NA of 1 November 
2017
Art. 25 Law on Lao 
Nationality No. 29/NA of 
1 November 2017
Latvia Yes (withdrawal)
Except if a national holds the nationality of an EU/EFTA/
NATO Member State or Australia, Brazil or New Zealand or 
if permission for retention has been granted by the Cabinet. 
Na
Art. 24 par. 1 sub 1 Law on Citizenship 1994
Art. 9 Law on Citizenship 1994
Lebanon Na Na
Decree No. 15 on Lebanese citizenship
Lesotho Yes Yes (if national by 
naturalization or 
registration) (withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for a 
period of 7 years. 
Except if he has 
resided in a designated 
(Commonwealth) 
country. 
Except if he/she has 
registered annually in the 
prescribed manner. 
Except if he/she has given 
notice to the authorities 
of his/her intention to 
retain nationality.
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Liberia Yes Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for two years (in 
country of origin) or 
five years (in any other 
foreign country). 
Art. 22.1 Alien and Nationality Law Art. 21.51 Aliens and 
Nationality Law 
Libya Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for two years 
within the first ten years 
following the date of 
acquisition of Libyan 
nationality.
Law No. 24 for 2010/1378 on the Libyan Nationality Art. 13 Law No. 24 for 
2010/1378 on the Libyan 
Nationality 
Liechtenstein Na Na
Act of 4 January 1934 on the Acquisition and Loss of 
Citizenship reissued in 1960
Lithuania Yes 
Except if he/she has acquired another nationality at birth 
or has left the (occupied) Republic of Lithuania before 
11 March 1990 or is a descendant of such a person or 
was permitted to retain Lithuanian nationality for his/her 
outstanding merits or has acquired Lithuanian nationality by 
way of exception (on the basis of Art. 20) or has acquired 
Lithuanian nationality while having refugee status. 
Na
Art. 24 par. 2 XI-1196 The Republic of Lithuania Law on 
Citizenship
Art. 7  XI-1196 The Republic of Lithuania Law on 
Citizenship
Luxembourg Na Na
Law of 8 March 2017 on the nationality of Luxembourg 
Macedonia Na Na
Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia
Madagascar Yes Na
Art. 42 Order No. 60-064 of 22 July 1960 on the nationality 
code of Madagascar as amended by Law No. 16-038 of 15 
December 2016
State First Generation
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Malawi Yes Yes (if national other 
than by birth or descent) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years.
Except if he/she has 
registered annually or 
has made a declaration to 
retain to nationality. 
Art. 8 Malawi Citizenship Act No. 28 of 1966 Art. 25 par. 2 sub d 
Malawi Citizenship Act 
No. 28 of 1966
Malaysia Yes (withdrawal) Yes (national by 
naturalization or 
registration) (withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 5 
years and deprivation is 
conducive to the public 
good.
Except if he/she has 
registered annually. 
Art. 24 par. 1 Federal Constitution Art. 25 par. 2 Federal 
Constitution 
Maldives Na Na
Constitution of the Republic of the Maldives 2008 
Mali Na Na
Law No. 2011-087 of 30 December 2011 on the code of 
persons and the family 
Malta Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years. 
Except if he/she has 
made a declaration to 
retain nationality.  
Art. 14 par. 2 Maltese 




Except if permission for retaining nationality has been 
granted. 
Na
Art. 406 Citizenship Act 1984 
State First Generation
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Except if permission for retaining nationality has been 
granted. 
Na
Art. 30 Law No. 1961-112 on the Mauritanian Nationality 
Code as amended by Law No. 2010-023 of 2010
Art. 31 Law No. 1961-112 on the Mauritanian Nationality 
Code  as amended by Law No. 2010-023 of 2010
Mauritius Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 5 
years.
Except if he/she has 
made a declaration to 
retain nationality. 
Art. 11 par. 4 sub A 
Mauritius Citizenship 
Act No. 45 of 1968
Mexico Yes (if national by naturalization) (withdrawal)
Art. 37 par. A of the Constitution states that nationals by 
birth cannot be deprived of nationality. 
Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 5 
years. 
Art. 37 par. B sub I Political Constitution of the Republic of 
Mexico
Art. 37 par. B sub II 
Political Constitution of 
the Republic of Mexico
Micronesia Na 
Micronesian nationality law distinguishes between citizenship 
status and nationality status. Those who possess nationality 
status without citizenship status have all the rights of FSM 
citizens  to enter, reside and work in FSM indefinitely.380   
According to Art. 206 par. 1 sub a of the Citizenship and 
Naturalization Act, those who naturalize in a foreign State can 
be deprived of their citizenship status.
According to Art. 303 FSM Nationals Act, nationality cannot 
be lost, except upon voluntary and formal renunciation. 
Na
Art. 206 par. 1 sub a Citizenship and Naturalization Act 
Art. 303 FSM Nationals Act
Moldova Na Na
Law on the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova No. 1024-
XIV of 2 June 2000
Monaco Yes Na
Art. 8 par. 1 Law No. 1.155 of 18.12.1992 on the nationality 
380  Art. 302 FSM Nationals Act.
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Mongolia Na 
Dual nationality is “not allowed”, but there is no explicit loss 
provision is place.
Na
Art. 4 par. 1 Law of Mongolia on Citizenship 1995 
Montenegro Yes (withdrawal)
There is a bilateral agreement in place on dual nationality 
between Montenegro and Macedonia, but this agreement 
does not prevent the loss of Montenegrin nationality for those 
who acquired Macedonian nationality after 3 June 2006.381 
Na
Art. 24 par. 1 Montenegrin Citizenship Act of 30 July 2016 
Morocco Na Na
Dahir 1-58-250 Code of Moroccan Nationality
Mozambique Na
According to Art. 14 par. 1 sub a of the Law on Nationality, 
nationality is lost upon voluntary acquisition of another 
nationality. The Constitution of Mozambique has been 
amended in 2004 and does no longer state that nationality 
can be lost on this ground. 
Na
Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 
Art. 14 par. 1 sub A Law on Nationality of 20 June 1975 
Myanmar Yes Yes 
Loss of nationality 
upon “emigrating 
permanently”. 
Art. 16 Burma Citizenship Law 1982 Art. 16 Burma 
Citizenship Law 1982
Namibia Yes (if national by naturalization or registration) Yes (if national by 
naturalization)
Loss upon permanent 
residence abroad for a 
period of 2 years.
Except if permission for 
retaining nationality has 
been granted. 
Further (minor) 
exemptions apply.  
Art. 7 par. 1 sub a Namibian Citizenship Act 1990 Art. 7 par. 3 Namibian 
Citizenship Act 1990
Nauru Na Na
Naoero Citizenship Act 2017 
Nepal Yes Na
Art. 10 par. 1 Nepal Citizenship Act 2063 (2006)
381  Agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro on dual citizenship of 6 March 2009. A copy of the 
agreement is on file with the author. 
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Except if he/she was born in the other State of which he 
possesses nationality and if he/she is also a resident in that 
other State or if he/she has resided in the other State for a 
continuous period of five years before attaining the age of 
majority or if he/she is married to a person possessing that 
other nationality. 
These exceptions are not in place if the other State has signed 
and ratified the Strasbourg Convention of 1963 and is party 
to the first chapter of that convention but did not sign and 
ratify the Second Protocol of that Convention (on 1 January 
2018: Austria and Norway). 
Yes 
Loss upon residence 
abroad for an 
uninterrupted period of 
10 years. 
Except if he/she has 
during that period 
resided in an EU State 
for more than one year 
or acquired an identity 
document or made a 
declaration regarding 
the possession of Dutch 
nationality. 
Art. 15 par. 1 sub a Kingdom Act on Netherlands Nationality
Art. 15 par. 2 Kingdom Act on Netherlands Nationality
Art. 15A par. 1 sub a Kingdom Act on Netherlands 
Nationality
Art. 15 par. 1 sub 
c Kingdom Act on 
Netherlands Nationality
Art. 15 par. 3 Kingdom 
Act on Netherlands 
Nationality
Art. 15 par. 4 Kingdom 
Act on Netherlands 
Nationality
New Zealand Na Na
Citizenship Act 1977 
Nicaragua Yes (if national by naturalization) 
Art. 20 of the Political Constitution of Nicaragua states 
that Nicaraguan nationality by birth shall not be lost upon 
acquisition of another nationality. 
Na 
Art. 20 Political Constitution of Nicaragua
Art. 64 par. 1 General Law on Migrations and Aliens (Law 
No. 761)
Niger Na Na
Law No. 2014-60 of 5 November 2014 on amending the 
order No. 84-33 of 23 August 1984 on the code of the 
nationality of Niger 
Nigeria Yes (if national other than by birth) Na
Art. 28 par. 1 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999
North Korea Na Na
Nationality Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 1963
Norway Yes Na 
Art. 23 Act No. 51/2005 on Norwegian Citizenship 
State First Generation
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Oman Yes
Except if permission for retaining nationality has been 
granted. 
Na
Art. 19 Royal Decree No 38/2014 Promulgating the Omani 
Citizenship Law
Art. 5 Royal Decree No 38/2014 Promulgating the Omani 
Citizenship Law
Pakistan Yes 
Except if nationality of Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America is 
acquired.382 
Yes (withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for 7 years if loss 
of nationality is in the 
public interest. 
Except if he/she has 
annually registered or 
maintained a substantial 
connection to Pakistan. 
Art. 14A Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 Art. 16 par. 4 Pakistan 
Citizenship Act 1951
Palau Na Na
Second Constitutional Convention 2005 
Panama Yes (if national by naturalization)
Panamanian nationality law makes a distinction between 
nationality and citizenship status. Citizenship status refers 
solely to political rights. Nationals by birth cannot lose/
renounce their nationality status. They are able to voluntarily 
renounce their citizenship status. 
Na




Except if nationality of a designated country (Australia, Fiji, 
Germany, New Zealand, Samoa, United Kingdom, United 
States of America and Vanuatu) is acquired and permission is 
granted for retaining nationality. 
Na
Art. 64 Constitution of Papua New Guinea 1975 
Art. 6C Citizenship Act 1976 
382  < http://www.dgip.gov.pk/files/immigration.aspx>. 
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Paraguay Yes (if national by naturalization) (withdrawal)
Panamanian nationality law makes a distinction between 
nationality and citizenship status. Citizenship status refers 
solely to political rights. Citizenship status is lost upon the 
acquisition of another nationality.
Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
 Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 3 
years. 
Except if a justifying 
reason for residence 
abroad has been 
provided. 
Art. 150 Political Constitution of 1992 
Art. 153 par. 1 Political Constitution of 1992
Art. 150 Political 
Constitution of 1992
Peru Na Na
Political Constitution of Peru of 1993 
Law on Nationality, Law No. 26574
Philippines Yes (if national is not a ‘natural-born’ citizen)
A ‘natural-born’ citizen can retain  nationality upon 
application and swearing an oath of allegiance.
Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon taking up 
permanent residence 
abroad within a five-year 
period of naturalization. 
Residence of more than 
one year in the country 
of origin or more than 
two years in any other 
country is deemed to be 
evidence of permanent 
residence abroad. 
Art. 1 par. 1 Commonwealth Act No. 63 
RA 9225 Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 
2003
Administrative Order No. 91 2004
Art. 18 Commonwealth 
Act No. 473 
Poland Na Na
Act on Polish Citizenship of 2 April 2009
Portugal Na Na
Law No. 37/81 
Qatar Yes (withdrawal) Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 1 
year. 
Art. 11 par. 5 Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of 
Qatari nationality
Art. 12 par. 4 Law 
No. 38 of 2005 on the 
acquisition of Qatari 
nationality
State First Generation
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Romania Na Na
Law on Romanian Citizenship no. 21/1991
Russia Na Na
Federal Law from 31 May 2002 № 62-FZ ‘About Citizenship 
of the Russian Federation’
Rwanda Na Na





Constitution of Saint Christopher and Nevis of 1983
Saint Lucia Na Na








Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 5 
years.
Except if he/she has 
made a declaration to 
retain nationality. 
Constitution of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1979 No. 
916
Art. 14 par. 2 sub d Saint 
Vincent and Grenadines 
Citizenship Act 1984
Samoa Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 
two years if it is unlikely 
that he/she will reside in 
Samoa in the future. 
Art. 16 Citizenship Act 
2004
Sao Tome and 
Principe
Na Na
Law 6/90, Law on Nationality 
San Marino Na Na
Law 30 November 2000 No. 114 Law on Citizenship
Saudi Arabia Yes (withdrawal) 
Except if permission for retaining nationality has been 
granted.
Na
Art. 13 Saudi Arabian Citizenship System
Senegal Na Na
Law No. 61-70 of 7 March 1961 on the Senegalese 
Nationality 
State First Generation
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another nationality






Law on citizenship of the Republic of Serbia 2004 
Seychelles Na Na
Seychelles Constitution 1993 
Seychelles Citizenship Act 18 of 1994
Sierra Leone Na Yes (if national by 
naturalization)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years.
Except if he/she has 
registered annually or 
has made a declaration to 
retain to nationality.
Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991
Sierra Leone Citizenship Act No. 4 of 1973 as amended by 
the Sierra Leone Citizenship (amendment) Act No. 11 of 
2006
Art. 18 Sierra Leone 
Citizenship Act No. 4 of 
1973 as amended by the 
Sierra Leone Citizenship 
(amendment) Act No. 11 
of 2006
Singapore Yes (withdrawal) Yes (withdrawal) 
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 10 
years, except if person 
has entered Singapore 
during that period with 
a Singaporean identity 
document.
If national by 
naturalization: loss upon 
continuous residence 
abroad for 5 years if loss 
is conducive to the public 
good, except if he/she 
has made a declaration to 
retain nationality. 
Art. 134 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Art. 135 par. 1 sub c 
Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore
Art. 129 par. 5 
Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore
Slovakia Yes Na
Art. 9 par. 16  Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the 
Slovak Republic
Slovenia Na Na
Act on the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality








Art. 23 The Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978
Somalia Na
Art. 10 of Law No. 28 of 22 December on Somalia 
Citizenship states that nationality is lost upon acquisition 
of another nationality. However, Art. 10 of the Provisional 
Constitution 2012 states that a person cannot be deprived of 
Somali nationality. 
Na
Art. 8 par. 3 Law No. 28 of 22 December on Somalia 
Citizenship
Art. 10 Provisional Constitution 2012
South Africa Yes 
Except if he/she applies to retain South African nationality 
and the Minister of Home Affairs grants permission for 
retention. 
Na
Art. 6 South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 
South Korea Yes Na
Art. 15 par. 1 Nationality Act No. 14183 2016
South Sudan Na Na




Loss of nationality if he/she is habitually residing abroad after 
a period of three years upon acquisition of another nationality. 
Except if a declaration is made within three years for retaining 
nationality. 
Except if the nationality of an Ibero-American State or 
Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Portugal is 
acquired. 
Yes (if national otherwise 
than national of origin)
Loss of nationality if 
he/she has during a 
period of three years 
exclusively made use of 
the nationality that he/she 
had declared to renounce 
when he/she acquired 
Spanish nationality.  
Art. 24 par. 1 Civil Code Art. 25 par. 1 sub a Civil 
Code 
Sri Lanka Yes 
Except if permission for retaining nationality has been 
granted.
Na
Art. 20 par. 5 Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948
Art. 21 par. 1 Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948
Art. 19 par. 2  Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948
Sudan Na 
Except if nationality of South Sudan is acquired. 
Na
Art. 10 par. 2 Sudanese Nationality Act 1994 
Suriname Yes Na
Art. 11 par. 2 Law on Nationality and Residence
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality





Swaziland Yes (if national by registration) (withdrawal) Yes (if national by 
registration) (withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 7 
years. 
Except if he/she has 
made a declaration to 
retain nationality.
Art. 49 par. 1 sub c Constitution Of The Kingdom Of 
Swaziland Act 2005
Art. 49 par 1 sub e 
Constitution Of The 
Kingdom Of Swaziland 
Act 2005
Sweden Na Na
Law 2001:82: Swedish Citizenship Act
Switzerland Na Na
Law on Swiss Nationality of 20 June 2014
Syria Na383
Possibility of withdrawal of nationality. 
Yes (withdrawal) 
Loss upon leaving Syria 
indefinitely for the 
purpose of selling in a 
non-Arab country and 
he/she has continuously 
resided abroad for three 
years. 
Except if convincing 
reason is provided. 
Art. 21 par. A Legislative Decree 276 
Art. 10 par. 2 Legislative Decree 276
Art. 21 par. G Legislative 
Decree 276  
Taiwan Na Yes 
Art. 11 par. 3 Nationality Act 
Tajikistan Yes (withdrawal)
Except if Russian nationality is acquired, as a bilateral dual 
nationality treaty is in place between Tajikistan and Russia.384
Na
Art. 23 par. 2 Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan 
on Nationality of the Republic of Tajikistan
383  The acquisition of another nationality is interpreted by Syrian nationality law as the renunciation of Syrian nationality, 
which is only permitted if permission has been granted. Art. 10 par. 2 Legislative Decree 276 states that those who acquire ano-
ther nationality without such permission will by all means and in all situations remain a Syrian nationality, although it is possible 
that their Syrian nationality will be revoked on the basis of Art. 21 par. A Legislative Decree 276. See: Forcese, C., “A distinction 
with a legal difference”, in: Edwards, A. and Ferstman, C. Human Security and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy and International Affairs, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 447. 
384  Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Settling Issues of Dual Citizenship. A copy of 
the treaty is on file with the author. 
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality
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Tanzania Yes Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for a 
period of five years.
Art. 7 par. 1 Tanzania Citizenship Act 1995 Art. 15 par. 2 sub d 
Tanzania Citizenship Act 
1995
Thailand Yes (withdrawal) Yes (withdrawal)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad in a 
foreign country of which 
his parent is a national for 
a period of 5 years after 
attaining age of majority/
sui iuris. 
If national by 
naturalization: loss upon 
residence abroad for 5 
years, except if person 
had domicile status.
Art. 22 Nationality Act B.E.2508 Art. 17 par. 1 Nationality 
Act B.E.2508
Art. 19 par. 5 Nationality 
Act B.E.2508
Togo Yes (withdrawal) Na
Art. 23 par. 1 Ordinance 78-34 of 7 September 1978 on the 





Yes (if national otherwise than by birth or descent) Na
Art. 11 par. 1 Citizenship of the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago Act
Art. 11 par. 2D Citizenship of the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago Act
Tunisia Na Na
Legislative Decree 63-6 of 28 February 1963
Turkey Na Na
Law No. 5901/2009 Turkish Citizenship Law
Turkmenistan Na Na
Law of Turkmenistan of June 22, 2013 No. 411-IV “About 
citizenship of Turkmenistan”
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality






Tuvalu Citizenship Act (as amended by Citizenship 






Art. 15 Constitution 1995 
Art. 19A par. 1 Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control 
Act 1999 
Ukraine Yes Na




Yes Yes (if national by 
naturalization or 
affiliation) 
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 4 
years. 
Except if he/she has 
provided a reason for 
residence abroad. 
Art. 15 par. C Federal Law No. (17) Of 1972 concerning 
Nationality and Passports
Art. 16 par. 4 Federal 










United States Code, Title 8, Chapter 12, Sub-Chapter 3: 
Nationality and Naturalisation
Uruguay Na Na
Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality




INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
Except if person applies to retain Ugandan nationality.The 
application is subject to approval of the Uganda Citizenship 
and Immigration Control Board.The further requirements 
for retention of nationality are outlined in Art. 19A and Art.
19C of the Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act 
1999.
Uzbekistan Yes (withdrawal) Yes (withdrawal)
Loss if he/she is 
permanently residing 
abroad.
Except if he/she has 
registered within a period 
of three years. 
Except if he/she had 
a good reason for not 
fulfilling the registration 
requirement. 
Art. 21 par. 5 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 
Citizenship of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Art. 21 par. 2 Law of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan 




Vatican City Na Na
Law on Citizenship, Residence and Entry 2011 
Venezuela Na Na
Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
Law on Nationality and Citizenship
Vietnam Na385 Na
Law on Vietnamese Nationality No. 24/2008/QH12 (as 
amended by Law 56/2014/QH13) 
Yemen Na Yes (if national 
by naturalization) 
(withdrawal)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 2 
years. 
Art. 18 par. B Law No. 
6 of 1990 on Yemeni 
Nationality
Zambia Na Na
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act of 2016 No. 2 of 
2016 
385  Art. 13 Law on Vietnamese Nationality No. 24/2008/QH12 (as amended by Law No. 56/2014/QH13) states that persons 
of Vietnamese origin residing abroad who have not lost Vietnamese nationality before the law came into force will retain their na-
tionality. A corresponding loss provision in Art. 26 Law on Vietnamese Nationality was revoked by the same amending law. Al-
though Vietnam still adheres to the principle of single nationality except in the cases provided by law (Art. 4 Law on Vietnamese 
Nationality), there is currently no explicit loss provision in place for those who voluntarily acquire another nationality.
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality






According to Art. 9 par. 2 of the Citizenship of Zimbabwe 
Act, Zimbabwean nationality is immediately lost upon 
voluntary acquisition of another nationality. However, 
according to Art. 42 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 
nationals by birth cannot lose their Zimbabwean nationality 
upon acquisition of another nationality.. 
Yes (if national by 
naturalization or 
registration)
Loss upon residence 
abroad for a period of 5 
years. 
Except if permission for 
retaining nationality has 
been granted. 
Further minor exceptions 
apply. 
Art. 42 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act 
2013
Art. 9 par. 2 Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act
Art. 13 par. 1 Citizenship 
of Zimbabwe Act
State First Generation
Loss of nationality  upon voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality




INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
Afghanistan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure) 
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na386 
Art. 9 par. 2 Law on Citizenship of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan
Art. 10 Law on Citizenship of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan  





Art. 7 Law No. 8389 of 5.8.1998 “On Albanian 
Citizenship”





Art. 6  Law No. 70-86 of 15 December 1970 
concerning the Algerian Nationality Code





Art. 2 Law on Nationality of 5 October 1995





Art. 9 par. 1 Law No. 2/16 on Nationality of 15 
April 2016
386  Art. 10 par. 2 Law on Citizenship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan states that his/her nationality will be lost if he/she 






A patre/matre: Yes (if parent was born in 
State and became a national at the date of 





Art. 113 par. B The Antigua and Barbuda 
Constitution Order 1981 






Art. 1 par. 2 Law 346 on Nationality of 1978  
Armenia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na






Art. 16 par. 2 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 





Art. 7 Federal Law on Austrian Nationality 1985 
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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A patre/matre:Yes (if parent is also a national by 
descent: residence requirement for the parent) 
A patre:





Art. 11 par. 1 Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on 
Citizenship of the Azerbaijan Republic
Bahamas A patre/matre: 




Art. 8 Constitution of the Commonwealth of the 
Bahamas 1973 
Bahrain A patre/matre: 





Art. 4 par. B Bahraini Citizenship Act 1963
Bangladesh A patre/matre: Yes (procedure if parent is also a 




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss of nationality if person 
has attained the age of 21 
years except if person holds 
nationality of any state of 
Europe or North America or 
any other State specified by 
the Government and applies 
for retention of his/her 
original nationality.387 
Art. 5 Citizenship Act 1951 Art. 14 par. 1A Citizenship 
Act 1951 
Art. 2B The Bangladesh 
Citizenship (Temporary 
Provisions) Order 1972
387  It is important to note that even though nationals of Bangladesh are able to apply for retention of nationality prior to their 
naturalisation abroad, the abovementioned legislative provisions only refer to reacquisition of nationality.  See: <https://www.
bangladeshconsulatela.com/dualnationality.html>. Although permission for retention of nationality is generally required, subor-
dinate regulation indicates that nationals of the United Kingdom are not required to obtain such permission (Statutory Regula-
tory Order (SRO) No. 69 Law/2008).
State Second Generation




Barbados A patre/matre: Yes (if parent was born in State) 





Art. 5 Constitution of Barbados 2002 
Belarus A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na 
Art. 13 Law of the Republic of Belarus of 1 
August 2002 No.136-З On Citizenship in the 
Republic of Belarus
Belgium A patre/matre: Yes (procedure if parent is a 




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Loss of nationality upon 
continuous residence abroad 
between the age of 18 and 
28. 
Except if he/she has made a 
declaration or if he/she was 
born in a former Belgian 
colony. 
Art. 8 par. 1 sub 2 Belgian Nationality Law 1984 Art. 22 par. 5 Belgian 
Nationality Law 1984





Art. 25 Belize Constitution 1981 






Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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Art. 12 Law No. 65-17 of 23 June 1965 on the 
Benin Nationality Code  
Art. 13 Law No. 65-17 of 23 June 1965 on the 
Benin Nationality Code  
Bhutan A patre/matre: 
A patre: 
A matre:
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na 
Art. 6 par. 1 Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Bhutan
Art. 2 Bhutan Citizenship Act












The subnational provisions on the acquisition 
of nationality in the case of birth abroad of the 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are similar to the national 
provisions. Therefore, there is no need to discuss 
these provisions separately.388
Na 
Art. 27 of the Law on 
Citizenship Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of 22 March 
2016 states that nationality 
is lost if a person loses 
his ‘nationality’ status 
of Republika Srpska or 
the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The 
‘nationality’ legislation of 
these two entities do not 
contain a loss provision that 
is of relevance in this regard.
Art. 6 par. A Law on Citizenship Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of 22 March 2016
Art. 6 par. D Law on Citizenship Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of 22 March 2016




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss upon reaching the age 
of 21 years. 
388  Art. 6 Law on the Nationality of Republika Srpska of 10 April 2014 and Art. 7 Law on the Nationality of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 28 April 2016. 
State Second Generation




Art. 5 par. 1 Citizenship Act No. 8 of 1998 Art. 15 par. 1 Citizenship 
Act No. 8 of 1998





Art. 12 par. 1 sub c Constitution of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil
Brunei A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if a) father is a national, working 
abroad for Brunei government or a Brunei 
company and birth is registered within six 
months or b) if father is not a national, born in 
Brunei and indigenous or c) if father is not a 
national, his own father and mother were born in 
Brunei and indigenous, working abroad for the 
Brunei government or a Brunei company and 
the birth is registered within six months. 
A matre:
A patre+matre: Yes (if father and mother are 
not nationals, born in Brunei, and indigenous in 
accordance with the First Schedule).389 
Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Loss of nationality upon 
residence abroad for a 
continuous period of five 
years. 
Except if person has 
maintained a substantial 
connection with Brunei. 
Art. 4 Brunei Nationality Act Art. 9 par. 1 Brunei 
Nationality Act





Art. 8 Law on Bulgarian Citizenship
389  If nationality is acquired a patre, the term ‘indigenous’ refers to persons of the Malay race. If nationality is acquired a pa-
tre et a matre, the term ‘indigenous’ refers to persons of any of the races mentioned in the First Schedule of the Brunei National-
ity Act. 
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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Art. 140 Law No. VII 0013/FP/PRES of 16 
November 1989 on the Code on Persons and 
Family in Burkina Faso
Burundi A patre/matre: 




Art. 12 Constitution of Burundi 2005
Art. 2 Law No. 1-013 of 18 July 2000 on the 
reform of the Nationality Code





Art. 4 par. 1 Law on Nationality 1996 





Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss upon reaching the age 
of majority. 
Art. 6 Law of 11 June 1968 on the Cameroon 
Nationality Code
Art. 7 Law of 11 June 1968 on the Cameroon 
Nationality Code
Art 31 par. A Law of 11 
June 1968 on the Cameroon 
Nationality Code
390  Acquisition of nationality  a matre is not referred to in Law No. 1-013 of 18 July 2000 on the reform of the Nationality 
Code.
State Second Generation




Canada A patre/matre: Yes (dependent on the ground 
on which the parent has obtained Canadian 
nationality. In general, a parent born abroad 





Art. 3 par. 1 sub B Citizenship Act 1985
Art. 3 par. 3  Citizenship Act 1985














Art. 6 Law No. 1961.212 of 1961 on the Central 
African Nationality Code (as amended by Law 
64.54) 





Art. 9 Order No. 33/PG-INT of 14 August 1962 
on the Chad Nationality Code






Art. 10 par. 2 Political Constitution of the 
Republic of Chile
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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China A patre/matre: Yes (except if parent has 






Art. 5 Nationality Law of the People’s Republic 
of China 1980
Art. 1 par. 1 Regulations Defining Overseas 
Chinese and Diasporas with Foreign Nationality





Art. 96 par. 1 sub b Political Constitution of 
1991 




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation) (withdrawal)
Art. 11 Law No. 79-12 of 12 December 1979 on 
the Comoros Nationality Code
Art. 52 Law No. 79-12 of 
12 December 1979 on the 
Comoros Nationality Code





Art. 1 par. 1 states that 
nationality cannot be held 
concurrently with another 
nationality. There is no 
explicit loss provision in 
place. 
Art. 2 par. 1 Law No. 04-024 of 12 November 
2004 on the Congolese Nationality
391  The term ‘settled abroad’ is defined as holding permanent resident status abroad and having resided abroad for at least 
two years, of which 18 months continuously. See Art. 1 par. 1 Regulations Defining Overseas Chinese and Diasporas with For-
eign Nationality. 
State Second Generation









Art. 7 Law No. 35-61 of 20 June 1961 on the 
Code of the Congolese Nationality





Art. 13 par. 2 Political Constitution of 1949




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation) (withdrawal)
Art. 7 par. 1 Law No. 61-415 of 14 December 
1961 on the Code of the Ivorian Nationality
Art. 49 Law No. 61-415 
of 14 December 1961 on 
the Code of the Ivorian 
Nationality
Croatia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if other parent is not a national of 
the State in which the child is born or if child 
takes up residence in Croatia)
A matre: Yes (if other parent is not a national of 
the State in which the child is born if child takes 
up residence in Croatia)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na 
Art. 4 Law on Croatian Citizenship
Art. 5 Law on Croatian Citizenship
Art. 6 Law on Croatian Citizenship
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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Art. 29 par. C Constitution of the Republic of 
Cuba 1992
Art. 3 par B Decree No. 358 of 1944 





Art. 109 par. 2 Law of 2002 (141(I)/2002)





Art. 4 Act 186/2013 on Citizenship of the Czech 
Republic
392  According to Art. 29 par C of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1992, nationals by birth are “[…] those born 
abroad to either a Cuban father or mother provided that legal formalities are previously met”. Art. 3 par. B of Decree No. 358 of 
1944 further defines these ‘legal formalities’ and requires that the individual born abroad must reside in Cuba in order to acquire 
nationality. Taken together, this entails that a child of a Cuban national cannot obtain Cuban nationality by birth from abroad. 
See also: US Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Policy Memorandum: Updated agency interpretation of Cuban citizenship 
law for purposes of the Cuban Adjustment Act”, PM-602-0154, 21 November 2017, via: <https://www.uscis.gov/>. 
On the 1st of January 2018, a new Decree entered into force, which interprets Art. 29 par C of the Constitution in a different 
way. According to Art. 3 of Decree 352 of 2017, a child of a Cuban national born abroad can acquire Cuban nationality upon 
request, as long as he/she is present in Cuba. This provision does not specifically see on acquistion of nationality at birth, but 
mainly targets descendants of Cuban emigrants who wish to obtain Cuban nationality at a later age. See: Gaceta Oficial de la 
República de Cuba, No. 63, 30 December 2017, p. 1359 ff. 
State Second Generation








Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) (if national by 
descent)
Loss of nationality if he/she 
has not lived in Denmark or 
stayed in Denmark under 
conditions that indicates 
cohesion with Denmark 
before reaching the age of 
22 years. 
Except if a permission 
for retaining nationality is 
granted. 
Except if he/she has resided 
for at least 7 years in another 
Nordic State. 
Art. 1 Act on Danish Nationality
Art. 2 Act on Danish Nationality
Art. 8 Act on Danish 
Nationality





Art. 4 Law No. 79/AN/04/5 of 24 October 2004 
on the Djibouti Nationality Code














Art. 18 par. 1 Constitution of the Dominican 
Republic 2015
Art. 26 par. 1 Law No. 1683 on Naturalization 
of 16 April of 1948  
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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Art. 3 par. A Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of East Timor 
Ecuador A patre/matre: Yes (if parent or grandparent or 





Article 7 par. 2 Constitution of the Republic of 
Ecuador 2008
Art. 22 Civil Code 





Art. 2 par. 1 Law No. 26 of 1975 on Egyptian 
Nationality  





Art. 90 par. 2 Constitution of the Republic of El 








Art. 3 Law No. 3/2011 of 14 July, regulating the 
Equatorial Guinean Nationality
State Second Generation









Art. 2 par. 5 of the Eritrean 
Nationality Proclamation 
No. 21/1992 states that 
permission must be 
requested for retaining 
Eritrean nationality next 
to another nationality. 
An adequate justification 
for this request must be 
provided. There is no 
explicit loss provision in 
place. 
Art. 3 Constitution of Eritrea
Art. 2 par. 1 Eritrean Nationality Proclamation 
No. 21/1992
Art. 2 par. 5  Eritrean 
Nationality Proclamation 
No. 21/1992





Art. 5 par. 1 Citizenship Act 1995 




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation) 
Loss of nationality takes 
place one year after reaching 
the age of majority. 
Art. 6 par. 1 Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Art. 3 par. 1 Proclamation No. 378/2003 
Art. 20 par. 2 Proclamation 
No. 378/2003





Art. 8 par. 1 Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
145
2
INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
Finland A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure if born out of wedlock) 
A matre: Yes 
A patre+matre:
Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) (if national by 
descent)
Loss of nationality if he/she 
has not lived or resided in 
Finland before reaching the 
age of 22 years. 
Except if a declaration for 
retention of nationality is 
made or person has applied 
for or obtained a Finnish 
identity document or has 
completed military service 
in Finland. 
Except if he/she has resided 
for at least 7 years in another 
Nordic State.
Art. 9 359/2003 Nationality Act
Art. 26 par. 2 359/2003 Nationality Act
Art. 34 359/2003 
Nationality Act




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Person has never resided 
in France or held possession 
d’état and ascendant through 
whom he/she obtained 
French nationality has not 
resided in France or held 
possession d’etat for 50 years
Art. 18 Civil Code (Book I, Title I bis of French 
Nationality)
Art. 23-6 Civil Code (Book 
I, Title I bis of French 
Nationality)





Art. 13 Law No. 37-1998





Art. 10 Constitution of the Second Republic of 
Gambia 1997  
State Second Generation




Georgia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na 
Art. 10 Law of the Republic of Georgia on 
Citizenship of Georgia




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
 
Except if it is considered 
impossible or not reasonable 




Art. 4 par. 1 Nationality Act 1913 Art. 29 Nationality Act 1913
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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Except if person has been 
habitually resident in 
Germany for at least 8 years 
before reaching the age of 21 
or has attended a German 
school for at least 6 years or 
has a German
school-leaving qualification 
or has completed vocational 
education in Germany.
Except if person has not 
received a notice requiring
him/her to renounce the 
other nationality within one 
year after reaching the age 
of 21.
   
   
    
 
Except if person holds the 
nationality of an EU
Member State or
Switzerland.





Art. 6 par 2 Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana 1992 





Art. 1 par. 1 Law 3284 on the ratification of the 
Greek Nationality Code






Art.97 Constitution Order 1973





Art. 144 Political Constitution of the Republic of 
Guatemala 2002
Guinea A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if born in wedlock)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) (withdrawal)
Loss upon residing abroad 
in a State of which he/she 
has obtained the nationality 
by affiliation and his/her 
ancestor have resided in that 
State for at least 50 years. 
Except if person and 
ancestor has possession d’état. 
Art. 30 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea
Art. 31 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea
Art. 32 Civil Code of the Republic of Guinea
Art. 103 Civil Code of the 
Republic of Guinea
State Second Generation









Art. 5 par. 1 sub b Law on Nationality No. 2/92 
of 6 April 1992
Guyana A patre/matre: Yes (procedure if national 





Art. 44 Constitution of the Co-operative 
Republic of Guyana 1980
Haiti A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure) 
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na 
Art. 11 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti 
1987  





Art. 23 par. 2 Political Constitution of 1982





Art. 3 par. 1 Act LV. of 1993 on Hungarian 
Citizenship
State Second Generation
Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
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Iceland A patre/matre: 




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) (if national by 
descent)
Loss of nationality if he/she 
has not lived or resided in 
Iceland before reaching the 
age of 22 years. 
Except if a declaration is 
made or person has resided 
for at least 7 years in another 
Nordic State.
Art. 1 par. 1 Icelandic Nationality Act No. 
100/1952
Art. 1 par. 2 Icelandic Nationality Act No. 
100/1952
Art. 2 Icelandic Nationality Act No. 100/1952
Art. 12 Icelandic Nationality 
Act No. 100/1952
Art. 14 par. A Icelandic 
Nationality Act No. 
100/1952 






Art. 4 The Citizenship Act 1955
Indonesia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if child is born in wedlock) 
A matre: Yes
A patre+matre:
Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss of nationality upon 
reaching the age of 21 years. 
Art. 4 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 12 
2006
Art. 5 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 12 
2006
Art. 25 par. 4 Law of the 
Republic of Indonesia No. 
12 2006
Art. 6 Law of the Republic 
of Indonesia No. 12 2006





Art. 976 par.2 The Civil Code of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran
State Second Generation




Iraq A patre/matre: 




Art. 3 par. A Iraqi Nationality Law 26 of 2006
Ireland A patre/matre: Yes (except if parent was born 






Art. 7 par. 1 Irish Nationality and Citizenship 
Act 1956






Art. 4 par. 2 Nationality Law 5712-1952





Art. 1 par. 1 Act No. 91/92
Jamaica A patre/matre: Yes (procedure for certain 





Art. 3C Jamaica Constitution Order 1962
Art. 4 par. 1 The Jamaican Nationality Act 1962
State Second Generation
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Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
A Japanese national who 
was born abroad and also 
acquired another nationality 
at birth will retroactively lose 
Japanese nationality after 
three months from the date 
of birth, unless he/she (i.e. 
the parent) has registered 
his choice to maintain 
Japanese nationality within 
that period. 
Before the age of 22 years, 
he/she will have to either 
renounce his/her foreign 
nationality or declare that 
he/she chooses Japanese 
nationality and will renounce 
his/her foreign nationality.393 
If he/she does not make 
such a declaration, he/she 
can be summoned in writing 
to do in writing. If he/
she does not subsequently 
make such a declaration 
within one month from the 
date of reception, Japanese 
nationality is lost. 
Art. 2 par. 1 Nationality Law Art. 12 Nationality Law of 4 
May 1950
Art. 104 Household 
Registration Law of 29 
December 1947
Art. 14 Nationality Law of 4 
May 1950
Art. 15 Nationality Law of 4 
May 1950
Art. 6 Implementing Order 
of the Nationality Law of 1 
November 1984
393  Art. 16 of the Nationality Law states that Japanese nationality can be revoked if a person has declared to choose Japanese 
nationality and has public office in another State, if 1) it is a position that only a national of that State is able to take and 2) it is a 
position that would “substantially contradict his or her choice of Japanese nationality”. 
State Second Generation




Jordan A patre/matre: 




Art. 3 par. 3 Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality 
Kazakhstan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes
Na 
Art. 11 Law On Citizenship of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan
Art. 12 Law On Citizenship of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan





Art. 14 par. 1 Constitution of Kenya 2010
Kiribati A patre/matre: 




Art. 25 par. 2 Kiribati Independence Order 1979 
Kosovo A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes
Na 
Art. 6 par. 2 sub 1 Law No 04/L-215 on 
Citizenship of Kosovo
Art. 6 par. 2 sub 3 Law No 04/L-215 on 
Citizenship of Kosovo
State Second Generation
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Art. 2 Kuwait Nationality Law 1959 
Kyrgyzstan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes
Na 
Art. 12 The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic 2007
Laos A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes
Yes 
Loss upon residence abroad 
for a period of 7 years 
without authorization. 
Loss upon residence 
abroad if it exceeds the 
validity of the authorization 
and he/she is not under 
the administration of an 
embassy or consulate and 
he/she has not maintained 
any legal connection with 
Laos for a period of more 
than ten years.
Art. 14 Law on Lao Nationality No. 29/NA of 1 
November 2017
Art. 15 Law on Lao Nationality No. 29/NA of 1 
November 2017
Art. 25 Law on Lao 
Nationality No. 29/NA of 1 
November 2017




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation) (withdrawal) 
Except if the other State 
is an EU/EFTA/NATO 
Member State or Australia, 
Brazil or New Zealand or 
permission for retention has 
been granted by the Cabinet. 
Art. 2 par. 1 sub 2 Law on Citizenship 1994 Art. 24 par. 1 sub 1 Law on 
Citizenship 1994
Art. 9 Law on Citizenship 
1994
State Second Generation




Lebanon A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes 




Art. 1 Decree No. 15 on Lebanese citizenship
Art. 2  Decree No. 15 on Lebanese citizenship





Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss of nationality upon 
reaching the age of 21 years. 
Art. 39 Constitution of Lesotho 1993 Art. 41  par. 2 Constitution 
of Lesotho 1993
Liberia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if father is of negro descent and has 
resided in Liberia prior to the birth of the child) 
A matre:
A patre+matre:
Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Except if he/she takes an 
oath of allegiance to Liberia 
before reaching the age of 
23. 
Art. 28 Constitution of the Republic of Liberia 
1986
Art. 20.1 Alien and Nationality Law
Art. 28 Constitution of the 
Republic of Liberia 1986
Art. 20.1 Alien and 
Nationality Law  
Libya A patre/matre: 




Art. 3 Law No. 24 for 2010/1378 on Libyan 
Nationality 





Art. 4 par. 1 Act of 4 January 1934 on the 
Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship reissued in 
1960
State Second Generation
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Art. 14 XI-1196 The Republic of Lithuania Law 
on Citizenship
Art. 7 par. 1 XI-1196 The 
Republic of Lithuania Law 
on Citizenship





Art. 1 par. 1 Law of 8 March 2017 on the 
nationality of Luxembourg
Macedonia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure) 
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na
Art. 4 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of 
Macedonia
Art. 5 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of 
Macedonia





Art. 9 Order No. 60-064 of 22 July 1960 on the 
nationality code of Madagascar as amended by 
Law No. 16-038 of 15 December 2016 




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation) (withdrawal) 
Art. 5 Malawi Citizenship Act No. 28 of 1966 Art. 7 Malawi Citizenship 
Act No. 28 of 1966
State Second Generation




Malaysia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if born in wedlock) (procedure if 
father was born abroad)
A matre: Yes394 (if born out of wedlock) 
(procedure if mother was born abroad)
A patre+matre: 
Na
Art. 14 par. 1 sub b Federal Constitution
Part II Federal Constitution
Art. 15 par. 2 Federal Constitution





Art. 9 par. A sub 2 Constitution of the Republic 
of the Maldives 2008





Art. 224 Law No. 2011-087 of 30 December 
2011 on the code of persons and the family
Malta A patre/matre: Yes (if parent or other ascendant 





Art. 5 par. 3 Maltese Citizenship Act 1964





394  According to Art. 17, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution, the constitutional provisions on Malaysian nationali-
ty (Part III of the Federal Constitution) which make reference to a father should be interpreted as to make reference to a moth-
er in case of an illegitimate child. 
State Second Generation
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Art. 11 par. 1 sub 2 Constitution of the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands
Mauritania A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes 
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre:
Na
Art. 8 par. 1 Law No. 1961-112 on the 
Mauritanian Nationality Code
Art. 13 Law No. 1961-112 on the Mauritanian 
Nationality Code





Art. 23 Constitution of the Republic of 
Mauritius 






Art. 30 par. A Political Constitution of the 
Republic of Mexico





leads to loss of “citizenship 
status”, but not of 
“nationality status”.395
Art. 3 par. 2 Constitution of the Federated States 
of Micronesia 
Art. 301 FSM Nationals Act
Art. 202 Federated States of Micronesia 
Citizenship Act 
Art. 3 par. 3 Constitution 
of the Federated States of 
Micronesia









395 Micronesian nationality law distinguishes between citizenship status and nationality status. Those who possess 
nationality status without citizenship status have all the rights of FSM citizens to enter, reside and work in FSM indefinitely 
(Art. 302 FSM Nationality Act). 





Art. 11 par. 1 sub a Law on the citizenship of 
the Republic of Moldova No. 1024-XIV of 2 
June 2000
Monaco A patre/matre:
A patre: Yes (except if father acquired 
Monegasque nationality by marriage)
A matre: Yes (if mother is a national by birth, 
naturalization, reacquisition or if mother is 




Art. 1 Law No. 1.155 of 18.12.1992 on the 
nationality
A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)






Art. 7 Law of Mongolia on Citizenship 1995





Art. 5 Montenegrin Citizenship Act of 30 July 
2016
396  Art. 1-3 Convention between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic on the prevention of dual citizenship of 11 September 1975. 
State Second Generation
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If a child is born with
Mongolian-Russian
nationality, parents are 
required to opt for one
of the nationalities within 
three months after birth.
Otherwise, the nationality 
of their (last) country of 
residence is retained. 396





Art. 6 Dahir 1-58-250 Code of Moroccan 
Nationality





Art. 23 Constitution of the Republic of 
Mozambique
Myanmar A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (only if parent has nationality status 
and other parent has associate citizen status or is 
a naturalized citizen)
A matre: Yes (only if parent has nationality status 
and other parent has associate citizen status or is 
a naturalized citizen) 
A patre+matre: Yes
Na
Art. 7 Burma Citizenship Law 1982





Art. 4 par. 2 sub a Namibian Citizenship Act 
1990





Art. 4 par. B Naoero Citizenship Act 2017
State Second Generation




Nepal A patre/matre: 
A patre: 
A matre:
A patre+matre:  Yes 
Art. 3 par. 1 of the Nepal Citizenship Act 2063 
states a child of a Nepalese parent can acquire 
Nepalese nationality. 
Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Chinese-Nepalese dual 
nationals of 18 year and 
above who reside in the 
Tibet region may according 
to their own will opt for 
Chinese nationality, 
which will result in loss of 
Nepalese nationality.397   
Art. 11 par. 3 Constitution of Nepal 2015 Art. 10 par. 3 Nepal 
Citizenship Act 2063 (2006)




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Loss upon residence abroad 
for an uninterrupted period 
of 10 years during his 
majority. 
Except if he/she has during 
that period resided in an 
EU State for more than 
one year or acquired an 
identity document or a 
declaration with respect to 
the possession of Dutch 
nationality. 
Art. 3 par. 1 Kingdom Act on Netherlands 
Nationality
Art. 15 Kingdom Act on 
Netherlands Nationality
New Zealand A patre/matre: Yes (if parent is national otherwise 





Art. 7 par. 1 Citizenship Act 1977





Art. 16 par. 2 Political Constitution of Nicaragua
397  Art. 14 Exchange of Notes No. 3 of 20 September 1956. A copy of the document is on file with the author.  
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Acquisition upon birth abroad Loss 
161
2
INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 





Art. 11 Law No. 2014-60 of 5 November 2014 
on amending the order No. 84-33 of 23 August 
1984 on the code of the nationality of Niger





Art. 25 par. 1 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999
North Korea A patre/matre: No (no acquisition of nationality 





Art. 5 par. 1 Nationality Law of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea 1963




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Loss of nationality if he/she 
has not resided in Norway 
for at least 2 years. 
Except if he/she has 
remained sufficient ties with 
Norway and permission 
is granted for retaining 
nationality.  
Except if he/she has resided 
in another Nordic State 
for at least 7 years before 
reaching the age of 22.
Art. 4 Act No. 51/2005 on Norwegian 
Citizenship
Art. 24 Act No. 51/2005 on 
Norwegian Citizenship
State Second Generation




Oman A patre/matre: 




Art. 11 Royal Decree No 38/2014 Promulgating 
the Omani Citizenship Law











Art. 5 Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 Art. 16 par. 4 Pakistan 
Citizenship Act 1951





Art. III section 2 Constitution Palau 
Constitution of 1981 






Art. 9 Political Constitution of the Republic of 
Panama 1972
State Second Generation
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Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
  
Except if person holds the






Switzerland, Syria, UK, 
USA.




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation) 
Except if nationality of a 
designated country has 
been acquired (Australia, 
Fiji, Germany, New 
Zealand, Samoa, United 
Kingdom, United States of 
America and Vanuatu) and 
permission is granted for 
retaining nationality. 
Art. 66 par. 2 Constitution of Papua New 
Guinea 1975
Art. 2 Citizenship Act 1976






Art. 146 par. 3 Political Constitution of 1992





Art. 52 Political Constitution of Peru of 1993





Art. IV par. 2 Constitution of the Philippines 
1987 





Art. 14 Act on Polish Citizenship of 2 April 2009
State Second Generation









Art. 1 par. 1 sub c Law No. 37/81
Qatar A patre/matre: 




Art. 1 Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of 
Qatari nationality





Art. 5 par. 2 sub b Law on Romanian 
Citizenship no. 21/1991
Russia A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (if single parent)
A matre: Yes (if single parent)




Art. 12 par. 1 Federal Law from 31 May 2002 
№ 62-FZ ‘About Citizenship of the Russian 
Federation’
398  Art. 4 Protocol of 8 November 2005 between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Russian Feder-
ation on the inventory of bilateral agreements states that the status of the Convention between the Government of the Social-
ist Republic of Romania and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Settlement and Prevention of 
Double Citizenship of 28 June 1978 shall be determined at a later stage. The current status of the treaty is unclear. The treaty is 
marked as not in force by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All documents are on file with the author. 
399  Art. 1-3 Convention between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic on the prevention of dual citizenship of 11 September 1975 and Art. 1-3 Convention between the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the prevention of dual citizenship. Both docu-
ments are on file with the author. 
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If a child is born with
Mongolian-Russian or
Slovak-Russian nationality,
parents are required to opt 
for one of the nationalities 
within three months after
birth. Otherwise, the 
nationality of their (last) 
country of residence is
retained. 399





Art. 6 Organic Law No. 30/2008 Of 25/07/2008 
Relating To Rwandan Nationality
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis
A patre/matre: Yes (if parent was born in State 
and was immediately before 19 September 






Art. 91 par B Constitution of Saint Christopher 
and Nevis of 1983
Saint Lucia A patre/matre: Yes (if national otherwise than by 
descent who obtained nationality on the basis of 





Constitution of Saint Lucia 1978
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines






Art. 92 Constitution of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 1979
State Second Generation




Samoa A patre/matre: Yes (if parent or grandparent is a 
national otherwise than by descent or has resided 





Art. 7 par. 1 Citizenship Act 2004 (as amended 
by Citizenship Amendment Act 20
San Marino A patre/matre:
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na
Art. 1 Law 30 November 2000 No. 114 Law on 
Citizenship
Art. 3 Law 30 November 2000 No. 114 Law on 
Citizenship







Art. 5 par. 1 sub c Law 6/90, Law on Nationality





Art. 7 Saudi Arabian Citizenship System





Art. 5 Law No. 61-70 of 7 March 1961 on the 
Senegalese Nationality
State Second Generation
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Art. 7 Law on citizenship of the Republic of 
Serbia 2004
Art. 9 Law on citizenship of the Republic of 
Serbia 2004





Art. 11 Seychelles Constitution 1993
Sierra Leone A patre/matre: Yes (if parent or grandparent was 






Art. 5 Sierra Leone Citizenship Act No. 4 of 
1973 as amended by Act No. 11 of 2006 and 
Citizenship Amendment Act of 2017
State Second Generation




Singapore A patre/matre: Yes (procedure) (except if 
parent is a national by registration and child 
has acquired the nationality of the State where 
is he/she is born) (residence requirement for 





Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) (withdrawal) 
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad for 10 
years (before or after 
reaching the age of 
majority), except if person 
has entered Singapore 
during that period with 
a Singapore identity 
document.
Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss if he/she does not take 
the “Oath of Renunciation, 
Allegiance and Loyalty” 
before attaining the age 
of 22 years or does not 
renounce any foreign 
nationality when the 
Government so requires. 
Art. 122 Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore
Art. 135 par. 1 sub c 
Constitution of the Republic 
of Singapore
Art. 122 par. 4  Constitution 
of the Republic of Singapore





If a child is born with 
Slovak-Russian nationality, 
parents are required to opt 
for one of the nationalities 
within three months after 
birth. Otherwise, the 
nationality of their (last) 
country of residence is 
maintained.400
Art. 5 par. 1 sub a  Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on 
Citizenship of the Slovak Republic
400  Art. 1-3 Convention between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the pre-
vention of dual citizenship. The document is on file with the author. 
State Second Generation
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Slovenia A patre/matre: 
A patre: 
A matre: 
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na
Art. 4 Act on the Citizenship of the Republic of 
Slovenia




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Art. 22 The Solomon Islands Independence 
Order 1978
Art. 23 par. 1 The Solomon 
Islands Independence Order 
1978
Somalia A patre/matre: 




Art. 2 Law No. 28 of 22 December on Somalia 
Citizenship





Art. 2 par. 1 sub b South African Citizenship 
Act 88 of 1995




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss of nationality upon 
reaching the age of 22 years. 
Except if he/she has vowed 
his/her intention not to 
exercise his/her foreign 
nationality in South Korea. 
Art. 2 par. 1 sub 1 Nationality Act No. 14183 
2016
Art. 12 par. 1 Nationality 
Act No. 14183 2016
State Second Generation









Art. 8 par. 3 Transitional Constitution of the 
Republic of South Sudan 2011
Nationality Act 2011




Yes (loss upon renunciation) 
(if national by descent and 
parent is also national by 
descent)
Except if a declaration for 
retention of nationality is 
made.
Art. 17 par. 1 sub a Civil Code Art. 24 par. 3 Civil Code 




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Except if permission for 
retaining nationality is 
granted. 
Art. 5 par. 2 Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 Art. 20 par. 1 sub b 
Citizenship Act No. 18 of 
1948
Art. 19 par. 3 Citizenship 
Act No. 18 of 1948
Sudan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes 
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre:
Na
Except if nationality of 
South Sudan is acquired. 
Art. 4 par. 2 Sudanese Nationality Act 1994
Art. 4 par. 3 Sudanese Nationality Act 1994
Art. 10 par. 2 Sudanese 
Nationality Act 1994





Art. 3A Law on Nationality and Residence
State Second Generation
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Swaziland A patre/matre: 




Loss of nationality if father 
was also born abroad 
and person has not filed 
a declaration of intent to 
retain within one year after 
attaining the age of majority. 
Art. 43 par. 2 The Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Swaziland Act 2005
Art. 41 The Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland Act 2005
Art. 43 par. 3 The 
Constitution Of The 
Kingdom Of Swaziland Act 
2005




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) 
Loss of nationality if he/she 
has never resided in Sweden 
before reaching the age of 
22.
Except if permission is 
granted for retaining 
nationality.
Except if he/she has resided 
for at least 7 years in other 
Nordic State.  
Art. 1 Law 2001:82: Swedish Citizenship Act Art. 14 par. 1 Law 2001:82: 
Swedish Citizenship Act
Art. 17 Law 2001:82: 
Swedish Citizenship Act




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Except if person has 
registered in order to retain 
nationality before reaching 
the age of 25.  
Art. 1 par. 1 Law on Swiss Nationality of 20 
June 2014
Art. 7 Law on Swiss 
Nationality of 20 June 2014
Syria A patre/matre:




Art. 3 Legislative Decree 276
State Second Generation









Art. 2 par. 1 Nationality Act  
Tajikistan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure) 
A patre+matre: Yes 
Na
Art. 13 Constitutional Law of the Republic of 
Tajikistan on Nationality of the Republic of 
Tajikistan
Tanzania A patre/matre: Yes (if parent is national otherwise 




Yes (loss upon non-
renunciation)
Loss of nationality if before 
attaining age of majority, 
the other nationality is 
not renounced or oath of 
allegiance is not taken or 
a declaration regarding to 
the intention to reside in 
Tanzania has not been made
Art. 6 Tanzania Citizenship Act 1995 Art. 7 par. 1 Tanzania 
Citizenship Act 1995




Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad)
Loss upon continuous 
residence abroad in a 
foreign country of which 
his parent is a national for 
a period of 5 years after 
attaining age of majority/
sui iuris. 
Art. 7 par.1 Nationality Act B.E.2508 Art. 19 par. 5 Nationality 
Act B.E.2508
State Second Generation
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Togo A patre/matre: 




Art. 3 Ordinance 78-34 of 7 September 1978 on 
the Code of the Nationality of Togo





Art. 2 Nationality Act
Trinidad and 
Tobago
A patre/matre: Yes (if parent is a national 





Art. 17 par. 3 Constitution of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago Act





Art. 6 Legislative Decree 63-6 of 28 February 
1963
Turkey A patre/matre: Yes (in wedlock and out of 





Art. 7 Law No. 5901/2009 Turkish Citizenship 
Law
State Second Generation




Turkmenistan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes
Na
Art. 11 Law of Turkmenistan of June 22, 2013 
No. 411-IV “About citizenship of Turkmenistan”





Art. 45 par. 2 Constitution of Tuvalu





Art. 10 par. B Constitution 1995














Art. 2 par. C Federal Law No. (17) Of 1972 
concerning Nationality and Passports
State Second Generation
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Art. 2 par. 1 British Nationality Act 1981






Art. 301 United States Code, Title 8, 
Chapter 12, Sub-Chapter 3: Nationality and 
Naturalisation






Art. 74 Constitution of the Republic
Uzbekistan A patre/matre: 
A patre: Yes (procedure)
A matre: Yes (procedure)
A patre+matre: Yes 
Yes (loss upon residence 
abroad) (withdrawal)
Loss if he/she has 
permanently residing abroad 
for a period of at least three 
years after reaching the age 
of 16 years. 
Except if he/she has 
registered at a consulate/
embassy within or before 
that period. 
Art. 13 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 
Citizenship of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Art. 14 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 
Citizenship of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Art. 21 par. 2 Law of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan on 
Citizenship of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan
Art. IV par. 1 sub b 
Regulation on Issues 
Related to the Citizenship of 
Uzbekistan 
State Second Generation









Art. 11 Citizenship Act 1980
Vatican City Na Na
Law on Citizenship, Residence and Entry 2011
Venezuela A patre/matre: Yes (procedure401) (if parent was 
born in State, otherwise acquisition requires the 





Art. 32 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela





Art. 15 Law on Vietnamese Nationality No. 
24/2008/QH12 (as amended by Law 56/2014/
QH13)
Art. 16 Law on Vietnamese Nationality No. 
24/2008/QH12 (as amended by Law 56/2014/
QH13)
Yemen A patre/matre: 




Art. 3 Law No. 6 of 1990 on Yemeni Nationality
401  Art. 32 par. 3 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela states that a declaration of willingness to acquire Vene-
zuelan nationality is required. 
402  Article 16 Law on Vietnamese Nationality No. 24/2008/QH12 states that if one of the parents is a foreign national, the 
parents must agree in writing in order for their child to acquire Vietnamese nationality. However, also if such an agreement is not 
made, the child will acquire Vietnamese nonetheless.  
State Second Generation
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Art. 36 par. 1 Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) Act of 2016 No. 2 of 2016





Art. 37 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 
(No. 20) Act 2013
Art. 5 par. 1 Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act
State Second Generation





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INTO THE CITIZENSHIP MAZE: DUAL NATIONALITY FROM AN EMIGRATION PERSPECTIVE 

Sri Lankan nationality law and 
the Sri Lankan diaspora: 




In addition to the broader analysis brought forward in the previous Chapters, this 
country study of Sri Lankan nationality law provides a more in-depth analysis of 
the topic. The Sri Lankan case exemplifies how a country that has experienced 
large waves of emigration in relatively recent times can relate to its diaspora, in 





It will be argued that Sri Lankan nationality has traditionally been shaped to 
complement the country’s newly gained Statehood with an ethnically defined 
nationhood. In more recent times, its legislation has been influenced by other 
political and economic considerations, in particular regarding the topic of dual 
nationality. It will also be shown that Sri Lankan’s complex policies regarding 
dual nationality have given rise to a novel citizenship formation in the form of an 
additional, conditional and commodified nationality status. 
This Chapter commences with a concise introduction to the Sri Lankan diaspora. 
The emigration movements of Sri Lankans, as well as their transnational 
engagement will be outlined. After that, the focus will shift towards Sri Lankan 
nationality law. For reasons of comprehensiveness, the historical development of 
Sri Lankan nationality law will be set out first. It will be attempted to place the 
country’s legislation within a bigger context and designate the historical factors 
that have shaped Sri Lankan’s nationality legislation. Subsequently, a detailed 
overview of Sri Lanka’s legislation regarding dual nationality is provided, in 
particular regarding how Sri Lanka uses its dual nationality policies to reach out 
to its diaspora through so-called ‘dual citizenship certificates’. In addition to that, 





Sri Lankan nationality law is a complex and, due to how it intertwines with the
country’s civil conflict, it is also a delicate matter. In this Chapter, I will outlined the
development of Sri Lankan nationality law in relation to its diaspora, in particular
regarding multiple nationality.
2. MAPPING THE SRI LANKAN DIASPORA 
It is estimated that more than three million individuals of Sri Lankan descent 
are residing outside of Sri Lanka.403  Taken into account that Sri Lanka has a 
population of a mere 20.5 million, this number is relatively high.404 This segment 
aims to describe the Sri Lankan diaspora by mapping their emigration movements 
as well as how they have remained connected transnationally to Sri Lanka. First, Sri 
Lankan emigration movements from its independence in 1948 to the offset of the 
civil conflict in 1983 will be described. After that, emigration movements during 
the conflict period and its aftermath will be discussed separately. 
2.1 Sri Lankan economic emigration since 1948
Scholars have commonly divided the Sri Lankan emigration outflow in a pre-1983 
era and a post-1983 era, as it is often argued that the commencement of the Sri 
Lankan conflict in 1983 had a significant impact on Sri Lankan emigration.405 
However, this division might not be entirely accurate. Although pre-1983 emigration 
is often labelled as economic migration, it has been argued that emigration before 
1983 was already, to a certain extent, linked to interethnic tensions, as Tamil-
Sinhala ethnic riots also took place in the 1950s and 1960s, which triggered 
Tamil individuals to emigrate.406 Conversely, after 1983, the economic situation, 
in particular in Northern Sri Lanka, continued to play a role in the emigration 
process, next to the intensifying conflicts.407 Nevertheless, it is equally clear that 
refugee emigration greatly increased after 1983 and therefore changed the nature 
of Sri Lankan emigration. 
Before the commencement of the Sri Lankan conflict in 1983, emigration was already 
commonplace in Sri Lanka. First of all, after the country gained independence in 
1948, a relatively small number of individuals from mainly upper- and middle 
class families had emigrated from Sri Lanka.408 These emigrants were often highly 
educated and chose to emigrate in order to continue their studies or enhance their 
career prospectives.409 These emigration movements were in particular facilitated by 
403  Yong, T., and Mizanur, R., Diaspora engagement and development in South Asia, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 
3. 
404  Sri Lanka had 20,966,000 inhabitants in 2015. See World Bank Data on Sri Lanka via < http://data.worldbank.org/coun-
try/sri-lanka>. 
405  McDowell, C., A Tamil Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland, Oxford: Ber-
ghahn Books, 1996, p. 11; Øivind F. Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long-Distance Nationalism, London: Pluto 
Press, 1999, p. 18 ff. 
406  Ratnapalan, L., “Before and after 1983: the impact of theorising Sri Lankan Tamil migration history around the 1983 Co-
lombo riots”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 37 No. 2, 2014, p. 290. 
407  Ibid. 
408  McDowell, C., A Tamil asylum diaspora: Sri Lankan migration, settlement and politics in Switzerland, Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 1996, p. 90 ff. 
409  Ibid. 
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the lenient migration regime within the Commonwealth of Nations.410 At a later stage, 
Sri Lankan (student) emigration to other Commonwealth countries proliferated 
among the broader society, in particular towards the United Kingdom.411 After 
finishing their studies, student emigrants regularly decided to take up employment 
in the United Kingdom or in another Commonwealth country.412 
Secondly, Sri Lanka witnessed an increasing outflow of low-skilled workers from 
the 1970s, predominantly towards the Middle East. Since then, the number of Sri 
Lankans who took up employment abroad increased rapidly. In 2009, for example, 
247,119 individuals were registered as departing Sri Lanka for the purpose of 
working abroad, with over half of them emigrating to either Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates.413 In the same year, the total number of 
Sri Lankans working abroad was estimated at 1.7 million.414 While in the 1990s, 
the emigrant outflow mainly consisted of female emigrants, by 2009 the gender 
division had become almost equal.415 In the majority of cases, female emigrants 
take up employment as domestic workers in Arab countries, while male emigrants 
often work as construction workers.416 These emigrants were mainly individuals 
of Sinhala origin from rural areas.417 These migration movements are mostly of a 
temporary nature, as the destination countries in the Gulf region tend not to offer 
pathways to permanent residence or nationality.418 Therefore, it could be questioned 
whether these labour emigrants should be taken into account when studying Sri 
Lankan transnational communities. In this regard, Van Hear convincingly argues 
that their homeland orientation (which is inherent in their temporary status and 
isolation in their host countries) makes them a part of a Sri Lankan transnational 
community.419
Both the low- and highly skilled emigration outflow were mainly driven by economic 
factors. During the 1960s and 1970s, subsequent Sri Lankan governments chose to 
finance the country’s welfare expenditures through increasing market restrictions 
410  Ibid. 
411  Valentine D., Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 
155. 
412  Ibid. 
413  Sri Lankans departing to work abroad are required to register as such at the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. 
Data derived from the Bulletin of International Migration Statistics of Sri Lanka 2010 via <http://www.statistics.gov.lk>. 
414  Ibid. 
415  Ibid. 
416  Sriskandarajah, D., The migration–development nexus: Sri Lanka case study, International Migration, Vol. 40 No. 5, 2002, 
p. 288.
417  Van Hear, N., “Sri Lanka’s diasporas”, in: Chatterji, J., and Washbrook, D. (eds.), Routledge handbook of the South Asian di-
aspora, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 238. 
418  For an overview of immigration policies in the Gulf region, see: Shah, N. M. “Labour Migration from Asian to GCC 
Countries: Trends, Patterns and Policies”, Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2013, p. 58. 
419  Van Hear, N., “Sri Lanka’s diasporas”, in: Chatterji, J., and Washbrook, D. (eds.), Routledge handbook of the South Asian di-




in order to maintain the country’s trade balance.420 These policies proved to be 
dysfunctional in practice and therefore had a negative effect on the country’s 
economic development. The correspondingly high level of unemployment within 
Sri Lanka, as well as the falling currency rate of the Sri Lankan Rupee stimulated 
Sri Lankans to work abroad.421 In the late 1970s, when capital restrictions were 
loosened, this did not result in sufficient internal economic recovery, but it did 
in fact further enhance labour emigration, as it became easier for Sri Lankan 
emigrants to remit foreign currencies.422 This coincided with a growing demand 
for labour in the gulf countries.423 
The outflow of highly skilled Sri Lankans was stimulated in particular by overly 
selective policies for university admission and government job positions.424 As these 
policies de facto favoured the Sinhalese subgroup, mainly highly skilled persons of 
Tamil origin did not have enough opportunities for study and work within Sri 
Lanka. Next to that, persons of Tamil origin were also hindered in practice by 
discrimination. For these reasons, the Tamil group was overrepresented among 
student migrants.425 
2.2 Sri Lankan forced emigration 
The 1983 ethnic riots and the outbreak of the conflict in Northern Sri Lanka led to 
an increased outflow of refugees, mostly of Tamil origin.426 The intensifying conflict 
particularly increased the outflow from the Northern Sri Lankan provinces, where 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam movement (LTTE) was most active.427 These 
outflows were caused by the violent clashes between the Sri Lankan armed forces 
and the LTTE movement, as well as the nature of the LTTE regime in the Northern 
provinces. As the LTTE made use of forced recruits, Tamil households financed 
the emigration of young men, so that they would not have to participate in LTTE 
forces.428 Furthermore, the LTTE aimed to become the sole representative of the 
Tamil population and therefore contested other Tamil groups which threatened 
420  Athukorala, P., Macroeconomic policies, crises, and growth in Sri Lanka, 1969-1990, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
1994, p. 114. 
421  Sriskandarajah, D., The migration–development nexus: Sri Lanka case study, International Migration, Vol. 40 No. 5, 2002, 
p. 289.
422  Arunatilake, N. et al., “Sri Lanka”, in: Kelegama, S. (ed.), Migration, Remittances and Development in South Asia, London: 
Sage Publications, 2011, p. 113. 
423  Ibid. 
424  Van Hear, N., “Sri Lanka’s diasporas”, in: Chatterji, J., and Washbrook, D. (eds.), Routledge handbook of the South Asian di-
aspora, London: Routledge 2014, p. 236.
425  Ibid.
426  Bandarage, A., The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy, London: Routledge, 2009, 
p. 116. 
427  Ibid. 
428  Van Hear, N., “Sri Lanka’s diasporas”, in: Chatterji, J., and Washbrook, D. (eds.), Routledge handbook of the South Asian di-
aspora, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 241. 
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the LTTE’s position among the Tamil.429 Besides the conflict, the continuing dire 
economic situation, particularly in Northern Sri Lanka, fostered emigration.430 
The UNHCR estimates that the most prominent destination country was India, 
as it had received more than half of the total refugee population. In 1990, it was 
estimated that around 200,000 refugees of Sri Lankan origin were residing in 
India.431 Other prominent destination countries were Canada, France and the 
United Kingdom.432 
2.3 Sri Lanka’s diaspora and transnational engagement 
Sri Lanka’s diaspora remains connected with Sri Lanka in numerous ways. The 
Sri Lankan emigrant population has delivered a significant contribution to the 
economic development of Sri Lanka through remittances. However, a major 
share of these remittances is sent by (temporary) migrant workers rather than by 
refugees.433 The World Bank estimates that the Sri Lankan emigrant population 
remitted seven billion US Dollars in 2015, or around 9% of the Sri Lankan GDP.434 
Over the past two decades, remittances have grown rapidly. In 1990, the sum of 
remittances was 401 million US Dollars, or 5% of the country’s GDP.435 Other, less 
measurable forms of engagement also take place, but they require a more nuanced 
approach in order to be described adequately. Therefore, they will be discussed 
separately for the Tamil and Sinhala diaspora groups. 
Tamil engagement 
A distinction must be made between the Sri Lankan diaspora, as such, and the 
Tamil diaspora specifically. The Tamil diaspora is estimated to encompass around 
one million persons.436 The diaspora of the Tamil group is marked by a relatively 
high degree of organization, consisting of independent Tamil organizations as well 
as organizations which are or were directly or indirectly related to the LTTE.437 It 
can be challenging to separate LTTE-related organizations from independently 
operating Tamil organizations, as these organizations are not always outspoken 
429  DeVotta, N., “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the lost quest for separatism in Sri Lanka”, Asian Survey, Vol. 49 
No. 6, 2009, p. 1023. 
430  Valentine D., Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 
170. 
431  UNHCR Population Statistics, via: <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series>. 
432  Ibid. 
433  Lasagabaster, E. et al., Sri Lanka’s migrant labor remittances: Enhancing the Quality and Outreach of the Rural Remit-
tance Infrastructure, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3789, December 2005, p. 21 ff. 
434  World Bank Data on Sri Lanka (Personal remittances, received (current US Dollar) via <http://data.worldbank.org>. 
435  Ibid.  
436  International Crisis Group, The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, Asia Report No. 186, Brussels: Internation-
al Crisis Group, 2010, p. 2. 




about their interconnectedness.438 
The level of organization among the Tamil diaspora also differs depending on their 
country of residence. In India, most Tamil are either required to live clustered in 
camps or are forced to reside intermittently elsewhere in India, with limited access 
to paid labour.439 This marginalization also limits the opportunities for diaspora 
involvement and self-organization. In Canada, a country which has received a 
relatively large number of migrants of Tamil origin, Tamil households tend to live 
in concentrated areas within the major cities, which provide more opportunities 
for community organization, through for example Tamil Hindu temples as well as 
non-religious Tamil organizations.440 
Tamil diaspora: LTTE and diaspora engagement 
A national or regional conflict can be played out globally through diasporas in 
either a positive or a negative way. Emigrants can engage in a conflict by adopting 
the role of ‘distant warrior’ or ‘distant peaceworker’ or, in certain instances, a 
combination of both.441   
In its heyday, the organizational structure of the LTTE included an international 
department. This department was led by the LTTE International Secretariat, which 
was part of the LTTE’s central governing committee.442 Below the International 
Secretariat stood the so-called ‘front organizations’, which operated in countries 
with a significant Tamil population.443 These front organizations usually consisted 
of several units, namely a political unit, a finance unit, a procurement unit, and 
an intelligence unit.444 Examples of such front organizations are the British Tamil 
Organization (UTO) in the United Kingdom, the Federation of Associations of 
Canadian Tamils (FACT), the French Federation of Tamil Associations (FFTA), 
and the Australasian Federation of Tamil Association (AFTA).445 
Through such front organizations, the LTTE not only aimed to remain connected 
to the Tamil diaspora, but it also aimed to exercise a certain degree of control over 
438  Lyons, T., and Mandaville, P., Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013, p. 104. 
439  Velamati, M., “Sri Lankan Tamil migration and settlement: time for reconsideration”, India Quarterly, Vol. 65 No. 3, 2009, 
p. 278. 
440  Orjuela, C., “Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka’s violent conflict”, Global Net-
works, Vol. 8 No. 4, 2008, p. 441. 
441  Ibid., p. 437. 
442  Byman, D. et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, Santa Monica: Rand, 2001, p. 43. 
443  Richards, J., An institutional history of the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies-CCDP, 2014, p. 51. 
444  Ibid., p. 52. 
445  Chalk, P., “The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka”, Georgetown Journal of In-
ternational Affairs, Vol. 9 No. 2, 2008, pp. 97-104. 
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it, as the Tamil diaspora was one of the organization’s main funding sources.446 
As a consequence, the front organizations pressured Tamil migrants to donate a 
share of their income to LTTE causes. Although a share of the Tamil emigrants 
was indeed willing to contribute financially to the LTTE, others were forced to 
do so. A Human Rights Watch report describes how members of LTTE’s front 
organizations regularly visited Tamil families and businesses and urged them to 
donate. Those who refused to donate received severe threats in some cases.447
Another form of diaspora fundraising entailed that Tamil individuals set up 
business with the financial assistance of the LTTE, with the obligation of returning 
a share of the profits. Next to that, the LTTE often received funds from Tamil 
charitable causes, even though they may not necessarily seem LTTE-related at 
first sight. Taken together, these LTTE fundraising activities were estimated to 
yield 200 to 300 million US Dollars per year.448 This contributed significantly to 
the development of the LTTE and enabled the organization to develop a State-
like structure.449 Therefore, it has been argued that diaspora engagement was 
responsible for the long duration and intensity of the conflict; without assistance 
and funding from outside, the LTTE would not have been able to maintain its 
position for such a long period of time.450 
Next to securing financial contributions to the LTTE, the front organizations also 
aimed to mobilize individuals, organizations and States to provide support for 
LTTE’s causes. This was carried out by the front organizations’ political units, by 
disseminating its vision on the conflict and the situation of the Tamil population.451 
These efforts were especially targeted at the offspring of Tamil emigrants in order 
to ensure that this group remained committed to the Tamil case. Next to that, the 
organizations aimed to influence public opinion through manifestations and media 
outreach.452 
Although the Sri Lankan civil war officially came to an end in 2009, the conflict 
did not entirely disappear from the Sri Lankan diaspora communities. The Tamil 
446  Wayland, S., “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora”, Review of Inter-
national Studies, Vol. 30 No. 3, 2004, p. 421. 
447  Becker, J., Funding the “final war”: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora, Human Rights Watch Report, 
New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006.
448  Chalk, P., “The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka”, Georgetown Journal of In-
ternational Affairs, Vol. 9 No. 2, 2008, p. 101. 
449  Richards, J., An institutional history of the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Geneva: Graduate Institute of Inter-
national and Development Studies-CCDP, 2014, p. 51.
450  Wayland, S., “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora”, Review of Inter-
national Studies, Vol. 30 No. 3, 2004, p. 425.
451  Byman, D. et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, Santa Monica: Rand, 2001, p. 44 ff.
452  Lyons, T., and Mandaville, P., Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks, New York City: Columbia Universi-




transnational engagement during the civil war resulted in strong Tamil nationalism, 
which means that the support for self-determination and the creation of an 
independent Tamil State has remained. This is partially explained by the fact that 
the Tamil residing outside of Sri Lanka was enabled to adopt a hardliner stance, 
while those residing in the Sri Lankan conflict areas were confronted with the 
immediate dire consequences of that choice and were therefore compelled to adopt 
a more pragmatic stance. For this reason, the Sri Lankan government has defined 
the engagement among the transnational communities as a potential threat for the 
progress of the peace process.453
Sinhala engagement  
The number of permanent Sinhala emigrants is considerably smaller than the 
number of Tamil permanent emigrants. Although Sinhala emigrants outnumber 
Tamil emigrants, as such, the abundant majority of Sinhala emigrants are temporary 
labour emigrants.454 It is estimated that around 100,000 persons of Sinhalese-Sri 
Lankan origin reside permanently in Western States.455 
Sinhala diaspora engagement is seemingly less prevalent than Tamil engagement. 
Firstly, the Sinhala emigrant population is relatively more scattered, which 
makes self-organization more challenging.456 Secondly, the Sri Lankan conflict 
has not been a uniting force for Sinhala emigrants in a similar fashion as for 
Tamil emigrants. Among the Sinhalese, the Sri Lankan conflict is generally not 
perceived as an interethnic conflict, but as national resistance against a terrorist 
organization.457 Consequentially, this resistance is rather perceived as a national 
cause than a Sinhalese one. Thirdly, the Sinhalese are not forced into engagement 
by a diaspora organization. There is neither a Sinhalese nor a Sri Lankan equivalent 
of the LTTE front organizations; the Sri Lankan government plays a less active 
role in the engagement of its population abroad.458 Nevertheless, a number of 
Sinhala diaspora organizations have existed, for example the Australian Society 
for Peace Unity and Human Rights for Sri Lanka (SPUR).459 These organizations 
453  International Crisis Group, The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, Asia Report No. 186, Brussels: Internation-
al Crisis Group, 2010, p. 17 ff. 
454  Orjuela, C., “Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka’s violent conflict”, Global Net-
works, Vol. 8 No. 4, 2008, p. 441. 
455  Lyons, T., and Mandaville, P., Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks, New York City: Columbia Universi-
ty Press, 2013, p. 100. 
456  Ibid., p. 101. 
457  Sriskandarajah, D., “Tamil diaspora politics”, in: Ember, M., Ember, C. R., Skoggard, I. (eds.), Encyclopedia of diasporas: 
Immigrant and refugee cultures around the world, New York City: Springer, 2005, p. 442. 
458  Lyons, T., and Mandaville, P., Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks, New York City: Columbia Universi-
ty Press, 2013, p. 102. 
459  Orjuela, C. and Sriskandarajah, D., “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Warmongers or Peacebuilders”, in: Koshy, S., 
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are often related to the embassies of the Sri Lankan State and disseminate the Sri 
Lankan government’s perspective. According to Orjuela, the imagined Sinhalese 
political project concentrates on maintaining an undivided Sri Lanka, a goal that 
is threatened by a terrorist organization.460 However, there is also a tradition of a 
more divisive Sinhala nationalism, which perceives Sri Lanka as a Sinhala Buddhist 
State with little room for other minorities. 461  
 
          
            
           
            
 
         
           
         
            
 
2.4 Sri Lanka’s diaspora policies 
For a significant period of time, the Sri Lankan government failed to reach out to 
its population abroad effectively.462 Therefore, it did not succeed in spreading a 
counter narrative to the information disseminated by the international operations 
of the LTTE. This only changed after the failed peace negotiations between the 
Sri Lankan government and the LTTE movement of 1995, after which the Sri 
Lankan government felt a greater urge to increase its international outreach.463 The 
embassies and High Commissions of the Sri Lankan government were referred to 
as a Sinhala mouthpiece by Tamil movements, on the grounds that, for example, 
it was often impossible to communicate with these institutions in Tamil and 
organized events were aimed more at the Sinhala group. 464 Nevertheless, the Sri 
Lankan government clearly also aimed to reach out through its embassies and High 
Commissions to all Sri Lankans, emphasizing interethnic dialogue.465 
460  Orjuela, C., “Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka’s violent conflict”, Global Net-
works, Vol. 8 No. 4, 2008, p. 442. 
461  Lyons, T., and Mandaville, P., Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks, New York City: Columbia Universi-
ty Press, 2013, p. 437. 
462  Ibid., p. 106; Gunaratna, R., A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: International dimension of the Sri Lankan con-
flict: threat and response, Ethul Kotte: Marga Institute, 2001, p. 19. 
463  Lyons, T., and Mandaville, P., Politics from afar: Transnational diasporas and networks, New York City: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2013, p. 106. 
464  Ibid., p. 107. 




It can be concluded that Sri Lanka has a relatively large diaspora population, 
consisting mainly of temporary labour emigrants and refugee emigrants of Tamil 
origin and their descendants.To a lesser extent, the country’s diaspora also consists 
of other economic emigrants, as well as their descendants, who emigrated either 
before or after the Sri Lankan conflict commenced. While the Sri Lankan 
government has developed a more comprehensive outreach approach towards its 
diaspora steadily, the historical development of the country’s diaspora relations 
nevertheless makes this a contentious field. The question remains how these 
dynamics have a ected Sri Lankan nationality policies towards its diaspora 
population, in particular concerning dual nationality. In the next part of this 
Chapter, these policies will therefore be studied in detail.
In order to work towards a coherent and overarching diaspora strategy, the Sri 
Lankan Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Overseas Sri Lankans and 
Cultural Diplomacy Division, which is a subdivision of the Ministry’s Economic 
Affairs Division.466 One of its key activities is to facilitate interaction and engagement 
with Overseas Sri Lankans  (which explicitly includes nationals as well as non-
nationals of Sri Lankan origin).467 Among others, it assists persons of Sri Lankan 
origin residing abroad (in particular second and third generation emigrants) to 
visit Sri Lanka and ‘reconnect’ with the country.468 The Division’s main goals are 
fostering post-conflict reconciliation as well as to increase their potential socio-
economic contributions.469 In addition to that, it supports other organizations 
that work towards the same goals.470 The Division cooperates to a limited extent 
with other sections of the Sri Lankan government, particularly with Sri Lanka’s 
embassies and missions abroad in order to support them in their outreach activities 
to the diaspora.471 Next to that, the Division cooperates with the Office of National 
Unity for Reconciliation in order to organize reconciliation programmes as well as 
with the Department of Immigration & Emigration in order to facilitate visits to Sri 
Lankan for reconciliatory or socio-economic purposes.472 
Sri Lanka developed a more substantial outreach approach towards its temporary 
labour migrants. In 1985, it established the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 
for this purpose.473 This governmental agency regulates and supervises foreign 
employment agencies and delivers assistance and predeparture training programmes 
to future labour migrants.474 In order to monitor labour migration adequately, it 
is compulsory for labour migrants to register themselves as such at the Sri Lanka 
Bureau of Foreign Employment.475 It also implemented a social security scheme 
for labour migrants.476 In addition, the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Agency was 
established in 1996, which promotes foreign employment and recruits and trains 
future labour migrants.477 Sri Lanka’s strategy towards temporary labour migrants is 
twofold: labour migration is actively encouraged by the Sri Lankan government, yet 
466  <https://www.mfa.gov.lk/division/economic-affairs-overseas-sri-lankans-cultural-diplomacy/overseas-sri-lankans-divi-
sion-2/>
467  Ibid. 
468  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, “Performance Report 2017”, p. 153 via <https://www.parliament.lk> 
469  Ibid.  
470  Ibid. 
471  Ibid., p. 154. 
472  Ibid. 
473  Art. 3 Sri Lanka Bureau of foreign Employment Act No. 21 of 1985. 
474  OECD, Asian Development Bank Institute and ILO, Labor Migration in Asia: Building effective institutions, Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank Institute, 2016, p. 21. 
475  Art. 51 Sri Lanka Bureau of foreign Employment Act No. 21 of 1985. as amended by Act No. 4 of 1994. 
476  See for an overview and analysis of Sri Lanka’s social security policies for temporary labour emigrants: Del Rosario, T., 
Best practices in social insurance for migrant workers : the case of Sri Lanka, ILO Asian Regional Programme on Governance of 
Labour Migration, Working Paper No. 12, Bangkok: ILO 2008.  
477  OECD, Asian Development Bank Institute and ILO, Labor Migration in Asia: Building effective institutions, Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank Institute 2016, p. 21.
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it also aims to protect labour migrants from potential abuse. An analysis from 2002 
reveals that, at that time, the latter was only accomplished to a limited extent. This 
was caused by the widespread evasion of the mandatory registration procedure and 
a general lack of awareness among labour migrants of the support mechanisms.478
3. SRI LANKAN NATIONALITY LAW 
3.1 Nationality in Ceylon479 before 1948 
For reasons of comprehensiveness, this section will provide an overview of 
‘nationality’ statuses that were in place before and after the country gained 
independence. Admittedly, this might seem excessive, but there are convincing 
justifications for this approach. First of all, Sri Lankan nationality law is an 
understudied subject and a comprehensive overview of its historical development 
is difficult to find in the academic literature.480 Secondly, historical developments 
can sometimes provide a better understanding of nationality law today. 
 
An important side note is that, as previously discussed in Chapter 1, pre-modern 
State structures cannot easily be compared with those of modern States, as 
traditional allegiances cannot always be put on equal footing with the modern-day 
nationality status. 
3.2 Nationality in Ceylon under Portuguese rule: 1517 to 1658
In 1505, a Portuguese vessel became stranded on an island that would later be 
named ‘Ceilão’, as the ship had drifted off its course on its way to the Maldives. 
After first establishing contact with the rulers of the Kotte Kingdom, a large part of 
the island was gradually colonized by the Portuguese.481 
The status of the island was formalized on 29 August 1518, when the Malwana 
Convention was concluded by a Portuguese delegation and representatives of the 
island’s rulers. This way, a layered system of allegiances was created, in which the 
rulers had sworn an allegiance to the Portuguese king, while the island’s population 
continued to have an allegiance to their local rulers.482 
478  Dias, M. and Jayasundere, R., Sri Lanka: Good practices to prevent women migrant workers from going into exploitative 
forms of labour, GENPROM Working Paper, No. 9, Geneva: ILO, 2002. 
479  Before 1948, the country was named Ceylon. The country’s name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972. Since then, the offi-
cial name of the country has been the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. 
480  A notable exception is the excellent country report of Ganeshathasan and Welikala, yet it focuses heavily on the issue of 
statelessness. See: Ganeshathasan, L. and Welikala, A., Report on Citizenship Law: Sri Lanka, Globalcit Country Report, San 
Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2017. 
481  De Silva, C. R., Portuguese Encounters with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009, p. 1. 




3.3 Nationality in Ceylon under Dutch rule: 1658 to 1802
In 1658, Ceylon came under the colonial rule of the Republic of the Seven United 
Netherlands (or the Dutch Republic) after it conquered the island. This raises the 
question what the official status of the inhabitants of Dutch Ceylon would have 
been. Before answering that question, it must be noted that the Dutch Republic did 
not have a well-defined ‘citizenry’ as a modern-day State would have had; therefore, 
there was no nationality law in place as such.
Whether one was considered a subject (onderdaan) of the Dutch Republic 
depended on his domicile (ingezetenschap) in one of the Dutch provinces.483 The 
grant of domicile status was a competence of the provinces. In order to obtain 
domicile status, one would have to reside in one of the seven Dutch provinces.484 
This entailed that a person residing permanently outside the provinces, whether 
in a Dutch colony or a third country, could not have domicile status within the 
Dutch Republic. Therefore, domicile status was in principle lost if one had resided 
outside his city or province for a longer period of time and could consequently 
also not be bestowed upon his descendants.485 This is illustrated by the fact that the 
descendants of former Dutch subjects had to apply for domicile status (through a 
so-called ‘small naturalization’) at the Provincial Council or General Council upon 
return from the Dutch East Indies.486 It can be concluded that the inhabitants of 
Ceylon were not regarded as Dutch subjects. 
Although in this period Ceylon was referred to as ‘Dutch Ceylon’, the island 
(except for the Kingdom of Kandy) was in practice governed by the Dutch East 
India Trading Company. The inhabitants were therefore referred to as “subjects of 
the Company”.487  Ceylon was ruled by the Council of Ceylon of the Dutch East 
India Trading Company. This Council consisted of a maximum of eight members 
and was led by the Governor, who was appointed by the High Government 
(Hoge Regering) of the Company seated in Batavia.488 Its legislative system was a 
patchwork of Dutch, Dutch-East Indian and local regulations.489 In addition to this, 
the Company’s governance system was dependent upon the native rulers for the 
483  Van Den Berg, P., “Inboorlingschap en ingezetenschap in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1600-1795”, Tijd-
schrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, Vol. 71 No. 1/2, 2003, p. 135. 
484  Ibid., p. 134. Alternatively, one could obtain domicile in a Dutch city (so-called stadshouderschap). 
485  Ibid., p. 135. However, domicile status could be temporarily retained during periods of absence with the permission of the 
City Council or Provincial Council. 
486  Ibid., p. 4. 
487  Multiple decrees of the Council of Ceylon refer to “the subjects of the noble Company” as opposed to “the subjects of 
the King of Kandy”, whose Kingdom had remained independent. However, this distinction was not taken overly seriously, as 
showed by the decree “[…] to announce that the illegal mining of gemstones – also by the subjects of the King of Kandy – will be 
punished with lifelong banishment and forced labor in Cape Hope”. See: Hovy, L., Ceylonees plakkaatboek: Voorwerk, teksten 
1-269, Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 1991. 
488  Ibid., p. 38. 
489  Ibid., p. 40. 
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execution of its regulations. Therefore, these rulers de facto continued to rule over 
their subjects in a similar manner as in precolonial times.490
 
        
           
           
     
           
            
             
           
            
           
      
           
            
         
  
             
        
            
        
           
            
            
              
           
An allegiance could come into existence in several ways. First, birth within the 
king’s territories created an allegiance. Next, an allegiance could be established 
490  Ibid., p. 43. 
491  Van der Burg, M., Transforming the Dutch Republic into the Kingdom of Holland: the Netherlands between Republican-
ism and Monarchy (1795–1815), European Review of History, Vol. 17 No. 2, 2010, p. 151 ff. 
492  Schrikker, A., Dutch and British colonial intervention in Sri Lanka, 1780-1815: expansion and reform, Leiden: Brill, 
2007, p. 131. 
493  Art. 5 Treaty of Amiens. 
494  Godden, L. and Casinader, N., “The Kandyan Convention 1815: Consolidating the British Empire in Colonial Ceylon”, 
Comparative Legal History, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2013, p. 212. 
495  De Silva, K.M., A history of Sri Lanka, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, p. 210. 
496  Karatani, R., Defining British citizenship: Empire, commonwealth and modern Britain, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 40. See 
also: Fransman, L., Fransman’s British nationality law, London: Bloomsbury, 2011, p. 129 ff. 
497  Coke, E., The reports of Sir Edward Coke Vol. 4, London: J. Butterworth, 1826, p. 2 ff.
498  Blackstone, W., Oxford Edition of Blackstone’s: Commentaries on the laws of England: Book I of the rights of persons, 




3.4 Nationality in Ceylon under British rule: 1802 to 1914
In 1795, with the support of the revolutionary French Republic, the Dutch 
Republic was overthrown and was succeeded by the Batavian Republic. Thereby,
the country became an a liated State of the French Republic. 491 Consecutively, 
British troops occupied Dutch Ceylon in 1796 in order to avoid that the island 
would also become an outpost for the French Republic. 492 This conflict was 
eventually settled on 27 March 1802, when the Treaty of Amiens was signed by 
representatives of the French Republic, Britain, the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Batavian Republic in order to restore peace between the British Empire and 
Napoleonic France. Through the Amiens Treaty, the island of Ceylon was
transmitted from Dutch to British rule. 493The AmiensTreaty excluded the island’s 
Kingdom of Kandy, which remained as an independent territory until 2 March 
1815. On that date, representatives of Kandy and the British Empire concluded the 
Kandyan Convention, which transferred powers to the BritishThrone,whereby the 
entire island came in British hands. 494
From that moment on, the entire island had the status of Crown Colony within 
the British Empire. 495 Therefore, the nationality status of its inhabitants was 
determined by British law. At that time, the British ‘nationality status’ was solely 
regulated by common law principles, combined with additional (immigration) 
acts. 496 British nationality status was based on the principle of allegiance, which 
was defined in the 1608 Calvin’s Case. 497 The allegiance entailed that a bond was 
established between King and subject, in which the King was deemed obliged to 
provide protection for the subject and the subject was obliged to obey the King. 
The allegiance was perpetual in nature and could therefore not be renounced. 498
by birth abroad through the paternal line for two generations.499 Regarding newly 
acquired territories, three grounds of acquisition were of importance. Firstly, the 
inhabitants of a conquered territory would, through its conquest, automatically 
become British subjects. Since the beginning of the 18th century, however, it was 
considered that an official statute or treaty was required for this.500 Secondly, in the 
case of settlement, the British settlers were deemed to ‘transplant’ the British rule 
with them, as they were deemed to be settling in a territory which had no other form 
of governance.501 Thirdly, a territory could be annexed through treaty, which is of 
relevance for the Ceylonese case. The inhabitants would become British subjects 
after such annexation, although some form of expression of will by the individual 
was deemed to be necessary.502 Nevertheless, the fact that one remained living 
in the State territory was already seen as a sufficient expression of their will.503 
Lastly, one could become a British subject through naturalization. In general, this 
was a lengthy and costly procedure.504 However, many overseas British territories, 
including Ceylon, had introduced colonial naturalization acts over time which were 
more lenient in nature.505 Through these acts, the naturalized individual became a 
British subject within that specific territory, but not within Great Britain itself.506 It 
can be concluded that the inhabitants of Ceylon became British subjects through 
annexation of the island by treaty. 
3.5 Nationality in Ceylon under British rule: 1914 to 1972
It would take until 7 August 1914 for the first British Nationality Act to come into 
force. This Act consolidated the common law principle of allegiance. In principle, 
each individual born ‘within His Majesty’s dominions’ was deemed to be a natural-
born British subject.507 The phrase ‘within His Majesty’s dominions’  should not be 
confused with the term ‘dominions’, as such, which referred only to self-governing 
territories within the British Empire.508 Instead, the phrase ‘within His Majesty’s 
dominions’ also referred to the British Crown Colonies and therefore also referred 
to Ceylon.509  
499  Karatani, R., Defining British citizenship: Empire, commonwealth and modern Britain, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 
41. 
500  Ibid., p. 42. 
501  Ibid.. 
502  Ibid., p. 43. 
503  Piggott, F., Nationality: Including Naturalization and English Law on the High Seas and Beyond the Realm, London: W. 
Clowes and Sons, 1906, p. 87. 
504  Ibid., p. 98 ff. It must also be noted that several less restrictive naturalization regimes were in place specifically for the nat-
uralization of skilled workers. 
505  Wood Renton, A. and Grenville Phillimore, G. Burge’s Commentaries on colonial and foreign laws, Vol. 2, London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1908, p. 176. 
506  Later, Art. 16 of the 1870 Naturalization Act confirmed the existing practice that a naturalization within a colony only had 
effect on its own territory.
507  Art. 1 par. 1 sub a British Nationality Act 1914. 
508  According to Annex 1 British Nationality Act 1914, this included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Newfoundland. 
509  Fransman, L., Fransman’s British nationality law, London: Bloomsbury, 2011, p. 148.
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Furthermore, Art. 8 of the 1914 Act introduced the so-called ‘imperial naturalization’, 
which entailed that a local naturalization in a British Possession would no longer 
only be effective within that particular territory. Instead, the naturalized individual 
would become a British subject within the entire British Empire. 
  
       
  
          
         
              
    
         
           
          
  
            
               
   
           
     
             
          
       
               
            
 
3.6 The Nationality Law of Sri Lanka after 1948
As mentioned before, on 15 November 1948, the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 
1948 was introduced. Even though the country was a successor State, the Act was 
not in line with the pre-existing British nationality legislation. Instead, the Act drew 
new boundaries for the citizenry. The Act introduced two ‘citizenship statuses’, 
510  Art. 6 Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order in Council 1931. 
511  Bandarage, A., The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy, London: Routledge, 2009, 
p. 37. 
512  Art. 1 par. 1 jo. par. 3 British Nationality Act 1948. 
513  This occurred through the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. 





          
       




        
 
   
  
           
  
 
         
 
         
 
 
            
            
            
        
       
    
   
      
   
    
    
   
 
    
      
     
   
   
    
        
           
          
          
During these decades, Ceylon gradually obtained a higher level of self-governance. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, a process of democratization began steadily 
in Ceylon, which led to the introduction of a partially elected assembly in 1909. 
By 1931, the Ceylon Donoughmore Commission had brought forward a more 
progressive Constitution,which introduced universal su￿rage for all British subjects 
older than 21 years who had resided for more than six months in an 18-month 
period in a Ceylonese electoral district.510 Along with this democratization 
process, a political movement for the country’s independence movement came 
about.511 As a consequence of these developments, on 4 February 1948, Ceylon 
gained dominion status within the British Commonwealth. Thereby, it became an 
independent State within the Commonwealth. In order to define the citizenry of 
the newly independent country, the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 was 
created.The Act itself does not refer in any way to the former British nationality or 
their Commonwealth status. However, based on the British Nationality Act 1948, 
those who possessed or acquired the nationality of a Commonwealth country would 
automatically also be a Commonwealth citizen.512 This way, a ‘layered’ nationality 
status was created. Although, in principle, all British subjects had an equal status, 
the British government gradually adopted a more restrictive attitude regarding the 
right to abode in the United Kingdom513 and introduced a distinct 
British citizenship.514 Since 22 May 1972, this status is no longer of 
relevance, as Ceylon ceased to be part of the British Commonwealth and 
changed its o￿cial name to the Socialist Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka.
          
             
               
     
             
              
                
  
               
            
   
             
            
  
           
         
             
 
In principle, ‘citizenship by descent’ and ‘citizenship by registration’ were of 
equal status, as the acquisition of either of the two led to the same result, namely 
acquiring Sri Lankan nationality. However, the two statuses differed in practice. 
Upon acquisition of nationality, one received a citizenship certificate which 
specified a person’s status. In many instances in daily life (for example during a job 
application process), one could be asked to provide the citizenship certificate. As 
‘citizenship by registration’ had a different social status, this two-tiered policy could 
lead to discrimination in practice.520 
This restrictive character of Sri Lankan nationality law can only be understood by 
taking the context into account in which it came into being. After Sri Lanka gained 
statehood, the 1948 Citizenship Act was one of the first steps in the process of 
nation building. Sri Lanka took the decisive turn not to implement an ius soli mode 
515  Art. 4 par. 1 Act 18 of 1948.
516  Art. 4 par. 2 Act 18 of 1948. 
517  Kanapathipillai, V., Citizenship and statelessness in Sri Lanka: The case of the Tamil estate workers, London: Anthem 
Press, 2009, p. 42. 
518  Art. 12 Act 18 of 1948. 
519  Art. 11 par. 1 sub b i Act 18 of 1948. 
520  Kanapathipillai, V., Citizenship and statelessness in Sri Lanka: The case of the Tamil estate workers, London: Anthem 












              
  
 
           
 
 





namely ‘citizenship by descent’ and ‘citizenship by registration’. A person born
in Sri Lanka could obtain ‘citizenship by descent’ by proving that either his or
her father was born in Sri Lanka or that both his or her paternal grandfather and
paternal great grandfather were born in Sri Lanka. 515 A person born outside
Sri Lanka would need to prove that his or her father and paternal grandfather
were born in Sri Lanka or that his or her paternal grandfather and paternal great
grandfather were born in Sri Lanka. Next to that, the birth of that person had to be
registered at a Sri Lankan embassy within one year after the birth.516 A problematic
aspect of this procedure was that, for most of its history, the country did not have
an adequate birth registration procedure. In fact, it took until the 1920s before
the entire country had access to birth registration facilities.517 As a consequence,
a share of the population was unable to prove the descent of their (grand)father
and thereby could not obtain nationality by descent. Those who could not obtain
‘citizenship by descent’ were forced to apply for ‘citizenship by registration’.518 
Although the requirements seem to be more lenient than the ‘citizenship by
descent’ procedure, in general there are additional requirements (e.g. residence
requirements) in place or the application can be discretionally refused by the
responsible Minister.519
of acquisition, even though that would have been an appropriate route considering 
Sri Lanka’s multi-ethnic population and the fact that it had become an immigration 
destination during British reign due to the recruiting of (plantation) workers. 
Instead, Sri Lanka opted for a ius sanguinis mode of acquisition, with an added 
citizenship by registration procedure. 
Even though the nationality legislation does not state it explicitly, it implicitly 
disadvantaged the acquisition of nationality by the Indian Tamil ethnic group. This 
was caused firstly by the poor execution or even the absence of a birth registration 
procedure in the Northern provinces which were predominantly populated by Tamil. 
Secondly, the Indian Tamil were the most likely to have a father or grandfather with 
a non-Sri Lankan background, which would impede acquisition iure sanguinis. The 
existence of ‘citizenship by registration’ procedures did not sufficiently compensate 
these disadvantaged groups in practice. This was caused by a combination of 
factors, such as the short timespan for submitting applications, the high application 
fees, the complicated application procedures, and the high illiteracy rate among 
Indian Tamil plantation workers.521 The result was that a significant share of Sri 
Lanka’s inhabitants ended up as stateless.522 
In an attempt to mitigate the problem of statelessness, the Indian and Pakistani 
Residents Citizenship Act No. 3 of 1949 was introduced, with somewhat less strict 
conditions for obtaining citizenship by registration. The law offered a pathway to 
nationality for those of Indian or Pakistani descent who were excluded from the 
scope of the 1948 Act. The Act states that a person of Indian or Pakistani origin 
can apply for ‘citizenship by registration’ if they have resided in Sri Lanka without 
interruption for a minimum of ten years directly before 1946 (reduced to seven 
years for married individuals).523 Initially, the registration procedure was only in 
place for two years.524 However, a large number of the applications were (again) 
rejected on technical grounds and therefore it did not provide a solution.525 
The disadvantaged position of the Tamil population was aggravated by other 
decisions of the Sri Lankan legislator. This development took place in a climate of 
521  Wijeyeratne, R., Nation, Constitutionalism and Buddhism in Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 114; Wickramasinghe, 
N., Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: a History of Contested Identities, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2006, p. 171. 
522  See for an analysis of statelessness among Tamil in Sri Lanka: Sivapragasam, P., “From statelessness to citizenship: 
up-country Tamils in Sri Lanka”, in: Blitz, Brad K., and Maureen L., (eds.), Statelessness and citizenship: A comparative study on 
the benefits of nationality, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, p. 95. 
523  Art. 1 par. 1 Act 3 of 1949. 
524  Art. 5 Act 3 of 1949. 
525  Shastri, A., “Estate Tamils, the Sri Lanka citizenship act of 1948 and Sri Lankan politics”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 8 





Against this background, the first of these decisions was the introduction of the Sri 
Lanka Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949, which stated that 
only nationals would be able to participate in elections. Although this approach is 
common in the great majority of countries, it must also be acknowledged that the 
significant part of the Sri Lankan population that did not hold nationality hereby 
became disenfranchised, which further increased interethnic tensions.526 
In 1955, an Act was adopted which declared that the Sinhalese language would 
be the only official language of the country. This came at the expense of the Tamil 
language. Therefore, it became more difficult for the Tamil subgroup to obtain 
positions within the Sri Lanka government.527 Since 1956, the country’s president 
Solomon Bandaranaike no longer endorsed the creation of a multi-ethnic and 
multilingual nation, but began to support the creation of a Sinhalese nation.528 
He aimed to prevent the electorate from turning to Sinhalese-Buddhist activist 
politicians.529 In the long run, this would lead to a surge of Tamil nationalism 
as a response. In 1970, a system was introduced to favour the attendance of 
underrepresented groups in higher education institutions. As the Sri Lankan Tamil 
were regarded as an overrepresented group, this system mainly advantaged the 
Sinhalese.530 
In 1964, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed, which provided for a more 
radical solution of the problematic situation of the Indian Tamil group. The 
Agreement provided that 525,000 Indian Tamil individuals were to be ‘repatriated’ 
to India and receive Indian nationality, while 300,000 would obtain Sri Lankan 
nationality.531 However, it was decided that the repatriation would not be 
compulsory.532 
In 1986 and 1988, two Acts were introduced in an attempt to solve the problems 
that had been created by the 1964 Agreement, as a large number of Indian Tamil 
526  Shastri, A., “Estate Tamils, the Sri Lanka citizenship act of 1948 and Sri Lankan politics”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 8 
No. 1, 1999, p. 65 ff.
527  Manogaran, C. Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987, p. 44. 
528  Herath, R., Sri Lankan ethnic crisis: towards a resolution, Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2002, p. 102.
529  Ibid. 
530  Little, Angela W. and Siri T. H., Globalisation, Employment and Education in Sri Lanka: Opportunity and Division, Lon-
don: Routledge, 2014.
531  Kapur, D., Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 206. 
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4. THE DUAL NATIONALITY LEGISLATION OF 
SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka has always had a restrictive attitude towards dual nationality since the 
country became an independent dominion in 1948. Those who held Sri Lankan 
nationality as well as a foreign nationality on the date that the Citizenship Act of 
1948 went into force (on 15 November 1948) either had to renounce their foreign 
nationality or would lose Sri Lankan nationality four years later, on 31 December 
1952, as long as they were 22 years or older on that date.539 This was also the case 
for all of those who acquired a foreign nationality between 15 November 1948 and 
533  Acts No. 5 of 1986 and No. 39 of 1988. 
534  Department of Immigration and Emigration, “Special Provisions: Act No 39 of 1988” via: <http://www.immigration.gov.
lk>. 
535  Department of Immigration and Emigration, “Special Provisions: Act No 35 of 2003” via: <http://www.immigration.gov.
lk>.
536  Uyangoda, J., “Post-independence social movements”, in: Lakshman, W., Tisdell, C. (eds.), Sri Lanka’s Development Since 
Independence: Socio-economic Perspectives and analyses, Huntington: Nova Science, 2000, p. 63 ff. 
537  Weis, G., The Cage: The fight for Sri Lanka & the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers, London: Bodley Head 2011, p. 50. 
538  It falls beyond the scope of this Chapter to describe the development of the Sri Lankan conflict in detail. For detailed 
analyses of the Sri Lankan conflict, see: Bandarage, A., The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy, 
London: Routledge, 2009; Biziouras, N., The political economy of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: economic liberalization, mobilizational 
resources, and ethnic collective action, London: Routledge, 2014.




           
 
           
             
           
            
           
 
neither repatriated to India nor acquired Sri Lankan nationality.533 Under these
Acts, those who were supposed to receive Sri Lankan nationality under the
agreement could now receive the status upon application.534 In 2003, this was
supplemented with the Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act No.
35 of 2003, which automatically conferred Sri Lankan nationality upon those
who had not received the status yet, unless they already possessed Indian
nationality. Thereby, the Sri Lankan government considered the issue to be
solved.535
During the course of the 1960s, the presence of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism 
in politics, as well as in daily life, increased ethnic tensions. 536 As a response, at 
the end of the 1970s, the Sri Lanka government, led by president Jayawardene, 
attempted to stop the institutionalized discrimination of the Tamil minority with 
the introduction of a set of measures for the recognition the Tamil language as an 
o cial national language. 537 Nevertheless, in 1983 ethnic tension culminated into 
the beginning of a civil conflict, driven by the radical Tamil nationalist movement 
LTTE (or the Tigers of Tamil Eelam). 538 Needless to say, the conflict gravely 
a⇥ected all aspects of Sri Lankan life, including the country’s emigration patterns 
and its nationality legislation. This becomes particularly clear when studying Sri 
Lanka’s policies regarding dual nationality, as will be discussed in the next section.
31 December 1952.540 If such a person was less than 22 years old on 31 December 
1952, he would still lose his Sri Lankan nationality on the date he would turn 22 
years old.541 
  
                
           
              
              
              
   
            
            
   
  
4.1 Exception clause  
In 1987, an exception clause for this rigid system was introduced.544 This timing 
was most likely related to the conclusion of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord, 
which was signed on 29 July 1987.545 At the time, it was thought that the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Peace Accord would bring an end to the Sri Lankan civil war and, therefore, 
the question arose as to how one could involve the Sri Lankan diaspora in the 
country’s peacebuilding and restoration process.546 By amending Article 19 par. 
2 of the Citizenship Act, the Sri Lankan Minister of Interior Affairs was granted 
the discretionary power to permit a Sri Lankan national to retain or reacquire Sri 
Lankan nationality, even though that person also held another nationality. 
On the basis of the abovementioned provision, a person can reacquire Sri Lankan 
nationality if he lost Sri Lankan nationality in the past on the basis of Art. 19, 
20 or 21 of the Citizenship Act (due to voluntary renunciation of Sri Lankan 
540  Art. 20 par. 2 sub a Citizenship Act 1948.
541  Art. 20 par. 1 sub b Citizenship Act 1948.
542  The period of twelve months is only applied to citizens of descent. According to art. 21 par. 2 Citizenship Act 1948, the 
period for citizens by registration is three months. This difference is not in line with the Sri Lankan Constitution, as art. 26 par. 
3 of the Constitution state that no distinction shall be made between citizens of registration or citizens of descent “for any pur-
pose”.  
543  Upon registration within one year from the date of birth at a Sri Lankan consulate (see Art. 5 par. 2 Citizenship Act 
1948). 
544  Citizenship (Amendment) Act No. 45 of 1987.
545  Premdas, R.R. and Samarasinghe, S.W.R., “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord”, Asian Survey, 
Vol. 28, No. 6, 1988, p. 676. 
546  The effects of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord were short lived and it turned out to be unable to prevent a resurgence 
of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in the early 1990s. See: Bose, S., “Flawed meditation, chaotic implementation: The 1987 In-
do-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement”, in: Stedman, J.S. et al. (eds.), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boul-
der: Lynne Rieners Publishers, 2002, p. 631 ff. 
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After that initial period, Sri Lankan nationality law had a negative stance towards
dual nationality. Firstly, according toArt. 20 par. 5 jo. art. 21 par. 1 of the Citizenship 
Act, Sri Lankan nationality is automatically lost upon the voluntary acquisition of 
another nationality in another State. Secondly, according to Art. 20 par. 2 jo. art. 21 
par. 2, a Sri Lankan national who acquires a foreign nationality by operation of law 
will lose Sri Lankan nationality at a later date. The loss of Sri Lankan nationality 
in that case will either happen twelve months 542 after the acquisition or on the 22 nd
birthday, whichever date is latest. This entails that those who acquired Sri Lankan 
nationality as well as another nationality by birth would lose their Sri Lankan 
nationality on their 22 nd birthday, unless they renounce their foreign nationality
before that date. 543
nationality or voluntary or involuntary acquisition of another nationality).547 That 
person will regain Sri Lankan nationality with effect from the date specified in the 
declaration.548 
Sri Lankan nationals who are about to voluntarily acquire another nationality can 
a priori apply for the retention of Sri Lankan nationality, as one can also apply for 
this exception clause before the date on which Sri Lankan citizenship would be 
lost.549 This can also be the case for Sri Lankan nationals who acquired another 
nationality involuntarily. For example, Sri Lankan nationals who also acquired 
another nationality at birth are set to lose their Sri Lankan nationality on their 22nd 
birthday, but they can apply for retention of their Sri Lankan nationality before 
that date.550 
 
           
             
           
            
             
 
The exception clause covers those who have lost Sri Lankan nationality through 
the provisions of Art. 19, 20 or 21 of the Citizenship Act, which are all the loss 
provisions in the Citizenship Act which are currently in force. However, before 
2003, the Sri Lankan Citizenship Act contained two additional loss provisions which 
aimed for dual nationals who were ‘Sri Lankan citizens by registration’, namely 
Article 22 and 23. While Article 22 related to the loss of Sri Lankan nationality 
after five years of consecutive residence abroad, Article 23 covered a range of loss 
provisions, mostly related to crime and fraud. It is probable that those who lost Sri 
Lankan nationality through Article 22 or 23 of the Citizenship Act are ineligible 
for a dual citizenship certificate to be granted and, henceforth, the reacquisition of 
Sri Lankan nationality. 
547  See also: De Groot, G.R., Achtentwintig Nederlanders? Bewerkte adviezen en casus over de toepassing van de Neder-
landse nationaliteitswetgeving, The Hague: Elsevier, 2007, p. 247. 
548  Art. 19 par. 4 Citizenship Act.
549  Art. 19 par. 3 Citizenship Act.
550  Art. 19 par. 3 Citizenship Act. 
551  However, whether the applicant can maintain two nationalities is not solely dependent on Sri Lankan law, but also on the 




If permission for the reacquisition or retention of Sri Lankan nationality is granted, 
the applicant will receive a so-called ‘dual citizenship certificate’. Such a certificate 
can be defined as a ministerial declaration which states that the holder of the 
certificate is exempted from certain loss provisions in the Sri Lankan citizenship 
Act. More specifically, the holder of the certificate is exempted from the loss 
provisions of Article 19, 20 and 21 of the Citizenship Act. The applicant can 








Due to a scarcity of resources, it is difficult to determine which further requirements 
were in place for the acquisition of a dual citizenship certificate before 2015. 
Nevertheless, two options for acquiring a dual citizenship certificate could be 
found in regulations of the Sri Lankan Central Bank. Firstly, in 2007, a Regulation 
was introduced to permit a dual citizenship certificate to be granted to those 
who make a fixed deposit in a foreign currency at as Sri Lankan bank of at least 
50,000 US Dollars or its equivalent in another currency. An applicant could also 
opt to make a deposit of (the equivalent of) 25,000 US Dollars, in which case an 
additional fee for a dual citizenship certificate would be charged of 200,000 Rupees 
(approximately 1,205 euro).553 Secondly, in 2009, a Regulation was introduced to 
grant Dual Citizenship Certificates to those who were willing to buy Government 
Treasury Bonds or open a foreign currency account in Sri Lanka for a minimum 
of 25,000 US Dollars.554 
In 2011, it was announced that the granting of dual citizenship certificates would 
be suspended until further notice. Government officials stated that it had been 
suspended because of procedural ‘loopholes’, as a share of those who were granted 
dual citizenship certificates allegedly did not fulfil all conditions.555 In addition to 
that, it was alleged that the scheme had been used illegitimately by those in charge 
for the benefit of family members and acquaintances.556 Therefore, it was deemed 
necessary to review the procedure for dual citizenship certificates to be granted. 
A third reason for discontinuing the scheme was an alleged lack of benefits for Sri 
Lanka, as government officials alleged that some only acquired Sri Lankan nationality 
to evade an additional taxation on property ownership for non-nationals.557 
552  Office of the Cabinet of Ministers, “Proposed Administrative Procedure for granting Dual Citizenship”, via: <http://www.
cabinetoffice.gov.lk/>.
553  Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2007, via: <www.cbsl.gov.lk/>.
554  Circular Dual citizenship for investors in Government Treasury bonds, June 2009, via <https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/>.
555  Kodagoda, A., “New dual Citizenship will remove all loopholes”, Sunday Observer, 29 April 2012, via <http://www.sun-
dayobserver.lk/>.
556  “Fraudulently issued dual citizenship and diplomatic passports to come under scanner”, Asian Tribune, 2 March 2015 via 
<http://www.asiantribune.com/>.
557  “Strict new criteria for dual citizenship”, Lanka New Papers, 27 February 2011, via <http://www.lankanewspapers.
207
3
SRI LANKAN NATIONALITY LAW AND THE SRI LANKAN DIASPORA: THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP CERTIFICATE 
4.2 Further requirements for acquiring a dual citizenship certificate
before 2015
As granting a dual citizenship certificate is a ministerial discretionary power,
eligible applicants are not automatically granted a dual citizenship certificate and
remain subject to individual approval. Applicants therefore have to fulfil further
conditions which have been outlined by additional regulations. 552 As the current
additional regulations came into force in 2015, this section will first discuss the
preceding regulations.
After its suspension, the scheme went through a lengthy reform procedure. At 
first, it was proposed to amend the Sri Lankan Immigration Act and introduce an 
‘Overseas Sri Lankan Scheme’, which would first enable ex-nationals of Sri Lanka to 
be granted a five-year residence permit. After this period of five years, the applicant 
would be able to reacquire Sri Lankan nationality and obtain the abovementioned 
Sri Lankan dual citizenship certificate. The proposal was limited in scope, as it was 
stated that former Sri Lankan asylum seekers should be excluded. An official of 
the Department of Immigration and Emigration defended this limitation by stating 
that “[…] we are not ready to grant dual citizenship for those who left the country 
claiming that this is not a suitable country to live”. 558 A bill for the Overseas Sri 
Lankan Scheme was introduced by the Cabinet of Ministers in May 2012.559 
However, the process came to a halt in this stage due to a lack of cooperation from 
the Legal Draftsman’s Department.560 In December 2014, the Cabinet of Ministers 
decided to bypass the Legal Draftsman’s Department by removing the residence 
permit requirement from the Overseas Sri Lankan Scheme. In this way, there was 
no longer a need to amend the Immigration Act and the granting of dual citizenship 
certificates could be reinitiated by merely introducing an Administrative Procedure 
to that end. After all, as described above, the Citizenship Act already allowed 
the Minister to grant dual citizenship certificates at his discretion. Therefore, an 
Administrative Procedure was introduced by the Cabinet of Ministers in March 
2015.561 Unlike the original proposal, those who were granted asylum outside 
Sri Lanka are not excluded from its scope and are allowed to apply for a dual 
citizenship certificate. Several newspapers mention that is the dual citizenship 
certificate in principle is only granted to nationals of the United States, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Switzerland, or 
Italy, but the Administrative Procedure itself does not mention this restriction.562 
4.3 Further requirements for acquiring a dual citizenship certificate after 
2015
The current Administrative Procedure came in force on 12 March 2015 and 
sets further requirements for dual citizenship certificates to be granted. This 
com/>.
558  Kodagoda, A., “Not eligible”, Sunday Observer, 29 March 2015, via <http://archives.sundayobserver.lk/>. 
559  Office of the Cabinet of Ministers, Cabinet Decision on the Amendment of the Citizenship Act No.18 of 1948 and the 
Immigration and Emigration Act No.20 of 1948 with a view to formalizing the grant of Dual Citizenship and the Establishment 
of the “Overseas Sri Lankans” Scheme, 16 May 2015, via <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.lk/>.
560  “Amendments to Sri Lanka’s dual citizenship laws held up by Legal Draftsman”, Colombo Page, 20 October 2013, via 
<http://www.colombopage.com/>. The Sri Lankan Legal Draftsman’s Department has an administrative function and is respon-
sible for the drafting of new legislation and amending of legislation in all three official languages. See: <https://ld.gov.lk/>.
561  Office of the Cabinet of Ministers, Cabinet Decision on Administrative Procedure for granting Dual Citizenship, 12 
March 2015, via <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.lk/>.





Administrative Procedure covers five different categories, namely pensioners, 
persons with an academic or professional background, persons who own assets in 
Sri Lanka, persons who make a fixed deposit and persons who acquire a treasury 
bond.563 In addition to that, all applicants are required to submit a birth certificate, 
a police clearance certificate and proof of foreign nationality.564 The applicant is 
also required to pay a hefty application fee of 300,000 Rs (approx. 1,520 euro).
Persons who are 55 years or older
This category enables former Sri Lankans who have retired to (re)settle in Sri 
Lanka . The age limit is based on the Sri Lankan official retirement age. For men, 
the Sri Lankan retirement age is (in principle) 55 years, while the retirement age 
for women is (in principle) 50 years. 
 
Persons who fulfil academic or professional criteria  
The term ‘academic or professional criteria is defined as having a “minimum one 
year diploma […] or any other professional qualification”. 
Persons who own assets in Sri Lanka worth more than 2.500.000 Rs (approximately 
15,100 euro) 
The term ‘assets’ concerns real property, comprising land ownership as well as 
ownership of real estate. 
Persons who made a fixed deposit on a Non-Resident Foreign Currency or Resident 
Foreign Currency or Senior Foreign Invest Deposit Account of at least 25,000 USD for 
at least three years
The term ‘foreign currency account’ refers to an account in a Sri Lankan bank 
which has been authorized by the Sri Lankan Central Bank to hold foreign currency. 
In the past, Sri Lanka had imposed a stringent system for the control of foreign 
exchange, which entailed that official permission was required to convert the national 
currency into any foreign currency.565 Since 1994, the Sri Lankan monetary system 
has gradually become less restrictive and the Sri Lankan Central Bank’s activities 
regarding exchange control now relate mainly to the close monitoring of inflows 
and outflows.566 This reduced ability of the Sri Lankan Central Bank to manage 
foreign exchange might explain why the unconventional step was taken to grant 
563  Department of immigration and Emigration, “Dual Citizenship Application Form and Instructions for Applicants apply-
ing for Dual Citizenship” via: <https://immigration.gov.lk>.
564  Ibid.  
565  Such foreign exchange control is common in developing countries, as it is perceived to bring stability to weak econo-
mies.
566  <http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/htm/english/07_af_1fer/fer.html>. 
209
3
SRI LANKAN NATIONALITY LAW AND THE SRI LANKAN DIASPORA: THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP CERTIFICATE 
dual citizenship certificates in exchange for depositing foreign currency in Sri 
Lanka. Rather than exercising direct control, the Sri Lankan Central Bank seems 
to have resorted to giving an incentive to individuals to deposit foreign currency in 
Sri Lankan banks for a fixed period of time. 
Persons who have acquired treasury bonds or made a deposit on a Security Investment 
Account of at least 25,000 USD for a period of at least three years
The term ‘Treasury Bond’ refers to a debt security issued by the Sri Lankan 
Central Bank. A ‘Security Investment Account’ is bank account specifically aimed 
at foreign investors who are willing to invest in Sri Lankan companies or acquire 





   
 










4.4 Further requirements for acquiring a dual citizenship certificate for 
spouses and dependent minors 
The Administrative Procedure enables the spouse and children of the main 
applicant to also acquire a Sri Lankan dual citizenship certificate. Regarding the 
spouse, it is required that he or she lost Sri Lankan nationality through Article 19, 
20 or 21 of the Citizenship Act or will lose Sri Lankan nationality on that basis in 
the future. This way, applications are restricted to spouses of Sri Lankan descent. 




The question remains why the Sri Lankan government opted for this relatively
restrictive system. Unfortunately, as the requirements are outlined in an
Administrative Procedure, they are not the outcome of a legislative process and have
therefore not been the subject of a parliamentary debate. However, the underlying
reasons can, to a certain extent, be retrieved from secondary sources. The main
driver of the current scheme seems to be the Sri Lankan government’s drive to
ensure a selective scheme. The selectivity of the current scheme enables Sri Lanka
to adopt an inclusive attitude towards those who are perceived to be of economic
benefit to Sri Lanka, while it also enables Sri Lanka to adopt an exclusive attitude
towards those who are deemed less desirable. Furthermore, although the scheme
is openly exclusive in economic terms, the discretionary nature of the scheme also
provides for more implicit exclusions.When the scheme was introduced in 2015,
the then Minister of Public Order stated that every applicant for a dual citizenship
certificate would be “closely screened”, crassly adding that “[…] we don’t need
drug addicts or smugglers […] The country only needs valuable and helpful people
to come in”. 567
The spouse does not have to fulfil any additional requirements, except the payment 
of a fee of 50,000 Rs (approx. 255 euro). A non-Sri Lankan spouse would have to 
resort to applying for a residence visa for foreign spouses, which is initially valid for 
a period of two years and can subsequently be extended. A spouse can apply for a 
residence visa after three months of residence in Sri Lanka. It must also be noted 
that holders of a residence visa are not automatically granted a work permit.568 
The children of the main applicant can apply for a dual citizenship certificate, as 
long as they are under 22 years old and unmarried. Also, for children, it is required 
that they have lost or will lose Sri Lankan nationality in the future on the basis 
of Article 19, 20 or 21 of the Citizenship Act. This provision has turned out to 
be problematic in practice.569 First, as only those children who are570 or were Sri 
Lankan can apply, this provision excludes children who have not been registered 
at a Sri Lankan consulate within one year after their birth, as this is a mandatory 
requirement for obtaining Sri Lankan citizenship at birth.571 Furthermore, if the 
child was born after the Sri Lankan parent had lost his Sri Lankan nationality (e.g. 
due to naturalization abroad), the child is ineligible for the resumption or retention 
of Sri Lankan nationality and cannot obtain a dual citizenship certificate. A solution 
for the child would be to apply independently for Sri Lankan nationality on the basis 
of Art. 5A par. 1 sub b of the Citizenship Act. According to this provision, a person 
born between 1948 and 2003 can obtain Sri Lankan nationality if his parents were 
not nationals of Sri Lankan at the time of his birth, but they became nationals of 
Sri Lanka at a later date. In principle, this person is required to renounce his other 
nationality, but he can be granted permission from the Minister to retain his Sri 
Lankan nationality (similar to a dual citizenship certificate). However, there is no 
procedure in place for such permission to be granted on the basis of this particular 
provision. The situation is even more problematic for a child born in 2003 or later 
who did not acquire Sri Lankan nationality at birth, as the provision enshrined in 
Art. 5A of the Citizenship Act is only applicable to those who were born between 
15 November 1948 and 1 April 2003.572 As there is no other provision to resort to 
in this situation, a child without Sri Lankan nationality born after 15 April 2003 is 
unable to obtain Sri Lankan nationality together with his parent. This entails that 
568  Department of Immigration and Emigration, “Residence Visa”, via <http://www.immigration.gov.lk/>.
569  Arachchi, R., “Dual Citizenship aspirants in dilemma”, Sunday Observer, 19 August 2018. 
570  Children who hold Sri Lankan nationality as well as another nationality have an interest in acquiring a dual citizenship 
certificate, as it prevents them from losing their Sri Lankan nationality after attaining the age of majority ex. Art.  21 par. 2 of the 
Citizenship Act. 
571  A birth registration can nevertheless be accepted later than one year after the birth on the discretion of the Minister. Cur-
rently, this entails that it is possible to register a birth at a later stage, although a fine of 500. Rs. (approximately three euro) has 
to be paid per delayed year.
572  Art. 5A par. 1 Citizenship Act. 
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such a child can only obtain Sri Lankan nationality once he is the age of majority.573 
Overview: Dual nationality in Sri Lanka




Dual national after abovementioned date: 
Loss of Sri Lankan nationality upon voluntarily acquisition of another 
nationality
Loss of Sri Lankan nationality upon acquisition by operation of law after 12 
months or when he/she turns 22 (Art. 20 par. 5 Citizenship Act 1948).
Exception Minister of Interior Affairs can grant exemption from abovementioned loss 
provisions (Art. 19 par. 2 Citizenship Act 1948).
Exception – 
current regulation 
for the main 
applicant
-Persons who are 55 years or older 
-Fulfil Academic or Professional criteria 
-Own assets in Sri Lanka worth more than 2,500,000 Rs. (or approximately 
15,100 euro)  
-Fixed deposit on a Non-Resident Foreign Currency or Resident Foreign 
Currency or Senior Foreign Invest Deposit Account of at least 25,000 USD for 
at least three years
-Acquisition of Treasury Bonds or deposit on a Security Investment Account of 
at least 25,000 USD for at least three years
Exception – 
current regulation 
for the spouse and 
children of the 
main applicant
-Child or spouse has lost Sri Lankan nationality through Article 19, 20 or 21 of 
the Citizenship Act or is set to lose Sri Lankan nationality on that basis in the 
future.
4.5 The revocation of a dual citizenship certificate
According to Art. 19 par. 7 of the Citizenship Act, a dual citizenship certificate can 
be revoked by the Minister “if he is satisfied that the person in relation to whom 
such declaration was made has so conducted himself that his continuance as a 
citizen of Sri Lanka will not be of benefit to Sri Lanka”. Indirectly, the revocation 
of a dual citizenship certificate can result in the loss of Sri Lankan nationality. 
After all, due to the revocation of the dual citizenship certificate, that person is no 
longer exempted from the loss provisions enshrined in Art. 19, 20 and 21 of the 
Citizenship Act.   
573  The procedure for registration in this case can be found in Art. 11 par. 1 Citizenship Act. It requires that the applicant is 
of full age and sound mind, that his parent lost Sri Lankan nationality under Art. 20 of the Citizenship Act (involuntary loss of 
nationality) and that the applicant is and intends to continue to be ordinarily resident in Sri Lanka. According to Art. 15 par. 1 
Citizenship Act, the applicant is in principle required to renounce any other nationality he may have held, although the Minister 




Dual national at 15 November 1948:
loss of Sri Lankan nationality 31 December 1952 or the day he/she turns 22,
unless the other nationality has been renounced before that date. (Art. 20 par. 1 
Citizenship Act 1948).
The wordings of the loss provision are remarkable, as the criterion ‘not being of 
benefit’ is wide in scope compared to more conventional loss provisions.574 As the 
provision does not contain any limitations, it can lead to the arbitrary deprivation 
of nationality and is thereby arguably not in line with Sri Lanka’s obligations under 
international law. Art. 15 par. 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights expressly forbids the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Although the 
provision is not directly binding, this prohibition is increasingly perceived as part 
of international customary law.575 The Sri Lankan loss provision is not in line 
with several guiding principles which have been derived from the prohibition of 
the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. As the loss provision is extremely wide in 
scope and loosely defined, the interpretation and application of the provision is not 
predictable.576 Most importantly, the loss of nationality on the basis of this provision 
does not necessarily serve a legitimate aim and is not necessarily proportionate.577 
The provision can also constitute a breach of the obligations imposed by several 
treaties to which Sri Lanka is a party. Art. 5(d)(iii) of the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination forbids the 
deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds, to which the Sri Lankan loss 
provision could give way. According to Art. 8 par. 1 of the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, State parties “[…] shall undertake to respect the right of 
the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, […] without unlawful 
interference”, which also prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of the nationality of 
children, whether as dependents or independents.578 
One could argue that the deprivation of nationality does not take place in the case 
discussed here, due to the layered nature of the Sri Lankan loss provision. After 
all, due to the revocation of a dual citizenship certificate (or, in other words, the 
revocation of an exemption), the person concerned will again be subjected to the 
regular loss provisions of Sri Lankan nationality law, which can subsequently result 
in the loss of Sri Lankan nationality by operation of law. I would argue that a 
State should not be allowed to hide behind such a layered deprivation provision. 
Although the person concerned might lose his nationality directly by operation of 
574  One can compare this clause, for example, with the wording of Art. 8 par. 3 a II of the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, namely conduct “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State”. 
575  There is sufficient ground to recognize the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation as part of customary international law, al-
though the scope of this prohibition remains a matter of debate. See: Fripp, E., Nationality and Statelessness in the International 
Law of Refugee Status, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 252, Mantu, S., Contingent Citizenship: The Law and Practice of Citizen-
ship Deprivation in International, European and National Perspectives, Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2015, p. 31; Forlati, S. and Annoni, 
A., The changing role of nationality in international law, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 26. 
576  De Groot, G. R., Vink, M., Best practices on involuntary loss of nationality in the EU, Brussels: Centre for European Pol-
icy Studies, 2014, p. 4. 
577  UN Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General, 19 
December 2013, A/HRC/25/28, p. 16. 
578  De Groot, G.R., Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law, Brussels: Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies, 2013, p. 4. 
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law, this loss is indirectly set off by the revocation of his dual citizenship certificate. 
Next to that, the wordings of the provision make clear that its ultimate goal is 
not the revocation of a dual citizenship certificate itself, but the revocation of Sri 
Lankan nationality. After all, the provision states that revocation can take place if 
“[…] his continuance as a citizen of Sri Lanka [emphasis added, LvdB] will not be 
of benefit to Sri Lanka”.  Furthermore, scholars are increasingly questioning the 
traditional distinction between depriving one of nationality and the automatic loss 
of nationality by operation of law, arguing that the latter should also be perceived 
as an act of the State or, at the very least, an outcome of a process for which a State 
should be held responsible.579 
In principle, the revocation of a dual citizenship certificate will not result in 
statelessness, as a dual citizenship certificate holder will evidently have at least one 
other nationality. Nevertheless, it is possible that a holder of a Sri Lankan dual 
citizenship certificate loses his other nationality, after which he would solely be a 
‘mono-national’ of Sri Lanka, even though he still holds a Sri Lankan dual citizenship 
certificate. Nevertheless, in this case, the withdrawal of a dual citizenship certificate 
would not result in the loss of Sri Lankan nationality, as the loss provisions of 
Art. 20 and Art. 21 of the Sri Lankan Citizenship Act contain safeguards against 
statelessness and are therefore solely applicable to multiple nationals.580 
5. AN ALTERNATIVE TO DUAL CITIZENSHIP: 
RESIDENCE VISA (EX-SRI LANKAN 
CATEGORY)
Persons who have lost Sri Lankan nationality can also obtain a residence visa under 
the ex-Sri Lankan category.581 This category is specifically aimed at Sri Lankan 
emigrants who wish to return to Sri Lanka but are unable to obtain a dual citizenship 
certificate. 582  For example, an applicant might be unable to fulfil the relatively 
579  Boll, A.M., Multiple nationality and international law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 42; Donner, R., The 
regulation of nationality in international law (2nd ed.), Irvington: Transnational Publishers 1994, p. 122. In particular in response 
to the ECJ Tjebbes judgment, the limitations of the automatic loss of nationality have again become a matter of debate. See: Van 
Eijken, H. and Phoa, P., “Nationality and EU citizenship: strong tether or slipping anchor?”, in: De Vries, S., De Waele, H. and 
Granger, M. (eds.), Civil Rights and EU Citizenship, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, 2018, p. 113 ff. 
580  Art. 20 of the Citizenship Act states the article is only applicable to Sri Lankans who are “also a citizenship […] of another 
country”, while Art. 21 states that it is only applicable to individuals who “voluntarily become a citizen of another country”. 




582  Office of the Cabinet of Ministers, Cabinet Decision on Streamlining and updating of the existing Visa issue system, 9 




581 In Sri Lankan immigration law, the term ‘visa’ is both used for regular visas as well as residence permits. A visa can be 
granted on the basis of Art. 14 jo. Art. 23 par. 1 sub h Immigration and Emigration Act 1948.The further conditions for the ac- 
quisition of a visa are outlined in the Immigration and Emigration Regulations 1958. As there is no consolidated version availa- 
ble of the Immigration and Emigration Regulations 1958, the requirements have been retrieved from other governmental sourc- 
es.
stringent further requirements for the acquisition of a dual citizenship certificate. 
Alternatively, they might be unwilling to reacquire Sri Lankan nationality, because 
they have been naturalized in another State where dual nationality is not permitted, 
which means that the acquisition of Sri Lankan nationality might lead to the loss 
of the other nationality. The application procedure for this residence visa to be 
granted requires a Sri Lankan birth certificate, a Sri Lankan citizenship certificate 
or proof of Sri Lankan birth registration to be submitted.583 A Sri Lankan national 
can obtain a one-year residence permit, which can be renewed annually.584 
The residence permit does not come with additional requirements, except the 
requirement that one should have resided in Sri Lanka for at least three months 
prior to the date of application for the residence permit.585 The spouse and the 
dependent minors of the applicant can also obtain a residence visa in the same 
category, even if they never held Sri Lankan nationality themselves. Holders of 
a residence visa who wish to be economically active in Sri Lanka are in principle 
obliged to obtain a work permit.586 
6. NUMBER OF ISSUED DUAL CITIZENSHIP 
CERTIFICATES AND RESIDENCE VISAS (EX-
SRI LANKAN CATEGORY) PER ANNUM
According to an administrative report of the Sri Lankan Department for Immigration 
and Emigration, 37,000 individuals obtained a dual citizenship certificate between 
1987 and 2011.587 As mentioned earlier, between 2011 and 2015, the granting of dual 
citizenship certificates was halted. Since the reintroduction of the dual citizenship 
certificate acquisition procedure in 2015, the number of granted certificates rose 
steeply; more than 17,000 dual citizenship certificates were granted in 2016 alone. 
Although there are no further official statistics available, in November 2015, a Sri 
Lankan newspaper presented figures on the countries of origin of the applicants 
from the Department of Immigration and Emigration.588 At that time, around 
3,000 dual citizenship certificates were granted, most of which were to applicants 
from the United Kingdom (820), Australia (648), Italy (345), and Canada (330).  
583  Department of immigration and Emigration, “Residence Visa”, via <http://www.immigration.gov.lk/>.
584  Ibid. 
585  Ibid. 
586  Ibid. 
587  Department of immigration and Emigration, Periodic Report 2011, p. 2. 
588  Surendraraj, J., “11,000 more wait in hope for dual citizenship”, Sunday Times, 22 November 2015. 
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Dual citizenship certificate (2011-2017)589
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Granted citizenship certificates Na Na Na Na 3130 17544 10648
Resumption 2027 9418 5113
Retention 1013 8126 5535
Resident Visa (Ex-Sri Lankan category) 2011-2017 
Year 2011590 2012591 2013 2014592 2015593 2016594 2017595
Issued 634 3545 issued & extended Na 1475 1727 1480 1436
Extended 34 Na 2106 2244 2047 1931
7. COMPARING SRI LANKAN NATIONALITY, 
SRI LANKAN DUAL CITIZENSHIP 
CERTIFICATES AND SRI LANKA RESIDENCE 
VISAS
The three groups discussed in the preceding sections (Sri Lankan nationals, 
Sri Lankans who hold a dual citizenship certificate and holders of a Sri Lanka 
Residence Visa) have different rights and obligations. In this section, the aim is 
to provide a brief overview of these differentiations. In October 2014, Sri Lanka 
restricted land- and real estate ownership through the introduction of the Land 
Restoration of Alienation Act. This Act, in principle, forbids the transfer of title 
of Sri Lankan land to non-Sri Lankans and came into force retroactively from 1 
January 2013. There are a number of exceptions to this restriction; the transfer of 
title to a Sri Lankan dual citizenship certificate holder is one of these exceptions, 
as well as any transfer of title by intestacy, gift or testamentary disposition to a 
next of kin.596 Also, non-Sri Lankans are permitted to acquire a condominium in 
Sri Lanka, although they are required to pay the entire sum up front through an 
inward foreign remittance.597 The alternative for a non-Sri Lankan would be to 
resort to a lease, which is permitted for a period up to 99 years.598 In that case, an 
additional lease tax of 15% of the total value of the lease used to be imposed, but 
this provision was revoked in September 2016.599 This regulatory framework could 
589  Department of immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2017, p. 55.a
590  Department of Immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2011, p. 36. 
591  Department of Immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2012, p. 21. 
592  Department of immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2014, p. 32.
593  Department of immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2015, p. 32.
594  Department of immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2016, p. 29. 
595  Department of immigration and Emigration, Performance Report 2017, p. 32. 
596  Art. 3 par. 1 e Land (Restoration of Alienation) Act as amended by 
597  Art. 3 par. 1 b Land (Restoration of Alienation) Act.
598  Art. 5 Land (Restoration of Alienation) Act.




hinder the acquisition of land or real estate for non-Sri Lankan nationals. 
Through Article 4 e of the Constitution, political franchise is restricted to Sri 
Lankan nationals. Franchise is not formally restricted for Sri Lankan dual nationals, 
but participating in Sri Lankan elections is problematic for non-resident nationals 
as it is – except for a small number of exceptions – not possible to vote in Sri 
Lankan elections from abroad.600 With regard to taking up public office, Sri Lanka 
has a more restrictive stance.601 According to Art. 91 par. 1 d 13 of the Sri Lankan 
Constitution, a person who possesses another nationality next to Sri Lankan 
nationality cannot be a member of the Sri Lankan parliament. This provision is 
actively enforced and has caused problems for several Sri Lankan parliamentarians 
with a migrant background.602 Interestingly, this is the only limitation for the 
execution of public office that the Sri Lankan Constitution contains. For example, 
there is no similar restriction for the position of the President of Sri Lankan. 
Last, access to the Sri Lankan Supreme Court is restricted in certain cases to 
Sri Lankan nationals. According to Art. 121 par. 1 of the Constitution, only Sri 
Lankan nationals can take a case before the Sri Lankan Supreme Court for the 
constitutional review of a bill. 
8. SRI LANKAN DUAL NATIONALITY 





   
  
  
   
   
600  Although Sri Lankan electoral law does not forbid voting from abroad, no procedure has been set up to facilitate voting 
from abroad. Sri Lanka has therefore been urged to take practical steps to facilitate external voting. See: Committee Conclud-
ing observations of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families on 
Sri Lanka, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families: Sri Lanka, CMW/C/LKA/CO/1, 19 October 2009, p. 6.
601  See, for example, Art. 31 par. 1 and Art. 89 of the Sri Lankan Constitution.  




SRI LANKAN NATIONALITY LAW AND THE SRI LANKAN DIASPORA: THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP CERTIFICATE 
One of the aspects that makes Sri Lankan nationality stand out is that the one Sri
Lankan nationality is not necessarily equal to the other. Since 1948, Sri Lankans
have been divided in ‘citizens by descent’ and ‘citizens by registration’. Since
1987, a new categorization has come into play, namely ‘dual citizenship certificate
holders’. Although clearly dual citizenship certificate holders have a di erent status
within Sri Lanka than other nationals, their status is a privilege and a burden at
the same time. On the one hand, the holders are permitted to hold more than one
nationality and, thereby, they are allowed to maintain or obtain an additional set
of rights, which is not possible for regular Sri Lanka nationals. Also, while ‘citizens 
by registration’ used to suffer from a lower social status, dual citizenship holders 
could derive a certain social prestige from their status, as the ‘citizenship premium’ 
of having another nationality next to Sri Lankan nationality can be significant. 
On the other hand, a striking difference is that a dual citizenship certificate can 
be withdrawn at the discretion of the Minister, while  more protective provisions 
for the loss of nationality are applicable to other categories. Also, their political 
rights remain restricted and the legal status of their family members can remain 
uncertain. This exemplifies how Sri Lankan dual citizens obtain a differentiated, 
seemingly more conditional and less comprehensive nationality status. 
Another milestone is that Sri Lanka explicitly embraces the divided allegiances of 
a part of its citizenry. This is already shown by the name of the ‘dual citizenship 
certificate’; by using this name the Sri Lankan government acknowledges that the 
holder can have two allegiances and thereby does not make an all-encompassing 
claim on them. During a dual citizenship award ceremony, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mangala Samaweera downplayed a potential conflict of allegiances: “[…] It 
is important to note that Sri Lanka’s relationships with your adopted second-homes 
and with the Sri Lankan diaspora are not a zero-sum game – we all want peace, 
we all want prosperity and we all want an equal and just society, and world”.603 
At another citizenship ceremony, he stated that “Many say you [dual citizenship 
certificate holders, LvdB] have the best of both worlds, but in you, we have the best 
of both worlds”.604 While this statement addresses the routine accusation that dual 
nationals are two-faced and opportunistic, it emphasizes that the cumulative status 
of dual citizenship holders and their connections to more than one country can 
also be considered an advantage to Sri Lanka. In the same speech, dual nationality 
status is even presented as an asset to Sri Lanka, framing Sri Lankan nationality as 
a ‘homeland nationality’, assigning dual nationals the role of ambassador in their 
other country of nationality: “Sri Lanka is our motherland […] You can play an 
important role in this journey. You are a bridge between Sri Lanka and your host 
countries. Each of you is an ambassador of this country to your host countries”.605
Importantly, the Sri Lankan dual citizenship scheme also provides a striking 
example of a commodified nationality. Sri Lankan nationality law has always 
603  Speech made by Hon. Mangala Samaraweera, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Ceremony to mark the Granting of Dual 
Citizenship to 150 members of the Sri Lankan Diaspora Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 June 2015, via < https://www.mfa.gov.
lk/>.
604  Ibid. 




been closely linked to the processes of nation building. In the first decades of its 
independence, nationality law was used to create a homeland for the Sinhalese 
majority group, whereby the Sri Lankan government at the time made use of ethnic 
selectivity in its nationality legislation. In the current post-conflict setting, the Sri 
Lankan government set off a process of a process of nation (re)building by utilizing 
economic selectivity in its nationality legislation. The responsible Sri Lankan 
Ministers are well aware of this dynamic. In the abovementioned speech by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was stated that “salesmanship will be as important as 
statesmanship, for the modern Sri Lankan diplomat […]”. He further put emphasis 
on the economic contributions that the members of the Sri Lankan diaspora could 
deliver, as he stated that “[…] You are all citizens of this country who now carry 
the flag for Sri Lanka overseas […] There is much that you can contribute, and 
there is much that we can learn from your experiences. […] We hope that they 
use the talent and skills they have gained over the years, to help us accelerate our 
development and enrich our thinking. We should strive to reverse the brain drain 
during the long years of conflict and ensure that Sri Lanka will now receive all the 
benefits of a brain gain at this crucial time of her history […]”.606  
9. A SRI LANKAN-GERMAN CITIZENSHIP 
CONSTELLATION
Over the past decades, Germany has received a significant number of Sr Lankan 
migrants. Even though other countries (e.g. India, Canada and the United 
Kingdom) have been more predominant destinations for Sri Lankan migrants, a 
focus on the German-Sri Lankan case can illustrate how nationality laws can work 
in negative ways through their interactions. 
From the 1970s onwards, the Federal Republic of Germany received a small 
number of Sri Lankan labour migrants.607 Immigration of Sri Lankans drastically 
increased during the first years of the 1980s, when the Sri Lankan civil conflict 
began to develop. Initially, this was facilitated by the fact that Sri Lankan nationals 
could travel to the German Democratic Republic without a visa and were 
subsequently permitted to enter the Federal Republic of Germany in order to apply 
for asylum.608 In 1985 alone, 17,380 Sri Lankan nationals applied for asylum in the 
606  “Para-diplomacy to harness diaspora potential for country’s benefit”, Sunday Times, 10 May 2015. 
607  Salentin, K., Tamilische Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt: IKO, 2002, p. 69.  
608  Nieswand, B., “Die Transitzone und die Fiktion von Nichteinreise”, in: Oltmer, J., Migrationsregime vor Ort und lokales Au-
shandeln von Migration, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2018, p. 356.
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Federal Republic of Germany.609 However, from 1986 onwards, this so-called ‘hole 
in the Berlin wall’ was closed due to an agreement that the German Democratic 
Republic concluded with the Federal Republic of Germany, which entailed that 
from now on the former would ensure that travellers were in possession of a transit 
visa in exchange for financial support.610 As a consequence, the number of Sri 
Lankan asylum applicants reduced in 1988 to 3,383.611 The figures increased 
again during the early 1990s, when greater numbers of Sri Lankan refugees were 
able to enter Germany irregularly, particularly through Switzerland.612 Due to 
intensifying regulatory restrictions, Sri Lankan immigration dwindled by the end 
of the decade.613 By the end of 2001, Germany had received 63,533 Sri Lankan 
immigrants, of which 46,632 had a residence permit, while 16,901 had naturalized 
and obtained German nationality.614  Between 2002 and the end of 2011, another 
17,828 Sri Lankans naturalized in Germany.615 From that year on, the number of 
naturalizations of Sri Lankans decreased, with only 4,351 naturalizations between 
2012 and the end of 2018.616 
As Germany has a negative attitude towards dual nationality, it is in principle 
required that an applicant for naturalization either loses his original nationality by 
operation of law or that he has renounced his previous nationality. Before 2004, this 
requirement was enshrined in Art. 8 of the German Nationality Law of 1913 and 
Art. 5.3.1 of the Naturalization Guidelines of 1977. However, as the great majority 
of Sri Lankans entered Germany as refugees, they may have been able to make use 
of an important exception ground. According to Art. 5.3.3.3 of the Naturalization 
Guidelines, those who were entitled to asylum as well as foreign refugees who fell 
under the care of the German State could be exempted from the requirement to 
renounce  their original nationality if this would cause ‘unreasonable hardship’ for 
them. From 1990 onwards, this provision was enshrined in Art. 87 par. 1 sub 4 
of the Foreigners Act of 1990.617 In 2000, the provision was amended; it was no 
longer required to prove that the renouncing the original nationality would cause 
‘unreasonable hardship’.618 In 2005, this provision was integrated in the German 
609  Nuscheler, F., Internationale Migration: Flucht und Asyl, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1995, p. 119. 
610   Zumach, A., “Über die Festung Europa und Menschenrechte”, in: Bierdel, E. And Lakitsch, M. (eds.), Flucht und Migra-
tion: Von Grenzen, Ängsten und Zukunftschancen, Wien: Lit Publishers, 2014, p. 57; Nieswand, B., “Die transitzone und die fikti-
on von nichteinreise”, in: Oltmer, J., Migrationsregime vor Ort und lokales Aushandeln von Migration, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2018, 
p. 356.
611  Nuscheler, F., Internationale Migration: Flucht und Asyl, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1995, p. 119.
612  Salentin, K., Tamilische Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt: IKO, 2002, p. 69. 
613  Salentin, K., Tamilische Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt: IKO, 2002, p. 87. 
614  Salentin, K. and Wilkening, F., “Ausländer, eingebürgerte und das problem einer realistischen zuwanderer-integrationsbi-
lanz”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 55 No. 2, 2003, p. 286.
615  Destatis, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Einbürgerungen 2008, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009; Destatis, 
Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Einbürgerungen 2012, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt 2016. 
616  Destatis, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Einbürgerungen 2018, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt 2019.
617  Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts vom 9. Juli 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt, 14 July 1990, p. 1354-ff. 




Nationality Act, although with different wording.619 Art. 12 par. 1 sub 6 of the 
German Nationality Act now provided an exception ground for those who held a 
travel document granted to refugees on the basis of Art. 28 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention or a settlement permit granted on the basis of Art. 23 par. 2 of the 
Residence Act (i.e. a permit granted on humanitarian grounds). In 2007, the latter 
exception ground was removed.620 
Despite this provision, the official figures indicate that only a small share of 
naturalized Sri Lankans could retain their original nationality. Nevertheless, 
easing the exception provision in 2000 seems to have had a positive impact. In 
1999, only 64 out of 2,494 naturalized Sri Lankans (or 2.6%) were permitted 
to retain their original nationality.621 In 2000, this figure increased to 715 out of 
4,597 Sri Lankans (or 15.6%).622 By 2008, this figure had further increased to 
21.9%.623 As explained earlier in this Chapter, Sri Lankan nationality is in principle 
automatically lost upon the voluntary acquisition of another nationality but, since 
an amendment of Sri Lankan nationality law was introduced in 1987, Sri Lankans 
who acquire the nationality of another State can, by exception, be permitted to 
retain their nationality. Nevertheless, a 2006 German Administrative Court 
decision indicates that, despite this exception provision, it should be assumed that 
Sri Lankan nationality is automatically lost upon naturalization abroad and that 
the submission of further proof of the loss of nationality cannot be required by the 
German authorities.624
The situation is equally complex for naturalized Sri Lankans who wish to reacquire 
their Sri Lankan nationality. According to Art. 17 par. 1 sub 2 of the German 
Nationality Law, German nationality is in principle lost upon the acquisition of 
another nationality. Until 1 January 2000, a German national who (re)acquired 
another nationality could potentially retain his German nationality through the so-
called Inlandsklausel, on the basis of which German nationality would not be lost if 
a person was residing in Germany at the moment he acquired another nationality.625 
This provision was revoked in order to prevent that naturalized nationals would 
be enabled to reacquire their original nationality, as this considered an abusive 
619  Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von 
Unionsbürgern und Ausländern vom 30. Juli 2004, Bundesgesetzblatt, 5 August 2004, p. 1950 ff. 
620  Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen Union Vom 19. August 2007, Bun-
desgesetzblatt, 27 August 2007, p. 1970 ff. Although this amendment was presented as a mere technicality, the practical conse-
quence was that Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor States were no longer covered by this provi-
sion. See: Hofmann, R., Ausländerrecht, Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishers 2015, at 26-28.  
621  Bundestag, Matter 14/9815, 22 July 2002. 
622  Ibid. 
623  Destatis, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Einbürgerungen 2008, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009, p. 21. 
624  Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart, Judgment of 10 April 2006, 11 K 2724/05. 
625  Art. 25 par. 1 Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz vom 22. Juli 1913. 
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practice by the German legislator.626 Unlike for the naturalization procedure, 
there is no explicit exception ground in place for (former) recognized refugees. 
According to Art. 25 par. 2 of the German Nationality Law, a German national can 
get permission for the retention of German nationality (‘Beibehaltungsgenehmigung’ 
or ‘retention permit’). The provision states that, in the application process, a 
balance must be found between private and public interests. This is repeated by 
Art. 25.2.3.1 of the Application Instructions of 31 November 2014.627 According 
to Art. 25.2.3.3 of the Application Instructions, the exception grounds mentioned 
in Art. 12 of the Nationality Law can be applied equally to the permission for the 
retention of nationality, but this is only the case if they are related to Art. 12 par. 
5 of the Nationality Act (i.e. considerable [financial] disadvantages). According 
to a commentator, in principle, a retention permit should not be granted at all 
if a naturalized German national wishes to reacquire the nationality of origin, 
as this would undermine the effectiveness of the renunciation requirement for 
naturalizations.628 This line of argumentation is arguably overly restrictive. First, 
recognized refugees who naturalized in Germany before 2000 had to fulfil far more 
stringent requirements to be exempted from the renunciation requirement. It would 
not be unreasonable to facilitate the reacquisition of the original nationality under 
more equal terms for this group. Secondly, it is difficult to see why the retention of 
the original nationality should be facilitated explicitly for those recognized refugees 
who naturalize, while the reverse is true for those who reacquire their original 
nationality. It should be acknowledged that forced migrants can have a legitimate 
interest in the reacquisition of their original nationality, which could also further 
enhance circular mobility and return migration.  
10. CONCLUSION 
Putting all the pieces together, a picture of the Sri Lankan dual citizenship certificate 
emerges as an additional, conditional and commodified nationality status. Thereby, 
the Sri Lankan dual citizenship certificate is a far throw from traditional notions 
of nationality as an all-encompassing, exclusive allegiance. The dual status of its 
holders is not merely condoned, but it is embraced as a beneficial asset in the 
interest of Sri Lanka. Their dual statuses are juxtaposed as, on the one hand, a 
626  Topal, U., Staatsangehörigkeitsverlust und Mehrstaatigkeit, München: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2010, p. 88 ff.
627  Temporary application instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding the nationality law. Original title: Vorläufi-
ge Anwendungshinweise des Bundesministeriums des Innern zum Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG). 
628  Hailbronner, K., Commentary on Art. 25, para. 43a, in: Hailbronner, K. et al., Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, München: C.H. 




Sri Lankan ‘homeland nationality’ evokes an emotional attachment and, on the 
other hand, an ‘instrumental nationality’ is required in order to navigate through 
their lives. Since the dual citizenship certificate is an exceptional status, it can be 
granted to a selective group on the basis of (mostly) economic criteria. Although 
Sri Lanka has a tradition of differentiated nationality statuses, the dual citizenship 
certificate nevertheless breaks with convention, granting nationality is traditionally 
predominantly based on either birth or residence. 
Considering Sri Lanka’s troubled past and the country’s enduring difficulties, it 
is understandable that the country’s outreach to its diaspora remains partial and 
selective. Although the high application rates demonstrate the popularity of the dual 
citizenship certificate, it has also been shown in this Chapter that the conditional 
and limited nature of the dual citizenship certificate results in challenges regarding 
family remigration and could potentially result in the arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality. While the dual nationality policy clearly serves Sri Lanka’s national 
interest, less attention has been paid to the emigrants’ interests. An unconditional 
status, free of financial or educational hurdles, would not only enable a far greater 
group of emigrants to reacquire or retain their Sri Lankan nationality, but it would 
also lower the barrier for the acquisition of nationality for these emigrants in their 
new home countries. The consideration to gradually open up Sri Lanka’s dual 
nationality policies can therefore be encouraged. 
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The brief study of the German-Sri Lankan citizenship constellation demonstrates 
how poorly aligned nationality laws in a destination- and origin country can result in 
ambiguities and barriers. It becomes particularly clear that German nationality law 
creates di culties if (former) Sri Lankan refugees wish to reacquire their original 
nationality; even though the retention of the original nationality is facilitated in the 
naturalization procedure, this is not the case for those who wish to reacquire their 
original nationality at a later stage. This also indicates that there should be 
more awareness for the existence of reacquisition routes similar to the Sri Lankan 
route, and their profound importance for those who wish to make use of them.

Dual Nationality in Spain and 
the Spanish Diaspora: 




This Chapter will examine the attitudes of Spain towards its diaspora and, more 
specifically, its (re)incorporation by means of the Spanish Law of Historical 
Memory. Spanish emigration has taken place in a delicate historical context. 
Although Spanish emigration has always been partially economic in nature, 
the country has also witnessed the exile of a significant number of Spaniards, 
particularly as a consequence of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the 
subsequent 36-year Franco regime. The conflict between, on one side, liberal allies 
of the Spanish Second Republic (commonly referred to as ‘Republicans’) and 
adjacent left-leaning groups, and, on the other side, the conservative Nationalist 
faction that led to a staggering number of casualties also displaced hundreds of 
thousands of Spaniards.629 Moreover, the victory of the Nationalist faction and 
the post-war establishment of the Franco regime impeded the return for several 
decades to come of those with opposing political views.  
After the Spanish democratic transition in 1975, the official stance of the Spanish 
State towards those who had exiled from Spain remained ambiguous for a long 
time. However, the adoption of Law 52/2007 or ‘Law of Historical Memory’ 
constituted a turning point in this regard. This Chapter will focus in particular on 
how Spanish exiled persons and their descendants could make use of an option 
right to (re)acquire Spanish nationality under the Law of Historical Memory. This 
case study reveals how a State can remain related to its diaspora, even after an 
extensive period of time. 
Firstly, this Chapter will aim to map the Spanish diaspora and provide a historical 
overview of Spanish emigration movements, with a particular focus on exile during 
the Civil War period as well as during its aftermath. Secondly, the historical context 
of the Law of Historical Memory will be elucidated, in particular how Spain has 
attempted to come to terms with its past after the country’s democratic transition 
and what role the Law of Historical Memory has played in this regard. Thirdly, 
the nationality provisions of the Law of Historical Memory will be discussed and 
will also be positioned within the framework of Spanish nationality law in general. 
Lastly, the practical outcomes of these provisions will be discussed, particularly in 
the context of Cuba, where the majority of all applications have originated. 
629  Beevor, A., The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, New York: Penguin Books, 2006; Payne, S., The Spanish 
Civil War, the Soviet Union, and communism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Salvadó, F., The Spanish Civil War: 




2. MAPPING THE SPANISH DIASPORA
Spain has been an emigration State for a major part of its history, which was partially 
driven by economic incentives, but also by forced migratory movements.630 This 
was already the case in the 19th century, when the restauration of absolutist rule 
triggered waves of forced emigration, in particular to France and – at a later stage 
– to other mostly European destinations.631 Historically, economic emigration had 
been colonial in nature, with South American territories as the main destination, but 
these movements decreased after these territories gained independence.632 However, 
by the end of the 19th century, the economic emigration of Spanish labourers to the 
independent South American States surged, reaching a peak in 1912 with 240,000 
departures within a single year.633 These emigrants mainly came from rural areas in 
Galicia, Asturias, and the Canary Islands and mostly had Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
and Uruguay as their destinations.634 Spanish emigration to South America was 
driven by the steep demand for agricultural workers in South American countries, 
on the one hand, and the economic decline in the Spanish agricultural sector, on 
the other hand.635 Although the size and impact of these emigration movements 
was substantial, it should be taken into account that these movements were not 
necessarily linear, as a share of emigrants eventually returned to Spain.636 
Although the forced emigration of repressed groups had already occurred before 
the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931, the number of forced 
migratory movements significantly increased during the course of the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-1939).637 The number of those who exiled from Spain peaked 
at the end of the Civil War in 1939, not only as deprived Spaniards fled the dire 
conditions in their home country, but also as republicans, socialists, anarchists, and 
others who opposed the conquering nationalist forces left the Spanish territories in 
large numbers.638 It is estimated that approximately 450,000 people left Spain in 
that year, the abundant majority of which fled to France and were forced to reside 
630  Guia, A., “Migrations”, in: Shubert, A. and Álvarez Junco, J. (eds.), The History of Modern Spain: Chronologies, Themes, In-
dividuals, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 292. 
631  Ibid, p. 293. 
632  Altman, I., “Spanish migration to the Americas”, in: Cohen R. (eds.), The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 28 ff. 
633  Guia, A., “Migrations”, in: Shubert, A. and Álvarez Junco, J., (eds.), The History of Modern Spain: Chronologies, Themes, In-
dividuals, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 298.
634  Bover, O., Velilla, P., Migration in Spain: Historical Background and Current Trends, IZA Discussion Papers No. 88, Bonn: 
Institute for the Study of Labor, 1999, p. 6; Sánchez-Alonso, B., “Those Who Left and Those Who Stayed behind: Explaining 
Emigration from the Regions”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2000, pp. 730-755. 
635  Ibid. 
636  Ibid, p. 5. 
637  Guia, A., “Migrations”, in: Shubert, A. and Álvarez Junco, J. (eds.), The History of Modern Spain: Chronologies, Themes, In-
dividuals, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 293 ff. 
638  Rickett, R., Refugees of the Spanish Civil War and those they left behind: personal testimonies of departure, separation 
and return since 1936, University of Manchester (PhD dissertation), 2014, p. 49 ff. 
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in refugee camps in their destination country.639 In the five years that followed, an 
additional 160,000 people left Spain.640 In addition to France and other European 
States, other prominent destinations were the Americas (in particular Mexico) 
and Africa (particularly Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia).641 Due to the unreceptive 
attitude of the French State and the arduous living conditions of Spanish refugees 
in France, an estimated 300,000 refugees ultimately left France.642 A majority 
returned to Spain, in particular those whose exile from Spain was not (anymore) 
politically motivated.643 A share of the remaining refugees eventually re-emigrated 
mainly to South American States with the support of the French State, Republican 
civil organizations as well as some of the South American receiving States.644 
These movements of exile continued well into the 1960s and 1970s, albeit on a 
much smaller scale, as people sought refuge from the repressive Franco regime.645 
Furthermore, in the same period of time, labour migration mainly to other European 
countries also increased rapidly.646 
In total, 7,142,239 persons emigrated from Spain between 1886 and 1995. 
Emigration peaked between 1886 and 1936 with a total of 4,574,217 emigrants, 
the abundant majority of which emigrated to the Americas. Emigration increased 
again in the post-war period to 2,171,306 between 1946 and 1975, after which 
the figures decreased once more. During that period of time, Europe increasingly 
replaced the Americas as the destination of choice.647 An important addition is that, 
in the post-war period, the level of return migration decreased significantly, which 
entailed that permanent emigration became more common.648
It can be concluded that Spanish emigration is historically diverse in nature and 
that economic migratory movements alternated with forced migratory movements. 
Moreover, these phenomena occasionally occurred simultaneously and became 
639  Guia, A., “Migrations”, in: Shubert, A. and Álvarez Junco, J. (eds.), The History of Modern Spain: Chronologies, Themes, In-
dividuals, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 294. 
640  Ibid. 
641  Ibid. 
642  Dreyfus-Armand, G., “From exodus to exile: The diversity of returns and the Spanish Civil War refugees”, in: Soo, S. and 
Gemie, S. (eds.), Coming Home? Conlict and return migration in the aftermath of Europe’s twentieth century civil wars, Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 44. 
643  Ibid. 
644  Soo, S., The Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1939-2009, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2013, p. 99. 
645  Guia, A., “Migrations”, in: Shubert, A. and Álvarez Junco, J. (eds.), The History of Modern Spain: Chronologies, Themes, In-
dividuals, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 295. 
646  Bover, O. and Velilla, P., Migration in Spain: Historical Background and Current Trends, IZA Discussion Papers No. 88, 
Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, 1999, p. 7. 
647  Ministry of Labour, Migration and Social Security, Anuario de migraciones, 1886-1995, as reproduced in: Martín-Pérez, 
A. and Moreno-Fuentes, F. “Migration and Citizenship Law in Spain: Path-dependency and Policy Change in a Recent Country 
of Immigration”, International Migration Review, Vol. 46 No.3, 2012, p. 635. 
648  Fernández Vargas, V. “Análisis cuantitativo”, in: Vives, P., Vega, P. and Oyamburu, J. (eds.), Historia general de la emigración 




3. SPANISH NATIONALITY LAW AND THE 
SPANISH DIASPORA
In order to elucidate the significance of the nationality provisions that were 
incorporated in order to reach out to the Spanish diaspora, it is necessary to make a 
few introductory remarks on Spanish nationality law and position these provisions 
within the existing legal framework.  This entails that certain clauses which are of 
relevance for the Spanish emigrant population must be discussed. It must be noted 
that this section does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the historical 
development of Spanish nationality law, as there are numerous other scholarly 
works that provide a meticulous account on this subject.649  
4. SPANISH NATIONALITY LAW 
Spanish nationality can be divided in two subcategories, namely ‘nationality 
by origin’ (nacionalidad originaria) and ‘derivate nationality’ (nacionalidad 
derivativa).650 Nationality of origin is, in principle, reserved for those who acquired 
Spanish nationality at birth, while derivate nationality in principle refers to the 
non-automatic acquisition of Spanish nationality.651 The most important difference 
is that nationals of origin are better protected against the loss of Spanish nationality 
on the basis of Art. 11 par. 2 of the Spanish Constitution.
Spanish nationality can be acquired iure sanguinis if the mother and/or the father of 
the new-born child is a Spanish national at the moment of birth (Art. 17 Civil Code). 
This provision (ius sanguinis a patre and ius sanguinis a matre) can be perceived as 
the traditional cornerstone of Spanish nationality law, as a similar provision was 
already enshrined in the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.652 This provision could be 
649  See: Rubio Marín, R. et al., “Country report on citizenship law: Spain”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domen-
ico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2015; Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: a study on changing norms 
in public and private international law and in the municipal laws of four EU Member States, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2012, p. 281 ff; De Groot, G.R., Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel : eine rechtsvergleichende Studie uber Erwerbs- und Verlustgründe 
der Staatsangehörigkeit, The Hague: Asser Institute, 1988, p. 178 ff; Carrascosa González, J., Derecho español de la nacionalidad: es-
tudio práctico, Albolote: Editorial Comares, 2011; Fernández Rojas, J., Derecho español de la nacionalidad, Madrid: Editorial Tec-
nos, 1987. 
650  Rubio Marín, R. et al., “Country report on citizenship law: Spain”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di 
Fiesole: European University Institute, 2015, p. 20 ff. 
651  Ibid. 
652  Art. 17 Civil Code of 1889. See: Royal Decree of 24 July 1889 on the publication of the Civil Code, Boletín Oficial del Es-
tado, No. 206, 25 July 1889.
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intertwined as well.
perceived as an early example of a ‘diaspora policy’, as it enabled emigrants and 
their descendants to remain connected to Spain to a certain extent. However, at 
that time, the scope of the provision was mitigated by the fact a Spanish woman 
would automatically lose her nationality if she acquired another nationality through 
marriage.653 This restriction was lifted between 1931 and 1939, but it returned 
in the Francoist era in 1954 and remained in place until 1975.654 Therefore, a 
great number of female emigrants of Spanish origin were not able to transfer their 
nationality to their offspring. Furthermore, the automatic transfer of nationality 
iure sanguinis was limited by a mandatory registration procedure.655 This became 
particularly problematic during the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Franco 
regime. As many Spanish exiles did not wish to establish contacts with the Franco 
regime, they did not fulfil the mandatory registration requirement and therefore 
they could not maintain Spanish nationality or transfer it to their children.656 
Another hurdle was that Spain has always had a relatively restrictive stance towards 
dual nationality, which meant that those who acquired the nationality of their new 
country of residence lost their Spanish nationality. This attitude towards dual 
nationality was originally enshrined in Art. 20 of the 1889 Civil Code and would 
remain the principal Spanish stance on the matter for the years to come. 
Despite the abovementioned limitations, Spain has maintained a relatively inclusive 
attitude towards its emigrant population. Spain attempted to remain connected to 
the Spanish inhabitants of the newly independent South American States. For that 
reason, the peace treaties that Spain concluded with its former colonial territories 
during the course of the 19th century included a provision that provided that the 
first generation of Spanish emigrants could retain their Spanish nationality and 
simultaneously hold the nationality of the new State.657 A further allowance came 
about during the era of the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939), when the Spanish 
ambition arose to initiate a further rapprochement with other ‘hispanic nations’.658 
In an – albeit never implemented – provision of the Republican Constitution of 
1931, it was stated that Spaniards who naturalized in a Latin American State or in 
Portugal would, by exception, not lose their Spanish nationality and therefore they 
653  Art. 22 Civil Code of 1889. See: Royal Decree of 24 July 1889 on the publication of the Civil Code, Boletín Oficial del Es-
tado, No. 206, 25 July 1889.
654  Rubio Marín, R. et al., “Country report on citizenship law: Spain”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di 
Fiesole: European University Institute, 2015, p. 7 ff. 
655  Martín Pérez, A. and Moreno Fuentes, F. J., “Dealing with Loopholes in National and EU Citizenship: Spanish Nationali-
ty in the Case of Western Sahara”, in: Guild, E., Rotaeche, C. G. and Kostakopoulou, D. (eds.), The reconceptualization of Europe-
an Union citizenship, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, p. 156. 
656  Ibid. 
657  Moreno Fuentes, F., “Migration and Spanish Nationality Law”, in: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds.), Towards a European Na-
tionality: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU, New York: Palgrave, 2014, p. 120.
658  Pike, F. Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America, Notre Dame: 




would retain both nationalities.659 
At a later stage, the idea of hispanic rapprochement or Hispanidad would become 
a pillar of the extraterritorial ambitions of the Franco regime.660 This gave rise to 
a Falangist ideal to create a Hispanic Community of Nations, based on traditional 
Spanish values, Roman-Catholicism and ‘hispanic unity’.661 A 1954 reform of 
Spanish nationality law can be regarded as a first step in this regard, as it enabled 
the conclusion of dual nationality treaties with South American countries and the 
Philippines. The main purpose of this project was to create closer ties with Latin 
American states by remaining connected to Spanish emigrant populations.662 
Although the project of Hispanidad could initially be perceived as neo-imperial in 
nature, the regime was soon forced to take a more pragmatic stance in this regard 
due to its own isolation.663
As stated earlier, the legal roots of the dual nationality treaties can be traced back 
to a 1954 amendment of the Spanish Civil Code.664 The amendment stated that 
the acquisition of a Latin American or the Philippine nationality would not lead 
to the loss of Spanish nationality if the prevention of the loss was expressly agreed 
upon by the States involved. Between 1958 and 1970, dual nationality treaties 
were concluded  and came into force with Chile (ratified by Spain on 28 October 
1958), Peru (15 December 1959), Paraguay (15 December 1959), Nicaragua (25 
January 1962), Guatemala (25 January 1962), Bolivia (25 January 1962), Ecuador 
(4 March 1964), Costa Rica (21 January 1965), Honduras (23 February 1967), 
Dominican Republic (16 December 1968) and Argentina (2 February 1970).665 
The Spanish-Colombian dual nationality treaty is the only treaty that was ratified 
at a later date after the Spanish democratic transition, namely on 29 November 
659  Art. 24 Constitution of the Second Spanish Republic of 1931. See also: Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: 
a study on changing norms in public and private international law and in the municipal laws of four EU member states, Leiden: Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 284 ff. 
660  Escudero, M., “Hispanist democratic thought versus Hispanist thought of the Franco era: A comparative analysis”, Pérez 
de Mendiola, M., Bridging the atlantic: Toward a reassessment of iberian and latin american cultural ties, New York: State Universi-
ty of New York 1996, p. 172 ff. 
661  See Olmo, R., “Spain between Latin America and Europe: a Geopolitical overview”, Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos 
Españoles, Vol., No. 21, 1995, p. 30; Diffie, B. “The ideology of hispanidad”, Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
1943, p. 458; Escudero, M. “Hispanist democratic thought versus Hispanist thought of the Franco era: A comparative analysis”, 
in: De Mendiola, M. (ed.) Bridging the Atlantic: toward a reassessment of Iberian and Latin American cultural ties, New York: State 
University of New York, 1996, p. 171.
662  Olmo, R. “Spain between Latin America and Europe: a Geopolitical overview”, Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos Es-
pañoles, Vol., No. 21, 1995. 
663  Ibid. 
664  Law of 15 July 1954 on the reform of the First Title of the First Book of the Civil Code, named “on the Spanish and the 
foreigners”, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 197, 16 July 1954, pp. 4831-4834. Original title: Ley de 15 de julio de 1954 por la que 
se reforma el Titulo Primero del Libro Primero del Código Civil, denominado “De los españoles y extranjeros”. 
665  Marin Lopez, A., La doble nacionaliad en los tratados suscritos por España con las republicas Americanas, Anuario es-
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1980.666 Except for the Guatemalan treaty,667 the other treaties do not facilitate 
the acquisition of nationality, as such, but instead they facilitate the concurrent 
retention of two nationalities. In general, the treaties determine that, upon the 
acquisition of the nationality of the other contracting state, the original nationality 
will not be lost. Furthermore, if one had already lost his original nationality upon 
acquisition in the past, the original nationality could be reacquired.668 
An important limitation of the treaties is that they are only applicable to ‘nationals 
of origin’, which entails that, in principle, only nationals by birth can rely on the 
dual nationality treaties. Furthermore, the treaties stipulate that only one of the two 
nationalities is ‘active’, namely the nationality of the state where one resides. The 
other nationality remains ‘dormant’ until one takes up residency in the other state. 
The dual national possesses the nationality of two states, but he is only recognized 
as a national in one of those States. As a consequence, that dual national cannot 
receive identity documents from the other State and will potentially face travel- 
and settlement restrictions when trying to take up residence in the other State.669 
Therefore, these individuals were unable to exchange their ‘active’ nationality by 
taking up residence in the other State. 
In spite of this relatively inclusive approach, a share of the Spanish emigrants was 
unable to retain its Spanish nationality or unable to transfer nationality to their 
offspring. After the democratic transition of Spain, the Spanish legislator sought to 
provide a pathway to Spanish nationality for these individuals of Spanish descent. 
In 1990, a transitory provision was introduced during a period of three years that 
allowed individuals to opt for Spanish nationality if either their mother or father 
was a former Spanish ‘national by origin’ and was born in Spain.670 Those who 
made use of this option right were granted ‘derivate nationality’ status.
Although the provision seems to set a low threshold, it was faced with a number of 
restrictions. First, the applicant had to fulfil all of the regular requirements enshrined 
in Art. 23 of the Civil Code for those who wish to acquire Spanish nationality by 
option or naturalization. This entailed that the applicant was obliged to take the 
666  Ibid. 
667  The Nationality Convention between Spain and Guatemala originally provided the option to obtain nationality by estab-
lishing domicile in the other state (art. 1) and guaranteed visa free travel (art. 8). The first additional Protocol (1996) and second 
Additional Protocol (2001) to the Convention put a halt to these privileges. See: Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: 
a study on changing norms in public and private international law and in the municipal laws of four EU member states, Leiden: Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 297.
668  Ibid., p. 289. 
669  Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: a study on changing norms in public and private international law and in the 
municipal laws of four EU member states, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 294.




oath of allegiance, to declare the renunciation of any former nationality (unless 
they were covered by one of the exception clauses) and to register the acquisition 
of nationality in the Spanish Civil Registry. Secondly, it was initially only possible 
to opt for Spanish nationality for those who were already residing in Spain. This 
residence requirement could only be waived in individual cases by decision of the 
Government.671 However, this hurdle was resolved in 1995, when this residence 
requirement was abolished.672 It was argued that this requirement had been waived 
in almost all cases and, therefore, it was considered appropriate to abolish it in its 
entirety.673 
Secondly, it was not immediately clear what was meant with the phrase ‘birth in 
Spain’. It was particularly unclear whether birth in Spanish overseas territories 
could be considered as ‘birth in Spain’. To make matters more complex, the 
option right in Art. 20.1b CC refers to ‘birth in Spain’ (nacido en España), while 
another provision (relating to preferential naturalization) refers to ‘birth in Spanish 
territory’ (nacido en territorio Español). This raises the additional question whether 
there is a difference between these two terms. The exact meaning of the term ‘birth 
in Spanish territory’ was established in a judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain 
(Tribunal Supremo), which addressed the question whether birth in the Spanish 
colony of the Western Sahara should be considered as birth in ‘Spanish territory’. 
The Court considered that the scope of the term ‘Spanish territory’ referred to 
all territories that fell under the authority of the Spanish State and were subjected 
to its laws. For that reason, a person who was born in the Western Sahara under 
Spanish colonial rule was considered to be born in Spanish territory.674 The 
question remained whether ‘birth in Spanish territory’ can be equated with ‘birth 
in Spain’, which is the term used in the option right provision. In a 2010 Resolution 
of the General Directorate of Registries and Notaries, the question was brought 
forward whether a father born in Cuba before its independence in 1898 could be 
considered to be ‘born in Spain’. By analogy to the Supreme Court case referred 
to above, it was ruled that the term ‘birth in Spain’ could indeed also refer to 
territories outside of metropolitan Spain.675 However, it was also decided that, in 
this particular case, further proof of the retention of Spanish nationality by the 
father after 1898 was required.676
671  Third Transitory Provision jo. Art. 26 par. 1 sub a Law 18/1990. 
672  Law 29/1995, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 264, 4 November 1995, p. 32072. 
673  Explanatory Memorandum, Law 29/1995, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 264, 4 November 1995, p. 32072.  
674  Spanish Supreme Court Judgment No. 6266/1995 of 7 November 1999. 
675  Resolution of 5 October 2010, General Directorate of Registries and Notaries, Resolutions of the General Directorate of 
Registries and Notaries (Civil Registry), BDI, 27 July 2011, pp. 206-2010. 
676  Ibid. 
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Initially, this option right was only in place for a period of three years from the date 
the provision went into force, or from 7 January 1991 to 7 January 1994. However, 
one month before this date, the timeframe was extended to 7 January 1996 and was 
subsequently extended again to 7 January 1997.677 As these temporary solutions 
were considered insufficient, a permanent solution was sought. For that reason, 
it was decided in 2002 to amend Art. 20 of the Civil Code in order to turn this 
temporary provision into an option right without any time restriction.678 
5. DUAL NATIONALITY IN SPAIN 
After Spain’s democratic transition, the dual nationality policy expressed in the dual 
nationality treaties also became part of Spanish nationality law on the national level. 
Through Art. 23 par. 4 of Law 51/1982, it was established that the acquisition of 
the nationality of an Ibero-American country, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial 
Guinea, or Portugal would no longer lead to the loss of Spanish nationality, 
regardless of whether a dual nationality treaty between Spain and that particular 
State was in place or not. Through Art. 23 of Law 18/1990, the nationals of the 
abovementioned States were also exempted from the renunciation requirement if 
they acquired Spanish nationality. From that moment on, there were two different 
routes in place to retain dual nationality status; the abovementioned dual nationality 
treaties (vía convencional) as well as the provisions of the Spanish nationality law 
(vía legal).679 The main difference between these two options was that, those who 
relied on a dual nationality treaty had one active and one dormant nationality, 
while those who relied on the provisions of Spanish nationality obtained two active 
nationalities. However, from 1996 onwards, this limitation was removed by the 
conclusion of additional protocols to the treaties. Except for Chile, such protocols 
were concluded with all States that had concluded a dual nationality treaty.680 
There are two categories of such protocols. The first category of protocols enables 
dual nationals to withdraw from the application of the treaty. As a consequence, 
from that moment on, they were covered by the more advantageous novel provisions 
enshrined in Spanish nationality law. The second category of protocols enables one 
to obtain identity documents from the other State and thereby refer to ‘active’ 
677  Law 15/1993 of 23 December 1993 and First Transitory Provision of Law 29/1995 of 2 November 1995. 
678  Law 36/2002 of 8 October 2002. 
679  Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: a study on changing norms in public and private international law and in the 
municipal laws of four EU member states, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 204. 




nationalities.681 The treaties, in conjunction with the additional protocols, made it 
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681  Vonk, O., Dual nationality in the European Union: a study on changing norms in public and private international law and in the 
municipal laws of four EU member states, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 296. 
682  Art. 29 par. 2 Political Constitution of 1982. 
683  Law 52/2007, of 26 December, to recognise and broaden rights and to establish measures in favour of those who suffered 
persecution or violence during the Civil War and the Dictatorship, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 310, 27 December 2007. Origi-
nal title: Ley 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padeci-
eron persecución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura. 
684  See Explanatory Memorandum of Law 52/2007. Original text: Es la hora, así, de que la democracia española y las genera-
ciones vivas que hoy disfrutan de ella honren y recuperen para siempre a todos los que directamente padecieron las injusticias y agravios 
producidos, por unos u otros motivos políticos o ideológicos o de creencias religiosas, en aquellos dolorosos períodos de nuestra historia. 
685  The ideology of the Franco regime is referred to as ‘Falangism’ and mainly consists of a combination of fascist- and con-
servative Catholic elements. See also: Boyd, Carolyn P., Historia patria: politics, history, and national identity in Spain, 1875-1975, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 234. 
686  See: Lopez, F. “Bourgeois State and the Rise of Social Democracy in Spain”, in: Chilcote, R. et al., Transitions from Dicta-
torship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece, New York: Routledge, 1990. 
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In this day and age, the practical relevance of the dual nationality treaties dwindled,
as the overview provided in the second Chapter of this dissertation shows that
the States with which Spain has concluded dual nationality treaties permit dual
nationality. The only State where the acquisition of another nationality still leads
to the loss of the original nationality is Honduras, but the scope of this provision
is limited to Honduran nationals by naturalization. 682 Therefore, the nationality
treaties can best be perceived as a remnant of the past.
After its transition to democracy in 1975, Spain has undergone a historical process
of reconciliation, in which the introduction of the Law of Historical Memory can be
seen as a landmark step.The Law of Historical Memory 683 was introduced in 2007
and aims to honour and compensate “those who directly su ered the injustices and
grievances produced by some or other political or ideological motives or religious
beliefs in that painful period of our history”. 684 This section will outlined the
historical context in which the Law of Historical Memory came into being.
6.1 First stage: the ‘pact of forgetting’
On 20 November 1975, General Francisco Franco passed away, which brought 
an end to his Falangist 685 regime and his appointed successor, King Juan Carlos 
I of Spain, supported a transition to democracy. 686 Although this set out a clear 
direction for the Spain’s future, it remained uncertain how the country should 
come to terms with its past. Spain found itself in a peculiar situation for a number 
of reasons. First, its former head of State had not been deposed, but was instead
succeeded by the person he had appointed, who nevertheless had set out a 
path to political change. Therefore, there was no clear ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ side 
during the time of the transition that could establish a national narrative about 
the country’s past and, instead, a focus on mutual consensus arose.687 Secondly, 
a further complicating factor was the context of the Spanish Civil War. As the 
Nationalist side had emerged as the victor of the Civil War, the wartime period had 
traditionally been commemorated from a Nationalist perspective. This was made 
visible by the numerous memorial sites that glorified the Nationalist victory, of 
which the so-called ‘Valley of the Fallen’ is arguably the most prominent example. 
Once the rule of the Franco regime had ended, revisiting the legacy of the Franco 
regime also entailed revisiting the Nationalist narrative on the Civil War.688 Thirdly, 
the Spanish political and societal context after 1975 left little room for actions 
against members of the former regime. After Franco’s death, a climate of fear 
had arisen, as the presence of an extreme right as well as an extreme left which 
denounced a democratic transition could lead to further instability or a return to 
Spain’s violent past.689 Therefore, Spanish politics at the time was characterized 
by sheer risk-averseness and attempts to unravel the country’s dark past were 
therefore considered to be inappropriate at that time.690 Furthermore, the faction 
of ‘Francoist reformists’ remained a political force that could not be ignored, which 
made political collaboration with this group a necessity.691 
             
            
            
      
               
           
        
              
       
  
        
687  Edles, L., Symbol and ritual in the new Spain: The transition to democracy after Franco, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, p. 41 ff. 
688  Jimeno, R., Amnesties, Pardons and Transitional Justice: Spain’s Pact of Forgetting, New York: Routledge, 2018, p. 50. 
689  Aguilar, P., “Spain”, in: Barahona de Brito, A. (ed.), The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 96. 
690  Ibid. 
691  Ibid.
692  Magone, J., “The role of the EEC in the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek transitions”, in: Muro, D. and Alonso, G. (eds.), 
The politics and memory of democratic transition: The Spanish model, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 218. 
693  Humphrey, M., “Law, Memory and Amnesty in Spain”, Macquarie Law Journal, Vol. 13, 2014, p. 32. 




In order to preserve the country’s stability, it was decided to largely disregard the 
sensitive issues of the past. Instead, the Spanish political left and political right 
are said to have reached an unwritten agreement which is commonly referred to 
as the ‘pact of forgetting’ (pacto del olvido). 692 This agreement meant that events 
that took place during the Civil War and the Franco reign would not be a matter 
of discussion, while Spanish political forces would focus on the country’s future 
development instead. In the so-called ‘preconstitutional period’ (1975-1978), this 
compromise led to the adoption of the amnesty law of 1976.The amnesty law took 
‘universal victimhood’ as a starting point. 693 Therefore, the law granted amnesty for
“all acts of political intent” (todos los actos de intencionalidad política) committed 
before 15 December 1976. 694 The amnesty law was later supplemented by two
Royal Decrees, which granted an (albeit selective) entitlement to compensation 
for those who had suffered injuries as well as pension payments to the victims as 
well as their relatives.695 The tacit conclusion of the pact of forgetting culminated 
in the adoption of the new Spanish Constitution of 1978, which affirmed Spain’s 
democratic transition. In the light of the subject of this Chapter, it should be 
mentioned that the 1978 Constitution already granted fundamental social rights 
to the Spanish emigrant population. In Article 42 of the Constitution, it was stated 
that “The State shall be especially concerned with safeguarding the economic and 





















This increased attention culminated in political steps in 2002, when the Spanish 
parliament unanimously adopted a declaration that condemned the Franco regime 
695  Royal Decree of 5 March 1976 and Royal Decree of 6 November 1978. 
696  Encarnación, O., “Pinochet’s revenge: Spain revisits its Civil War”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 24 No. 4, 2007, pp. 39-
50.
697  An oftenmentioned example is the Spanish radio program Hoy por Hoy, which had collected people’s memories of the 
dictatorship and the Civil War and its aftermath. The biographical stories were aired in 2001 and 2002 and reached a considera-
ble audience of more than 2.5 million listeners. See also: Richards, M., After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain 
since 1936, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
698  Boyd, C., “The politics of history and memory in democratic Spain”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science Vol. 617 No. 1, 2008, p. 143 ff.
699  Ibid. 
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6.2 Second stage: from forgetting to remembering
The status quo as outlined above remained unchallenged for a lengthy period 
of time, as there was a common perception that there was a need for a future- 
oriented approach. This began to change around 1998, sparked by the attention
around the indictment of the Chilean ruler Pinochet for human rights violations. 696
Comparisons were made between the acts committed by the Pinochet regime and
those of the Franco regime, which raised the question why the Pinochet regime was
held accountable for its actions while the actions of the Franco regime had seemingly
– at least in the political arena – fallen into oblivion. This led to an increasing
interest, reflected by literary publications and by the interest of the Spanish media,
in the legacy of the dictatorship and the Civil War. 697 Next to that, this increasing
interest was further fuelled by the increased debates about the excavation of the
remains of Civil War victims. 698 During and after the Civil War, a large number
of summary executions had been carried out.The victims were mainly those who
were suspected to have sympathized with the Republican front.Their remains were
deposed in anonymous mass graves, leaving bereaved family members unaware of
their location. This led to descendants wishing to excavate such mass graves and
establish the identities of the victims. 699
and recognized the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship.700 This declaration 
was firstly future oriented, as it stated that it should, under no circumstances, be 
acceptable “to use violence in order to impose […] political convictions and establish 
totalitarian regimes” and that “the spirit of concord and reconciliation” that had 
been in place since the 1978 Constitution should be continued. Furthermore, 
the declaration was a call for action, as it stated that there was a need for “moral 
recognition” of the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship. Therefore, it called 
for “a comprehensive policy of recognition and economic and social protection 
of exiles from the Civil War as well as the War Children”, including an extension 
of Spanish nationality law in order to include these individuals as well as their 
descendants. 
The Spanish political situation at that particular time must also be taken into 
account. In 2004, the moderate left-wing PSOE had won Spanish parliamentary 
elections. The party found itself in a challenging position, as it had not gained an 
absolute majority in parliamentary seats and was in need of the support of other 
left-wing fractions as well as nationalist701 parties. Next to that, the PSOE faced 
fierce opposition from the second-largest party, the right-wing PP (Partido Popular). 
Therefore, the PSOE had the difficult task to cater to its own constituencies as well 
as the more radical left-wing parties and the nationalists, while at the same time 
strongly opposing the PP. The Law of Historical Memory could combine these 
aims satisfactorily.702 
In October 2004, the Interministerial Commission for the Study of the Situation 
of the Victims of the Civil War and Francoism was established. This Commission 
would take two years to study which actions should be taken in relation to the Civil 
War victims and the Francoist legacy. In 2006, the head of the Commission, María 
Teresa Fernández de la Vega, presented the findings of the Commission to the 
Spanish Parliament. Next to that, she presented a draft bill named “Draft Bill for 
recognizing and extending rights and establishing measures for those who suffered 
from persecution or violence during the Civil War and the dictatorship”.703 The 
bill addressed a wide range of topics, including the recognition of the injustices the 
victims were subjected to and the illegality of the actions of the Francoist regime, 
700  Diaro de sesiones del congreso de los dipudatos, Plenary Session No. 625, 20 November 2002. 
701  There are several smaller Spanish political parties that aim to represent a particular Spanish region. These parties are 
commonly referred to as ‘nationalist’.  
702  Blakeley, G., “Politics as usual? The trials and tribulations of the Law of Historical Memory in Spain”, Entelequia Revista 
Interdisciplinar, Vol. 7, 2008, pp. 315-330.
703  Original title: Proyecto de Ley por la que se reconocen y amplía derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron 
persecución o violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura. See: Boletin Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congress of Deputies, Se-




provision of (additional) compensation for victims, support for excavation and the 
identification of deceased victims, the removal of Francoist symbols and monuments 
and granting nationality to members of the International Brigades. Fernández de 
la Vega presented the bill as a logical next step in the process of reconciliation. 
According to her, the 2002 parliamentary declaration was only a starting point for 
reconciliation, and it had to be complemented by governmental action.704 The bill 
faced strong opposition from two sides. On the one hand, the smaller left-wing 
parties claimed that the bill was not explicit enough in its condemnation of the 
Franco regime and the Nationalist war front and that it did not offer sufficient 
compensation to the victims. On the other hand, the PP claimed the bill constituted 
a breach with the reconciliation approach that Spain had adopted since the 
conclusion of the pact of forgetting and the adoption of the 1978 Constitution. The 
PP had envisaged the parliamentary declaration of 2002 as a closing step of the 
reconciliation process. Therefore, the bill was perceived by the PP as unnecessary, 
as it argued during the plenary debate on the bill that it would “tear open old 
wounds”.705 As could be expected, the PP urged for the bill to be revoked.706 In 
contrast, several smaller nationalist parties, as well as progressive parties, submitted 
their own alternative bills and – at a later stage – they also submitted a significant 
number of amendments. 
The original bill merely contained one clause that directly referred to Spanish 
nationality, namely granting Spanish nationality to the surviving members of the 
International Brigades without requiring them to renounce their other nationality. 
However, several amendments to the bill were proposed which would significantly 
extend the granting of Spanish nationality.707 These amendments were similar 
in scope, as they intended to provide a pathway to Spanish nationality for those 
who were exiled from Spain during the Civil War and the dictatorship. One of 
the amendments contained an extensive explanatory memorandum, which 
stated that those who were exiled from Spain, as well as their descendants, are 
victims of the Franco regime and that the bill does not adequately address the 
suffering of this group. It also explicitly refers to the fact that a share of the exiles 
had been stripped of their Spanish nationality, which can further explain why the 
amendment provided a clause for the (re)acquisition of Spanish nationality.708  The 
scope of some of these amendments is remarkably broad. For instance, one of these 
704  Diaro de Sesiones del Congreso de los diputados, Plenary Session No. 206, 14 December 2006, p. 11256. 
705  Diaro de Sesiones del Congreso de los diputados, Plenary Session No. 206, 14 December 2006, p. 11260. 
706  Ibid. 
707  Amendment No. 1, Amendment No. 130, Amendment No. 213 and Amendment No. 344, in: Boletín oficial de las cortes 
generales, Congress of Deputies, Series A, 7 November 2007, No. 99-20. 
708  Boletín oficial de las cortes generales, Congress of Deputies, Series A, 7 November 2007, No. 99-20, p. 48. 
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amendments proposed an option right which would enable the children, as well 
as the grandchildren of Spanish exiles, to acquire Spanish nationality through a 
simple declaration. This amendment also explicitly stated that these persons should 
be allowed to have dual nationality.709
As the PSOE was in need of political support from the parties that had criticized 
the bill, it was decided to take this criticism into account and revise the bill in its 
entirety. This revised bill contained an additional clause which established an option 
right for exiles and their descendants to acquire Spanish nationality. This bill was 
eventually adopted on 26 December 2007 and published in the government gazette 
a day later.710 The nationality provisions incorporated in the Law of Historical 
Memory will be studied in greater detail in the following section.  
7. THE NATIONALITY PROVISIONS OF THE 
LAW OF HISTORICAL MEMORY (LAW 52/2007)
A further step in this process was the introduction of Law 52/2007 or the Law of 
Historical Memory. The law contains two clauses that directly relate to Spanish 
nationality law. Firstly, the law contains a rather specific provision for granting 
Spanish nationality to the former members of the International Brigades during 
the Spanish Civil War, which will be further dealt with in detail in Section 3.3.3. 
Secondly, it contains two more substantive provisions that grant a right to opt 
for Spanish nationality to those whose (grand)mother or (grand)father was a 
former Spanish ‘national by origin’, provided that they fulfil certain additional 
requirements which will be explained further below.711 
There are several differences between these newly introduced option rights and 
the abovementioned option rights that were introduced in the early 1990s and 
2002. Firstly, this novel option right granted ‘nationality by origin’ status instead of 
‘derivative nationality’ status. Thereby, this option right granted a more privileged 
nationality status than the provisions that were introduced earlier. For that reason, 
it was considered necessary to compensate those who had opted for derivative 
nationality status in accordance with the earlier provisions. Therefore, this group 
709  Boletín oficial de las cortes generales, Congress of Deputies, Series A, 7 November 2007, No. 99-20, p. 152.
710  Ley 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de 
quienes padecieron per- secución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 310, 27 Decem-
ber 2017, pp. 53410-53416. 




was allowed to apply to change its nationality status from derivative nationality to 
nationality by origin. Secondly, contrary to the option rights introduced earlier, 
it did not require that the (grand)parent was born in Spain. Therefore, these new 
option rights had a much broader scope. Furthermore, it considerably reduced the 
burden of proof for applicants, as, even in cases in which a parent of the applicant 
was born in Spain, it could be difficult to deliver documents to prove this. Thirdly, 
those who made use of these option rights were exempted from the requirement to 
renounce the former nationality. Although the provisions do not provide an explicit 
exemption from the renunciation requirement, Cazorla González argues that this 
exception results from the fact that the option rights provides ‘nationality by origin’ 
status.712 This interpretation is confirmed by an Instruction of the Directorate 
General for Registers and Notaries, which addresses the provision discussed here. 
In the second preliminary article, it is stated that this group is exempted from the 
requirement to renounce their former nationality.713
Option right for children of Spaniards of origin 
The first paragraph of the Seventh Additional Provision of Law 52/2007 grants the 
right to opt for Spanish nationality to those whose mother or father was a former 
Spanish ‘national by origin’. The administrative requirements for this option 
right are relatively lenient; it is sufficient for the applicant to file an official birth 
certificate as well as an official birth certificate of the (former) Spanish parent.714 It 
should therefore be noted that the scope of the provision is much broader than (the 
descendants of) exiled Spanish persons alone. 
Option right for grandchildren of Spaniards of origin 
The Law of Historical Memory also contains a provision which grants an option 
right to those whose grandparent was a former Spanish national, in the case the 
grandparent had lost or renounced his or her Spanish nationality as a consequence 
of exile.715 This provision is more restricted, as it requires the applicant to prove 
that the loss or renunciation was caused by the grandparent’s exile from Spain 
during the Civil War or during the rule of the Franco regime. The ways in which 
the applicant can prove that this is the case are described in an Instruction of 
the Directorate General for Registers and Notaries.716 The departure of the 
712  Cazorla González, M., Adquisición de la nacionalidad por descendientes de españoles, Madrid: Editorial Reus, 2011, p. 26.  
713  Second Preliminary Article of Instruction of 4 November 2008. Original title: Instrucción de 4 de noviembre de 2008, de la 
Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado, sobre el derecho de opción a la nacionalidad española establecido en la disposición adi-
cional séptima de la Ley 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre. 
714  Art. 2 par. 2 of Instruction of 4 November 2008. 
715  Second paragraph of the Seventh Additional Provision of Law 52/2007. 
716  See Section V of Instruction of 4 November 2008. 
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grandparent from Spain can either be proven by official documents which confirm 
the departure or documents which confirm the arrival or residence in the host 
State. Furthermore, it must be proven that the grandparent fled or was exiled 
from Spain, as ‘ordinary’ or economic emigration is not considered sufficient. 
This ‘exile status’ can be proven by documents from the UNHCR or a national 
refugee office. Alternatively, it can be proven by documents from another ‘public 
or private institute’ which is ‘related to exile’. A third option is to submit proof that 
the grandparent is or was a recipient of a special pension regulation for Spanish 
exiles.717 An important exception is that those who left Spain between 18 July 1936 
and 31 December 1955 are assumed to have ‘exile status’. In those cases, there 
is therefore no need to provide such documentation. Next to these requirements 
relating to exile, the applicant is required to submit an official birth certificate as 
well as an official birth certificate of the grandparent. 
The nationality provisions of the Law of Historical Memory entered into force on 
28 December 2008. Initially, the provisions were in place for a period of two years. 
However, in 2010, it was decided to extend the timeframe with one additional year, 
due to the great number of applications received by certain Consulates and the 
difficulties these Consulates had to process all applications.718 
In 2011, another addition to the Law of Historical Memory was made. This 
addition was meant to be a solution for issues caused by the Spanish nationality law 
reform of 1954. As stated earlier, the 1954 reform had introduced a loss provision 
for women who married a non-Spanish husband. If these women acquired the 
nationality of their husband due to their marriage, they were set to lose Spanish 
nationality. Accordingly, the grandchildren of these women could not make use 
of the option right introduced by the Law of Historical Memory. The sixth Final 
Provision of Law 20/2011 therefore stated that the grandchildren of an exiled 
Spanish woman could opt for Spanish nationality even if their grandmother had 
lost Spanish nationality on the basis of the 1954 loss provision.719 It also stated that 
his provision would be in place for one year.
Option right for members of the International Brigades
The second nationality-related provision in the Law of Historical Memory addresses 
717  In 2005, Spain introduced the so-called ‘benefits for the children of the war’ (prestaciones para niños de la guerra). This en-
tails that the Spanish State provides (upon application) a pension to those who were displaced as a minor by the Spanish Civ-
il War between 18 July 1936 and 31 December 1939 and have lived for most of their lives outside of Spain. See: Law 3/2005, Bo-
letín Oficial del Estado, No. 68, 21 March 2005. 
718  Resolution, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 72, 17 March 2010, pp. 28399-28400. 




the nationality status of members of the International Brigades. This provision is 
much narrower in scope, but it is nevertheless of great symbolic importance. 
The International Brigades (Brigades Internacionales) were groups of (predominantly 
communist) non-Spanish volunteers who fought at the side of the Spanish Republic 
during the Civil War.720 More than 60 years after the commencement of the Civil 
War, it was decided to honour the surviving members of the International Brigades 
by granting them the opportunity to acquire Spanish nationality. According to 
the explanatory memorandum of Royal Decree 39/1996, it was decided to grant 
these volunteers the right to apply for Spanish nationality in order to acknowledge 
their “work for freedom and democracy” and show “the gratitude of the Spanish 
nation” towards them.721 The legal basis for this provision is Art. 21 par. 1 CC, 
which states that, in exceptional circumstances, Spanish nationality can be granted 
by Royal Decree (or, in other words, a decision by the Council of Ministers). In 
order to make use of this right, the individual must apply in person at a Spanish 
consulate or, in case he or she is already residing in Spain, at a municipality.722 The 
person to whom the application is made must then gather the ‘necessary evidence’ 
which proves the applicant has been a member of the International Brigades, 
although this requirement is not further specified.723 The application must then 
be forwarded to the Spanish General Directorate of Registries and Notaries. If 
approve-d, the individual will receive a so-called ‘naturalization certificate’ (carta de 
naturaleza). With this certificate, the individual can be granted Spanish nationality 
if the three further requirements of Art. 23 CC are fulfilled within a 180-day period 
from the day that the certificate was granted. Two of these conditions are relatively 
easy to fulfil, namely making an oath of allegiance and registering the nationality 
status in the Civil Registry, but the third condition constituted a severe restriction, 
as it required the individual to renounce the applicant’s former nationality. It goes 
without saying that this hurdle inhibited many potential applicants from making 
use of the provision. More than a decade later, this hurdle was removed by means 
of Art. 18 of the Law of Historical Memory. This Article stated that those who 
made use of the abovementioned right would be exempted from the requirement 
of Art. 23 CC to renounce their former nationality. 
720  Alpert, M., The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 
219 ff. 
721  Royal Decree 39/1996, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 56, 5 March 1996.
722  Art. 2 Royal Decree 39/1996.  
723  Art. 3 Royal Decree 39/1996. 
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8. THE LAW OF HISTORICAL MEMORY IN 
PRACTICE: THE CASE OF CUBA
As could have been expected, the provisions of the Law of Historical Memory 
were of considerable interest, in particular in the South American region. In total, 
479,318 applications were received.724 By July 2015, 311,268 applications had 
been approved, while 91,206 applications were still pending at that time.725 Around 
92% of the applicants applied for Spanish nationality on the basis of their parent’s 
Spanish origin, while 7% applied for Spanish nationality on the basis of their 
grandparent’s Spanish origin. The remaining 1% had already acquired derivative 
Spanish nationality status and now applied for Spanish nationality of origin status. 
The abundant majority of the applicants (more than 90%) came from the South 
American region, with around 40% of all applications (192,082) coming from one 
south-American country, namely Cuba.726 
Although the option right of the Law of Historical Memory has been popular 
across the South American continent, in none of these countries was the response 
as extensive as in Cuba. Reportedly, when the deadline of the application process 
was approaching, Cubans queued up for hours in front of the Spanish embassy in 
Havana in order to submit their applications for Spanish nationality in time.727 This 
raises the question how this interest from Cubans for the acquisition of Spanish 
nationality can be explained. Furthermore, it raises the question whether this 
acquisition of Spanish nationality was in accordance with Cuban nationality law 
or, more specifically, whether the acquisition of another nationality by a Cuban 
national could result in the loss of Cuban nationality. 
8.1 Potential drivers of Cuban interest in the acquisition of Spanish 
nationality 
The Cuban interest in Spanish nationality can be explained by a multitude of 
factors, namely economic and societal factors during the application timeframe, 
the emigration restrictions in place for Cuban nationals, increased opportunities 
for travel and emigration (including the United States), and increased future 
opportunities and certainty. 
724  Response of the Government to a Written Question, 684/7324, Senate, 27 February 2017. For statistical data provid-
ed at an earlier stage, see: Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congress of Deputies, Serie D, No. 173, 7 November 2012, p. 
173. 
725  Ibid. 
726  Ibid. 





First, the economic and societal circumstances in Cuba at the time the application 
process was opened (2008-2011) should be taken into account. For more than a 
decade, Cuba had been plagued with an economic crisis, which was set to worsen 
due to the outbreak of the global economic crisis as well as a lack of internal 
reforms.728 This was added to by an already low level of economic development and 
the impoverishment of its population. Cuban nationals had limited opportunities 
to overcome this situation due to the restrictions inherent to the Cuban planned 
economy. These issues exacerbated the willingness of Cubans to emigrate. However, 
there were significant barriers in place that impeded Cuban emigration plans. For 
decades, the Cuban State had mainly perceived emigration as a threat. In order 
to impede a dreaded potential mass exodus and ‘brain drain’, the Cuban State 
traditionally imposed emigration restrictions. These restrictions are based on Law 
No. 1312 of 1976 (better known as the Ley de Migración or Migration Law).729 
Based on this law, the Cuban State can provide five different categories of passports 
to its nationals: diplomatic passports, service passports, official passports, marine 
passports, and ordinary passports. The great majority of Cubans are only eligible 
for an ordinary passport. The procedure for obtaining such an ordinary passport 
brings with it a high administrative burden and is also relatively costly, especially 
in terms Cuban standards. An ordinary passport has a limited validity of two years. 
More importantly, until 2012, the holder of an ordinary passport was unable 
to exit Cuba. For that, an additional exit visa was needed (better known as the 
tarjeta blanca).730 In order to obtain such an exit visa, one had to submit letters of 
approval of employers or teachers (in case of a student), next to invitation letters of 
a person who would ‘host’ the Cuban in the destination country. After submitting 
an application for an exit visa, one would often have to wait months for approval, 
while it was widely known that the chances were slim that the application would 
be approved at all. The applications were approved at the discretion of the Cuban 
authorities. Furthermore, it was unknown on the basis of which precise criteria the 
applications were assessed and, therefore, it was challenging to anticipate that.731 If 
a Cuban national managed to obtain an exit visa, the visa was only valid for a limited 
period of time: ten months. Therefore, the holder was only allowed to emigrate 
temporarily. If the holder would not return, this could have severe consequences. 
Firstly, the holder would be deprived of Cuban residence rights. Even though such 
728  See: Mesa-Lago, C., “The Cuban economy in 2006–2007”, Cuba in Transition, Vol. 17, 2007, pp. 1-20.
729  Law No. 1312 of 20 September 1975, Gaceta Oficial, 25 September 1975. 
730  Retter, E., “You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, but We Might Not Let You Leave: Cuba’s Travel Policy in the Wake 
of Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 23, 2009, p. 661.
731  Ibid., p. 664. 
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a person would still be considered a Cuban national, he would no longer be able 
to reside legally in Cuba. Next to that, based on Law No. 989 of 1961, the Cuban 
property of a non-returning emigrant could be confiscated.732  
In theory, these restrictions could be circumvented by exiting Cuba on a Spanish 
passport. However, a study which conducted interviews with potential Cuban 
emigrants suggests that Cubans are not willing to take such a risk, but instead they 
prefer to leave Cuba in accordance with the emigration rules. Even then, having 
Spanish nationality offers a major advantage, namely increased travel opportunities 
through visa exemptions. In practice, this means that one leaves Cuba on a Cuban 
passport and arrives in the country of destination with a Spanish passport. 
Eventually, a long-anticipated reform of the emigration restrictions took place in 
2013. The Emigration Law was amended significantly by Decree 302 of 2012.733 
As a consequence, from 14 January 2013 onwards, a major part of the emigration 
restrictions were lifted. First, the requirement to obtain a tarjeta blanca was 
removed in its entirety. Therefore, obtaining an ordinary passport now suffices 
for emigration purposes. Secondly, Cuban nationals are in principle permitted 
to remain abroad for two years instead of nine months. It also became possible 
to apply for permission to remain outside of Cuba for longer periods. Thirdly, 
Cubans no longer risk losing their Cuban residence rights altogether by emigrating. 
Depending on the circumstances, those who have emigrated permanently are 
permitted to return to Cuba for either 90 or 180 days per year. In addition, those 
who have emigrated permanently can apply to reacquire their full residence rights. 
Fourthly, the property of those who have emigrated permanently can no longer be 
confiscated.734 
For an extensive period of time, Cubans had been eligible for visa free travel to 
Spain. This gradually changed due to the accession of Spain to the European Union 
in 1986. Because of that – and in particular its membership of the Schengen Zone 
– Spain was obliged to restrict its visa policies. For that reason, a visa requirement 
was imposed on Cuban nationals from 1999 onwards.735 
One of the main advantages of obtaining Spanish nationality is that it increases 
732  Law 989 of 5 December 1961, Gaceta Oficial, 6 December 1961.  
733  Decree No. 302, Gaceta Oficial, 16 October 2012, pp. 1357-1360. 
734  Peters, P., Migration policy reform: Cuba gets started and US Should follow, Arlington: Lexington Institute, 2012. 
735  Ironically, the introduction of this visa requirement led to a surge of migration movements in the months preceding its im-
position. See: Recaño, J. et al., “Spain: a new gravity centre for Latin American migration”, in: Domingo Valls, A. et al. (eds.), 




mobility options for Cuban nationals. Clearly, the Spanish nationality enables one to 
take up residence in Spain and, by means of the additional status of EU citizenship, 
to take up residence in other EU Member States as well. The importance of EU 
citizenship rights in this regard should not be underestimated. Recaño, Roig and De 
Miguel show that, for migrants who do not hold Spanish nationality, 89.9% return 
to the country of origin. Of those immigrants who hold Spanish nationality, only 
62.1% return to the country of origin, while 12.1% moves on to an EU 15-State.736 
Also, Spanish nationality offers visa free travel to a much greater number of States 
than Cuban nationality. It has been shown that Cuban emigration, as well as travel 
abroad, has greatly increased since the Law of Historical Memory came into force, 
in particular emigration and travel on the basis of a Spanish passport.737 Most 
importantly, Spanish nationality provides visa free entrance to the United States.738 
As Spain is part of the US Visa Waiver Program, Spanish nationals are eligible for 
a United States Travel Authorization (ESTA) for travel to the United States.739 
Until 2012, a Spanish-Cuban dual national had another additional advantage. 
Until that date, the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 granted each Cuban the right 
to obtain a permanent residence permit (commonly known as ‘green card’) if he or 
she had been physically present in the United States for at least one year.740 This is 
commonly referred to as the ‘wet foot/dry foot-policy’, as those Cubans who were 
able to make it to US territory (‘dry foot’) are permitted to remain in the United 
States. Most Cubans who were able to make use of this policy entered US territory 
in an irregular way. However, for Cubans who have dual nationality, it is possible to 
enter US territory by using their non-Cuban nationality. 
After that, it is still possible to apply for permanent residence under the Cuban 
Adjustment Act on the basis of their Cuban nationality. This was confirmed by a 
decision of the US Administrative Appeals Office in 2005.741 In this case, a Cuban-
Swedish dual national had applied for the adjustment of status to that of a lawful 
permanent resident under the Cuban Adjustment Act. Initially, the application was 
rejected on the ground that an alien may only use one nationality for the purposes 
of immigration to the United States, as had been determined in an earlier case.742 
736  Ibid., p. 197. 
737  Oroza Busutil, R., “La migración cubana hacia España en el contexto de la aplicación de la Disposición Adicional Sépti-
ma de la Ley 52/2007 de la Memoria Histórica Española”, Mundi Migratios, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2014, p. 53 ff. 
738  Spain offers visa free access to 185 destinations, while Cuba offers visa free access to 63 destinations. See: <https://www.
henleypassportindex.com/>.
739  Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 30 October 2000. 
740  Next to that, the individual must also “be inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States” and be “otherwise 
admissible” (which mainly refers to a clean criminal record), but these requirements are of limited practical importance. See: 
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. 
741  Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office, 15 August 2005, via <https://www.uscis.gov/>.
742  Interim Decision No. 2947, Board of Immigration Appeals, 4 April 1983.
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Therefore, an alien dual national was deemed to be unable to enter US territory 
using one nationality and consequently applying for residence status by using the 
other. However, in appeal, it was decided that this is not the case for Cuban dual 
nationals who apply for residence status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. It was 
ruled that the applicant must only prove that he is a ‘citizen or native of Cuba’; 
whether the applicant is a dual national or not is irrelevant. This decision was based 
on another case in which a national of Haiti and ‘native’ of Cuba was deemed to 
be eligible for the adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act.743 This 
decision could apparently be extrapolated to apply to dual nationals, even though 
the case does not make clear whether the applicant was a dual national, as it was 
merely stated that he was born in Cuba and therefore considered to be a ‘native’ 
Cuban. 
In January 2017, the Cuban Adjustment Act was partially withdrawn as a part of 
an intended ‘normalization’ of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Cuba under the Obama administration.744 For that reason, Cubans can no longer 
make use of the ‘wet foot/dry foot’ policy described above and, therefore, Spanish 
nationality is of limited value nowadays for Cubans who want to emigrate to the 
United States permanently.745 Nevertheless, visa exemptions for Spanish nationals 
are still in place and remain of great importance. Lastly, it must also be noted 
that obtaining Spanish nationality does not necessarily equal emigrating. Rather, 
obtaining Spanish nationality offers the opportunity to travel and the opportunity to 
emigrate. 
It cannot be excluded that a person would acquire Spanish nationality for much less 
tangible reasons related to identity, inclusion or feelings of belonging. In general, 
application figures seem to indicate that such considerations play a minor role. It is 
telling that the number of applicants in other EU Member States – whose nationals 
have few instrumental reasons for the acquisition Spanish nationality due to their 
possession of EU citizenship status – is rather low, even though Western European 
countries received a significant number of Spanish exiles in the past (see also par. 
1). In July 2015, 3,061 applications had been received by the Spanish consulate in 
Paris, while 3,262 applications had been received by the embassy in Berlin.746 To 
compare, 192,082 applications had been received by the consulate in Cuba at that 
743  Interim Decision No. 1855, Board of Immigration Appeals, 25 March 1968. 
744  Department of Homeland Security, “Changes to Parole and Expedited Removal Policies Affecting Cuban Nationals”, 12 
January 2017, via <https://www.dhs.gov/>.
745  Having Spanish nationality can still be an advantage for migration to the United States, as it makes the holder eligible for 
a so-called E1 Treaty Trader Visa or E2 Treaty Investor Visa on the basis of the US-Spanish Friendship Treaty of 1903. However, 
taking the circumstances into account, it is unlikely that a resident of Cuba would be eligible for one of these visa categories. 




time. Furthermore, it must also be noted that the country where the application 
was first submitted does not necessarily correspond with the nationality of the 
applicant. It is possible that a share of the applications in France or Germany were 
submitted by third country nationals that reside in those countries, but they do not 
hold an EU Member State nationality. This way, the Spanish provision could even 
be a route to the further regularization or continuation of their stay in another EU 
Member State. 
However, intriguingly, qualitative studies on the motivation of the applicants 
indicate that those who apply for Spanish nationality often state less tangible 
reasons as national identity or feelings of belonging as reasons for their application, 
in addition to more instrumental reasons.747 It should therefore be borne in mind 
that such rationales are not necessarily mutually exclusive; both aspects can jointly 
be decisive factors. 
The matter can also be perceived from an entirely different perspective. Concerning 
identity, the acquisition of nationality is often perceived as an end point or the last 
step in a process of identity formation. However, the acquisition of nationality 
could also be perceived as the first step in this process. The mere fact that one is 
eligible to acquire a nationality can already be perceived as a form of inclusion in 
this regard. In the case of Cuba, the introduction of the Law of Historical Memory 
has reportedly ‘reactivated’ memory and led to a renewed interest in Spanish family 
histories.748 Finally, it can also constitute the first step in the formation of Cuban-
Spanish identities. 
8.2 Dual nationality and Cuban nationality law 
In principle, Cuban nationality law has a negative stance on dual nationality. 
According to Article 32 of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, Cuban nationality is 
lost upon the acquisition of another nationality. This seemingly contradicts another 
constitutional provision, which states that a Cuban national can never be deprived 
of his or her Cuban nationality. However, this provision makes an exception for 
deprivation ‘for causes legally established’, which legitimizes the loss provision in 
Article 32 of the Constitution. It is commonly accepted that Cuban nationality is 
not lost automatically, but that the nationality must be withdrawn by the Cuban 
747  See: Sánchez, C. A., & Cuesta, S. G., Migration and Spanish Citizenship Abroad: Recent Scenarios from the Cuban Con-
text, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 3, 2017, p. 91 and Golías Pérez, M., Los nuevos españoles a través de 
la Ley de la memoria histórica en Cuba y Argentina:¿ oportunidad o identidad? (Doctoral Dissertation), Coruña: University of 
Coruña, 2014, p. 321. 
748  Ascanio Sánchez, C. and García Cuesta, S., “Migration and Spanish Citizenship Abroad: Recent Scenarios from the Cu-
ban Context”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 3, 2017, p. 97.
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Dual nationality can also be acquired at birth. In principle, Cuban nationality is 
acquired iure soli – or by birth in the national territory of Cuba (Art. 29 a 1972 
Constitution). In case of birth outside Cuba, Cuban nationality can also be 
acquired iure sanguinis, but only if the Cuban parent fulfils the further conditions 
established by law (Art. 29 c 1972 Constitution). However, as mentioned above, 
there is currently no additional law or regulation in place that could establish 
these conditions. Nevertheless, those who acquired Cuban nationality at birth can 
potentially acquire another nationality at birth, either if one of their parents is a 
national of another State which has ius sanguinis provisions in place or if the child is 
born in a State which has ius soli provisions in place (in case the parents emigrated 
in accordance with Cuban emigration restrictions). Although Article 32 of the 
Constitution states that dual nationality shall not be allowed and Cuban nationality 
can be lost when a foreign citizenship is acquired, this provision does not cover the 
acquisition of a foreign nationality at birth. 
749  Piorno Garcell, M. and Cutíe Mustelier, D., “Ciudadanía múltiple en Cuba: lo cierto y los controvertido”, Revista Car-
ibeña de Ciencias Sociales, September, 2015, p. 9. 
750  César Guanche, G., Informe sobre la ciudadanía: Cuba, Globalcit Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fiesole: Eu-




authorities.Article 32 of the Constitution states that a procedure must be established
by law “to be followed for formalizing [emphasis added] the loss of citizenship, and
the authorities empowered to decide [emphasis added] on it”.The fact that a Cuban
authority is granted the competence to decide on the matter of loss of nationality
as well as that the loss of nationality needs to be formalized strongly indicate that
Cuban nationality is not lost upon the acquisition of another nationality. However,
the exact structure of this procedure remains unclear. In theory, this procedure
should be provided by Decree No. 358 of 1944 (also known as the Citizenship
Regulation [Reglamento de Ciudadanía]). Although this decree only addresses the
nationality provisions of the Cuban Constitution of 1940, which was subsequently
replaced by the 1972 Constitution, it is still in force. However, it has been argued
that this decree is no longer adhered to by the Cuban authorities. 749 The conclusion
must be drawn that there is currently no o cial procedure in place for the loss of
nationality. Therefore, it has been argued that Cuban nationality is in practice
not lost upon the acquisition of another nationality. 750
9. ANALYSIS 
The Law of Historical Memory exemplifies how difficult it can be to grasp the 
meaning of nationality. If perceived only as citizenship formation, the Law of 
Historical Memory seems to grant an option right to Spanish nationality to those 
who were exiled from Spain and their descendants out of a sense of historical 
indebtedness; this is an effort that could be seen as ‘reconciliatory nationality’. 
Thereby, Spain seemingly uses the flexibility that the (partial) acceptance of dual 
nationality engenders in a novel way, namely, to reach out to a previously excluded 
part of its diaspora. However, the scope of the provisions turns out to be much 
broader than the context of the Law of Historical Memory suggests; it does not 
only cover those who were exiled from Spain, but it includes a much broader 
category of Spanish emigrants and their descendants. Taking this into account, 
the Spanish legislation fits into a historical pattern. It can therefore be perceived 
as path-dependent rather than a novelty, as Spanish nationality law has remained 
strongly focused on its diaspora throughout its history.751 
When studied in conjunction with Cuban nationality, where the largest number 
of applications originate from, an entirely different picture arises. While it cannot 
be excluded that immaterial (reconciliatory) motivations play a role in this regard, 
the context of the Spanish-Cuban citizenship constellation makes it likely that 
Spanish nationality is acquired to ‘compensate’ the shortcomings of their Cuban 
nationality.752 For Cuban nationals, the acquisition of Spanish nationality greatly 
increases their mobility opportunities and safeguards them better against future 
economic volatility and insecurity. 
The adoption of the Law of Historical Memory might not be the last step in this 
regard. Several amendments which could – if adopted and implemented – provide 
a new option right for Spanish emigrants and their descendants have been brought 
forward. In May 2017, the Spanish parliament adopted a so-called ‘non-legislative 
proposal’ (proposition no de ley) which urged the Spanish government to ‘revitalize’ 
the Law of Historical Memory.753 Among others, it urged the Spanish government 
to take initiatives to grant nationality Spanish emigrants who fell outside the scope 
751  Martín-Pérez, A. and Moreno-Fuentes, F., “Migration and Citizenship Law in Spain: Path-dependency and Policy 
Change in a Recent Country of Immigration”, International Migration Review, Vol. 46 No. 3, 2012. 
752  For this phenomenon, Harpaz has coined the term ‘compensatory citizenship’. See: Harpaz, Y., “Compensatory citizen-
ship: dual nationality as a strategy of global upward mobility”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Vol. 45, No. 6, 2019, pp. 
897-916.
753  Bill of the Socialist Parliamentary Group, on the effective application and implementation of the Law of Historical Mem-
ory (No. 162/000327), Congress of Deputies, 11 May 2017. Original title: Proposición no de Ley del Grupo Parlamentario Socialis-
ta, sobre la efectiva aplicación y desarrollo de la Ley de Memoria Histórica. 
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of the nationality clauses introduced earlier. This included descendants of Spanish 
women who could not transmit their nationality, the descendants of those who had 
to renounce their Spanish nationality before the birth of their children and the 
adult children of those who have acquired the nationality on the basis of the Law 
of Historical Memory. Despite the fact that the proposals were adopted by Spanish 
parliament, it cannot be considered as binding due to its status as ‘non-legislative 
proposal’. In order to increase the pressure on the Spanish government, a second 
non-legislative proposal with a similar scope was put forward in July 2017.754 
Furthermore, another legislative proposal was made. In January 2017, the 
Confederal Parliamentary Group of Podemos proposed a bill which would grant 
an option right for the grandchildren of (former) Spanish nationals of origin 
without any further requirements.755 Next to that, it would grant an option right 
to all descendants (including adults) of those who opted or could have opted for 
Spanish nationality of origin. An altered version of the bill was eventually adopted 
unanimously by the Spanish Senate in May 2018. This bill proposed to amend 
Art. 20 of the Civil Code by adding four new option rights regarding the children 
of Spanish parents born before the entry into force of the Spanish Constitution of 
1978, the grandchildren of Spanish male emigrants who had renounced Spanish 
nationality in order to acquire the nationality of the host country, the grandchildren 
of Spanish emigrant women and the adult children of persons who have been 
recognized as Spanish nationals of origin by virtue of an option right.756 Although 
at the moment of writing it remains unclear whether and how these proposals will 
be accepted and implemented, it does show that there is continuing support for the 
further inclusion of the Spanish diaspora. 
10. CONCLUSION 
The most important conclusion of this Chapter is that things are not always what 
they seem. As the provisions for the acquisition of Spanish nationality discussed 
here are part of the Law of Historical Memory, it seems logical to perceive these 
provisions as a part of a reconciliation effort. However, whether nationality is also 
754  Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congress of Deputies, Series D, No. 204, 8 September 2017, p. 20. 
755  Bill on the grant of Spanish nationality to the descendants born abroad of Spanish ancestors (No. 124/000005), Boletín 
Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congress of Deputies, Series B, No. 71-1, 5 January 2017. Original title: Proposición de Ley en ma-
teria de concesión de la nacionalidad española a los descendientes nacidos en el extranjero de progenitores españoles. 
756  Bill on the grant of Spanish nationality to the descendants born abroad of Spanish ancestors (No. 622/000021), Boletín 
Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Senate, No. 241, 31 May 2018. Original title: Proposición de Ley en materia de concesión de la nacio-




acquired on those grounds is far from certain.
Concerning Spanish nationality law, there is a surprising continuity regarding its 
inclusive attitude towards the Spanish emigrant population. Spain has traditionally 
enabled descendants of Spanish emigrants to acquire Spanish nationality iure 
sanguinis. During the Francoist era, the idea of Hispanidad (which had already 
arisen at an earlier stage during the Spanish Second Republic) led to an increasingly 
inclusive attitude towards nationals of Ibero-American countries and the conclusion 
of dual nationality treaties. After Spain’s democratic transition, several temporary 
option rights were implemented for (the descendants of) Spanish emigrants who 
wished to (re)acquire Spanish nationality. In 2002, this temporary option right 
became a permanent one and was included in the Spanish Civil Code. In addition 
to that, the privileged position of the Spaniards who naturalized in Ibero-American 
States, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, or Portugal was enshrined 
in the Civil Code instead of bilateral treaties. Historically, the Spanish political 
right supported this inclusive approach based on a nationalist conception of a 
transnational Hispanic community, while the Spanish political left supported 
these efforts as a repayment of a historical debt, as well as for its inclusive nature. 
While the Law of Historical Memory in itself can be seen as a revolutionary step, 
the nationality clause discussed here is quite the opposite. Instead, it fits within a 
longstanding historical pattern in Spanish nationality law. 
Spanish nationality seems to be primarily acquired for practical reasons. This is 
indicated by the statistics on the countries of origin of applicants; most applications 
come from countries whose nationals have the most to gain by acquiring Spanish 
nationality. Conversely, the number of applications from other EU Member 
States – for whose nationals the acquisition of Spanish nationality has very few 
practical benefits – has remained relatively low. The Cuban country study shows 
that opting for a second Spanish nationality can be a future-oriented strategy to 
increase mobility opportunities and future security. Such strategies facilitated by 
dual nationality are not necessarily straightforward. Although it is obvious that 
the acquisition of Spanish nationality enables one to take up residence in Spain, 
it can also enable one to take up residence in another EU Member State. Before 
2012, a Cuban-Spanish dual national could even enter the United States and 
apply for permanent residence status after one year of residence under the Cuban 
Adjustment Act. 
Nevertheless, this does not exclude that less tangible factors also play a role in 
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the applicant’s decision-making processes. Furthermore, the acquisition of Spanish 
nationality may also give rise to an increased identification with Spain, as the mere 
fact of being included in a national community can already give rise to feelings of 
inclusion. Therefore, obtaining Spanish nationality can also be perceived as the 
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While the previous Chapter covered the incorporation of the Spanish diaspora in 
its nationality law through the Law of Historical Memory, this Chapter will focus 
on the incorporation of a more particular, yet historically important, subgroup. To 
be specific, this Chapter focuses on the Spanish Law 12/2015, on the basis of which 
the acquisition of Spanish nationality is facilitated for persons of Sephardic origin. 
It will be shown that, rather than a novelty, the law fits into a longstanding historical 
pattern. Next to that, it will be shown that the reasons for granting nationality to the 
Sephardic throughout history are varied and range from nationalist incorporation 
and economic pragmatism to reconciliation and compensation. However, if the 
Spanish law is studied in conjunction with the case of Venezuela – where the 
majority of the applicants originate from – this illustrates that Spanish nationality 
is more likely to be acquired as an ‘exit strategy’ rather than for its immaterial 
compensatory value. 
Firstly, this Chapter will briefly introduce the historical development of the 
Sephardic diaspora. After that, the numerous historical predecessors of Law 
12/2015 will be discussed. Subsequently, the Chapter will focus on Law 12/2015 
itself, including the parliamentary proceedings in the legislative drafting process 
and the structure of Law 12/2015. After that, the impact of Law 12/2015 will be 
discussed, with a specific focus on the case of Venezuela. 
2. MAPPING THE SEPHARDIC DIASPORA AND 
ITS TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
The term ‘Sephardic Jews’ (derived from Hebrew ‘Sfarad’, meaning ‘Iberia’) refers 
to those who descended from the Jewish population of the Iberian Peninsula.757 
Since the early middle ages, a Jewish population resided on the peninsula. Over 
time, this population group developed distinctive languages (Ladino and Haketia) 
and its own cultural and religious practices, which set them apart from other Jewish 
population groups.758
Although the emigration of Sephardic Jews has historically been a constant factor, 
757  Wexler, P., The Non-Jewish Origins of the Sephardic Jews, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 75 ff. 
758  Ullman, J.C., “A survey course in the history of the Jews in Spain: from antiquity to the present”, in: Gerber, J. S., Jews of 




it greatly increased in 1492.759 In that year, the monarchs of Castile and Aragon 
issued the so-called Alhambra Decree, which stated that practicing Jews were either 
required to convert to Catholicism or leave their territories before the 31st of July 
of 1492.760 While a share of the Sephardic population was consequently (forcibly) 
converted to Christianity (the so-called conversos), another share of the Sephardic 
population exiled.761 In later years, many of the converted Sephardic who had 
remained on the peninsula were still prone to persecution and exiled from the 
peninsula as well.762 This led to the formation of a Sephardic diaspora, common 
destinations being the Maghreb, the Ottoman Empire, France, South America, the 
cities of Venice and Livorno and Northern Europe (primarily the cities of Antwerp 
and Amsterdam).763 Although it is impossible to ascertain the exact figure, estimates 
of the number of exiled Sephardic Jews upon the promulgation of the expulsion 
decrees range from 50,000 to 150,000.764 
Despite these migratory movements, the Sephardic diaspora did not integrate in 
its entirety with the population in the countries of destination or with other Jewish 
groups, and thereby it maintained a distinct cultural dimension over time.765 While 
the Sephardic diaspora is diverse, a common characteristic can be its relatedness 
to an (albeit imagined) ancestral homeland – in particular through its language 
and customs – as the Sephardic diaspora has distinguished itself on the basis of its 
geographic origins.766  It is difficult to determine the current size of the Sephardic 
diaspora due to a lack of official statistics, but it has been estimated that up to 3.5 
million individuals could be identified as such, most of which reside in Israel (1.4 
million), Western Europe (445,000), North America (321,000), Central and South 
America (111,500), and Turkey and the Balkan region (41,000).767 However, a 
genealogical model analysis has shown that if one includes all of those persons who 
have at least one ancestor who was expelled from the peninsula after 1492, this 
would likely cover nearly all modern-day Jews.768 
759  Ibid. 
760  The Decree of Alhambra or the Edict of Granada of 31 March 1492 (El Decreto de la Alhambra o Edicto de Granada el 31 
de marzo de 1492).  For an English translation of the Decree, see: Constable, O. R. and Zurro, D. (eds.), Medieval Iberia: Readings 
from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, p. 352 ff. 
761  Gerber, J.S., Jews of Spain: A History of the Sephardic Experience, New York City: First Free Press, 1994, p. 140 ff. 
762  Ibid. 
763  Lachenicht, S., “Sephardi Jews: Cosmopolitans in the Atlantic World”, in: Lachenicht, S. and Heinsohn, K. (eds.), Diaspo-
ra Identities: Exile, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Past and Present, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009, p. 31-52; Bejarano, M., 
“Sephardic Communities in Latin America-Past and Present”, Judaica Latinoamericana, Vol. 5, 2005, pp. 9-26.
764   Kamen, H., “The Mediterranean and the expulsion of the Spanish Jews in 1492, Past and Present, No. 119, 1988, p. 44 
ff.   
765  See for example: Gerber, J. S., Jews of Spain: A History of the Sephardic Experience, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, 
p. 146 ff. and Benbassa, E., Rodrigue, A., Sephardi Jewry: a history of the Judeo-Spanish community, 14th-20th centuries, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000, p. 192 ff.
766  Ray, J. S., After Expulsion: 1492 and the Making of Sephardic Jewry. New York: New York University Press, 2013, p. 
162. 
767  “Los Sefardies Hoy”, Sefarad Israel, 3 August 2015 via <http://www.sefarad-israel.es/>.
768  Weitz, J., “Let My People Go (Home) to Spain: A Genealogical Model of Jewish Identities since 1492”, PLOS One, Vol. 9 
No. 1, 2014, p. 4. 
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3. SPAIN’S DIASPORA POLICIES: THE SPANISH 
‘REDISCOVERY’ OF THE SEPHARDIC 
POPULATION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a renewed Spanish interest in the Sephardic 
Jews arose. This renewed interest was sparked by a small movement of Spanish 
intellectuals and liberal politicians, commonly referred to as ‘philosephardism’.769 
The philosephardist movement supported a rapprochement of Spain and the 
Sephardic diaspora, as the Sephardic were perceived to be culturally proximate to 
Spain.770 This was based on perceived linguistic and cultural similarities and was 
mainly driven by the emerging (ethno)nationalist ideas at the time.771  The main 
proponent of the philosephardist movement was the Spaniard Angel Pulido (1852-
1932). Due to an encounter with the Sephardic intellectual Enrique Bejarano in 
1903, he had become a fervent supporter of a Sephardic-Spanish rapprochement.772 
His plea was primarily based on an alleged ‘Spanishness’ of the Sephardi, whom he 
often referred to as ‘Spaniards without a homeland’ (Españoles sin patria).773 
However, below the surface, the rise of the philosephardist ideas was driven by 
other factors. It should be borne in mind that the philosephardist movement gained 
momentum mainly after 1898. That year, which is commonly referred to as ‘The 
Disaster’, Spain lost its last colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere due 
to its defeat in the American-Spanish War, which catalysed a further decline of 
the Spanish economy.774 As a consequence, the loss of the overseas territories of 
the Spanish Empire led to a search for a new national narrative.775 Framing the 
Sephardic diaspora as a scattered part of the Spanish population contributed 
to that, as it appropriated a population which was residing outside of Spain’s 
territorial borders.776 This extraterritorial appropriation could be seen as an 
attempt to ‘compensate’ for the losses of colonial territories.777 Secondly, the loss 
of territories in the Americas led to a shifting focus on the remaining territories 
in North Africa. In these territories, a large number of individuals of Sephardic 
769  Rohr, I. ““Spaniards of the Jewish Type”: Philosephardism in the Service of Imperialism in Early Twentieth-Century 
Spanish Morocco”, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2011, p. 61 ff. 
770  Odeja-Mata, M., Modern Spain and the Sephardim: Legitimizing Identities, London: Lexington Books, 2017, p. 50 ff.
771  Ibid. 
772  Alpert, M., “Dr Angel Pulido and philo–Sephardism in Spain”, Jewish Historical Studies, Vol. 40, 2005, pp. 105-119.
773  See: Pulido, A., Españoles sin patria y la raza sefardí. Madrid: Establecimiento tipográfico de E. Teodoro, 1905.
774  Harrison, J., “The historical background to the crisis of 1898”, in: Harrison, J., Hoyle, A. (eds.), Spain’s 1898 Crisis: Re-
generationism, Modernism, Postcolonialism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. 
775  Kuznitzky, A., Spanish Attitudes Toward Judaism: Strains of Anti-Semitism from the Inquisition to Franco and the Holocaust, 
Jefferson: McFarland Publishers, 2014, p. 120 ff.; Friedman, M., “Reconquering “Sepharad”: Hispanism and proto-fascism in 
Giménez Caballero’s Sephardist crusade”, in: Flesler, D. et al. (eds.), Revisiting Jewish Spain in the Modern Era, London: Rout-
ledge Publishers, 2013, p. 51 ff. 
776  Ibid. 




origin were present, who were consequently framed as a ‘natural ally’ of Spain in 
these territories.778 Thirdly, a rapprochement between the Sephardic diaspora and 
Spain was perceived as economically beneficial.779 These ideas were also further 
disseminated by Pulido, who perceived the rapprochement as an opportunity for 
increasing the international economic power of Spain, as it was assumed that closer 
ties with the Sephardi would increase Spain’s influence within the Middle East.780 
4. SPANISH NATIONALITY LAW IN RELATION 
TO THE SEPHARDIC DIASPORA: FROM 














778  Ibid. 
779  Rohr, I., ““Spaniards of the Jewish Type”: Philosephardism in the Service of Imperialism in Early Twentieth-century 
Spanish Morocco, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2011, pp. 61-75; Rohr, I. “Philosephardism and Antisemi-
tism in Turn-of-the-Century Spain”, Historical Reflections, Vol. 31 No. 3, 2005, pp. 373-392; Odeja-Mata, M., Modern Spain and 
the Sephardim: Legitimizing Identities, London: Lexington Books, 2017, p. 50 ff, Ojeda-Mata, M. “The Spanish citizenship and 
the Sephardim: identity, politics, rights”, Mentalities, Vol. 27 No. 2, 2015, pp. 1-22. 
780  Guershon, I., “The Foundation of Hispano-Jewish Associations in Morocco: Contrasting Portraits of Tangier and Tetu-
an”, in: Goldberg, H. (ed.), Sephardi and Middle Eastern Jewries: History and Culture in the Modern Era, Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1996, p. 182 ff. 
781  The Ottoman-Spanish Peace Treaty was signed in 1782 to re-establish friendly relations between the Ottoman Empire 
and Spain after changes in regional power dynamics forced the Ottoman Empire and Spain to end their century-long hostilities, 
which were mainly related to their clashes of interest in the Mediterranean region. See: Tabakoğlu, H. “The Re-establishment of 
Ottoman-Spanish Relations In 1782”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 2/3, 2007. 
782  Angell, James B., The Turkish Capitulations, The American Historical Review vol. 6 no. 2,1901, pp. 254-259, p. 254; Ah-
mad, F. “Ottoman perceptions of the capitulations 1800-1914”, Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 11 No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-20.
783  Parolin, G., Citizenship in the Arab world: Kin, religion and nation-state, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, p. 
71 ff.; Quataert, D., The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 77 ff. See for a critical 
analysis of the significance and meaning of capitulations in the Ottoman Empire: Van den Boogert, M. H., The capitulations and 
the Ottoman legal system: qadis, consuls, and beraths in the 18th century, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2005.
784  Anastasopoulos, A., “Non-Muslims and Ottoman Justice(s)?”, in: Duindam, J. (ed.), Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Ac-
tors, Leiden: Brill Publishers 2013, p. 275 ff. 
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4.1 The Ottoman-Spanish capitulations
Due to the factors outlined above, Spain aimed to re-establish connections with 
persons of Sephardic origin by granting Spanish nationality or, alternatively,
o ering a protected status.The latter has a particularly long history. On the basis
of the Ottoman-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1782, 781 Spain was able to grant a special
status to Sephardic individuals by means of a capitulation. Capitulations can be
defined as a privilege granted by State to non-nationals of that particular State on
a discretionary and individual basis. 782 On the basis of a capitulation, an individual
fell under the (consular) jurisdiction of a State, even though he was residing in
the territory of another State. 783 The Ottoman Empire has historically recognized
such capitulations, mainly as a result of the jurisdictional system of the Ottoman
Empire.The jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire was personal (or non-territorial)
and made a strict distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. 784 A share of
these non-Muslims fell under a Millet or a non-Muslim religious community.
Such a Millet was, to a limited extent, permitted to be self-governing.785 Those 
who did not fall under a Millet could alternatively be covered by a capitulation or 
ahid name, which meant that a person would fall under the consular jurisdiction 
of a foreign power.786 The Ottoman Empire initially perceived the capitulations 
as an effective method to attract foreign merchants and, in addition to that, as a 
way to relieve itself of an administrative burden.787 However, over the course of 
the eighteenth century, the dominant position of the Ottoman Empire gradually 
declined and the capitulations became more and more instruments of power for 
European States, but the phenomenon nevertheless remained.788 The capitulations 
enabled other States to grant a protected status to individuals residing in the 
Ottoman Empire and became increasingly common, in particular during the 
course of the nineteenth century.789 At the beginning of the twentieth century, a 
share of the Spanish diplomats had come under the influence of the ideas of the 
philosephardist movement, which led to a great increase in granting the protected 
status to individuals of Sephardic origin.790 
4.2 The Royal Decree of 20 December 1924 
A problem arose for Spain after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, as it made 
the status of those who previously fell under the capitulations unclear.791 Driven 
by philosephardist ideas, as well as the aforementioned uncertainty around the 
status of Spanish protected persons in the former Ottoman Empire, a decree was 
adopted in order to grant Spanish nationality to this group.792 The preamble of the 
law stated that its aim is to provide a pathway to Spanish nationality for Spanish 
protégés. In romantic wording, the preamble of the law refers to them as “[…] 
families of Spanish origin, […] with deep rooted feelings of love for Spain […]” and 
also “quasi-naturalized”.793 However, it also brought forward the more pragmatic 
consideration that these individuals could be “[…] beneficial for our cultural 
relations in distant countries […] that may be genuinely useful for Spain”.794 
785  Abu Jaber, K. S., The Millet System In The Nineteenth‐century Ottoman Empire, The Muslim World, Vol. 57 No. 3, 1967, 
pp. 212-223; Barkey, K., and Gavrilis, G., The Ottoman millet system: Non-territorial autonomy and its contemporary lega-
cy, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 15 No. 1, 2016, pp. 24-42.
786  Feroz. A, “Ottoman perceptions of the capitulations 1800-1914”, Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 11 No. 1, 2000, p. 9 
ff. 
787  Inalcik, H., “International trade: general conditions”, in: Inalcik, H., Quataert, D. (eds.), An economic and social history of 
the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 189. 
788  Parolin, G., Citizenship in the Arab world: Kin, religion and nation-state. Amsterdam University Press, 2010, p. 73. 
789  Benbassa, E., Rodrigue, A., Sephardi Jewry: a history of the Judeo-Spanish community, 14th-20th centuries, Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2000, p. 169. 
790  Stein, S., Extraterritorial Dreams: European Citizenship, Sephardi Jews, and the Ottoman Twentieth Century, Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2016, p. 29.
791  Quataert, D., The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 78. 
792  Royal Decree, on the facilitation of naturalization for individuals of Spanish origin who have been protected as if they 
were Spanish (Real decreto para facilitar la naturalización de individuos de origen español que vienen siendo protegidos como si fueran 
españoles), Gaceta de Madrid, No. 356, 21 December 1924.  
793  Ibid. Original text : «[…] familias de origen español […] con sentimientos arraigados de amor a España […] cuasi natura-
lizados ». 





The first article of the Decree stated that individuals of Spanish origin, who 
were protected as if they were Spanish nationals (como si fuesen españoles) by 
the diplomatic agents of Spain abroad, could file a request for naturalization. 
The requirements for naturalization at that time could be found in Art. 25 of 
the Spanish Civil Code (CC). First of all, Art. 25 CC stated that a foreigner 
must have received a carta de naturaleza (or ‘naturalization certificate’).  Such a 
naturalization certificate was granted on the discretion of the Spanish authorities. 
Through the 1924 Decree, it was established that (former) Spanish protégés could 
be granted such a certificate. Furthermore, Art. 25 CC stated that the applicant 
must have renounced his previous nationality, must take an oath and register as a 
Spaniard in the Civil Registry. Especially the last requirement posed a hurdle for 
the group discussed here, as this group resided outside of Spain. Therefore, the 
Decree provided an exemption clause. The first article of the Decree stated that 
the applicant could be exempted from this requirement, as long as he provided a 
valid reason for being exempted. If approved, the applicant was allowed to register 
his naturalization through a diplomatic and consular register abroad. The second 
article of the Decree provided further details on how this registration abroad could 
be completed. The third article stated that this procedure for the acquisition of 
nationality would be in place until 31 December 1930. 
4.3 The Sephardic and Spanish nationality in The Second Republic (1931-
1939) and Francoist Spain (1939-1975)
Although the philosephardist movement continued to have an influence on the 
scholarly and political debate, this did not lead to further grants of nationality to 
those of Sephardic origin as such. However, the 1931 Constitution did provide a 
pathway to Spanish nationality for those of Spanish descent in general. Art. 23 of 
the 1931 Constitution stated that “a law shall establish procedures to facilitate the 
acquisition of citizenship to persons of Spanish origin residing abroad”. According 
to a 1933 Circular, the phrase “persons of Spanish origin” also applied to persons 
of Sephardic origin, who could therefore obtain Spanish nationality on the same 
conditions as Spanish emigrants. However, this circular was withdrawn in March 
1934.795 
In the 1930s, Spain was again confronted with the unclear status of those who 
became Spanish protected persons due to the Spanish capitulations granted on the 
basis of the abovementioned Ottoman-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1782. After the fall 
795  Garcia Gómez, R., Ley 12/2015, de 24 de junio, en materia de concesión de la nacionalidad española a los sefardíes origi-
narios de España, Ars Iuris Salmanticensis, Vol. 3, 2015, pp. 203-206. 
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of the Ottoman Empire, these individuals had dispersed across several successor 
States and uncertainty arose regarding the status of these persons. In an attempt 
to solve this matter, Spain made agreements with two States, namely Egypt and 
Greece. In January 1935, it was agreed that Spain would naturalize its protégés of 
Sephardic origin (271 in total) who were still residing in Egypt.796 In April 1936, 
a similar agreement was reached with Greece (covering 507 persons in total).797 
Both of these agreements included an annex with the names of the persons who 
would become Spanish nationals. However, due to the Spanish military coup of 
1936 overthrowing the Spanish government, these agreements were not ratified on 
the Spanish side.798 Therefore, the individuals who could have obtained Spanish 












In 1938, Spain signed and ratified the Montreux Convention Regarding the 
Abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt, which determined that the 14 State parties 
would abolish the capitulation system in Egypt on the 15th of October of 1949.801 
Therefore, by the end of the 1940s, the matter gained a greater level of urgency for 
the Spanish government. Consequently, a Decree Law was introduced in 1948 to 
provide a permanent solution for those affected.802 The explanatory memorandum 
796  Rother, B., “España y los judíos: de los albores del siglo XX a la Guerra Civil”, in: Macías Kapón, U., Los judíos en la Es-
paña contemporánea: historia y visiones, 1898-1998, Ciudad Real: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2000, p. 167. 
797  Ibid. 
798  Ibid. 
799  Díaz-Mas, P., Sephardim: The Jews from Spain, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 162 ff. 
800  Rozenberg, D., La España contemporánea y la cuestión judía: retejiendo los hilos de la memoria y de la historia, Madrid : Mar-
cial Pons, 2010, p. 171 ff.; Trías Sagnier, J., “Los Judíos Sefardíes Y La Patria Española”, Cuadernos De Pensamiento Político, Vol. 
29, 2011, p. 196 ff. 
801  Law ratifying the adoption by Spain of the Convention Regarding the Abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt, signed in 
Montreux on 8 May 1937 (Ley ratificando la aprobación por España del Convenio relativo a la abolición de las Capitulaciones en 
Egipto, firmado en Montreux el ocho de Mayo de mil novecientos treinta y siete), Gaceta de República, No. 83, 24 March 1938. 
802  Decree Law of 29 December 1948, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 9, 9 January 1949. Original title : Decreto Ley de 29 de 





One of the most controversial issues surrounding this topic was the attitude of the
Franco regime towards those of Sephardic origin.This attitude ranged from outright
hostility to – counterintuitively – moderate incorporation. 799 This inconsistency
can be explained by the di ering views on the issue of those in charge within
the Franco governments. A share of these officials had strong anti-Semitic views
and therefore opposed the inclusion of the Sephardic population. However, others
perceived the Sephardic as Spaniards and were willing to incorporate them on
nationalistic grounds. Furthermore, these changing attitudes were driven by
political and economic pragmatism. Finally, a combination of Hispanic nationalism
and pragmatism was a driving force behind several laws which provided a pathway
to Spanish nationality for the Sephardic under the Franco regime. 800
of this Decree states that it was meant to ensure compliance with the pledge that 
had been made by Spain more than a decade earlier.
 
The Decree Law had the following structure. The first article stated that the 
abovementioned agreements with Greece and Egypt shall enter into force from 1 
January 1949. The persons mentioned in the annexes of these agreements could 
therefore become Spanish nationals. The second article described the procedure 
for doing so. The applicant had to declare at a Spanish embassy or consular 
office that he wishes to make use of the right to become a Spanish national, as 
well as make an oath of fidelity. The third article exempted the applicant from the 
requirement to register his naturalization at the Civil Registry in Spain. Instead, the 
applicant could register his naturalization at an embassy or consular office instead. 
The article also stated that the spouse and the minor children of the applicant were 
eligible for obtaining Spanish nationality. Next to that, Spanish nationality could 
also be obtained by the minor children of an eligible individual.803 As a result, 778 
Spanish protégés of Sephardic origin were granted Spanish nationality on the basis 
of the Decree Law of 29 December 1948.804
Another milestone in this regard was the nationality law reform of 1954, which 
introduced the possibility to grant Spanish nationality on a discretionary basis 
through a naturalization letter (carta de naturaleza). Odeja Mata indicates that, in 
the 1950s and 1960s, Spanish nationality was granted on this ground to a number 
of persons of Sephardic origin, mainly from former Spanish territories in North 
Africa.805
4.4 Law 51/1982: Two routes to Spanish nationality 
Through the first nationality law reform after the democratic transition of Spain, a 
preferential naturalization ground for persons of Sephardic origin was introduced. 
This entailed that persons of Sephardic origin could naturalize after two years of 
residence in Spain, instead of the regular period of ten years.806 To a large extent, 
persons of Sephardic origin were therefore treated similarly to nationals of Ibero-
American countries, who already had this privilege. However, one difference 
remained, as persons of Sephardic origin were still required to declare that they had 
renounced their former nationality, before they could acquire Spanish nationality.807 
803  Ibid.  
804  Avni, H., Spain, the Jews, and Franco, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1982, p. 208.
805  Odeja-Mata, M., Modern Spain and the Sephardim: Legitimizing Identities, London: Lexington Books, 2017, p. 220. 
806  Art. 22 Ley 51/1982, de 13 de julio, de modificación de los artículos 17 al 26 de Código Civil, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 
No. 181, 30 July 1982. 
807  Ibid. 
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In addition to that, it remained possible to acquire Spanish nationality by a carta 
de naturaleza. According to Art. 21 CC, a carta de naturaleza can be granted on 
a discretionary basis by Royal Decree if there are “exceptional circumstances” 
related to the person concerned. This way, one could acquire Spanish nationality 
without prior residence in Spain. Although there were no further official guidelines 
in place for the acquisition of nationality on this ground, since the 2000s it has 
increasingly been used as a pathway to grant Spanish nationality to persons of 
Sephardic origin. Between 2006 and 2011, 792 individuals of Sephardi origin were 
granted Spanish nationality on this ground.808 The development of this practice was 
the steppingstone towards the adoption of Law 12/2015, which finally normalized 
this practice.
5. THE INTRODUCTION OF LAW 12/2015 
In October 2014, a bill was introduced which aimed to further facilitate the 
naturalization of individuals of Sephardic origin. During the parliamentary 
discussion, granting Spanish nationality to the Sephardic was first of all presented 
as a way to right a historic wrong. According to Minister of Justice Rafael Catalá 
Polo, the bill was supposed to ‘close a chapter that has remained until today 
open without a solution’.809 This stance was broadly supported by speakers from 
governing parties as well as opposition parties, who all referred to the great 
injustices that were inflicted upon the ancestors of the Sephardic community. The 
bill was mainly criticized by parliamentarians for being too restrictive in nature, in 
particular regarding the procedural fee that applicants were required to pay and 
the fact that they would have to travel to Spain in order to fulfil the naturalization 
process.810 Another point of criticism was the limited timeframe for the submission 
of applications.811 It was argued that, if granting nationality was supposed to be 
a compensation for wrongdoing, the procedure should not place any additional 
burdens. Furthermore, many of the speakers criticized the fact that the bill only 
enabled the granting of Spanish nationality for those of Sephardic origin, while 
other groups could also be entitled to similar compensation. An example that was 
brought forward was the status of the Sahrawi people, the inhabitants of Western 
Sahara.812 For this group, it was argued that acquiring Spanish nationality would be 
808  Diaro de Sesiones del Senado, Comisión de Justicia, No. 148, 3 July 2017, p. 15. 
809  Diario De Sesiones Del Congreso De Los Diputados Pleno Y Diputación Permanente, No. 242, 20 November 2014, p. 58.
810 Diario De Sesiones Del Congreso De Los Diputados Pleno Y Diputación Permanente, No. 242, 20 November 2014, p. 64. 
811  Ibid. 




even more important, as a share of the Sahrawi people can currently be considered 
as stateless. Another example brought forward was the Moors, or the former Islamic 
inhabitants of Spain, whose ancestors were also affected by the 1492 Alhambra 
Decree.813 However, Minister Catalá Polo argued that the Sephardi differ from 
other groups because they have maintained a distinct ‘Spanish’ culture. He stated 
that “the extraordinary example of fidelity to a language, to one’s customs and to 
the memory of the country from which the Spanish Jews were expelled by virtue 
of, or better said, in demerit of the edict of March 31, 1492, is for sure unique 
in our history and unique also in the dark history of the people expelled from 
their land. It is for its centennial character, it is for its affective intensity and it is 
also for the way in which the Sephardim have been able to accommodate different 
identities without ever renouncing any of them”. Thereby, he seemed to argue that 
the Sephardi should be granted Spanish nationality because of their alleged loyalty 
and ‘Spanishness’.814 
The preamble of Law 12/2015 sets out two similar reasons. Firstly, it emphasizes 
the bond between the Sephardi community and Spain by stating that the Sephardi 
community has maintained a distinct Iberian culture and that their “memory and 
fidelity” of Spain has always remained. Secondly, the preamble emphasizes the 
grave injustices that have been suffered by the Sephardi community. It refers to the 
banishment of 1492 but also to other injustices that the community has suffered 
outside of Spain. Therefore, the preamble states there must be a “definitive 
reconciliation” with the Sephardi community.   
Taken together, the parliamentary debate and the preamble of the law provide 
two reasons for the preferential granting of nationality to the Sephardi. First, their 
cultural proximity and their Spanish roots are emphasized. The Sephardi are 
framed as ‘lost sons’ of Spain, and during the parliamentary debates, the granting 
of nationality has even occasionally been referred to as a ‘homecoming’.815 This 
reasoning contains a strong ethnonational component, as the Sephardi are framed 
as persons who already belong to the Spanish nation and therefore deserve to 
become Spanish nationals. Secondly, the grave injustices that have been suffered 
813  Ibid., p. 63. 
814  Original text : El extraordinario ejemplo de fidelidad a una lengua, a unas costumbres y a la memoria del país del que fueron ex-
pulsados los judíos españoles en virtud o, casi mejor dicho, en demérito del edicto de 31 de marzo de 1492, es seguramente único en nuestra 
historia y único también en la oscura historia de los pueblos expulsados de su tierra. Lo es por su carácter centenario, lo es por su intensi-
dad afectiva y lo es también por el modo en que los sefardíes han sabido conciliar identidades distintas sin hacer nunca renuncia a ningu-
na de ellas. See : Diario De Sesiones Del Congreso De Los Diputados Pleno Y Diputación Permanente, No. 242, 20 November 2014, 
p. 59. 
815  Ibid. Original text: “[…] Sefarad ya no es una nostalgia sino un hogar en el que no debe decirse que los judíos se sienten como en 
su propia casa porque los hispanojudíos están en su propia casa, en la casa de todos los españoles, sea cual fuere su credo o religion.”
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by the Sephardi community are emphasized. The preamble as well as the speakers 
in the debates refer to the banishment of 1492, but also to the injustices and 
suppression that the community has suffered in the territories where they sought 
refuge. Therefore, the granting of Spanish nationality is presented as a form of 
compensation. As the ancestors of the Sephardi were expelled from the Spanish 
territories, obtaining Spanish nationality offers a right to return or, at least, become 
part of its (extraterritorial) citizenry. 
6. THE STRUCTURE OF LAW 12/2015
               
           
  
             
         
       
            
              
            
             
                
           
    
            
Sephardic origin can primarily be proven by submitting a certificate from the 
Permanent Commission of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Spain 
(Comisión Permanente de la Federación de Comunidades Judías de España) or a similar 
(rabbinic) authority outside of Spain. In the latter case, additional documentation 
must be supplied in order to accredit the authority, which must be legalized and 
(if needed) translated into Spanish by a sworn translator. However, many other 
means of proof are mentioned in the law, namely the ability to speak the Ladino or 
Haketia language, a birth certificate or marriage certificate (ketuba) which proves 
816  Jessurun d’Oliveira argues that this amendment is of limited practical importance, as the renunciation requirement en-
tailed in practice that one had to declare before a judge of the Civil Register that he no longer holds the original nationality. 
Therefore, he refers to this obligation as a “mere formality”. See: Jessurun, d’Oliveira, H.U., “Iberian nationality legislation and 
Sephardic Jews”, in: Carrera Nuñez, S., European citizenship at crossroads: The role of the European Union on loss and acquisition of 




The purpose of the law was twofold. First of all, the law permits those of Sephardi 
origin to maintain their nationality of origin upon the acquisition of Spanish 
nationality by adding an exemption ground to the loss provision of Art. 23 CC. 
Thereby, a person of Sephardi origin was no longer required to declare he had 
renounced his former nationality. 816 Secondly, the law was a clarification of Art. 21 
par. 1 CC, on grounds of which a carta de naturaleza can be granted to a person 
on a discretionary basis by Royal Decree if ‘special circumstances’ arise. As stated 
before, this clause had been used in the past to grant Spanish nationality to persons 
of Sephardi origin, but only on a case-by-case basis. Law 12/2015 formalized this 
procedure by providing a set of criteria for granting nationality to those of Sephardi 
origin. In the first article of the law, it is established that a person of Sephardi origin 
who has a ‘special relationship’ with Spain can obtain a naturalization certificate 
on the ground of Art. 21 par. 1 CC.This clause sets out two further requirements, 
namely having a Sephardic origin and having a ‘special relationship’ with Spain.
the Sephardic origin of the applicant or a genealogic report. Next to that, the law 
states that Sephardic origin may also be proven in any other way that provides 
sufficient proof of the applicant’s origin. Therefore, the means of proof stated 
above are guidelines rather than requirements. 
The applicant’s ‘special relationship with Spain’ can also be proven in various 
ways, namely with a certificate of studies in Spanish history or culture, knowledge 
of the Haketia language, being a descendant or family member of a person who fell 
under Spanish protection on the basis of the Decree Law of 1948 or the Decree 
of 1924 (which have been discussed in detail earlier in this Chapter) or by making 
a contribution or donation to a Spanish or Sephardic institution which is oriented 
at the study, conservation or dissemination of the Sephardi culture. Furthermore, 
any other document that sufficiently proves the applicant has a special relationship 
with Spain can be accepted. The abovementioned means of proof therefore merely 
function as guidelines.  
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In addition, the applicant will have to accredit the ‘special relationship with Spain’ 
by undertaking two tests. Firstly, the applicant will have to pass a Spanish language 
examination at A2 CEFR-level. Secondly, the applicant must pass an examination 
on knowledge about the Spanish Constitution and Spanish culture and society. 
Applicants from countries where Spanish is an o cial language are exempted from 
the language examination. On the basis of a Resolution of the General Director of 
the Registries and Notaries, applicants of 70 years or older are exempted from the 
requirement to pass the two tests. Lastly, the applicant must submit a legalized 
and apostilled birth certificate and, if necessary, a translation of the document by 
a sworn translator.
The application must be submitted to the General Directorate of Registries and 
Notaries through an online portal. The submitted documents are subsequently 
assessed by a notary. During this assessment, the applicant must be present, 
either in person or through a legal representative, to assert the authenticity of the 
documents.The application is then subjected to the further scrutiny of the General 
Directorate of Registries and Notaries. If approved, the application is transferred 
to the Civil Registry.Within a period of one year, the applicant must take several 
additional steps to acquire Spanish nationality, namely the regular procedure of 
registration described in Art. 23 CC. This entails that the applicant must request 
the registration of his naturalization as well as take an oath of allegiance. In addition 
to that, on the basis of Art. 2 par. 6 sub b Law 12/2015, the applicant must also
          
Applications for the acquisition of nationality on the ground of Law 12/2015 could 
initially be submitted until October 2018, but this deadline was extended with one 
additional year until October 2019.817 
7. LAW 12/2015 IN PRACTICE AND BEYOND
In addition to Law 12/2015, a large number of persons of Sephardic origin have not 
obtained Spanish nationality on the basis of Law 12/2015. Instead, they obtained 
Spanish nationality on the basis of separate Royal Decrees. On 29 October 2015, 
4272 Sephardic persons were naturalized through Royal Decree 893/2015, while 
on 5 August 2016 another 220 Sephardic persons were naturalized through Royal 
Decree 322/2016. The explanatory memoranda of these decrees state that these 
persons had submitted an application for discretionary naturalization before Law 
12/2015 went into force and were therefore granted Spanish nationality on a 
discretionary basis (Art. 21 par. 1 of the Civil Code). By August 2016, almost one 
year after Law 12/2015 came into force, reportedly only one person had acquired 
Spanish nationality on the basis of Law 12/2015, which can probably be explained 
by the time-consuming nature of the acquisition process.818 By July 2017, 1,091 
persons of the Sephardic origin had obtained Spanish nationality on the basis of Law 
12/2015.819 By November 2017, 1,442 persons of Sephardic origin had received 
Spanish nationality on the basis of the law, while 3,105 persons had submitted an 
application.820 These figures are still considerably lower than the expected 100,000 
to 200,000 applicants. The largest number of approved applicants (277) are from 
Venezuela. The Spanish Secretary of State stated in a debate that the interest 
of Venezuelan applicants can be explained by the grave economic and political 
situation in the country.821 The Secretary of State also stated that this may explain 
the relatively high number of Turkish applicants, namely 111. Other countries with 
a relatively high number of applicants were Israel (241), Argentina (135), Colombia 
(129), Mexico (127), and Brazil (119). As could have been expected, the number 
of applicants from EU Member States is small, with the highest number coming 
from France, namely 26 applicants.822 In that regard, Jessurun d’Oliveira points 
817  Ordinance, PRA/325/2018, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 75, 15 March 2018. 
818  Diaro de Sesiones del Senado, Comisión de Justicia, No. 148, 3 July 2017, p. 14.
819  Ibid.
820  Senado, Respuesta del Gobierno, No. 684/22705, 25 September 2017. 
821  Diaro de Sesiones del Senado, Comisión de Justicia, No. 148, 3 July 2017, p. 15. 




provide a document that proves the absence of a criminal record.
out that an inhibiting factor might be the potential loss of the original nationality 
upon the voluntary acquisition of Spanish nationality, which is, for example, in 
general the case in The Netherlands.823 He raises the question whether this is in 
line with case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular Genovese 
v. Malta.824 
By September 2018, the number of approved applicants had increased to 3,843 
in total. The largest number of applicants still came from Venezuela (1,009), 
followed at some distance by Israel (592), Mexico (484), Argentina (342), and 
Turkey (257). The number of accepted applicants from other EU Member States 
















8. LAW 12/2015: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA 
As stated above, Venezuelans constitute by far the largest group of applicants, being 
823  Jessurun, d’Oliveira, H.U., “Iberian nationality legislation and Sephardic Jews”, in: Carrera Nuñez, S., European citizen-
ship at crossroads: The role of the European Union on loss and acquisition of nationality, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2015, p. 
260 ff.     
824  Ibid., p. 261. 
825  Senado, No. 684/48804, 17 September 2018.
826  Annex of Ordinance, PRA/325/2018, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 75, 15 March 2018.
827  Ibid. 
828  Hernández, J., “Apellido sefardí: el nuevo boleto de los venezolanos para migrar a España”, TalCual, 2 July 2018, <https://
talcualdigital.com/>.
829  González, M., “Los sefardíes dan la espalda a su ley”, El País, 18 November 2018, <https://elpais.com/>. 
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Finally, it can be concluded that the number of accepted applicants has remained
relatively low, especially if one considers that the number of potentially eligible
individuals ran into the millions and the number of expected applicants ran into
the tens of thousands. There are several potential explanations for this outcome.
First of all, the Spanish government has asserted that it was di cult for Sephardic
organizations as well as applicants to retrieve all the required documentation in
time, in particular for those of advanced age. 826 Mainly for that reason, the Spanish
government decided to extend the application deadline by one year. 827 Secondly,
the high costs have been considered to be a burden for applicants. Although
the application fees are relatively low, applicants have incurred many additional
expenses in order to fulfil all the criteria and obtain all necessary documentation,
which have been estimated to be as high as 4,000 euro. 828 Thirdly, the language
requirement proved to be a hurdle. Even though the Sephardic Ladino language is
seemingly similar to modern-day Spanish, this has turned out to be insu cient to
pass a language test. 829
almost twice as many applicants as Israel. Therefore, it seems appropriate to take a 
closer look at this particular subgroup and study the Venezuelan and Spanish case 
in relation to each other. 
The Venezuelan interest in the acquisition of Spanish nationality cannot be properly 
understood without taking into account the unprecedented economic and political 
crisis that has ravaged Venezuela since 2014. Due to a combination of poor economic 
governance on the national level and detrimental political and economic factors 
on the international plane, the oil-dependent country has been confronted with a 
spiralling economy, resulting in soaring debts and hyperinflation.830 In addition to 
that, the Venezuelan government has increasingly resorted to an autocratic style of 
governance, resulting in severe human rights abuses.831 These factors led to mass 
emigration of the Venezuelan population, as it is estimated that more than three 
million people had fled the country by the end of 2018.832 It is estimated that around 
80% of Venezuelan emigrants were received by other countries in Latin America, in 
particular Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.833 However, a share of Venezuelans opted 
for another solution, namely the acquisition of a foreign nationality. As Venezuela 
has traditionally mostly been an emigrant receiving State, numerous Venezuelans 
were able to acquire another nationality on the basis of their ancestry. For example, 
an estimated 12,000 Venezuelans of Lebanese origin have been able to (re)acquire 
Lebanese nationality on the basis of their ancestry and have taken up residence 
in that country.834 The Spanish law discussed in this Chapter could be used in 
a similar way by Venezuelans of Sephardic origin. In June 2018, the Venezuelan 
Sephardic Association reported that it received more than 10,000 requests from 
Venezuelans for documents that could prove their Sephardic origin.835 The Spanish 
regulation has been referred to as an “excellent migration route”.836 Although the 
Spanish government has maintained that a “large part of the applicants” has done 
so “for personal recognition and pride” and “the recovery of a lost identity”, the 
Venezuelan context makes it unlikely that these factors have played a significant 
role.837 
830  Labrador, R., “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate”, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 January 2019, via <https://
www.cfr.org/>.
831  “Venezuela: Events of 2018”, Human Rights Watch, 29 November 2018, via  <https://www.hrw.org/>.
832  Staedicke, S., “As Venezuelan Crisis Deepens, South America Braces for More Arrivals and Indefinite Stays”, 21 Decem-
ber 2018, via <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/>.
833  Ibid. 
834  Sesin, C., “More Venezuelans Immigrate to Lebanon As Crisis Escalates”, NBC News, 18 July 2018, via <https://www.
nbcnews.com/>.
835  Hernández, J., “Apellido sefardí: el nuevo boleto de los venezolanos para migrar a España”, TalCual, 2 July 2018, <https://
talcualdigital.com/>.
836  Gómez, D., “Miles de venezolanos se convierten en sefardíes para ser españoles”, Alnavío, 20 November 2018, via <htt-
ps://alnavio.com/>.
837  Ordinance, PRA/325/2018, Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 75, 15 March 2018. Original text: “[…] si se tiene en cuenta que 
una buena parte de las concesiones se refieren a personas [...] cuya motivación para acogerse a la Ley 12/2015, de 24 de junio, no es en 




Historically, Venezuela had a restrictive attitude towards dual nationality. This 
was perceived to be beneficial for the incorporation of the many immigrants that 
Venezuela received as well as an attempt to lay an exclusive claim on its population, in 
particular with regard to military service.838 This changed in 1999, when Venezuela 
adopted a novel constitution with a diametrically opposite attitude towards dual 
nationality. Art. 34 of the Constitution explicitly states that Venezuelan nationality 
is not lost if a national opts for or acquires another nationality. In addition to that, 
Art. 35 of the Constitution states that Venezuelan nationals by birth cannot be 
deprived of their nationality, while Art. 36 of the Constitution grants Venezuelan 
nationals a right to voluntarily renounce their nationality, as long as they meet 
the precautionary conditions. For non-nationals who wished to obtain Venezuelan 
nationality through naturalization, it was no longer required to renounce their other 
nationality.839
Although it can be concluded that Venezuelan nationality law does not hinder the 
acquisition of another nationality, there are other hurdles in place, for example 
the limited availability of Venezuelan travel documents. Over the past years, it has 
been become increasingly difficult for Venezuelan nationals to obtain a Venezuelan 
passport. As the country has claimed that it can no longer produce a sufficient 
number of passports due to material shortages, they have reportedly only remained 
accessible for an elite group.840 As it is necessary to hold a national passport in 
order to be able to apply for Spanish nationality under the regulation discussed in 
this Chapter, this constitutes a major hurdle for potential Venezuelan applicants.
9. CONCLUSION
The numerous Spanish nationality policies for those of Sephardic origin illustrate 
the ambiguous character of nationality over time. From a historical perspective, 
mainly instrumental reasons led to the outreach to the Sephardic. After the Spanish 
annus horribilis of 1898, the incorporation of the Sephardic was perceived as a 
way to increase Spain’s extraterritorial power. However, under the influence of 
philosephardism, Spain also reached out to the Sephardic because of their 
perceived ‘Spanishness’. On the basis of this argumentation, the Sephardic were 
res”. 
838  Ferrer Rojas, L.E., “La Doble Nacionalidad en el Ordenamiento Constitucional Venezolano”, Revista de la Facultad de Ci-
encias Jurídicas y Políticas, No. 5, 2009, p. 205. 
839  Art. 25 Law on Nationality and Citizenship (Ley de Nacionalidad y Ciudadanía).
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granted Spanish nationality because the group was perceived to ‘belong’ and to be 
an integral part of the Spanish nation. The contemporary Spanish policies are more 
of a compensatory nature, as granting nationality is presented as a reconciliation 
effort. Because of historical sufferings, the Sephardi are considered to be deserving 
of Spanish nationality in a symbolic gesture. While instrumentalism has disappeared 
from Spain’s contemporary nationality policies towards the Sephardic, it might 
be all the more present on the applicant’s side nowadays, as applications are 
particularly high in countries that are experiencing political or economic turmoil 
and particularly low in EU Member States.
Finally, although the Spanish law towards the Sephardi has many historic 
predecessors, it is nevertheless ground-breaking in the scale and scope to which it 
permits Spanish nationality to be acquired extraterritorially as a second nationality 
mainly on compensatory grounds. It is thereby a far throw from a traditional 
notion of nationality. By allowing applicants to retain their nationality of origin and 
thereby become dual nationals, Spain significantly lowers procedural thresholds 
and facilitates those who it deems to be deserving of Spanish nationality. Thereby, 
it aims to facilitate the acquisition of nationality by persons of Sephardic origin ‘for 
personal recognition and pride’. However, if one studies the Spanish-Venezuelan 
case in conjunction, which covers more than a quarter of all applications, it 













Nationality is a paradox. It encompasses a nationalité de droit, or the establishment 
of a bond between a State and an individual which grants that individual the status 
of national and provides access to a set of rights. Yet it also encompasses a nationalité 
de fait, or an identity (par. 1.3, Chapter 1). Nationality is therefore an instrument 
as well as a sentiment, and this contradiction is what makes nationality difficult 
to grasp. When States give shape to their nationality policies, they continuously 
oscillate between these two meanings of nationality. 
The position of States on dual nationality has gradually evolved from outright 
hostility to acceptance, and it is now possibly moving towards embracing dual 
nationality, especially concerning one particular group of nationals, namely emigrant 
populations (par. 3, Chapter 1). By accepting dual nationality, in particular for 
external populations, the potential scope of a State’s citizenry is greatly enlarged. 
This raises the question how States make use of this leeway. Dual nationality 
acceptance can lead to a rise in novel uses of nationality, as it turns nationality from 
an all-encompassing link between a national and a State into a divisible, additional 
and external status. This raises the question how this change may manifest itself in 
practice. The goal of this study was therefore twofold, and addressed the following 
two questions: To what extent do States allow their emigrant population and their 
descendants to retain their nationality of origin, next to another nationality? And, 
does the tolerance of dual nationality for emigrant populations give rise to novel 
uses of nationality? 
In order to answer these questions, this study provided an extensive analysis of the 
nationality policies of 196 States for five modes of acquisition and loss of nationality 
(par. 3, Chapter 2). Taken together, these modes determine whether emigrants, as 
well as their descendants, can retain their nationality of their origin. The outcomes 
of the analysis will be summarized briefly and critically assessed below for each 
mode of loss or acquisition. 
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Preferably, emigrants should not be deprived of their nationality of origin upon 
naturalization in another State. This is in the emigrant’s interest, as well as in the 
emigration State’s interest. It is in the interest of the latter, as research indicates 
that allowing dual nationality can have a positive effect on (monetary as well as 
non-monetary) remittances. Furthermore, it enables States to maintain a bond 
with their emigrant population. It is in the emigrant’s interest, as loss provisions in 
the country of origin can prevent migrants from naturalizing in their host State, 
which can make their position within the host State more precarious. There are 
no compelling objections against the retention of the original nationality from a 
sending State-perspective.  
Preferably, there should also not be a partial deprivation clause in place, as 
these provisions have significant drawbacks. Provisions that enable authorities 
to grant permission for retention of nationality can lead to arbitrariness or even 
discriminatory practices if there are no clear guidelines on its applicability. This 
is also the case if States permit the retention of one’s original nationality upon 
naturalization in certain States on the basis of their cultural proximity. Other States 
permit the retention of one’s original nationality upon naturalization in certain 
(usually Western) States for economic reasons, or they impose economic criteria 
for the retention of nationality. Such an approach can be understandable from a 
State perspective, yet these policies exclude the more vulnerable migrant groups 
and can potentially deter them from naturalization in their host countries. In 
addition, reserving dual nationality status for a privileged group of emigrants could 
exacerbate inequalities.
It was also studied how these provisions in emigration States interact with 
legislative provisions in other States within a citizenship constellation (par. 7, 
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First generation: Loss of nationality upon naturalization abroad
(par. 4.1, Chapter 2)
117 States out of 196 States do not have a provision for loss upon the acquisition of
another nationality in place, while the remaining 79 States do.A large share of these
79 States (32) provide major exceptions to their main rule of loss of nationality.
These exceptions greatly vary in nature and in scope. Permission can be granted for
retaining nationality in 12 States, while in seven States, nationality is only lost upon
the acquisition of nationality in certain States. In 14 States, the loss of nationality 
is limited to certain categories of nationals. Lastly, a small number of States have 









   
 
First generation: Loss of nationality upon residence abroad (par. 4.2, Chapter 2)
In 46 States, nationality can be lost if a national has resided abroad for a certain 
amount of time (usually a period of five to ten years), while 150 States do not have 
such a provision. In all except one of these States, the effect of these provisions 
has been mitigated. In the majority of States, these provisions are only applicable 
to nationals by naturalization or those who acquired nationality otherwise than by 
birth or descent. In the remaining States, it is often possible to prevent the loss of 
nationality by making a declaration or obtaining permission for retention.
 
Emigrants should preferably not be deprived of their nationality upon residence 
abroad due to the important drawbacks of such provisions. First of all, there is a 
relatively high risk that such provisions can result in statelessness and therefore their 
application requires utmost prudence. Secondly, such provisions place a burden 
on emigrant households, as they can potentially derail migration trajectories. If 
loss of nationality upon residence abroad can be prevented through a declaration 
or permission, it is important that clear guidelines are provided. Particularly, if 
deprivation could have prevented, such provisions will otherwise merely result in 
the deprivation of nationality for the ill-informed. Also, the procedures for retention 
that are in place in some States are an unreasonable burden for emigrants, for 
example if the willingness to retain nationality needs to be renewed at an embassy 
or consulate on a yearly basis. Preferably, such procedures should enable emigrants 
to make use of such procedures at a distance and should provide a reasonable 




Chapter 2). Therefore, provisions resulting in the loss of nationality upon the
voluntary acquisition of another nationality in 42 States of origin and provisions
requiring the renunciation of the original nationality upon naturalization in 28
EU Member States were studied together. In short, this analysis identified the
constellations in which the emigration State permits the retention of nationality
after naturalization in another State in all cases, while the immigration State does
not require the renunciation of the original nationality in any case. Of these 1,176
constellations, a majority of 679 permitted dual nationality in all cases, or 57.7% of
the constellations. Taken together, a conservative estimate is that the 1,176
constellations covered at least the acquisition of nationality of 593,500 persons in
2017, or 72.4% of all persons.
Second generation: Acquisition of nationality in the case of birth abroad 
(par. 4.3, Chapter 2)
In virtually all States, a child born abroad can acquire the nationality of the parent, 
even if the child also acquires another nationality at birth. A small number of States 
restrict this provision by determining that only the father can transfer his nationality 
in the case of birth abroad or they may require that both parents must be nationals 
in order to transfer their nationality. It is important to note that many States have 
imposed a generational cap on the acquisition of nationality by birth abroad. This 
entails, for example, that nationality can only be acquired by birth abroad if the 
parent him- or herself was not born abroad. 
It is recommendable that first generation emigrant nationals be permitted to 
transfer their nationality to their offspring without limitations. This should be 
the case for acquisition a patre as well as matre. In the case of birth abroad from 
second-generation parents or further generations residing abroad, the automatic 
transmission of nationality could be considered excessive. Instead of providing for 
automatic acquisition iure sanguinis, the provision of an option right would be a 
more satisfactory alternative. 
Second generation: loss of nationality if other nationality has not been renounced before 
attaining majority and loss upon residence abroad (paras. 4.4, 4.5, Chapter 2)
In 21 out of 196 States, a person who has acquired another nationality at birth or 
during minority can lose his nationality if he does not renounce the other nationality 
before attaining a specified age, commonly the age of majority or by fulfilling other 
criteria (i.e. a period of residence within the State). In eight of these 21 States, there 
are exemptions to these grounds for loss in place. These exemptions entail that the 
nationality of certain States is excluded, that loss can be prevented by making a 
declaration or that permission for retaining nationality can be obtained. 
Preferably, descendants of emigrants should not be forced to renounce their 
other nationality in order to retain their nationality, as this can have detrimental 
consequences for that person’s future. Research has suggested that such provisions 
place a heavy burden on young dual nationals, as they are required to make a 
fundamental choice with wide-ranging implications at a relatively young age. States 
should also ensure to duly inform their affected nationals about the potential loss 
of nationality and the actions they could take to prevent the loss of nationality. 
The loss of nationality should preferably not be automatic and authorities should 
ensure all relevant circumstances of the case are taken into account. 
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In 15 States, a certain period of residence abroad can lead to the loss of nationality for 
those who were born abroad. In all except one of these States, the loss of nationality 
can either be prevented through a declaration or by obtaining permission or the 
provision is extremely narrow in scope. States therefore seem to realize that a rigid 
application of such provisions can have undesirable consequences, as virtually all 
of the States provide significant exemptions in this regard. As mentioned earlier, it 
is important that the affected persons are duly informed about the provision and 
the ways in which the loss of nationality can be prevented. 
Case studies: Spain and Sri Lanka
Two case studies were conducted in order to study how States reach out to their 
diaspora in a complicated context. The global analysis described above examined 
nationality policies in an isolated way, while in these case studies, the historical, 
political and societal context could be taken into account. 
The Sri Lankan case study demonstrates the challenges a State can face when it 
aims to reach out to its diaspora in a post-conflict context (Chapter 4). The Sri 
Lankan diaspora is relatively large and consists of (temporary) labour migrants, 
but also of a large refugee population. The diaspora has therefore been affected by 
the decade-long Sri Lankan civil war, in which a share of the diaspora has played 
an active role. Due to these deep wounds, the relationship between the Sri Lankan 
State and its diaspora its complex. In its nationality legislation, Sri Lanka has made 
a tentative and partial outreach to its diaspora through the discretionary grant of 
so-called ‘dual citizenship certificates’. These certificates halt the loss provisions 
in the Sri Lankan citizenship act and enable persons to either retain or reacquire 
Sri Lankan nationality. The current guidelines for the granting of such certificates 
mainly impose economic conditions on the applicant, next to a hefty application 
fee. The meaning of the Sri Lankan dual nationality provision is difficult to grasp; 
the provisions are instrumental in nature, yet the official rhetoric around it is often 
rather nationalistic and sentimental in nature. 
Although the cautious and restrictive approach is understandable, if one takes the 
Sri Lankan context into account, it has severe disadvantages. In practice, the limited 
approach has resulted in challenges regarding family remigration. In addition to 
that, the discretionary granting of dual citizenship certificates makes the process 
untransparent. Next to that, the revocation of a dual citizenship certificate remains 




more attention should be paid to the emigrants’ interests; it should be taken into 
consideration that the retention of original nationality can also be of paramount 
importance for more vulnerable emigrant groups that now remain excluded. 
The Spanish case studies demonstrate how a State can remain connected to its 
diaspora over a very lengthy period of time (Chapters 5 and 6). The case studies 
investigated the nationality provisions for (descendants of) Spanish emigrants 
included in the Law of Historical Memory, as well as the special nationality 
provisions for those of Sephardic-Jewish descent. First, the case study shows that 
both of the laws are not novelties, but instead they have a multitude of historical 
precedents in the Spanish context. Next to that, the case study shows that the laws 
are based on intermingling political motivations. The laws are primarily presented 
as a reconciliation effort, but they are equally grounded in a sense of inclusiveness 
for marginalized groups as well as a nationalistic discourse about the presumed 
‘Spanishness’ of the targeted groups. However, if the Spanish cases are studied in 
conjunction with the largest countries of origin (Cuba and Venezuela), it becomes 
plausible that the regulations are mainly used in an instrumental way by those who 
have most to gain from the acquisition of another nationality, in particular for 
mobility purposes. Although it cannot be excluded that less tangible factors might 
also play a role in this regard, the Spanish regulations might not necessarily serve 
their initial purpose. In addition, a focus on Cuban-Spanish nationals revealed that 
Spanish nationality can also be utilized for purposes outside of the Spanish context 
(e.g. travel and emigration to third States). It is therefore important that States 
become aware that the granting of nationality can have consequences beyond their 
national scope. 
The Sri Lankan and Spanish case studies illustrate several findings of the global 
analysis presented in the second Chapter. Both Sri Lanka and Spain belong to 
a cluster of countries that has partially come to accept dual nationality. It was 
determined in the second Chapter that the selective nationality policies of these 
States can often be categorized as either ‘ethnic selectivity’ or ‘economic selectivity’. 
While Spain’s approach to dual nationality is seemingly an example of the former, 
Sri Lanka’s approach seems to be an example of the latter. However, the case 
studies also demonstrate that this division is less clear-cut in practice. Sri Lanka’s 
nationality policies turned out to be an intertwining of different conceptions of 
nationality, while Spain’s reconciliatory nationality policies seem to also have paved 
the way to instrumental utilizations.
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A nuanced analysis of nationality legislation revealed how States that have come to 
tolerate dual nationality have made use of the new-found flexibility that this toleration 
offers. The analysis shows acceptance of nationality for emigrant populations and 
that this acceptance is often partial and conditional. Such partial acceptance of 
dual nationality can potentially create ’hierarchies of nationals’ in which certain 
nationals are permitted to be dual nationals while others are not. Nationals by birth 
or descent are compared to nationals by naturalization, highly-skilled and wealthy 
emigrants are compared to low-skilled emigrants and incidentally, and distinctions 
are directly or indirectly made on the basis of origin or ethnicity. In this context, 
‘mononationality’ is seen as a right, while dual nationality can be considered as 
a privilege. As a result of the increasing tolerance of dual nationality and the 
corresponding flexibility of States in nationality matters, nationality is no longer the 
(all-encompassing) connection between national and State, but rather a connection 
between national and State. Nationality is not necessarily the manifestation of a 
‘genuine link’, but it can also be founded on different grounds. As mentioned above, 
it was concluded that cases of partial acceptance of dual nationality have given rise 
to two forms of selectivity, namely ‘ethnic selectivity’ and ‘economic selectivity’. 
While the former has been the subject of intense scholarly debate, the latter seems 
to be a more recent phenomenon and deserves more academic attention than it has 
received so far. 
This study has shown that dual nationality has become an undeniable reality. The 
political debate should no longer focus on how to restrict dual nationality, but 
instead it should focus on how to deal with dual nationality. The question that 
future policymakers as well as future scholars should focus on is therefore clear: 
How to share a citizen?
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The position of States on dual nationality has gradually developed from hostility to 
tolerance, and is now possibly moving towards an embrace when it comes to one 
particular group of nationals, namely emigrants. By permitting dual nationality for 
emigrants, the potential scope of a State’s citizenry is greatly enlarged. Permitting 
dual nationality can turn nationality from an all-encompassing link between a 
national and a State into a divisible, additional and external status. 
The main objective of this thesis is to describe how States use their nationality 
policies to remain connected to their diasporas. In order to do that, this thesis firstly 
conducts a global comparative legal analysis to map the relevant policies. In order 
to complement this broad analysis with a more in-depth analysis, also two in-depth 
country studies are conducted on Spain and Sri Lanka. 
This dissertation’s hypothesis is that the acceptance of dual nationality, as it 
increases a State’s leeway when it comes to determining who is a national and 
who is not national, reinforces a State’s flexibility regarding its nationality policies. 
Furthermore, we anticipate that this additional flexibility might give rise to novel 
utilizations of nationality, depending on how a State makes use of this leeway. 
The main research question of this thesis is: To what extent do States permit 
dual nationality for their emigrant population and their descendants and 
does this tolerance of dual nationality for emigrant populations lead to 
new utilizations of nationality? 
The four ensuing research questions are: 
1. To what extent do States allow their emigrant population and their 
descendants to retain their nationality of origin next to another 
nationality? 
2. Which patterns can be detected in emigrant nationality policies 
and can new utilizations of nationality be detected? 
3. What are the emigrant nationality policies of Sri Lanka and what 
is their historical, political and societal context? 
4. What are the emigrant nationality policies of Spain and what is 
their historical, political and societal context? 
To answer the first two research questions, a global analysis of provisions on 
310
SUMMARY & SAMENVATTING
emigrant nationality was conducted. This analysis aims to determine whether States 
allow (the descendants of) emigrants to obtain and retain their original nationality, 
even if they already possess another nationality. For this study, the starting point 
is a national of a State who takes up residence in another State and subsequently 
acquires the nationality of that State by means of ordinary naturalization. After 
naturalization, this person becomes the parent of a child and wishes to transfer 
both nationalities to the child. In total, four modes of loss of nationality (L05, L02 
and L06 in the GLOBALCIT typology) and one mode of acquisition of nationality 
(A01b in the GLOBALCIT typology) are included in this scenario. 
The analysis shows that 117 States out of 196 States do not have a provision in place 
for loss upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality, while the remaining 79 
States do. A large share of these 79 States (32) provide a major exception to their 
main rule of loss of nationality. This often entails that permission can be granted 
for retaining nationality upon naturalization in another State, that nationality is 
only lost upon the acquisition of the nationality of certain States, that exceptions 
are in place on the basis of bilateral treaties, or that loss of nationality is limited to 
certain categories of nationals.  
In 46 States, nationality can be lost if a national has resided abroad for a certain 
amount of time (usually a period of 5 to 10 years), while 150 States do not have 
such a provision. In all except one of these States, the effect of these provisions has 
been mitigated. In a majority of States, the provision is only applicable to nationals 
by naturalization and/or registration. 
The majority of States facilitate the acquisition of nationality by  a child born 
abroad, even if the child also acquires another nationality at birth. However, it is 
not uncommon that these provisions are more restrictive than provisions regarding 
children born in the country or that they impose additional (administrative) 
requirements. In 21 States out of 196 States, a person who has acquired another 
nationality at birth or during minority can lose his nationality if he does not 
renounce that other nationality before attaining a specified age, commonly the age 
of majority or fulfils other criteria (i.e. a period of residence within the State). In 8 
of these 21 States, there are exemptions to these ground of loss in place. 
It is also shown how nationality provisions in emigration States and immigration 
States can interact within a citizenship constellation. This entails that provisions 
resulting in loss of nationality upon the voluntary acquisition of another nationality 
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(mode of loss L05 in the GLOBALCIT methodology) in the 42 most predominant 
States of origin of persons who naturalized in an EU Member State in 2017 and 
provisions requiring the renunciation of the original nationality upon naturalization 
(mode of loss L06 and mode of acquisition A06 in the GLOBALCIT methodology) 
in 28 EU Member States are studied in cohesion. It turns out that dual nationality 
is permitted under all circumstances for 57,5 % of all constellations. According to 
Eurostat data, these constellations covered the acquisition of nationality of 593,500 
persons in 2017. It therefore turns out that 72,4% of all persons were covered by a 
permissive constellation. It should be noted this figure is a conservative estimate of 
all permissive constellations, as many significant exceptions grounds could not be 
included in this analysis.
The Sri Lankan case study demonstrates the challenges a State can face when it 
aims to reach out to its diaspora in a post-conflict context. The Sri Lankan diaspora 
is relatively large and consists of (temporary) labour migrants, but also of a large 
refugee population. The diaspora has therefore been affected by the decade-long 
Sri Lankan civil war, in which a share of the diaspora has played an active role. 
Against that background, the relationship between the Sri Lankan State and its 
diaspora is complex. In its nationality legislation, Sri Lanka has made a tentative 
and partial outreach to its diaspora through the discretionary grant of so-called 
‘dual citizenship certificates’. These certificates ‘block’ the loss provisions in the Sri 
Lankan citizenship act and enable persons to either retain or reacquire Sri Lankan 
nationality. The current guidelines for the grant of such certificates mainly impose 
economic criteria on the applicant, next to a hefty application fee. Although the 
restrictive approach is understandable if one takes the Sri Lankan context into 
account, the approach has severe disadvantages. The limited approach has in 
practice resulted in challenges regarding family remigration, the transparency of 
the procedure as well as the potential arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 
The Spanish case studies demonstrate how a State can remain connected to 
its diaspora over a very lengthy period of time. The case studies investigate the 
nationality provisions for (descendants of) Spanish emigrants included in the 
Law of Historical Memory as well as the special nationality provisions for those of 
Sephardic-Jewish descent. First of all, the case study shows that both of the laws are 
not novelties, but instead have a multitude of historical precedents in the Spanish 
context. Next to that, the case study shows that the laws are based on intermingling 
political motivations. The laws are primarily presented as a reconciliation effort, 
but they are equally grounded in a sense of inclusiveness for marginalized groups 
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as well as a nationalistic discourse about the presumed ‘Spanishness’ of the targeted 
groups. However, if the Spanish cases are studied in conjunction with the largest 
countries of origin (Cuba and Venezuela), it becomes plausible that the regulations 
are mainly used in an instrumental way by those who have most to gain with the 
acquisition of another nationality, in particular for mobility purposes. Although it 
cannot be excluded that less tangible factors might also play a role in this regard, 
it has become clear that the Spanish regulations might not primarily serve their 
initial purpose. 
A nuanced analysis of nationality legislation has revealed how States that have 
come to tolerate dual nationality have made use of the new-found flexibility that 
this toleration offers them. The analysis shows that acceptance of nationality for 
emigrant populations is widespread, but also that this acceptance is often partial 
and conditional. Such partial acceptance of dual nationality can potentially create 
’hierarchies of nationals’ in which certain nationals are permitted to be dual 
nationals while others are not. Nationals by birth or descent are distinguished from 
nationals by naturalization, highly-skilled and wealthy emigrants are distinguished 
from low-skilled emigrants and incidentally, distinctions are directly or indirectly 
made on the basis of ethnicity. In this context, a ‘mononationality’ is seen as a 
right, while dual nationality can be considered as a privilege. As a result of the 
increasing toleration of dual nationality and the corresponding flexibility of States 
in nationality matters, nationality is no longer the (all-encompassing) connection 
between national and State, but rather a connection between national and State. 
Nationality is not necessarily the manifestation of a ‘genuine link’, but can also be 
founded on different grounds. In this dissertation, it was concluded that cases of 
partial acceptance of dual nationality have given rise to two forms of selectivity, 
namely ‘ethnic selectivity’ and ‘economic selectivity’. While the former has been the 
subject of intense scholarly debate, the latter seems to be a more recent phenomenon 




De houding van Staten tegenover de dubbele nationaliteit heeft zich geleidelijk 
bewogen van vijandigheid naar acceptatie, en beweegt nu mogelijk naar een 
omarming als het gaat om een  bepaalde groep van staatsburgers, namelijk 
emigranten. Door de dubbele nationaliteit toe te staan voor emigranten wordt 
het potentiële bereik van de nationaliteit aanzienlijk vergroot. Het toestaan van de 
dubbele nationaliteit kan daarmee de nationaliteit veranderen van een exclusieve 
status in een deelbare, aanvullende en externe status.
Het hoofddoel van deze dissertatie is om te beschrijven hoe staten hun 
nationaliteitsbeleid gebruiken om verbonden te blijven met hun diaspora. De 
dissertatie presenteert daartoe een wereldwijde rechtsvergelijkende analyse en 
brengt het relevante beleid in kaart. Om deze brede analyse aan te vullen met een 
meer diepgaande analyse, zijn er ook twee landenstudies uitgevoerd naar Spanje 
en Sri Lanka.
De hypothese van deze dissertatie is dat de aanvaarding van dubbele nationaliteit 
de flexibiliteit van een staat ten aanzien van zijn nationaliteitsbeleid versterkt, 
aangezien het de beslissingsruimte van een staat vergroot als het gaat om het 
bepalen wie staatsburger is en wie niet. Bovendien kan worden verwacht dat deze 
flexibiliteit kan leiden tot nieuwe gebruiksvormen van de nationaliteit, afhankelijk 
van hoe een staat gebruik maakt van deze beslissingsruimte.
   
 
 
De vier daaruit volgende onderzoeksvragen zijn: 
1. In hoeverre staan Staten toe dat emigranten en hun afstammelingen 
hun oorspronkelijke nationaliteit kunnen behouden naast een 
andere nationaliteit?
2. Welke patronen bestaan er in het nationaliteitsbeleid ten opzichte 
van emigranten en kunnen nieuwe gebruiksvormen van de 
nationaliteit worden waargenomen? 
3. Wat is het nationaliteitsbeleid ten opzichte van emigranten van 
Sri Lanka en de historische, politieke en sociale context daarvan? 
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De hoofdonderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift is: In hoeverre staan Staten
de dubbele nationaliteit toe voor hun emigranten en hun
nakomelingen en leidt deze tolerantie van de dubbele nationaliteit voor
emigranten tot nieuwe gebruiksvormen van de nationaliteit?
4. Wat is het nationaliteitsbeleid ten opzichte van emigranten van 
Spanje en de historische, politieke en sociale context daarvan? 
Om de eerste twee onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden is een wereldwijde 
rechtsvergelijkende studie uitgevoerd om vast te stellen in hoeverre Staten toestaan 
dat (de afstammelingen van) emigranten hun oorspronkelijke nationaliteit mogen 
behouden of (her)verkrijgen, ook als zij al een andere nationaliteit bezitten. Het 
uitgangspunt voor deze studie is een staatsburger die in een andere vreemde Staat 
verblijft en vervolgens door middel van gewone naturalisatie de nationaliteit van die 
Staat verkrijgt. Na naturalisatie wordt deze persoon de ouder van een kind en wenst 
hij beide nationaliteiten over te dragen. In totaal zijn in dit scenario vier vormen 
van nationaliteitsverlies (L05, L02 en L06 in de GLOBALCIT-typologie) en een 
vorm van nationaliteitsverwerving (A01b in de GLOBALCIT-typologie) verwerkt.
Uit de studie blijkt dat in 117 van de 196 de vrijwillige verkrijging van een andere 
nationaliteit niet leidt tot verlies van de oorspronkelijke nationaliteit, terwijl dat in de 
overige 79 staten wel het geval is. In een groot deel van de 79 staten (32) zijn echter 
belangrijke uitzonderingen op deze hoofdregel van kracht. Dit houdt bijvoorbeeld 
in dat toestemming kan worden verleend voor het behoud van de nationaliteit 
bij naturalisatie, dat de nationaliteit alleen verloren gaat bij de verkrijging van de 
nationaliteit van bepaalde Staten, dat de verliesbepaling alleen van toepassing is op 
bepaalde categorieën staatsburgers of dat er uitzonderingen gelden op grond van 
bilaterale verdragen.
In 46 Staten kan de nationaliteit verloren gaan als een onderdaan een bepaalde 
periode in het buitenland heeft verbleven (doorgaans een periode van 5 tot 10 jaar), 
terwijl dat in 150 Staten niet het geval is. In slechts één Staat is het effect van deze 
verliesbepalingen niet gemitigeerd. In de 45 andere Staten is de verliesbepaling 
doorgaans alleen van toepassing op staatsburgers die de nationaliteit door middel 
van naturalisatie of registratie hebben verkregen. 
De meeste Staten faciliteren de verkrijging van de nationaliteit van een in het 
buitenland geboren kind, ook indien het kind bij de geboorte al een andere 
nationaliteit verkrijgt. Het is echter niet ongebruikelijk dat deze bepalingen 
restrictiever zijn dan bepalingen jegens in het land zelf geboren kinderen of dat er 
aanvullende (administratieve) eisen wordt gesteld. In 21 staten van de 196 staten 
kan een persoon die bij de geboorte of tijdens de minderjarigheid een andere 
nationaliteit heeft verkregen zijn nationaliteit verliezen als hij geen afstand doet van 
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die andere nationaliteit voordat hij een bepaalde leeftijd heeft bereikt. In acht van 
deze 21 staten zijn er belangrijke uitzonderingen op deze verliesgrond van kracht.
De studie toont ook aan hoe nationaliteitsbepalingen in emigratiestaten en 
immigratiestaten binnen een constellatie tot elkaar in verhouding staan. Dit houdt 
in dat de samenhang wordt bestudeerd tussen enerzijds verliesbepalingen bij de 
vrijwillige verkrijging van een andere nationaliteit (L05 in de GLOBALCIT-
methodologie) in de belangrijkste herkomststaten van personen die in 2017 
zijn genaturaliseerd in een EU-lidstaat en anderzijds afstandsverplichtingen bij 
naturalisatie (L06 en A06 in de GLOBALCIT-methodologie) in 28 EU-lidstaten. 
Hieruit blijkt dat de dubbele nationaliteit onder alle omstandigheden is toegestaan 
in 57,5% van alle constellaties. Volgens gegevens van Eurostat hadden deze 
constellaties betrekking op de verwerving van de nationaliteit van 593.500 personen 
in 2017. Het blijkt dat 72,4% van alle personen onder een tolerante constellatie viel. 
Het moet worden opgemerkt dat dit een conservatieve schatting betreft, omdat 
veel belangrijke uitzonderingsbepalingen niet konden worden meegenomen in deze 
analyse. 
De landenstudie naar Sri Lanka toont aan met welke uitdagingen een Staat 
kan worden geconfronteerd wanneer deze tracht om verbonden te blijven met 
zijn diaspora in een post conflict-context. De Sri Lankaanse diaspora is relatief 
omvangrijk en bestaat uit (tijdelijke) arbeidsmigranten, maar ook uit een groot 
aantal vluchtelingen. De diaspora is sterk beïnvloed door de tien jaar durende 
burgeroorlog in Sri Lanka, waarin een deel van de diaspora eveneens een actieve 
rol heeft gespeeld. Tegen die achtergrond bestaat er een complexe relatie tussen 
de Sri Lankaanse staat en zijn diaspora. In zijn nationaliteitswetgeving heeft Sri 
Lanka een gedeeltelijke handreiking naar zijn diaspora gemaakt door middel van de 
discretionaire toekenning van ‘dubbele nationaliteitscertificaten’. Deze certificaten 
blokkeren de verliesbepalingen in de Sri Lankaanse nationaliteitswet en stellen 
daarmee de houders in staat om de Sri Lankaanse nationaliteit te behouden of terug 
te krijgen naast een andere nationaliteit. De huidige richtlijn voor de verstrekking 
van dergelijke certificaten stelt voornamelijk economische eisen aan de aanvrager, 
naast de relatief forse leges. Hoewel deze restrictieve aanpak begrijpelijk is als men 
rekening houdt met de Sri Lankaanse context, heeft de aanpak belangrijke nadelen. 
De verstrekking van dubbele nationaliteitscertificaten heeft in de praktijk geleid tot 
problemen op het gebied van gezinsremigratie, een beperkte transparantie van de 
procedure en een mogelijkheid tot willekeurige ontneming van de nationaliteit.
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De Spaanse landenstudies tonen aan hoe een Staat na een zeer lange periode 
nog verbonden kan blijven met zijn diaspora. De landenstudies onderzoeken de 
nationaliteitsbepalingen voor (afstammelingen van) Spaanse emigranten die zijn 
opgenomen in de Wet van de Historische Herinnering en de nationaliteitsbepalingen 
voor personen van Sefardisch-joodse afkomst. Allereerst tonen de landenstudies 
aan dat beide wetten geen noviteiten zijn, maar in plaats daarvan een groot 
aantal historische precedenten hebben in de Spaanse context. Daarnaast laat de 
landenstudie zien dat er verschillende politieke motieven ten grondslag liggen aan de 
besproken bepalingen. De bepalingen werden in de eerste plaats gepresenteerd als 
een verzoeningspoging, maar zijn evenzeer gebaseerd op een notie van inclusiviteit 
alsmede op een nationalistisch discours over de veronderstelde ‘Spaansheid’ van de 
doelgroepen. Als de Spaanse regelingen worden bestudeerd in samenhang met de 
belangrijkste herkomstlanden (Cuba en Venezuela), wordt het aannemelijk dat de 
regelgeving voornamelijk op een instrumentele manier wordt gebruikt door degenen 
die het meest te winnen hebben bij het verwerven van een andere nationaliteit, 
met name voor mobiliteitsdoeleinden. Hoewel niet kan worden uitgesloten dat ook 
immateriële factoren hierbij een rol spelen, is duidelijk geworden dat de Spaanse 
regelingen niet in de eerste plaats hun oorspronkelijke doelstellingen dienen. 
Een genuanceerde analyse van de nationaliteitswetgeving heeft aangetoond hoe 
Staten die de dubbele nationaliteit zijn gaan tolereren gebruik hebben gemaakt 
van de flexibiliteit die dit hen biedt. Uit de analyse blijkt dat acceptatie van 
nationaliteit voor emigranten wijdverbreid is, maar ook dat deze acceptatie vaak 
slechts gedeeltelijk en voorwaardelijk is. Een dergelijke gedeeltelijke aanvaarding 
van de dubbele nationaliteit kan mogelijk ‘hiërarchieën van staatsburgers’ creëren 
waarin bepaalde staatsburgers een dubbele nationaliteit mogen bezitten en andere 
niet. Staatsburgers van geboorte of afkomst kunnen worden onderscheiden van 
genaturaliseerden, hoogopgeleide en welvarende emigranten kunnen worden 
onderscheiden van laagopgeleide emigranten en ook kan er direct of indirect 
onderscheid worden gemaakt op basis van etniciteit. In deze context wordt alleen 
een ‘mononationaliteit’ gezien als een recht, terwijl de dubbele nationaliteit als 
een voorrecht geldt. Als gevolg van de toenemende tolerantie van de dubbele 
nationaliteit en de bijbehorende flexibiliteit waarover Staten beschikken op het 
gebied van nationaliteit, is de nationaliteit niet langer de allesomvattende band 
tussen staatsburger en Staat, maar eerder een band tussen staatsburger en Staat. 
De nationaliteit is niet noodzakelijkerwijs een uiting van een ‘daadwerkelijke band’, 
maar kan juist op een verscheidenheid van gronden worden gebaseerd. In dit 
proefschrift werd geconcludeerd dat gevallen van gedeeltelijke aanvaarding van 
317
SUMMARY & SAMENVATTING
dubbele nationaliteit aanleiding hebben gegeven tot twee vormen van selectiviteit, 
namelijk ‘afkomstselectiviteit’ en ‘economische selectiviteit’. Terwijl de eerste het 
onderwerp is geweest van uitvoerig wetenschappelijk debat, lijkt de laatste een 
recenter fenomeen en verdient het meer academische aandacht dan tot nu toe het 









The societal relevance of the dissertation 
Although the discourse on dual nationality has developed significantly over the past 
decades, it has remained a contested topic. The societal and political debate on dual 
nationality could benefit from the analysis brought forward in this dissertation, 
as it elucidates how States have approached this matter. This entails that the 
dissertation provides an overview of the current state of affairs on a global level. 
The analysis demonstrates that dual nationality is nowadays accepted for first- 
and second generation emigrants in a majority of States, while numerous States 
with a seemingly restrictive stance turn out to have mitigated these provisions. The 
dissertation also goes beyond the traditional binary approach to dual nationality, in 
which dual nationality is either tolerated or not. Instead, the analysis shows that the 
answer is often a complicated one, entailing a myriad of exceptions, deviations and 
inconsistencies. The case studies provide an in-depth analysis of dual nationality 
policies in two States. They expound the actors that gave shape to these policies and 
evaluate the outcomes of these policies on a transnational level. Thereby, they help 
to create a better understanding of the considerations behind particular nationality 
policies as well as their effects in practice. 
The dissertation is of relevance regarding States that currently experience or 
have experienced a significant level of emigration. There is increasing awareness 
of the transnational nature of migration and the benefits that emigration can 
have through (non-monetary as well as monetary) remittances. For that reason, 
numerous emigration States have introduced diaspora policies, ranging from the 
extension of extraterritorial electoral rights and social support to the introduction 
of cultural programs. A country’s nationality law can also play an important role 
in this regard, as it determines whether and how States can remain related to their 
emigrant populations and their descendants. The topics of diaspora relations 
and emigrant nationality policies are of particular importance for post-conflict 
countries. They can play an important role in post-conflict (temporary) return 
migration and post-conflict restoration. In addition to that, nationality policies can 
also play a role in post-conflict reconciliation, even after a lengthy period of time. It 
should therefore be emphasized that both of the case studies (Sri Lanka and Spain) 





The concept of circular migration has become a topic of interest for academics
and policy makers in the field of migration.This is often presented as a ‘triple win’
for sending States, receiving States and migrants, although it remains uncertain 
whether and how the benefits of circular migration can manifest itself in practice in 
under the current regular framework. It is nevertheless clear that allowing nationals 
to hold more than one nationality can be beneficial for circular migrants, as it 
enables them to hold a secure, permanent status in more than one country. The 
reverse is also true: if dual nationality is not permitted by a country of origin, 
circular migration patterns might be inhibited. By mapping emigrant nationality 
policies around the globe, the dissertation provides an overview of States that either 

















The innovative character of the dissertation, concrete products, services, 
processes and activities into which the research results can be translated 
and the implementation of the research results
The dissertation is innovative in its approach to nationality law, as it studies the 
relevant legislative provisions in a comprehensive manner. First of all, the analysis 
combines several modes of acquisition and loss of nationality that are of relevance 
for first- and second generation emigrants and studies these provisions in cohesion. 
In addition to that, also provisions for the reacquisition of nationality or ancestry-
based acquisition of nationality are taken into account. Secondly, the dissertation 
applies the concept of ‘citizenship constellations’, which entails that the provisions 
of sending States and receiving States are studied in cohesion for all EU Member 
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Target groups for the research results
The dissertation can be of relevance for policymakers, government o cials,
practitioners and – most importantly – emigrant citizens. For policymakers, the
analysis shows how States have given shape to their emigrant nationality policies
and how they have reached out to their diasporas. These policy outcomes are
assessed on the basis of international legal standards as well as their e cacy
and can therefore be of value in the course of policy drafting. For government
o cials and practitioners, the dissertation can function as a resource on emigrant
nationality policies on a global level and can be particularly insightful regarding
those legislative provisions that have so far remained understudied. The dissertation
could also be of practical value for emigrant citizens due to its holistic approach
to dual nationality. Migrants are a⇥ected by a combination of legislative provisions
that are presented in the dissertation in cohesion. For the same reason, the use of
‘citizenship constellations’ in this dissertation can be particularly beneficial, as it























States and the main countries of origin of those who acquired EU citizenship. Great
progress has already been made over the past years regarding the accessibility of
nationality legislation, in particular through the Global Citizenship Observatory
(GLOBALCIT).The dissertation’s approach could be used to further ameliorate
the accessibility of nationality legislation within and beyond academia. A potential
application would be an online database or online tool that would provide
an overview of all nationality provisions in all States that are of relevance in a
particular situation. For example, this would allow a Tajik emigrant who wishes to
naturalize in Russia to ascertain that he would be able to do so without losing his
Tajik nationality (on the basis of a Russian-Tajik nationality treaty, in deviation
from Tajikistan’s generally restrictive attitude to dual nationality) and that he would
not risk losing his Tajik nationality due to residence abroad. This tool could then
simultaneously also point on the requirements for his naturalization in Russia.
Such a tool could facilitate the access to reliable information on nationality law
provisions that is adapted to a migrant’s circumstances, which would also help to
improve their agency. In addition to that, such a tool could also be beneficial for
governmental o cials, legal practitioners and policymakers.
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